Why no Tandushka's in Libya??

[Feanor]

In the case of PRC S-300's being able to be used offensively... The problem as usual is detection and track management. The missiles themselves have sufficient range (depending on type) to cover the ~140 km between the closest points between Pingtan Island and Formosa. However, without the use of AEW, the highest a radar could be mounted is only ~130 m, and that is assuming 76N6 radar on a 39 m mast could be positioned atop Sunlight Rock. What that in turn means is that the GBAD system is unable to even detect targets flying at under 500 m. That leaves the radar systems vulnerable to prosecution by a number of different strike packages. Take LACM like the AGM-109 Tomahawk. If they were used on a seaskimming flight profile, the S-300 radar could at best detect the LACM when they were/are about 4 minutes out. Now if a radar array could not be positioned atop Sunlight Rock but was instead positioned along the coast at sea level, at best there would be about 2.6 minutes between detection and arrival of a LACM strike package. These estimates are assuming that the radar system(s) work as advertised and that there was no opposing DEW. The detection range restrictions come about due to the limitations imposed by the radar horizon.

In that case, yes. But note that the S-300s are protected by Tor-M1 tac-SAMs at closer ranges. In the case of our hypothetical, we may add Tunguskas to the list. The outcome of said strike is by no means predetermined, especially of the S-300 is cold to begin with, and only activates its radar once the target is within the engagement envelope.

As this should demonstrate, GBAD systems can make make areas potentially dangerous for flight. They are still unable to attack aircraft before strike packages can be launched against them, short of receiving outside 'help'.

Provided the scenario you described, and knowledge of the systems location. I'm not talking about GBAD being used to control the airspace, I'm talking about a GBAD-centric IADS using mobility and ambush tactics to inflict inappropriately high costs on the attacker.

Note the bolded area. The primary limitation stems from a limited commitment amongst the principal actors, not the effectiveness of a GBAD system. The best Libya could have done in the time allowed, would have been to construct an IADS which could potentially have required more assets to 'deal with' that Western nations were willing to provide.

-Cheers

But of course. No third world nation can ever hope for more then that. In fact had the coalition attacked Gaddafi, and discovered that they were losing a few birds a day, with a high sortie rate, due to significant quantities of highly mobile tac-SAMs, they may have well backed off. This probably would have been perceived as a victory (rightly so) for Gaddafi. Naturally most conflicts are limited (as opposed to total) wars. Otherwise the US would not have withdrawn from Vietnam, and the USSR from Afghan.

 

[Humming Drone]

GBAD systems can help. However, compared with other solutions there are better options. Admittedly though, some of these solutions are dependent on who/what is being fought, and in what manner.

[...]

For peer-level IADS, combat aircraft, especially if supported with AEW, are far more effective than GBAD systems. While GBAD systems might have a lower per-unit cost, they also have significant limitations in terms of operational capability. In addition, to have a properly integrated IADS whether it is airborne, ground-based, or some for of hybrid, there are going to need to be C4ISR node, as well as the appropriate comms and infrastructure to support same. Such facilities are pricey, and especially for the GBAD nodes are 'known' quantities in that they are not exactly easy to hide except for in heavily developed and connected areas.

Low-cost GBAD systems like manpack SAM's are a good, low cost air defence solution vs. low-flying aircraft performing recon and/or CAS. If money is limited, then perhaps some SPAAG/SAM systems could be useful. Given a choice though between developing a comprehensive IADS with significant ground-based sensors and AA/SAMs or going with AEW and fighters, AEW and fighters are a more capable and flexible path.

-Cheers

You are absolutely right, air force (i.e. fighters, tankers, and AEW aircraft) centered air defense is much more flexible and does not leave the initiative to the potential adversary. Such aircraft combination allows the user to perform other types of missions and, overall, is a better value offer.

However, GBAD are cheaper and require less time to put in place (even only considering infrastructure build-up for air bases and training time to prepare the pilots, crews and support personnel). Relatively effective GBAD can be set up much faster (relatively). So, it all would depend on a particular threat matrix, time and money available (among all the other reasons). There are no easy or universal answers to the air defense problems...

 

[gf0012-aust]

Feanor i image that you don't need any explanation of the motivation for which any air campaign since first Gulf War -GWAPS is rich of detail on that- begin always , exactly in this way .....(massive cruise missile attack on the fixed high altitude SAM sites ).

not exactly correct and not exactly "in this way" at all

every major air campaign since 1999 has started with the delamination of the CSS elements prior to and then concurrent with decapitating ADS.

and the critical nodes for ADS were usually scoped by specforces to ensure and validate the targets. specific nodes were targeted by VLO rather than cruise missiles. although the cruise missiles did the bulk of the heavy lifting against systems that weren't colocated in built up areas