Why ASEAN matters - in the era of great power competition

Ananda

The Bunker Group
dealing with a dictatorial regime than an institutional one.
Let me put it this way. Through out time Dictactorial regime mostly center to one person. Institutional regime (like Tatmadaw or CCP for that matter) is dealing with collective regime.

Indonesia never has Military Regime. Only Soekarno and Soeharto regime. Both fall when Soekarno and Soeharto decided to step down. Why you bring TNI? TNI never been a Military Junta. The moment Soeharto step down, their (TNI) leadership then make Political Compromise with civilian politicians.

Tatmadaw is in different situation altogether as the Military they also control the Political power. TNI never control Political Power. Soeharto control political power using TNI as his supporters. However the power never in TNI as institutions, but in Soeharto as person.

Just see what happen when a regime centering in person fall apart the moment that person losing power. Pulling down power from one person is relative easier then pulling down power from one institutions, let alone a solid insititutions.

That's the different betweem a regime control by an insitution then a regime control by one person. Dictactorial regime many of them centered in one person. There's no solidity left on his supporters the momen that person lossing control. They are relied on one persona image then common image. Insitutional regime especialy a solid one relied on Institutional common interest image, not personal ones.

You put Tito as example, is Yugoslavia still exist after Tito gone ? Bath different example as their power structure dismantle by US. However can the remnant of Bath can regain their power without Saddam ? No they can't. As everything center to one image.

However Cuban Communists can still hold after Castro gone. Shown regardless Castro center image, he manage left a solid institution behind. Soeharto party Golkar lose control the moment Soeharto step down, and throughout time until now only play as second or third political players, but never been a center one again. Shown their power and image only base to one person, and have difficulty to regain their solidity after that person losing it.

That's the different betwen power reside on Person image and power reside within Insitutional image. That's what Tatmadaw have so far, insitutional power and not personal power.
 
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STURM

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Why you bring TNI? TNI never been a Military
I merely asked a question - "
Not to get off topic but given the position it holds in society, the long historical connection and other factors, in your opinion can the TNI be called an institution
?

I didn't suggest the TNI was a military regime or that it was comparable to Myanmar's military government and this was clearly reflected in the question I asked and how I asked it ...

You put Tito as example, is Yugoslavia still exist after Tito gone ? Bath different example as their power structure dismantle by US
Both were centered on one domineering personality. In the case of Iraq, like in other Arab states including Syria and Libya, Saddam cultivated a cult image or petsonality.

However Cuban Communists can still hold after Castro gone. Shown regardless Castro center image, he manage left a solid institution behind. Soeharto party Golkar lose control
Yes but different circumstances and dynamics at play. In the case of Indonesia there was strong internal opposition, the TNI withdrew support, there was strong international pressure and Suharto's position became untenable. The situation in Cuba leading to Castro being replaced was different ...

The fact that Golkar fell and Cuba's communist government stayed on in power were due to different reasons ...
 
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OPSSG

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Hi guys,

1. Can I invite you to bring the discussion back to ASEAN, it’s geopolitical and military relevance to disputes in the South China Sea, the Natuna Sea and the trajectory of ADMM Plus?

2. ASEAN’s economic, cultural, political, and historical diversity means that these 10 countries do not share similar security perceptions and concerns.
(a) Singapore is attuned to the domestic sensitivities of its neighbors and can provide contextual intelligence or “an accurate assessment of the circumstances” to be a barometer for regional inclinations.​
(b) Partnership between the U.S. and Singapore in cybersecurity and digital connectivity is most substantially demonstrated through existing technical assistance programs — to that end, Singapore has established the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence.​
(c) 5 decades after diplomatic ties began, Singapore is America’s primary security partner in ASEAN. In the words of former INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Philip Davidson, ‘no other Southeast Asian country has done more to facilitate U.S. presence than our partners in Singapore.’ The U.S.–Singapore security relationship was founded on the cornerstone of maritime security cooperation.​

3. Support by Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia for an open and inclusive regional security order and institutional cooperation within ASEAN Plus groupings, like the East Asia Summit (a pan-Asian forum of 18 countries), the powerless 27 member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the useless ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus, will also be critical to give the appearance of action, when there is no real movement. These serve as multilateral talk-shop platforms to keep Team Biden engaged with ASEAN. Though I must say:
(i) with Cambodia as ASEAN Chairman from 28 Oct 2021, not much is expected in the way of progress in 2022;​
(ii) the bigger problem is the coup in Myanmar; and the loss of ASEAN centrality over time. In Oct 2021, the ASEAN summit opened without a representative from Myanmar following its top general's exclusion for ignoring peace proposals. Cambodia’s Hun Sen defended this step in surprisingly strong terms, saying, “ASEAN did not expel Myanmar from ASEAN’s framework. Myanmar abandoned its right... Now we are in the situation of ASEAN minus one. It is not because of ASEAN, but because of Myanmar”; and​
(iii) the minor irritation of 2022 Philippine elections, possibly affecting security in Sabah — that I hope will not materialise as explained by others in this thread.​

4. The post-World War II Cambodian government was first a French-centric colony, followed by a US-centric period, then a China-centric period, then a Vietnam-centric period, and now arguably is reverting back to a China-centric period. It is like a ping-pong ball.
(a) In 1992, the US ended an economic embargo of Cambodia and, in 1994, opened a diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh.​
(b) On 12 Nov 2021, Team Biden announced an illogical arms embargo against Cambodia because of allegations of growing Chinese military influence and Beijing’s “refurbishment” of the Ream Naval Base.​
(c) With new sanctions, America’s up-and-down relationship with Cambodia has taken another backward step. In 1970, the US supported the coup against Sihanouk, who fled to Beijing and later supported the Khmer Rouge, and the post-coup Khmer Republic under Lon Nol. The US made a loan of US$278 million to the Lon Nol government, an amount Washington is now claiming has doubled to US$500 million. Recently, the Biden administration demanded repayment of this loan.​

5. None of this ping-ponging of Cambodia was or is inevitable and reflects on the American misunderstanding of Cambodian politics.

6. Indonesia, and the rest of the ASEAN countries lack the military capability required to confront China much outside of their sovereign jurisdictions, and often even from within them.
(a) ASEAN countries, as a result, are neither suited nor inclined to participating in a classical concert of powers in the Indo-Pacific. However, their ability to navigate between the US and China by not choosing sides also faces growing challenges.​
(b) Power politics and internal weakness have steadily eroded the ability of ASEAN to uphold a degree of regional order capable of tying both superpowers to the region. This has contributed to a rise in ‘minilateral’ coalition building and the steady decline in the multilateral influence of ASEAN organised meetings like ARF and ADMM Plus or even the East Asia Summit.​

7. As usual, your discussion on Indonesia is very interesting but until the politically driven military procurement trajectory is fixed, the TNI is going to be too weak to make a difference in the 2021 to 2026 period — in the face of the Chinese challenge. Keeping in mind that TNI AL vessels are sinking on their own — for example, KRI Nanggala (Apr 2021), a TNI AL old refurbished submarine, and, KRI Teluk Jakarta, a Frosch I landing craft (July 2020) sank on their own. A new built KRI Rencongor caught fire (Sep 2018), for a total loss. As such, I am not very optimistic on the design or material condition of Indonesian naval vessels.

8. Fortunately, not all ASEAN members are not standing still. The SAF is effectively modernising with the introduction or operationalisation of F-35Bs, Type 218SGs, H225Ms and CH-47Fs by 2026. In counter-terrorism and special forces area:
(a) the Singapore Navy’s NDU Special Boat Group will raise, train and sustain all maritime specialised craft, including the Combatant Craft Large (CCL) and Combatant Craft Medium (CCM) which supports a common maritime situational awareness for the delivery of quick and effective responses during operations; and​
(b) the CCL is an effective NDU team extraction boat, from hostile beaches or river banks — enabling the navy to compete with the Singapore Army’s commando boat teams and their very slim vessels for some overlapping mission sets.​

S/NDESCRIPTIONPARAMETERS
1.Length26m
2.Breadth5m
3.SpeedIn excess of 35 knots
4.Range/EnduranceIn excess of 400nm
5.Complement4 Crew (Boat Commander, Coxswain, Navigator and Engineer)
6.Hull MaterialAluminium
7.Propulsion2 x MTU Engines
2 x Rolls Royce Kamewa Waterjets
8.Electro Optical (EO) System3rd Generation EO with Eye-safe laser
9.Navigation SystemsRadio Detection and Ranging (Radar), Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), Maritime Automatic Identification System (MAIS), Gyro Compass
10.Communication SuiteRadio Communications, C2 System
11.Weapon12.7mm OTO Melara Remote Weapon System
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
the case of Indonesia there was strong internal opposition, the TNI withdrew support, there was strong international pressure and Suharto's position became untenable
I merely point out that One Person Dictatorship regime will collapse as soon as the Dictator it self step down. It's different thing on Institution regime like Tatmadaw.

Can I invite you to bring the discussion back to ASEAN, it’s geopolitical and military relevance to disputes in the South China Sea, the Natuna Sea and the trajectory of ADMM Plus?
Certainly, after all this's the thread for.

the politically driven military procurement trajectory is fixed, the TNI is going to be too weak to make a difference in the 2021 to 2026 period — in the face of the Chinese challenge.
That's something that I'm still not see it will be fixed soon. The concept of Defense Investment still not clear on how it's really mean in implementation. Until they agree Politically on long term defense blue prints, anything can be change as soon as changes on Political interest.

The SAF is effectively modernising with the introduction or operationalisation of F-35Bs, Type 218SGs, H225Ms and CH-47Fs by 2026
Like I wrote on Pinoy thread, unfortunately so far in ASEAN only Singaporean Politicians that can agree on consistency defense route development.

The best hope for Indonesia bureaucracy (including in MinDef) to minimize Political Interest interference, I'm afraid will still take step by step transformation.
 
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STURM

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The U.S. Secretary of State has arrived in Malaysia after visiting Indonesia. No doubt, issues of common interests/concerns which will be discussed will be the South China Sea and Myanmar. After Malaysia he will be in Thailand,

Unlike other countries in the region Malaysia [in line with its foreign policy of being non aligned] has long downlayed its defence relationship with the U.S. and has avoided being seen as too close but the longstanding defence relationship in the form of bilateral exercises, Malaysian participation in U.S. hosted multilateral exercises,dialogues/exchanges, U.S. training grants and transfers/funding of gear is evident.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group

I'm thinkin before put this on one of Indonesian threads. However further assesment on this article from Indonesian MinDef site, also in my opinion more appropriate toward this thread. This move by Indonesian Present MinDef can be considered changes on strategic thinking, thus defense Investment in near and medium future term in Indonesia.

Prabowo aim this revised strategic documents being used as based for near and mid term projection as guide lines for Indonesia defense Investment and postures. One thing he put: "People can be change, but this projection should be used as based. We have to get out on old thinking that Indonesia will not face war 3 to 4 decades from now".

In context he wants the defense postures thar more ready on changing geopolitical environment. Why this is matter for ASEAN, it can shown that ASEAN members one by one being drawn for more active preparations on Geopolitical changing wheather. The realisation that diplomatics and economic growth must be actively accompanied with more robust defense postures.

If Indonesia that for some time stay on more docile moderates defense postures, changes on this can also awaken other members on similar path.
 

OPSSG

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Post 1 of 4: The Year of Cambodia as ASEAN Chairman

1. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s meeting with Burmese junta leader and their joint statement released afterwards caused friction within ASEAN. General Min Aung Hlaing said he had extended a ceasefire with all Myanmar armed minority ethnic groups until at the end of 2022. The ceasefire was originally scheduled to expire at the end of Feb 2022. The junta leader also said he would assure an ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar that he will be able to meet with all parties involved in the country’s political unrest, including armed minority ethnic groups.

(a) “The statement they issued is full of words but nothing substantial to resolve the current political crisis involving Myanmar,” said Ong Keng Yong, a veteran Singaporean diplomat who was a former secretary general of ASEAN.​
(b) There are concerns that the Cambodians are deliberately dragging ASEAN away from its moral high ground — a position established when Brunei was ASEAN Chairman. More importantly, the framing is NOT in line with the 5 point consensus (5PC), but it’s what you get when there’s no consensus within ASEAN on how to fully implement the 5PC. PM Hun Sen can call the visit a success. Worse still, allow Min Aung Hlaing to attach his roadmap to the 5PC. Given the above, some foreign ministers are refusing to attend a meeting in Siem Reap.​
(c) The opposition National Unity Government (NUG) has sought to rally non-state forces – both old and new – to its side in order to topple the junta, with mixed results. Most ethnic armed groups are hostile to the military regime, but they also see little prospect of it collapsing and until now have been reluctant to cement alliances with the opposition.​
2. Cambodia's insistence on including a representative of the Myanmar junta, when it shows no sign of reconciliation with the NUG, Aung San Suu Kyi and other elected officials that have been jailed, will make it harder for the United States or Europe to engage with ASEAN, and therefore harder for ASEAN to maintain the strategic equilibrium that it seeks. It is not a surprise that Cambodia said it had postponed the ASEAN Foreign Ministers retreat scheduled for 18 to 19 Jan 2022, because some ministers had expressed "difficulties" in attending. For context, let me share some details of ASEAN’s internal rift:
(a) Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah said PM Hun Sen should have consulted other ASEAN leaders before visiting Myanmar. Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, said he would skip the meeting because he had to attend a session of parliament the next day.​
(b) The Foreign Ministry’s director general for Asian, Pacific and African affairs, Abdul Kadir Jailani, said Indonesia could understand the postponement, considering the rising number of COVID-19 cases in the region amid the spread of the Omicron variant. Jokowi said earlier that 5 Point Consensus (5PC) need to guide.​

3. Given the tangles with Cambodians previously, over 'cutting loose' Laos and Cambodia from ASEAN by a former retired Singaporean diplomat, I would not be surprised if Singapore’s and Malaysia’s Foreign Ministers are leading the boycott of Cambodia’s attempt to host the foreign minister’s meeting, with Brunei, the Philippines and Indonesia trying to bridge the difference; with Thailand and Vietnam sitting on the fence between the groups.

(a) A group claiming to be made up of retired and active Cambodian diplomats hit back at Bilahari Kausikan over remarks he made at a webinar on 23,Oct 2020, in which he observed that Cambodia and Laos are "teetering precariously on the edge" of entrusting their agency to an external power [aka China] or trying to be passively neutral.​
(b) Former top Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan dismissed claims by a group of Cambodian diplomats that he is acting as an "agent" for a foreign power [aka US].​

4. In relation to Myanmar, Cambodian foreign ministry said: “If they build a thick wall and we use our head to hit it, it is useless. Cambodia uses different approaches to achieve the [ASEAN] five-point consensus." According the Cambodian point of view the latest attack was reported by Kyodo News. This is ridiculous, insane and an injustice that Cambodia is accountable for ASEAN’s split. What the Singaporean former diplomats want — the fait-accompli of ASEAN-9 (for the upcoming US-ASEAN meeting) and then they legitimise their decision to expel Myanmar and later on Cambodia and Laos will be their prime targets.
 
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ngatimozart

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2. Cambodia's insistence on including a representative of the Myanmar junta, when it shows no sign of reconciliation with the NUG, Aung San Suu Kyi and other elected officials that have been jailed, will make it harder for the United States or Europe to engage with ASEAN, and therefore harder for ASEAN to maintain the strategic equilibrium that it seeks. Therefore, it is not a surprise that Cambodia said it had postponed the ASEAN Foreign Ministers retreat scheduled for 18 to 19 Jan 2022, because some ministers had expressed "difficulties" in attending. For context, let me share some details of ASEAN’s internal rift:

(a) Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah said PM Hun Sen should have consulted other ASEAN leaders before visiting Myanmar. Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, said he would skip the meeting because he had to attend a session of parliament the next day.​
(b) The Foreign Ministry’s director general for Asian, Pacific and African affairs, Abdul Kadir Jailani, said Indonesia could understand the postponement, considering the rising number of COVID-19 cases in the region amid the spread of the Omicron variant. Jokowi said earlier that 5 Point Consensus (5PC) need to guide.​

3. Given the tangles with Cambodians previously, over 'cutting loose' Laos and Cambodia from ASEAN by a former retired Singaporean diplomat, I would not be surprised if Singapore’s and Malaysia’s Foreign Ministers are leading the boycott of Cambodia’s attempt to host the foreign minister’s meeting, with Brunei, the Philippines and Indonesia trying to bridge the difference; with Thailand and Vietnam sitting on the fence between the groups.

(a) A group claiming to be made up of retired and active Cambodian diplomats hit back at Bilahari Kausikan over remarks he made at a webinar on 23,Oct 2020, in which he observed that Cambodia and Laos are "teetering precariously on the edge" of entrusting their agency to an external power [aka China] or trying to be passively neutral.​
(b) Former top Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan dismissed claims by a group of Cambodian diplomats that he is acting as an "agent" for a foreign power [aka US].​
Maybe it is time to cut Cambodia and Laos loose. A harsh call, but if they are driving a wedge into the ASEAN consensus then that is not a good thing. It maybe also time for ASEAN to re-evaluate the role of the PRC as a participant within the organisation. It is clear that whilst it is only an observer, it is clearly acting against the interests of ASEAN as a whole. I think that the time is nearing where a choice has to be made and one that has to be in the best interests of the member nations of ASEAN, excluding Cambodia and Laos who are no more than puppet states of the PRC.
 
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OPSSG

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Post 2 of 4: The Year of Cambodia as ASEAN Chairman

5. The United States and China, are competing to shape ASEAN’s security architecture, as well as norms that include trade and the regulation of new technological infrastructures. As the result of China's rise (and consequent US relative decline), the ability of American power to unilaterally shape outcomes in the Indo-Pacific has declined. But the United States worsened this drift back toward bipolarity by repeated errors like Iraq, and by electing Trump (who discarded the TPP). These frictions will play out over decades, not only in Beijing, Washington, but also in the 10 ASEAN capitals. For geo-political context on ASEAN developments, I note the following:

(a) In Oct 2021, President Biden announced US$102 million in new initiatives to expand the U.S.-ASEAN Strategic Partnership during the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, reflecting the Biden-Harris Administration’s deep commitment to ASEAN. But these sums allocated are unlikely to benefit Cambodia and Laos, which external observers have likened to vassals, satellite states.​

(b) Hun Sen at first said Myanmar had itself to blame for being excluded from the ASEAN summit. But he changed his rhetoric soon after receiving the ceremonial gavel for the revolving chairmanship of ASEAN. “It is not up to ASEAN to resolve this issue. ASEAN is here to help, but Myanmar needs to solve its own problems by itself,” Hun Sen said.​

6. PM Hun Sen asks Japanese envoy and philanthropic Nippon Foundation Chairman Yohei Sasakawa to be an advisor to the ASEAN chair to help him to resolve the Myanmar coup because Yohei Sasakawa has visited Myanmar more than 100 times and knows many of the disputing parties in Myanmar. Meanwhile:

(a) "International actors should avoid pressuring ethnic armed groups into new ceasefires, engage with the parallel government and other opposition representatives, and work with local civil society organisations to address humanitarian needs" say Crisis Group. Correctly assessed the peace process is "moribund", so is the ceasefire process the ASEAN Chairman and the junta were extolling.​
(b) Myanmar’s military is for the first time requiring the wives of its mid-ranking officers to undergo two weeks of military training. The training for the spouses of captains and majors was launched at battalions in Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region as well as in Taunggyi and Aungban in Shan State. The junta has also mobilized paramilitary groups known as “Pyusawhtee,” which comprise pro-military people, some members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, and ex-soldiers.​
It maybe also time for ASEAN to re-evaluate the role of the PRC as a participant within the organisation. It is clear that whilst it is only an observer, it is clearly acting against the interests of ASEAN as a whole.
7. Given that China’s view of itself as a big country, it’s recent behaviour towards each ASEAN member state is not unexpected — having said that China and Japan are important engines of economic growth by virtue of their participation in Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) — which means excluding China, from economic meetings or the regional security architecture, due to undue Chinese influence (in Cambodia and in Laos), is not realistic for ASEAN.
(a) As of June 2021, mutual investment between China and ASEAN exceeded 310 billion U.S. dollars, while the business revenue of Chinese enterprises from project contracts in ASEAN countries approached 350 billion U.S. dollars.​
(b) China has remained ASEAN's largest trading partner for 12 consecutive years, while ASEAN became China's largest trading partner. Trade between China and ASEAN has skyrocketed by 85 times since the two sides established their dialogue relations in 1991.​

(c) In contrast to the American rejection of the TTP under Trump, thanks to Xi, RCEP officially comes into force in Jan 2022. Six ASEAN members of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and four non-ASEAN members of China, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, officially began to implement RCEP.​
(d) As much as China’s actions in the disputed waters of South China Sea cause concern, for the sake of uninterrupted economic growth, ASEAN members have to tolerate these actions, while engaging in some push back. Back in 2020, Vietnam was forced to pay around US$1 billion to international energy firms after cancelling offshore energy contracts following Chinese pressure. In 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte told journalists President Xi Jinping had warned him there would be ‘war’ if the Philippines attempted to develop a gas field off its own coast. And Malaysia and Brunei have also come under similar pressure not to develop energy resources.​
 
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OPSSG

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Post 3 of 4: The Year of Cambodia as ASEAN Chairman

8. With 181,400 people internally displaced, there are indications that the fighting is no longer sporadic; but given the lack of unity in the rebel groups, they cannot displace the junta by force.
  • A united front comprising all of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups joining the NUG in taking the fight to the military regime is not a realistic prospect, given their diversity and the historical rivalries among them.
  • At least four groups have emerged as important partners of the parallel government, and another half-dozen or so have engaged with the NUG to some degree. In doing so, they have taken a significant risk, motivated largely by the need to respond to public sentiment but also to some degree by the opportunity to establish a genuinely federal state.
9. The Philippines will work with Norway, as President of the Security Council, in finding ways to end the killings in Myanmar that have dragged on for a year, far too long for that country’s suffering people. The Philippines offers the most explicit position of the original ASEAN-5, thus far, despite Cambodia’s efforts to tilt the process in favour of the junta. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore are against legitimizing junta. But Cambodia along with Laos, and Vietnam, think there's no other option.
(a) “I will work with ASEAN colleagues in the next few weeks to find measures to ease the suffering of the people of Myanmar, and push for dialogue among all stakeholders, most especially Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and substantial progress in the Five-Point Consensus of ASEAN,” Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. said in a statement. Locsin also condemns sentencing Aung San Suu Kyi and insists that ASEAN Special Envoy "talks must include all, not just a select few…”​
(b) With Cambodia chairing ASEAN, China's leadership senses an opportunity as, during Cambodia’s previous chairing, it was particularly friendly towards Beijing's interests. Keeping in mind that Hun Sen has been Cambodian PM since 30 Nov 1998. His tenure of more than 23 years (even longer than Putin), with no intention of stepping down, means ASEAN as on organisation cannot work without undue Chinese influence.​
10. Singapore's full statement completely contradicts Phnom Penh's version of the video conference — as a dictator steeped in decades of violence against internal opposition in Cambodia, Hun Sen has no concept of international collective decision making by ASEAN. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, as an international leader of repute within ASEAN, is stepping-in to manage any unilateral attempt to ‘white-wash’ the illegal actions and the killings in Myanmar. This will also prevent Phnom Penh from allowing the military in Myanmar to move beyond ASEAN’s 5PC, without substantive concessions from the party at fault.
(a) Singapore's prime minister says that ASEAN "should continue excluding Myanmar's junta from its meeting until it cooperates on an agreed peace plans," meaning ending the violence and releasing political prisoners. By this act, PM Lee has allowed the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to meet at a future date while noting the lack of progress made by Myanmar’s junta. ASEAN will no longer allow Phnom Penh, as Chairman, to hijack the agenda or act against the collective interests of the organisation (by behaving as China’s agent) —like what they did in 2012.​
(b) As part of the tag-team efforts of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, Lim Jock Hoi (of Brunei and as Secretary-General of ASEAN), will pay an official visit to Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia from 15 to 19 Jan 2022. This will help Phnom Penh focus on what it needs to do, if it’s Chairmanship is to be a success.​
(c) The UN Special Envoy, Ms. Noeleen Heyzer, underlined her readiness to help strengthen regional efforts towards effective urgent implementation of the “Five-Point Consensus,” aligned with the will of the people of Myanmar. The UN Special Envoy stressed that a Myanmar-led process, that is guided by the will of the people, towards a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future needed to be supported by a coherent international approach grounded on regional unity. She highlighted an UN-ASEAN “humanitarian plus” umbrella could coordinate and deliver assistance to affected communities through all existing channels, and address the multiple priority needs of the people across the country. This would include civilian protection as well as food security, socio-economic resilience, humanitarian and COVID assistance. The UN Special Envoy also welcomed the Prime Minister Hun Sen’s invitation to co-facilitate such efforts.​
 
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STURM

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Since the coup and before that over the Rohingya issue; Myanmar has been annoyed [to put it mildly] with Malaysia; now it seems Cambodia is too.


''Malaysia will not support any attempts to invite political representatives from Myanmar to meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob told his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen on Tuesday.''

''Saifuddin said the trip -- hailed as historic and successful in the Cambodian media -- did no good. At a dinner with reporters, he said the visit risked giving the impression that ASEAN recognized the military government, and suggested that Malaysia was wary of Cambodia using its position as ASEAN chair to invite Myanmar's regime back into the fold. Hun Sen responded by calling Saifuddin "arrogant" and disrespectful of the role of ASEAN chair''.
 

Sandhi Yudha

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Since the coup and before that over the Rohingya issue; Myanmar has been annoyed [to put it mildly] with Malaysia; now it seems Cambodia is too.


''Malaysia will not support any attempts to invite political representatives from Myanmar to meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob told his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen on Tuesday.''

''Saifuddin said the trip -- hailed as historic and successful in the Cambodian media -- did no good. At a dinner with reporters, he said the visit risked giving the impression that ASEAN recognized the military government, and suggested that Malaysia was wary of Cambodia using its position as ASEAN chair to invite Myanmar's regime back into the fold. Hun Sen responded by calling Saifuddin "arrogant" and disrespectful of the role of ASEAN chair''.
The communist chinese government supports the military junta of Myanmar, so the Cambodian also has to do that. After all the Cambodian government has to follow up the instructions/orders from their masters.
 
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