Why no Tandushka's in Libya??

[Rickredline]

Tandushka!!!!!
I would like to know if there is any reason why countries like Libya did not purchase the awesome 'Tandushka' system from the Russian's??
It would constitute a reasonable deterrent against casual invasions against sovereign countries. My impression is that the system would be effective against the full array of frontline weaponry ie choppers, jets....and tanks,.and maybe even drop some of the inbound Tomahawk/Cruise missiles. Its very mobile, small compliment, stand alone...etc,etc..I know its a bit pricey but a country like Libya for example certainly has the buck's.

 

[Haavarla]

As a stand alone assets for anti air, its not that great.. Could be in a pich if you manage to hide it and suddenly ambush some inbound shoppers..

But on the ground it would be a unit to fear.. imagine Gaddafi forces using it on civilians..

How many Tandushka does Russia have b.t.w?

 

[Rickredline]

Tandushka

I have seen this weapon in action and am inclined not to agree with your statement. Yes it needs to be in the hands of well trained personnel, but the missile is top a notch tank-killer with high % success at range. Helicopters and low flying aircraft are its primary foodstuff and its mobility prevents it from being targeted as a static installation. Used in irregular batteries I cannot but think this weapon is formidable enough to be a deterent , it has multi target acquisition tech and something like an A10 would be ill-advised to venture too close because its jamming would not disable the system. 4 auto 35mm radar guided canons with missile capability??? ..not good????...I still think if you have the money it represents a 'pause and consider' moment for the invader .....Iraq was another case in point. Its primary purpose is helicopter killing/tank wacking and Im not sure how many Russia has but I am very sure they would build a batch..........you are right, it would be very good at shopper wacking, or jogger harrassing too.In the hands of some enthusiastic 'self-taught' soldiers like in Somalia it would be a big problem because they understand guerilla tactics and dont 'stand and fight' and give the conflict to the techno soldiers that way.

 

[Feanor]

Just out of curiousity, what's a Tandushka? Or did you mean the 2S6 Tunguska?

 

[Rickredline]

One and the same,2S6M1,
also called 2k22 and Grison, in my native language its almost impossible to say the real name...its named after the terrible explosion that occurred when a meteorite hit the central Siberia area. Implying similair devastation capability....good name.The development of that weapon seems similair to the Pantsir S....both were designed to operate in conditions where A10 and Apache 'jam,hit,go'....30mm canons, I think I said 35 .......such is my enthusiasm.

 

[Feanor]

The Pantsyr is a replacement for the Tunguska. A major improvement in capability.

Libya did not get the system because only recently had their issue of Soviet-era debts been settled with the Russian government. Consequently they signed a large number of contracts, and were on the verge of signing more when this whole mess got started.

 

[Rickredline]

Tunguska

Aha, thanks for that....this may also be a reason why that nation is treated that way then.I remember reading somewhere that Syria was getting the Pantsyr system....which may be a sound reason then for the differance in approach to their problems....how do you rate the Tunguska and Pantsyr then in terms of being a deterrent or at least a serious stumbling block in the way that these guys (US/NATO) make war....rate the latest versions in an air attack scenario only??...there was a hush when Iran got the S 300 as it is deemed effective against all the modern aircraft....given that for outer defences and Tunguska/Pantsyr close in...in your opinion, effective against the type of attack Libya is under or no??..I think its absolutely ideal.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The 2S9 Tunguska would be just as useless as all those KPV machineguns and MANPADS in countering western air power over Libya. The Tunguska is designed to destroy missile armed attack helicopters and low level attack planes (A-10) and none of its weapons can reach higher than 10-12,000 feet (SA-19 GRISON). So the western strike fighter with an advanced targetting pod at 20,000 feet is untouchable but more than able to drop a smart bomb ontop of the Tunguska.

The Pantsir has a much better missile (SA-22 GREYHOUND) than can reach well above 20,000 feet. But Pantsir as a command guidance system has limitations that will likely see it easily defeated by SEAD/DEAD forces.

 

[Feanor]

Generally correct. Both systems have their place in a sophisticated IADS, but neither one would be much more then a footnote in this case. The S-300PMU2s would have mattered more, had that deal been completed before the invasion, but even that would make little difference. At the end of the day there isn't much a country like Libya can do to stop a joint European effort.

 

[Mindstorm]

The question of Rickredline is much more interesting than what someone could think at a first impression.

The presence of "Tunguska" (in particualr M/M1 version) among the air defence systems of Libya ,even accounting for a typical downgraded export model, would have represented a very,very big complicating factor for NATO plans ,and not because it would have respresented an immediate threat for fixed wing NATO aircraft -it is a short range, point defence AD system- ,but because it would have represented the first AD system ever confronted by Western Air Forces capable to engage cruise missiles and in a very efficient way ; under this point of view it would have represented a true "allowing " element for the other segments of the obsolescent Libyan air defence structure.

Anyone, in particular those with specific knowledges on this type of subjects, will have likely noted how this air campaign has begun in the same, identical way of any other in the last 20 years ago : employement of a barrage of cruise missiles against the sites hosting the fixed long range/high altitude air defence systems .

In this conflict this truly crucial first part of the operations is even more important, for the problem represented by Lybian SA-5 which, in spite to being surely a very outdated and scaled down export version , would have rendered a lot of missions ,among which SEAD stand-off jamming operations, OCA for intruding strike elements, first line CAP , AWACS missions etc....) incredibly hard and risky to conduct.

Returning at the actual scenario we have that in the first 29 hours of operations , the "Coalition of the Willing " has employed 124 Tomahawk against 22 Libyan long range fixed SAM sites , an average of 5,6 at site .
Six Tomahawk wouldn't have been simply an easy ,but even an offensively easy target for a battery of Tunguska (6 launcher ) placed at defence of similar targets ; a subsonic cruise missiles are ,in fact , pratically the easiest target to engage for a system like Tunguska -M/M1: slow ,clumsy ,re-engageable several times and totally uncapable to react ,in any way, to interception ; at the point that except in massive attacks (35-40 cruise missiles in transition in the defended area in a very small time window ) only the twinned 2A38M 30 mmm cannon are employed for theirs suppression .
This is a video on the system ; you can see interception of a cruise missile at 5:17 - 5:24.

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KUc8iJ0QvEs"]YouTube - Tunguska-M1[/nomedia]

Note that batteries not allocated at protection of specific targets (SA-5 sites, C3 stations , airfields etc..) would have represented true walking-mines when present in the most probable attack's pact of groups of long range PGMs .
Likely ,even excluding in-travel interception by part of detached batteries , the coalition would have been forced to employ the same costly and limited resource for engage only few SA-5 sites ,and the effect most probable would have been only the quick and momentary undeployement of the SAM site so massively attacked .
When you add to a side a new capability , almost always the effects on the entire branched chain of different element interactions is never linear but exponential.

 

[Feanor]

I suspect it would require large quantities, FOC, and proper integration they would not be able to do this effectively. In the best case scenario they'd be able to stop a large portion of cruise missile and PGM strikes, but would quickly lose most of the systems to a dedicated and thorough SEAD campaign. They would be able to pull off a number of successful ambushes against NATO planes, if they keep the systems cold right up until engagement. They would NOT be able to effectively contest the air.

 

[Mindstorm]

I suspect it would require large quantities, FOC, and proper integration they would not be able to do this effectively. In the best case scenario they'd be able to stop a large portion of cruise missile and PGM strikes, but would quickly lose most of the systems to a dedicated and thorough SEAD campaign. They would be able to pull off a number of successful ambushes against NATO planes, if they keep the systems cold right up until engagement. They would NOT be able to effectively contest the air.

Feanor i image that you don't need any explanation of the motivation for which any air campaign since first Gulf War -GWAPS is rich of detail on that- begin always , exactly in this way .....(massive cruise missile attack on the fixed high altitude SAM sites ).

If you postulate a dedicated SEAD mission (or for be most precise a much,much more difficult DEAD missions ,for what you have asserted ) attempting to capitalize the Tunguska-M momentarily comitted at neutralize the inbound cruise missile and ,therefore, less mobile and evasive , you generate a situation in which you would put your aircraft just in that condition so feared and always accurately attempted to avoid by part of NATO's military planners just through employement of barrages of cruise missile.

 

[Todjaeger]

The question of Rickredline is much more interesting than what someone could think at a first impression.

Not especially, no. What follows is essentially a hypothetical discussion on GBAD, IADS, SEAD/DEAD and IADS rollback. This has occurred a number of times on other threads here at DT. The difference in this case is that hypothetical IADS is located in Libya.

Anyone, in particular those with specific knowledges on this type of subjects, will have likely noted how this air campaign has begun in the same, identical way of any other in the last 20 years ago : employement of a barrage of cruise missiles against the sites hosting the fixed long range/high altitude air defence systems .

Now here is a question. Why have US/NATO air campaigns been fought in similar fashions for the last two decades? Apart from the fact that they work I mean.

The delamination and rollback of a hostile IADS is done in a fashion to render the opponent effectively 'blind' and 'dumb' by damaging or destroying radar installations, comm links and command/control centres. If Libya had sufficient quantites of short-ranged, low altitude SAM systems to create an IADS, the best that they could reasonably manage would be to cause US/European forces to expend more munitions to carry out the rollback. The system itself lacks the range and altitude to seriously threaten striking aircraft, it can only (potentially) be used to engage the actual inbound munitions. The inability to engage the strike aircraft means that strikes could continue until either the stockpile of SAM's is expended, the launch systems are damaged/.destroyed, or the assets the SAM's are to protect have been neutralized. In short, it might increase the cost and/or cause slight delays, it would not change the outcome.

-Cheers

 

[Feanor]

In short, it might increase the cost and/or cause slight delays, it would not change the outcome.

In other words with sufficient quantities of additional GBAD, the cost could be raised to an unacceptable (politically, or even militarily) level. So while the Tunguska itself (regardless of quantity) could not alter the outcome, sufficient purchases of modern SAM/AAA, with proper networking, integration, and hardening of C4I nodes (or keeping them mobile) could alter the outcome.

 

[Todjaeger]

In other words with sufficient quantities of additional GBAD, the cost could be raised to an unacceptable (politically, or even militarily) level. So while the Tunguska itself (regardless of quantity) could not alter the outcome, sufficient purchases of modern SAM/AAA, with proper networking, integration, and hardening of C4I nodes (or keeping them mobile) could alter the outcome.

True, but only a handful (or less) of countries have the potential combination of technology, defence in depth and C4ISR required to possibly enable GBAD to be that effective. And Libya is not anywhere close to being one of these countries.

Also this still does not get around the great limitation GBAD systems face. Namely the inability to be anything other than reactive to an opponent.

-Cheers

 

[Feanor]

True, but only a handful (or less) of countries have the potential combination of technology, defence in depth and C4ISR required to possibly enable GBAD to be that effective. And Libya is not anywhere close to being one of these countries.

Also this still does not get around the great limitation GBAD systems face. Namely the inability to be anything other than reactive to an opponent.

-Cheers

GBAD can be used offensively. Chinese S-300 systems engagement envelope reaching well into the straight, almost to the coast of Taiwan, is a good example. When you say only a handful of countries have the tech, and the physical assets you're spot on, but Libya very well could have had all the necessary equipment had they broken through on the debt issue with Russia in say 2002 instead of 2009. They had the oil and gas money, and could have built a formidable GBAD-centric IADS in the 8-9 years. The fact that they did not do so is not because it was impossible for them, but because the circumstances did not play out that way.

In other words the principal point has some validity. A loose coalition of 1st world military with limited commitment, can be effectively deterred or even halted by a powerful GBAD-centric third world IADS. It just happens to be a rather unlikely scenario.

 

[Todjaeger]

GBAD can be used offensively. Chinese S-300 systems engagement envelope reaching well into the straight, almost to the coast of Taiwan, is a good example. When you say only a handful of countries have the tech, and the physical assets you're spot on, but Libya very well could have had all the necessary equipment had they broken through on the debt issue with Russia in say 2002 instead of 2009. They had the oil and gas money, and could have built a formidable GBAD-centric IADS in the 8-9 years. The fact that they did not do so is not because it was impossible for them, but because the circumstances did not play out that way.

In the case of PRC S-300's being able to be used offensively... The problem as usual is detection and track management. The missiles themselves have sufficient range (depending on type) to cover the ~140 km between the closest points between Pingtan Island and Formosa. However, without the use of AEW, the highest a radar could be mounted is only ~130 m, and that is assuming 76N6 radar on a 39 m mast could be positioned atop Sunlight Rock. What that in turn means is that the GBAD system is unable to even detect targets flying at under 500 m. That leaves the radar systems vulnerable to prosecution by a number of different strike packages. Take LACM like the AGM-109 Tomahawk. If they were used on a seaskimming flight profile, the S-300 radar could at best detect the LACM when they were/are about 4 minutes out. Now if a radar array could not be positioned atop Sunlight Rock but was instead positioned along the coast at sea level, at best there would be about 2.6 minutes between detection and arrival of a LACM strike package. These estimates are assuming that the radar system(s) work as advertised and that there was no opposing DEW. The detection range restrictions come about due to the limitations imposed by the radar horizon.

As this should demonstrate, GBAD systems can make make areas potentially dangerous for flight. They are still unable to attack aircraft before strike packages can be launched against them, short of receiving outside 'help'.

In other words the principal point has some validity. A loose coalition of 1st world military with limited commitment, can be effectively deterred or even halted by a powerful GBAD-centric third world IADS. It just happens to be a rather unlikely scenario.

Note the bolded area. The primary limitation stems from a limited commitment amongst the principal actors, not the effectiveness of a GBAD system. The best Libya could have done in the time allowed, would have been to construct an IADS which could potentially have required more assets to 'deal with' that Western nations were willing to provide.

-Cheers

 

[Rickredline]

Tunguska/Pantsyr

I think 'Mindstorm' is thinking along the lines I am enquiring. The fun-est analogy is to stop the cork being removed from a bottle of champagne. Relatively easily accomplished.....but it also stops the drunken car crash, the wild fight over sexy Sue, the resultant pregnancy, the court case for damage to property, slander etc etc etc...
And yes I hear what everyone says, even the Greyhound missiles would'nt win it ....but if the cost to any attacker is higher than zero and not quite calculable so accurately, and you now have to explain to only 10 families why their boys arnt coming home, and the taxpayer has to fork out for 10 more Tornados...when the money is tight anyway...then the scenario is not as simple as we are making it. The coalition will not, considering they are not actually being attacked, press on regardless of cost. The way it is.....Generals work for politicians, and the cost is accounted for by the politician and his commitee. The value of having the Pantsyr / Tunguska on the ground in my opinion will influence events sufficiently to justifiy having it. More so the Pantsyr obviously. It doesnt need to win the war for them.....it needs only to load the bill for their effort in whatever way it can. A good example is NATO's problem with Turkey....this issue has nothing to do with hardware performance but may well influence the outcome. An operational GBAD system even smaller ones like Pantsyr have tremendous early impact potential on the manner in which war is conducted by NATO right now. Air superiority is everything. Realise that you may effect an invasion by tech means.....but the war aint over. My point in all of this is also that currently, spending money on good GBAD systems helps you in ways that really count.....more effectively probably than most other area's...????

 

[Rickredline]

Todjaeger sums it nicely in my opinion....the GBAD only needs to put them in a situation where they need to/ think they need to put in more than its worth. Thanks for the info guys, its been enlightening.

Cheers

 

[Todjaeger]

My point in all of this is also that currently, spending money on good GBAD systems helps you in ways that really count.....more effectively probably than most other area's...????

GBAD systems can help. However, compared with other solutions there are better options. Admittedly though, some of these solutions are dependent on who/what is being fought, and in what manner.

For all intents and purposes, a 3rd world GBAD-based IADS cannot withstand a 1st world air campaign. The best which might be accomplished is a 'chicken-bone' defence as I call them, where the 3rd world IADS could present more risk or realistically cost, than a not particularly commited 1st world air arm is willing to face or expend.

For peer-level IADS, combat aircraft, especially if supported with AEW, are far more effective than GBAD systems. While GBAD systems might have a lower per-unit cost, they also have significant limitations in terms of operational capability. In addition, to have a properly integrated IADS whether it is airborne, ground-based, or some for of hybrid, there are going to need to be C4ISR node, as well as the appropriate comms and infrastructure to support same. Such facilities are pricey, and especially for the GBAD nodes are 'known' quantities in that they are not exactly easy to hide except for in heavily developed and connected areas.

Low-cost GBAD systems like manpack SAM's are a good, low cost air defence solution vs. low-flying aircraft performing recon and/or CAS. If money is limited, then perhaps some SPAAG/SAM systems could be useful. Given a choice though between developing a comprehensive IADS with significant ground-based sensors and AA/SAMs or going with AEW and fighters, AEW and fighters are a more capable and flexible path.

-Cheers