What strategy can we use to win in Afganistan?

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WarGod

New Member
Now that we are builiding up troops in Afganistan the war is going to turn bloody this spring and summer. It looks like we are repeating the same mistakes we made in Vietnam. What strategy can we use to defeat the taliban and al qaida? Also how many troops do you guys think we will have in Afganistan in two to three years? Do you guys also think if thing turn bad in Pakistan we would have to send troops in there? Pakistan has a strong military but they are unwilling to fight the taliban, so how can we win this war? Is Afganistan Vietnam and Pakistan is cambodia with nukes?
 

wtsimpson7

New Member
What I believe we need to do is 3 important things. 1st, we need to do counterinsurgency right. Clear insurgents out, keep that area protected, and build the infrastructure/local relations. Next, we might need to talk to the Taliban. It doesn't hurt to have communication with the enemy. Finally; pressure Pakistan. They will be a huge advantage once we truly win them over. If we can do this, we might be able to win!!! (about how many troops we need, that might depend on Iraq's needs, etc. Since I.D.K 'bout that, I would leave that up to you guys.)
 

PatriotTurk

New Member
It's impossible to win Guerilla troops with standard army. We have too much skill about that in our warfare in Southeastern Anatolia.

1. You should create militia troops with high training. (Like commado etc.)

2. You must reduce your troops in Afghanistan.

3. And you must establish high relationship with local people, not Taliban. (Respect their culture etc.)

If you do these factours. You'll win.
 

MrQuintus

New Member
1: Put FOBs every 4km along the entire Afghan border, starting with the Afghan pakistan border, about 1000 in all.

2. destroy every opium field

that would make a nice start
 

Marc 1

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
1: Put FOBs every 4km along the entire Afghan border, starting with the Afghan pakistan border, about 1000 in all.

2. destroy every opium field

that would make a nice start
Destroy the opium fields and yes the talibs have lost their source of revenue, but so have the local farmers. All the local farmers see is a coalition soldier destroying his business in a place that does not have any form of social security (i.e. a deth sentence for his family). Do you think that will help?

If you intend doing that you need to make it worthwhile to grow another crop, that the talibs won't be able to sell at a profit. eg wheat that the coalition offers $1000 a tonne for. Totally unrealistic in market terms, but if that's what you need to do to keep the population happy and starve the talibs of funding...
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Amidst all the talk of a new strategy, sanctuaries in Pakistan and extra troops for Afghanistan, an important point to consider is that a large number of the Pashtun population [not all of whom share the same religous views of the Taliban or have ties with Al Qaida] see the Taliban as a legitimate ressistance movement against a foreign occupation. At the moment the Talibs dominate large areas of the countryside and retain the support of a large part of the population, irrespective of how many are killed by coalition troops.

MrQuintus..., even assuming enough troops could be found to man the 1000 FOBs you mentioned, what effect would it have on on winning hearts and minds or the insurgency campaign against the Talibs. Instead of being seen, mixing with the population and dominating the countryside, troops would be confined to these FOBs and would serve no useful purpose.

For those interested in Afghanistan, I strongly recommend Ahmad Rashid's '' Descent Into Chaos'' and ''Taliban''.
 
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Kilo 2-3

New Member
1. Continue the drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Decpatiation strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda destabilizes their ability to act cohesively in the region. This gives coalition troops the chance to take more effective action against insurgents in the area.

2. Get the Department of Agriculture busy. Find some kind of cash crop which will grow well in Afghanistan, but without the social problems drugs like opium create.

Some have proposed soybeans as a possible solution. They have less dollar value than poppies, but they do provide protein and they are a step in the right direction
For Afghans, a soy solution takes root - Los Angeles Times

3. Partner with Pakistan. They don't want the Taliban any more than we do, and driving them out of or hampering their presence in Pakistan will deprive them of a key base of operations

4. Build schools. People like Greg Mortensen have enjoyed success in this area, and it's greatly reduced the Taliban's sympathetic base in the population. having an educated population is going to be key if Afghanistan wants to grow economically and politically in the future.

5. Win over the people. Guys in full battle rattle aren't going to do this, it's going to take vets, agricultural specialists, and medics to help the people and gain their trust.

This is also going to require the coalition military to step up their efforts to protect the people. That means following the current ROEs, as restrictive as they are, to avoid civilian casualties, and to make an effective effort to protect the people.

6. Reduce troop footprint. Rumbling around in tanks lets you control the roads, but not the whole country. Ultra-mobile, unconventional or QRF forces need to be deployed to take the country and fight the Taliban in their own backyard.

It's what SOG did in 'Nam and Laos and it worked to a degree...now all we need are some Montagnards.

7. Get the Afghans up to speed. Tribal differences make things hard. Afghan isn't one homogenized group, it's a bunch of Pashtun tribal units and they are rivals. This hampers the efforts of the local Army and the ANP, and only in the Commando units have the tribal barriers been fully addressed and solved.

The average ANP soldier isn't ready to replace the average US Army soldier, they need intensive training, and they need something to be proud of.

It will be difficult, but it's what has to be done.
 

chris

New Member
Win in Afganistan? As in installing a stable and democratic government and leave that place?

My best guess is that you need the same steps you will need to take, to enforce and maintain a complete weapon's ban to the population of Texas.

Disclaimer. This is not about a pro gun or not discussion . I sincerely think that victory in Afghanistan is like asking Texans to live under a weapons ban. You will need to take the same approach.

So, I'm asking you. What strategy can we use to enforce a weapon's ban in Texas?

PS. Again, I'm not saying that we should enforce a weapon's ban in Texas. If we had too, how would we do it?
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
1. Continue the drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. .
One of the problems with the drone attacks in Pakistan is that is has led to some degree of resentment by Pakistanis who feel that it infringes on Pakistani sovereignty. Another problem is though Pakistani cooperation is crucial to success in Afghanistan, the current government is deeply unpopular amongst many Pakistanis who view their government as having as sold itself off to the U.S.

They don't want the Taliban any more than we do, and driving them out of or hampering their presence in Pakistan will deprive them of a key base of operations
On the contrary, there are many 'jihadist' elements in the Pakistan military and public who are pro Taliban. That ones of the reasons the U'S. is so worried about the Pakistani nukes in event of Pakistan falling totally into the hands of the jihadists.

Tribal differences make things hard. Afghan isn't one homogenized group, it's a bunch of Pashtun tribal units and they are rivals.
What about the Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkmens? Despite reduced Northern participation in the Kazai government, many Pashtuns still see Kazai's government as one that is dominated by non-Pashtuns and one that is nothing but a puppet pulled by U.S. strings.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Well when the Pashtuns form the basis of the resistance, it's hard to position the current government otherwise. NATO did cooperate with the Norther Alliance in it's time, and the Northern alliance consisted of *drumroll* non-Pashtuns. ;)
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Does anyone know what the ethnic composition of the ANA is? Has the Kazai government managed to attract non- Pashtun volunteers?
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Guys, I would like to recommend that you read what four articles on two areas, the ANA and the ANP, which set the background for Stratfor's 'The Meaning of Marjah'. The Stratfor article is written by Kamran Bokhari, Peter Zeihan and Nathan Hughes and a portion of it is quoted below. I have put in bold and in blue some text for emphasis:

Stratfor said:
...As the Obama administration’s strategy has begun to take shape, it has started thinking about endgames. A decades-long occupation and pacification of Afghanistan is simply not in the cards. A withdrawal is, but only a withdrawal where the security free-for-all that allowed al Qaeda to thrive will not return. And this is where Marjah comes in.

Denying the Taliban control of poppy farming communities like Marjah and the key population centers along the Helmand River Valley — and areas like them around the country — is the first goal of the American strategy. The fewer key population centers the Taliban can count on, the more dispersed — and militarily inefficient — their forces will be. This will hardly destroy the Taliban, but destruction isn’t the goal. The Taliban are not simply a militant Islamist force. At times they are a flag of convenience for businessmen or thugs; they can even be, simply, the least-bad alternative for villagers desperate for basic security and civil services. In many parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban are not only pervasive but also the sole option for governance and civil authority.

So destruction of what is in essence part of the local cultural and political fabric is not an American goal. Instead, the goal is to prevent the Taliban from mounting large-scale operations that could overwhelm any particular location. Remember, the Americans do not wish to pacify Afghanistan; the Americans wish to leave Afghanistan in a form that will not cause the United States severe problems down the road. In effect, achieving the first goal simply aims to shape the ground for a shot at achieving the second.

That second goal is to establish a domestic authority that can stand up to the Taliban in the long run. Most of the surge of forces into Afghanistan is not designed to battle the Taliban now but to secure the population and train the Afghan security forces to battle the Taliban later. To do this, the Taliban must be weak enough in a formal military sense to be unable to launch massive or coordinated attacks. Capturing key population centers along the Helmand River Valley is the first step in a strategy designed to create the breathing room necessary to create a replacement force, preferably a replacement force that provides Afghans with a viable alternative to the Taliban.

That is no small task. In recent years, in places where the official government has been corrupt, inept or defunct, the Taliban have in many cases stepped in to provide basic governance and civil authority. And this is why even the Americans are publicly flirting with holding talks with certain factions of the Taliban in hopes that at least some of the fighters can be dissuaded from battling the Americans (assisting with the first goal) and perhaps even joining the nascent Afghan government (assisting with the second).

The bottom line is that this battle does not mark the turning of the tide of the war. Instead, it is part of the application of a new strategy that accurately takes into account Afghanistan’s geography and all the weaknesses and challenges that geography poses. Marjah marks the first time the United States has applied a plan not to hold the line, but actually to reshape the country...
Two areas of concern - the ANA and the ANP - the problems and recommendations:

(i) Col (Rtd) Jeff Haynes* writes on 'Reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA)' in November 2009. NPS also has a 'Summary on the ANA'. This piece is longer but necessary to set the stage to critique the ANA. which provides the background for Jeff Haynes.

(ii) Robert A. Wehrle writing for Washington Times on February 21, 2010 says that 'Afghan mess bigger than we thought'. This article is mercifully short and concise on the conceptual problems with the current approach, in particular, the weak link called the ANP. There's also a companion piece called 'Reforming the ANP', which is longer and more detailed than the piece by Robert A. Wehrle.

In reality all these articles quoted above are external view points and I find that we are really lacking articles written by the Afghans themselves. Therefore I've included a link to an article (to a 17 page pdf) written by Ali A. Jalali. He was the Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005. His expressed view sees the situation as more complex and has a focus beyond the immediate problems of the ANA and ANP.

--------------------------------
*Note: Jeff Haynes recently retired as a Colonel from the United States Marine Corps after 24 years of service. During 2008, he commanded Regional Corps Advisory Command-Central where he advised the Afghan National Army’s 201st Corps Commanding General and staff. Concurrently, Colonel Haynes commanded 23 Embedded Training Teams consisting of over 600 advisors and support personnel from all US services and 5 contributing nations distributed throughout central and eastern Afghanistan.
 
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AfghanAmbush

New Member
I don't have time right now to explain every detail of this war but here is some insight.

The only way to beat the insurgency in Afghanistan is to stay there for about five more years but i don't think thats going to happen and at the end of the day the insurgents still have power. The Taliban are simply going to outlast the forces. For all of you who think that Opium brings them most of their money, your wrong. The insurgency does get some money off it but not at the extent that most people think, at one point the taliban almost eradicated opium from Afghanistan. The western intelligence and DEA have good control of the drug trade. The Taliban will not be bribed and part of the population support them, with resources and men (mostly pashtuns) but also some in the north. I've spoken with people recently from Kabul, they tell me that the U.S is not helping at all and even people in Kabul distrust the Americans. They do like the Germans, Japanese and the Indians who actually help the population and do it for free. You have to understand that the ISI is also connected to the Taliban, hence the recent attack that targets the guest houses (mostly Indians). The recent capture of the taliban commander is also not that surprising for most there because he was actually taking to the government (peace talks) and he might have had a little to much power. My guess is that the ISI gave him up before he did talk to the west or became too powerful. This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.
 

Kilo 2-3

New Member
I don't have time right now to explain every detail of this war but here is some insight.

The only way to beat the insurgency in Afghanistan is to stay there for about five more years but i don't think thats going to happen and at the end of the day the insurgents still have power. The Taliban are simply going to outlast the forces. For all of you who think that Opium brings them most of their money, your wrong. The insurgency does get some money off it but not at the extent that most people think, at one point the taliban almost eradicated opium from Afghanistan. The western intelligence and DEA have good control of the drug trade. The Taliban will not be bribed and part of the population support them, with resources and men (mostly pashtuns) but also some in the north. I've spoken with people recently from Kabul, they tell me that the U.S is not helping at all and even people in Kabul distrust the Americans. They do like the Germans, Japanese and the Indians who actually help the population and do it for free. You have to understand that the ISI is also connected to the Taliban, hence the recent attack that targets the guest houses (mostly Indians). The recent capture of the taliban commander is also not that surprising for most there because he was actually taking to the government (peace talks) and he might have had a little to much power. My guess is that the ISI gave him up before he did talk to the west or became too powerful. This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.
AfghanAmbush, I'm sure you could speak on this more accurately than myself, but isn't opium, even without Taliban links, harmful to the long-term stability of Afghanistan both regionally and nationally?

I say that because opium, while it does generate a livelihood for farmers, also creates severe addictions to the drug, resulting in severe poverty and destitution which could hold Afghanistan back or could become a factor in provoking rebellion or dissent several years down the road.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Most of Afghan's opium gets exported. Not much of it actually stays in Afghan. I wouldn't be surprised if statistics for opium usage hadn't climbed all that much in the recent decade.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.
Have any official figures been released about the number of Afghan civilians killed by mistake since 2001 by coalition airstrikes/artillery?

Some Afghanistan videos:

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWsmJIwe9Q4"]YouTube- Conversations With History - Ahmed Rashid[/ame]

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dymGck_j8BY"]YouTube- Paki Ahmad Rashid Exclusive; "Taliban Willing To Talk"[/ame]

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iT847FtAWQw"]YouTube- Interview with Peter Jouvenal[/ame]

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo6WI9nnlOs"]YouTube- Riz Khan - General Stanley McChrystal - 9 Dec 09 - Part 1[/ame]

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvYglyjbHkI"]YouTube- Massoud's Last Stand - Afghanistan[/ame]
 
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