The Soviet Tank Gamble

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Nope. Firepower and protection are both matters of physics. Mobility was determined by the norms guided by doctrine in the Soviet Army that was the design bureaus' sole client. Organisational velocity if you will. What was considered though which was not a matter of science, was the industrial production capacity for a new design. That is where the T-64 came a cropper. The other 'big one' is of course the crews you keep talking about. The Soviet Army found that they just could not allocate enough conscripts to crew the more complex designs in the offing in the 60s, so they reduced the crew and increased the support personnel numbers. I can't remember who, but someone worked out that if the essential field support personnel are added to the tank's crew, then a Soviet 3-crew tank has a crew of 5, while the then new NATO tanks had crews of 7-8. And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, and because NATO designers were attempting to design catch-up models for two decades. Again, no flaw.

What a load of drivel. The soviet union with a largely conscript army could not find enough people to crew its tanks? Firepower and mobility are both matters of physics? Gee thats a useful statement - just a tad obvious I'd think. This would be a useful point to make if you expanded why you just stated the obvious to argue a point. Organisational velocity? What's that? That phrase doesn't link in any way to the sentence before or after it, it's drivel. Perhaps it's the speed the high command of an organisation achieves when fired from a cannon?

I particularly like this point: And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, So there is no flaw in Soviet tank designs because the Soviet Union was outproducing Nato?
So western tank designers are continually playing catch up are they? During Desert Storm the Iraqui's had quite a few tank engagements between the 500 T-72's they owned and the M1's and Challengers of the coalition. if these tanks were superior surely that would have offset any tactical disadvantage due to Iraqui ineptitude, yet in nearly every engagement the kill ratio was what 20 or 50 to one? Doesn't seem to support your point very well does it? Egypt for example has traditionally purchased soviet equipment. Recently it has purchased M1's tanks and Mig 29SMT's. If the current Russian designs were so superior why would the Egyptians who have no particular affiliation chose the Abrams over current Russian designs? Could it be that the better tank is a western design?

Were you an officer in the Army?

The Soviet union lost about 27 miilion in the war, and another estimated 25 miiilion shortfall in births. Besides that much of the education infrastructure in the most populated part of the Soviet Union was largely destroyed. It lost almost 50% of secondary and close to 75% of tertiary teaching staff. These populations, or the education resources to produce technologically capable personnel for the more advanced tanks of the 1960s were still not available, and the damage of war to the population and education infrastructure was not restored in the Soviet Union until late 1960s, though some argue that this was never achieved during USSR's being. Absolute country population numbers do not necessarily reflect its ability to provide suitable personnel for its armed forces.

You seemed to not understand that firepower and mobility are largely a matter of physics. It was not my intention to in any way insult you. Sometimes stating the obvious is useful in a discussion to establish that both parties are on the 'same page' as it were.

Organisational velocity is reflective of the norms used by the Soviet Army planner based on stated operational tempo rates at each level of command from tactical to strategic. Its a short way to express what I just said, and Simpkin used a whole chapter to explain and define it. It s foreign concept in NATO doctrines.

Suitability of the design for production, particularly wartime production, was one of the design selection criteria in the Soviet Union. It is pointless if the design is very safe for the crew, but insufficient number of units can be produced to win a war, right?

Let me rewrite what you said below

During the 1991 Desert Storm the 44 Iraqi divisions, of which 42 were combat ineffective, had an unknown number of tank engagements between the estimated 500 early model export version T-72's they owned and the unknown number of 1980s made and upgraded M1's and Challengers of the coalition. if these tanks were superior surely that would have offset any tactical disadvantage due to Iraqui ineptitude, yet in nearly every engagement the kill ratio was what 20 or 50 to one?

Even simple logic suggests that a more recent design is likely to be more advanced than an older design.
However, I will once again state the obvious that the crew is part of the crew survival systems included in the design.It is equally obvious that engineering for incompetence is an unachievable goal in tank design.

Egyptian purchase of the M1 was mostly for foreign relations and domestic politics reasons. The purchase was in part paid for by Saudi Arabia and in part because "the country has used the US military aid program that accompanied the 1979 Camp David Accords to replace much of that equipment with American items. The country began a co-production program for M1 Abrams tanks in 1988, which involves kit assembly in Egypt but outsources sensitive functions like adding the M1’s special armor." However, by 1991 not even a company was fielded by the Egyptian Army, and the Egyptian 3rd Armored and 3rd Mechanized Divisions came to Saudi Arabia with T-62s. Then they requested more M1s after they realised that Bush is likely to win the election and was likely to take a hard stand towards Iraq. Last I heard though is that Egyptians have a lot of problems servicing their tanks, and an estimated 35% are in fact not combat worthy.

 

[FutureTank]

The Christie tank and BT series had their engine in the rear, turret in the centre and driver at the front - much lke current designs. How does this wash with your assertation that the mass needs to be centralised? One of the fastest tracked vehicles in recent service would be the brits Scimitar/Scorpion varients. Official top speed 80kph, unofficially, quite a bit more - they are front engined.

I don't know where I know this from, so need a bit of time to get back to where I got this idea in the first place.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I suspect that had the Soviet Army chosen to adopt the JS-3 as their point of MBT design origin they too would have had the volume to introduce all sorts of creature comforts. Are you saying that doing more with less in tank warfare is a flaw?

The Js-2 had a weight of 46 tonnes, I can only guess that the JS-3 was heavier compared to the T34-85 at 32 tonnes. That level of interior volume and armour has a cost in weight, so IF the soviets had pursued this line of tanks they too would have ended up with an equivalent weight to western designs. Where is the 'more with less' equation here?

But they did not pursue the this heavy tank line of design philosophy, and ended up with c.40t tanks with same gun. In 1980 the T-80 was still 43t.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
When people start comparing "apples with apples", I will happily listen.

We are comparing MAIN BATTLE TANKS - it is apples with apples.

Yes, the main battle tank is the tank mostly used in a given national Army. This was achieved not by engineering design in the US Army, but by administrative action of renaming the M26 from a 'heavy tank' to a 'main tank', later main battle tank, in the way the British Army renamed the Centurion from a 'cruiser' to a 'universal' tank.

The previous "main" tank in both the US and the British armies was the M4 Sherman at 30.3t. The renaming of the M26 increased the weight of the main tank to 41.7t, i.e. by 11.4t or 37.6%. In the case of Centurion the increase was to 51t by 20.7t or 68.3%. The Cromwell, another 'cruiser tank', was only 27.9t.

Conversely the Soviet wartime main tank, the T-34/85, weighed 32t and was replaced by the T-54 at 36t and T-55 at 40.5t, increases of 4t and 8.5t respectively. These were increases of 12.5% and 26.5% respectively by 1958.

Now you may not be aware of it, but before apples reach the shops, they are sorted, or graded into sizes among other categories. This assures that if a customer purchases a tray of apples, they re all same size in the tray. The main apple in the tray is usually the medium apple because smaller apples are soled for canning purposes, and very large fruit are sold for cooking.

What you are doing with the tanks is renaming the heavy tanks "main" and selling them as "medium". So I comes to the market and I see your "main" tanks and next to them are these smaller "medium" tanks, and sure, they look great, but, you only get a dozen to the "tray", of the "main", but you get 24 to the "tray" of the "mediums".

So yes, we are comparing "main" battle tanks, but that does not describe their most important weight classification that guides oh so many other engineering factors, including crew survivability, right?

So, can the NATO tank designers produce a medium tank? No.
They can produce an infantry fighting vehicle in the same weight class though, so maybe next decade

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Which electronic equipment? You mean this?

Is it a flaw in the Soviet design that the French electronics don't function in Indian deserts?
Here India Army´s T-72 Upgrade Program - Project RHINO [Archive] - Military Photos is an article on the T-72 Indian upgrade planning c.2004. So you take a state-designed tank that had state enterprises design upgrade systems and subsytems for, and you try and fit systems and subsystems designed by non-state commercial enterprises that never intended their product to go into the T-72. What were those Soviet designers thinking of?
Where is the flaw in design here?

Where do we start - lack of a climate control system to the detriment of the crew and electronics. A space so constrained that it makes future upgrades difficult (technology does evolve) just for starters. There's a very good chance a western design would not have needed to be upgraded in the first place, and if it was necessary, upgrades seem to accomplished a fair bit easier and with more success.

I think you missed the question.
Where is the fault of the Soviet designers that the Indians are having problems with adopting the T-72 to THEIR needs?

Clearly in the original specification for the T-72 export version there was no specification for a climate control system. If it had been installed on the T-72, they would have been way ahead of their time since the Australian Army only installed them in 1997. Of course it could be that ADF didn't really care about the comforts of the Australian tankers before that year.

The T-72 tank has been modernised and upgraded over the past four decades. So far the observed trend is that electronics, the primary internal form of upgrade are only getting smaller, and more adaptable to internal tank spaces. For example some electronic modules can now be moulded to the available spaces in the tank rather than manufactured in the old boxy forms. This is likely to only get easier, not harder.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Now you may not be aware of it, but before apples reach the shops, they are sorted, or graded into sizes among other categories. This assures that if a customer purchases a tray of apples, they re all same size in the tray. The main apple in the tray is usually the medium apple because smaller apples are soled for canning purposes, and very large fruit are sold for cooking.

What you are doing with the tanks is renaming the heavy tanks "main" and selling them as "medium". So I comes to the market and I see your "main" tanks and next to them are these smaller "medium" tanks, and sure, they look great, but, you only get a dozen to the "tray", of the "main", but you get 24 to the "tray" of the "mediums".

So yes, we are comparing "main" battle tanks, but that does not describe their most important weight classification that guides oh so many other engineering factors, including crew survivability, right?

So, can the NATO tank designers produce a medium tank? No.
They can produce an infantry fighting vehicle in the same weight class though, so maybe next decade

What a load of semantical crap, its not even good semantics, its very poor. Tanks unlike apples are not sorted into weight class at the start of the battle. It isn't boxing. Featherweights have to fight heavyweights if they want to or not. The same applies for intellectual class of online posters here at DT. In which case I would classify FutureTank as well in the 'tankette' category. Not even a Bren carrier...

As to their being no NATO medium tank... The Leopard 1 and AMX 30 would be classified as such. So would the "XM1202 Mounted Combat System Tank, Combat, Full Tracked: Medium". The Leopard 1 and AMX 30 were built with 1950s technology and full allotment of volume for typical tank functions. So they scarified armour weight. The XM1202 built with 21st century technology was able to significantly reduce internal volume.

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Matilda was a heavy tank by British standards, but was same weight as the T-34, but undergunned. Churchill was an infantry support tank, not a heavy tank. Centurion was however a 'universal' tank (redesignated from Cruiser) that in reality was the first British "medium tank" in the Panther "mould" that had also been referred to in the Panzertruppen as a 'universal tank'. The only reason that there was no "British Tiger" is because the UK was industrially exhausted.

Again evading my point - the poms did have a history of heavy tank production - the Matilda predated the T34 by a number of years and was considered a heavy tank in its day. Just because it was labeled an infantry tank doesn't change its characteristics. There was in fact a british 'Tiger' called the TOG 2. This design could have been further developed but was abandonned in favour of the Centurion which should have been a decent match for the Tiger, but arrived too late to see action in WW11.

Matilda was used in combat as a medium tank

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Not at all. The British and Americans were convinced by the Germans that IF they had had enough Tigers and Panthers, they would have stopped the Red Army as they stopped the Allies in Normandy. Until early 1980s that was the basic understanding of tank warfare in NATO, and the designs went accordingly. Quite the contrary to lots of NATO heavy tanks sitting in hull down positions image, the actual doctrine was essentially that of the Wehrmacht with very minor national differences between the big four, and later three NATO tank users, and that is small combined armies groups based on battalion-brigade headquarters "pinching off" Soviet deep thrusts into West Germany. However, Germans never really "got" the Red Army's operational methods, which is why they lost in repeated Soviet offensives.

I forget which german general when asked by Hitler what sort of tank the general needed to stop the soviets replied T-34's. His somewhat ironic comments went unheeded and the rest is history. It wasn't the germans who never really 'got' the soviet tactics, it was Hitler who mandated such stupidities as not allowing withdrawl, not permitting his senior commanders any operational lattitude that was of great assistance to the soviets. The choice between cheap and plentiful or expensive and more capable was a simple choice for the west. Smaller standing armys had to look at quality over quantity, they had no choice. Unlike the USSR that could field an army as large as the politbureau demanded, western democracies need to satisfy voters, so maintaining an army the size of the eastern block countries was never going to happen.

Right, the Hitler lost the war, and forced designs of bad tanks and could not get enough troops into the front line.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Not waffling. The premise is that the Soviet tanks have a flaw in ignoring crew survival and the NATO tanks don't. What I, perhaps clumsily, tried to point out is that placed in the Soviet doctrinal context the NATO tanks would also have a flaw, and that flaw would equal to about 20t of the design. If the Soviet designers were given different doctrinal contexts, maybe those of the IDF, they too would perhaps produce a 70t heavy tank with near-100% crew survival potential.

Therefore we conclude that the soviet tanks were perfect for the then soviet doctrine. What of other 200+ countries that don't share this doctrine? NATO tanks do not have a 'flaw'. To have a tank with the technology of the day when their structures were originally designed (70's/80's) that offers the level of protection, mobility firepower and crew comfort (as well as the smaller facets such as limits on elevation depression etc) the vehicles happened to be around 20t more than soviet designs. Perhaps the next generation (such as FCS) will be much lighter than Soviet designs, according to your logic, this means that soviet designs have a design flaw.

Countries face the same choice as Australia of where to buy their tanks, and make selection best they can
I'm not sure what you see as advantages NATO tanks had over Soviet tanks in crew survivability before the last Cold War Generation

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Ignoring your sarcasm for a moment, I guess it depends what you see as modern. The T-72 belongs to the same generation of tanks as the M60A1, Leopard 1, and Chieftain, going into production in 1971. Aside from the low hull, I don't see very many significant differences in the design approach to crew survival. The M60 was a continued evolution of the M26/46. The Leopard was really a Panther design philosophy using 1960s technology, and Chieftain....well, the British have to be different by finally getting "their Tiger"
None of these tanks were present in the Gulf War. Moreover the low profile was not a significant factor in the defeat of the Iraqi armoured troops (see last quote).

US marines were equipped with M60's during GW1. What was the ratio M60's to T- 72 in kills?But once again you are forgetting the origins of this quote which was you telling me this was not about modern tanks.

Please, the USMC M60s was the last M60 upgrade version! And I don't think they actually engaged any Iraqi tanks
Well, its about Soviet tanks as the thread says. No new Soviet tank has been fielded that has been designed before the end of the Cold War.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I think its relevant since the fifth man was an assistant loader. It shows a different predisposition in general towards greater crew comfort, while not having a clue about doctrine. It was in fact the "American Tiger" designed sharing many M47/48 components, but intended to engage Soviet tanks at long range. Its elevation was 8 degrees, only three greater than its contemporary T-54, but no one claimed it flawed. Instead though...it went to be used by the Marines as an infantry support tank! The T-54 of course begun design during the war, and was intended to outrange the Tiger II. So, in 1957 they were surpassed by the US 65t design. I don't see a flaw here either.

Again we need to see context here:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Of course to do this, the design requires a very large turret ring, so to portray this as an advantage, the NATO designers claim the NATO tanks are more ergonomic, forgetting that tanks are not made to ensure a comfy ride. You really do not want to be tossed around the turret as the driver tries to frantically take evasive action. In a T-34 tankers would just grab onto the gun, or push against the walls to keep themselves steady.

Me:Try that in a modern tank and the stabilisation system will ensure that anyone hanging onto the main armament will be pulped as the gun elevates and depresses. Having riden in a Leopard cross country with stab engaged I was damn glad that there was a big metal guard to keep me from being thrown against the breach as it moved up and down. Its not about 'comfort' as you keep saying - its about trying to minimise crew fatigue levels - warfare is a 24hour business, and particularly during the type of blitzkreig assaults experienced by the armoured forces under Gudarian in 1940 and GW I and GWII, this is a major consideration. In some cases the only times the tankers got to dismount was to reload and refuel for days at a time.

Originally Posted by Marc 1
Also its not about steadying yourself whilst the tank scoots to another firing position, crew are not there to hang on for dear life, they will be using their optics, searching for threats/targets, firing the gun whilst on the move and loading the gun. Manhandling a 120mm round in the confines of a turret is difficult enough when stationary - space is not a 'luxury' with current crew numbers and techniques. Sure it is possible to eliminate the loader, but then you have the additional workload of other tasks placed onto the other 3 crew (an argument all by itself).

FT: There used to be a five man crew in a 120mm armed US Tank.

So originally you started telling people that space was a luxury and that thankers in T34's just hung on to the breach of the main armament. When it was pointed out to you that taking that kind of action in a moder tank will see you pulped by the stab system, and that the crew aren't there just to hang on anymore, you decide to tell people for no apparent reason that there was a US tank with a crew of 5? To what end? To then say the US didn't have a clue about doctrine? Who's doctrine? A crew of 5 was not unusual in an allied tank at the end of WW11 - instead of manning a hull mounted MG this crew member was used to assist loading. Once again you demonstrate that you cannot argue effectively, you switch topics and try to divert. Why not just admit you are wrong?

The comment re hanging on for dear life in a T-34 was actually from a memoir. It illustrates the vast improvement made in the design of the fighting compartment in the T-54. I have no argument about what happens in tanks designed since the Second World War, or even at the end of it. My point is that flaws were being steady corrected in Soviet tanks over the history of their design
Having an assistant loader in the M103 suggests a certain thinking about tank design in the US. The JS-3 had a crew of 4, and it seems the loaders of 120mm armed tanks now can handle their ammunition alone. That thinking is comfort. The M26 was adopted as much for its heavier armour and larger gun as for being comfortable and big because the M4 was a fairly bad tank to fight in
Reference to doctrine was to question the creation of the M103, and then its use as an infantry support tank with the USMC. What was the thinking behind this tank in terms of its utility?
In the Sherman, the most widely used Allied medium tank the fifth crewman was a co-driver, but he was using the bow .30cal The intention was to have the ability to relieve the driver on march, but from my reading drivers hated anyone else driving the tank, so the guy ended up using the MG and making tea
Arguing effectively? All you have done is to pick on every point I make without stating why you think the Soviet tanks were flawed aside from comparing them with the incomparable

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I can only base what I say on combat experiences of various designs. Both Soviet and German heavy tanks had transmission and other chassis issues, German tanks worse so than the Soviet. The IDF also had to do a lot of work on the M48s which was integrated into the M60 that should have been M48A7. However I accept that you are largely correct in the process of how transmissions are selected.

How magnanamous of you. Trying to obfuscate by the drivel about reliability levels of WW2 and Korean war designs has little relevance.

What?

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Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Was that reference to drugs necessary?

Pretty hard to take the high moral ground when you are seeking to mislead and misrepresent

So you decided on the lower approach?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
The bustle is there to increase the load of the tank. Guess where most of the original 55 rounds for the 105mm gun went in the M1? Or the 42 rounds of the SEP version Australia bought? But wait, the bustle is AS vulnerable to penetration as the rest of the turret! Without some way of venting ammunition detonation (not "cook off") it would be deadly, so the "crew safety features" are actually sheer necessity in the design! And what of the Israelis? Well, they have a "dry turret" now because all the ammunition is back in the hull in the Merkava IV.
The hull is also where the Soviet tanks keep much of the ammunition, so again, no significant flaw in 30 year old design.

Again misrepresentation. I have never stated that the soviet designs are flawed due to their ammunition being stored in the hull. Just mounting the rounds in the hull is not sufficient, not all engagements occur with the tank hull down - I'm willing to bet there is also a significant shielding system around the Merkava's ammunition storage. The turret bustle is at the rear of the turret - given that the turret will normally face the expected threat that reduces the probability of a hit in this area significantly. If the bustle is penetrated it still protects the crew. Problem? No.

And what is the problem with the Soviet tanks not having this "feature"?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
The gun does not need a counterbalance, and you well know it, since it has a recoil system like all ordnance pieces.
Yet again stop misquoting me. Here is what I have said:

Sounds like rubbish to me. If anything a bussle on a turret will help counterbalance the weight of the gun. There are certain limits anyway to using a cross slope as a hull down position - namely the gun depression limits. Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle, so cross slope positioning and the risk of the vehicle rolling over is not an issue.

Note I said counterbalances the turret, not the gun.

Marc 1, how does one counterbalance a turret? And why, fiven it is mounted in the turret ring?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Given a certain slope gradient and the perpendicular position of the turret up-slope, the tank has a chance of toppling backwards. This was the problem with the Soviet KV-2 that was compounded by the inadequate recoil absolution for its much larger gun. Admittedly it is not a great worry, but in the heat of combat the driver may not be aware of the turret position and the gunner may not be aware of the hull orientation.

Sounds like a design and testing issue to me. This is what Google has to say about the KV2:

While impressive on paper, it had been designed as a slow-moving bunker-buster. It was less useful in the type of highly mobile, fluid warfare that developed in World War II. The turret was so heavy it was difficult to traverse on non-level terrain, and it was expensive to produce. Only about 250 KV-2s were made, all in 1940-41, making it one of the rarer Soviet tanks.

Ironically, more weight (you know that evil thing you keep harping about) may have provided a cure. But seriously if you are using this 3.65m tall monstrosity whose trunions seem to be about a meter higher than a modern MBT as an example of how unstable MBT's are you are clutching at straws.

Ok, I'll get back to you on this, since I see some real data is required

 

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Actually given the proposed gun depression, the location of the hull would be such that the depth of the elevation crest it is behind would be of far greater protection from returned fire than its own frontal armour.

Err, that's the idea of being hull down.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
If you are suggesting that reversing [straight back]? into the dead ground is what you would do, than I would say that a much better solution is to approach the crest obliquely which not only allows the driver the option of reversion, but also going forward down the slope (never straight over the top).

Get out your pen and start rewriting tactics manuals for quite a few army's then, as this is not the usual way they operate. Think about it - if you approach the crest at a say 45 degree angle and either go too far or find an enemy vehicle coming up the same crest from the other side, you are exposing your weaker side armour. Lets say you fire a shot and then move forward, even if you turn quickly the enemy will have an idea which side you are likely to appear around and train their weapons appropriately. Many MBT transmissions incorporate more than one reverse ratio to enable faster reversing.

"if you approach the crest at a say 45 degree angle and either go too far or find an enemy vehicle coming up the same crest from the other side" - er, no, that requires a new tank driver course manual, not tactics.
Tactics is where a unit seeks to occupy a defensive, position with no prior area recon, and is surprise at close range. S**t happens, but less rarely if one looks where he is going
I don't understand how the enemy is supposed to see which way the tank is exiting the firing position through the smoke and dust of the plume that conceals the turret only. The driver obviously does not gun the engine so the tank can be observed by its exhaust, so likelihood of being fired on only remains from the mortars, or some organic artillery. In either case I doubt the crew wants to stuff around doing three point turns on a slope rather than just scooting away in the facing direction
Of course I have no practical experience and just observe based on my reading and talking with those that had

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Angles of depression I have been able to find: T54/55 -5 degrees, T62 -5 degrees T-64 ? T-72 -6 degrees T-80 -4 degrees. T-90 ? degrees. I cannot find 18 degrees - unless you are talking elevation which is of course the exact opposite and would prove that you really do have no idea. One of the main reasons that limits main armament depression in an MBT isn't necessarily the hull, but the fact that there is not enough height inside the turret to allow the breech to recoil. It is one of the main reasons why western tanks are higher. The trunions are usually placed higher in western tanks as well as this means less depression restrictions by the hull. This is not just 'handy' when firing from a reverse slope, but means the main armament is less likely to find its stops when trying to track a target whilst moving across rough ground.

No, as it was explained to me the procedure works differently. The gun is lowered over the side, and the tank edges up to the crest side on. The gunner observes through the barrel, then the tank tanks a "roll" back, the gun is loaded, and comes up to the crest again to fire at available elevation, which are the numbers you quoted. However, when I asked a former Soviet tanker (currently officer in a training unit) about this depression he said the West makes too much of it. It is rare in his experience to not find a hull down position, and in nay case tanks are for moving not for sitting around on reverse slopes.

Incidentally, unless the mortar fire is some form of anti armour round conventional fragmentation/HE rounds will have little effect.

Soviet doctrine suggests differently, but the data I have came from the Western experience and suggests as you say, that mortar fire is ineffective

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I guess you will need to do a bit of research. Although prevalent during the Second World War, toppling tanks are found in wartime and peacetime since, even in training.

I'd better get a warning out to all tankies then. Strange that you hear about MRAPS rolling but not tanks. The armys of the world must have some huge shared conspiracy to keep the knowledge of these death traps to themselves eh?

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Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I'm quite happy to admit I'm wrong, when I am suitably convinced of it.

I'm suitably convinced that you will never change your mind, so don't go looking for any further replies.

Ok

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Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Did you forget that the 'septics' had integrated battlegroup networking while the Iraqis had even their tactical radios jammed? What about the fact that the Iraqi T-72s were firing 20 year old ammunition meant for the M60s? How about lack of combat leadership in many Iraqi armoured units? I could go on.
Again, there does not seem to be a Soviet tank design flaw, but the organisational flaw by the user.

You'll have to explain how you fire ammunition intended for a rifled 105mm gun from a 125mm smoothbore. Go ahead, make all the excuses you want - the stories are legion about how the poor bloody Iraqi tankers could not even see the yanks and poms with their night vision gear and were being picked off en masse.

The Iraqi 125mm APFSDS round had been designed in the 1970s to deal with the likes of M60, and had been taken out of Soviet service by this stage, and used for training only

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
However, you ask ANY 'septic' officer, from any Arm what the requisite superiority ratio is on the offensive, and he/she will tell you it is 3:1. As a matter of fact most won't even know why its 3:1, but they all know it. The Soviet Army prefers 6:1 local superiority in the breakthrough as this makes things a bit easier, roughly compatible to "hot knife through butter" when an offensive is conducted by an integrated combined arms force.

What has this got to do with the price of fish? here's a little tip, some of us do know about these ratio's, after all we don't just sit around polishing brass and boots - for officers there is actually a module on Tactics that if you fail will end your career. If you like I can still quote for you artillery planning ranges of both the RAG and the DAG (that should excite you - they were after all based on soviet weapons and doctrine when I leaned them 21 years ago). But I fail to see what this has to do with the discussion.
Tanks, aside from crew survivability, are also designed to perform in a certain way, individually and in units and formations. Force ratios as you know have to do with the reality that an attacking force will, all things being equal, take casualties. Clearly in Iraq not all things were equal, and it had nothing to do with crew survivability.

 

[eckherl]

One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

Thus some of the reasons why T series tanks are less accurate and are in need of additional boresighting sessions, they just recently started realizing the benefits of a good MRS device located at the end of the tube.

 

[eckherl]

Do they plan to keep the T90 production line while preparing/build a second in the next few years for the new T-xx or will they stop producing the T90 as soon as orders are fullfilled and switch to the new one completely?

No new Russian T-95 will make its debute any time soon, you can expect T-80 and 90 series to go thru a series of upgrades to keep them soldiering on for at least another decade, this will include a bustle mounted loading system on both series tanks also for safety purposes for the crew, ease in uploading the vehicles and give the potential for long rod growth for KE projectiles.

 

[eckherl]

Again, the T-90 is a stop-gap measure. It's going through low-level production. If Russia were to be as economically strong as it were under Soviet times, they'd have replace the entire T-72 fleet by less than 10 years, I think. Soviet tank production ran at about a few thousand a year (not entirely sure of the figure, but I do know it's within the thousands), but from various factories.

No, the T-90 is not viewed as a stop gap measure and the only reason why Russian units are not getting them in a timely fashion is due to current threats to the country, cost and exporting them out to other countries. kind of the same situation inregards to BMP 3, how many of those are Russian units getting.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

No, the T-90 is not viewed as a stop gap measure and the only reason why Russian units are not getting them in a timely fashion is due to current threats to the country, cost and exporting them out to other countries. kind of the same situation inregards to BMP 3, how many of those are Russian units getting.

The countries of the former Soviet Union have effectively recovered their GDP to the levels of the Soviet Union at the fall. However much of this economic regrowth is not in heavy industry sectors as the Soviet economy was hugely skewered in this areas favour. Also modern Russia is spending a tiny fraction of its GDP on defence compared to the Russian part of the Soviet Union. Russia is only spending about 2.5% of GDP on Defence compared to the Soviet Union that was spending upwards of 20%. The USA spends about 4% on defence and most other countries under 2%. Despite increasing defence spending Russia faces a huge opportunity deficit thanks to the lack of investment in defence industry infrastructure back to the Soviet era and the past 20 years of low defence spending. The Russians would need to completely modernise their industry to even be able of building a new blank sheet tank.

 

[Feanor]

No new Russian T-95 will make its debute any time soon, you can expect T-80 and 90 series to go thru a series of upgrades to keep them soldiering on for at least another decade, this will include a bustle mounted loading system on both series tanks also for safety purposes for the crew, ease in uploading the vehicles and give the potential for long rod growth for KE projectiles.

Just out of curiousity, how do you know this? And when can we expect to see it?

No, the T-90 is not viewed as a stop gap measure and the only reason why Russian units are not getting them in a timely fashion is due to current threats to the country, cost and exporting them out to other countries. kind of the same situation inregards to BMP 3, how many of those are Russian units getting.

To the best of my knowledge one bltn of BMP-3s was procured annually 2006-2008. I'm not sure if the numbers increased from there onward.

The countries of the former Soviet Union have effectively recovered their GDP to the levels of the Soviet Union at the fall. However much of this economic regrowth is not in heavy industry sectors as the Soviet economy was hugely skewered in this areas favour. Also modern Russia is spending a tiny fraction of its GDP on defence compared to the Russian part of the Soviet Union. Russia is only spending about 2.5% of GDP on Defence compared to the Soviet Union that was spending upwards of 20%. The USA spends about 4% on defence and most other countries under 2%. Despite increasing defence spending Russia faces a huge opportunity deficit thanks to the lack of investment in defence industry infrastructure back to the Soviet era and the past 20 years of low defence spending. The Russians would need to completely modernise their industry to even be able of building a new blank sheet tank.

UVZ has modernized quite extensively since 1999, mainly due to the production of the T-90S for India, T-90A for domestic, and T-90SA for the Algerians. Overall the T-90 has seen a serial run of around 1000 units since the India order opened up. Interestingly enough even right now in the crisis, while railroad car production at UVZ has slowed down and around 20 000 workers were laid off in the railroad department, the tank assembly line is still working with no lay-offs in sight.

It's also the only tank plant left in Russia. So when you say industry I'm assuming you're also referring to the sub-manufacturers such as JSC Spetstehnika, and OAO "Motovilikhinskiye zavody".

 

[FutureTank]

One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

This is probably correct when accuracy at long ranges is required. However, at the time of Soviet tank designs, and NATO, the average engagement range in Europe was 700-900m. Even in the North African Campaign of the Second World War the average engagement LOS was 1,100m.

Aside from the fact that at the time Soviet tanks were not doctrinally required to fight predominantly from hull-down positions, was this a significant consideration for NATO designers?

It seemed to me that the reasoning behind Soviet designs was that a penetration at the average range from a 105mm or a 120mm gun was likely to be disabling if not destructive to their tanks, and same applied to the effect of a 115mm or 125mm round on NATO tanks. It is virtually impossible to miss a tank at 900m even with a less accurate gun using even T-55 optics, regardless of it being 40t or 60t.
Penetration anywhere outside of the frontal armour at that range was likely with 1970s technology, and would be disabling even if no ammunition was detonated inside. There are just too many systems inside the fighting compartment of a Cold War tank since c.1956 for a penetration to miss everything. Even at the 80s level of computerisation, a single power surge would likely to have fried every chip in most systems.

Also, three crew in a turret and the gun's breech, even with more volume of a NATO tank, will still occupy more than 50% of the internal turret volume, and therefore there is at least a 50/50 chance of a wound on at least one crewman, or damage to the breech. I suspect, due to lack of published statements, that the thinking of Soviet designers was, if they must have a 50/50% chance of a casualty in the turret, they may as well reduce the number of crew to two. The autoloader also reduces the size of the breech somewhat. Mind you that's academic if the carousel is hit.

Was lack of accuracy in Soviet tanks considered a factor by US designers or British or German armoured forces?

In the XM1, "Crew survivability was the number one priority for the new tank.", however what many forget that the primary factor in this is, er....armour! With all the best intentions, the M1A1 HA did not enter production until 1988, and only just over 600 of these were available for the Gulf War in 1991. Depleted uranium has two and a half times the density of steel. It was only added on the front turret armour which is based on WW2 data of tank vs tank greatest number of hits in combat data.

Does that mean that despite knowing this the US designers neglected the crew for four decades and only woke up to the fact in 1988? Nope, its just that the science and technology were not there to offer the degree of protection desired in a head-to-head tank engagement until 1988.

It also means that they expected Soviet gunnery to be accurate enough to hit the front of the M1 turret at 900m under combat conditions and after a cross country march that may have affected stabilisation in Soviet tanks, and so they took appropriate steps to remedy this.

Ultimately all the upgrades, but chiefly armour, added 8t to the burden of the AGT-1500 engine. This may have been acceptable for a force that only fielded 5,000 vehicles, but the Soviet Army fielded more than that in T-64s alone! It was simply uneconomical to increase fuel consumption of such a much larger fleet that would include the T-72s and T-80s, a fleet of at least 15,000 tanks. Still they tried as anyone who remembers the "Dolly Parton" frontal armour upgrades knows.

 

[Firn]

UVZ has modernized quite extensively since 1999, mainly due to the production of the T-90S for India, T-90A for domestic, and T-90SA for the Algerians. Overall the T-90 has seen a serial run of around 1000 units since the India order opened up. Interestingly enough even right now in the crisis, while railroad car production at UVZ has slowed down and around 20 000 workers were laid off in the railroad department, the tank assembly line is still working with no lay-offs in sight.

It's also the only tank plant left in Russia. So when you say industry I'm assuming you're also referring to the sub-manufacturers such as JSC Spetstehnika, and OAO "Motovilikhinskiye zavody".

So how many T-90s can be produced or can be purchased by the Russian Army? And how well does the T-90 address the points raised by Waylander and Eckerl about the accuracy?

 

[Marc 1]

Originally Posted by Waylander
One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

This is probably correct when accuracy at long ranges is required. However, at the time of Soviet tank designs, and NATO, the average engagement range in Europe was 700-900m. Even in the North African Campaign of the Second World War the average engagement LOS was 1,100m.

Aside from the fact that at the time Soviet tanks were not doctrinally required to fight predominantly from hull-down positions, was this a significant consideration for NATO designers?

It seemed to me that the reasoning behind Soviet designs was that a penetration at the average range from a 105mm or a 120mm gun was likely to be disabling if not destructive to their tanks, and same applied to the effect of a 115mm or 125mm round on NATO tanks. It is virtually impossible to miss a tank at 900m even with a less accurate gun using even T-55 optics, regardless of it being 40t or 60t.
Penetration anywhere outside of the frontal armour at that range was likely with 1970s technology, and would be disabling even if no ammunition was detonated inside. There are just too many systems inside the fighting compartment of a Cold War tank since c.1956 for a penetration to miss everything. Even at the 80s level of computerisation, a single power surge would likely to have fried every chip in most systems.

Also, three crew in a turret and the gun's breech, even with more volume of a NATO tank, will still occupy more than 50% of the internal turret volume, and therefore there is at least a 50/50 chance of a wound on at least one crewman, or damage to the breech. I suspect, due to lack of published statements, that the thinking of Soviet designers was, if they must have a 50/50% chance of a casualty in the turret, they may as well reduce the number of crew to two. The autoloader also reduces the size of the breech somewhat. Mind you that's academic if the carousel is hit.

Was lack of accuracy in Soviet tanks considered a factor by US designers or British or German armoured forces?

In the XM1, "Crew survivability was the number one priority for the new tank.", however what many forget that the primary factor in this is, er....armour! With all the best intentions, the M1A1 HA did not enter production until 1988, and only just over 600 of these were available for the Gulf War in 1991. Depleted uranium has two and a half times the density of steel. It was only added on the front turret armour which is based on WW2 data of tank vs tank greatest number of hits in combat data.

Does that mean that despite knowing this the US designers neglected the crew for four decades and only woke up to the fact in 1988? Nope, its just that the science and technology were not there to offer the degree of protection desired in a head-to-head tank engagement until 1988.

It also means that they expected Soviet gunnery to be accurate enough to hit the front of the M1 turret at 900m under combat conditions and after a cross country march that may have affected stabilisation in Soviet tanks, and so they took appropriate steps to remedy this.

Ultimately all the upgrades, but chiefly armour, added 8t to the burden of the AGT-1500 engine. This may have been acceptable for a force that only fielded 5,000 vehicles, but the Soviet Army fielded more than that in T-64s alone! It was simply uneconomical to increase fuel consumption of such a much larger fleet that would include the T-72s and T-80s, a fleet of at least 15,000 tanks. Still they tried as anyone who remembers the "Dolly Parton" frontal armour upgrades knows.

When you quote a poster you are replying or commenting directly in response to that post. You do know that don't you? Have another look at Waylanders post - he is referring to the fact that because the soviet designs do not depress as far as western designs, when travelling across country the stabilisation system will hit its limits (ie not be able to keep the assigned point of aim) as well as a NATO design. This has bugger all to do with range. Even at a range of 20 meters if you cannot bring the barrel of your main armament to bear you cannot hit the target. Quoting factoids about the north african campaign will not change that fact.

Then you proceed to regale us with casualty figres and volume figures if a turret is penetrated. Why? This has nothing to do with the ability of a tanks stab system or the limits imposed by its design. Where did you get these figures? In one of your previous posts you claim the reason for the automatic loader is because the russian army could not find enough conscripts to put a loader in every tank. Now you claim the designers made this call to limit casualties? Which is it?

Your final paragraph is that adding 8 tonnes of armour adds an impost to the fuel consumption that only the US with its fleet of 5000 tanks can bear, but the Russians with a fleet of 15,000 cannot afford it? For starters you'd probably find the addition of 8 tonnes would have a barely perceptable increase in fuel usage - certainly a justifiable one give the benefits of uparmouring.

 

[Waylander]

Thanks Marc. You just beat me with your reply.
As you said hitting your maximum elevation has nothing to do with range at all.
Your aim is screwed and it is quite unimportant how far away your target is.

And hitting your max. elevation is quite easy with a Leo II during a cross country ride.
It is even much more easy with a T-72.

I may also add some thoughts to Future Tank's posts when I have some more time.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The design of the Object 430 (that became the T-64) in 1958 had nothing to do with demographics. The automatic loader was selected like the 5TD engine and low turret roof height (limiting depression) to drastically reduce the internal volume and hence armoured volume and therefore weight.

As to Soviet demographics they were hardly effected by a one person reduction of tank crew strength. Especially since this reduction resulted in an increased maintenance burden and more maintainers. Since the Soviets retained an active tank park of around 35,000 vehicles this is less than 1% of active army strength. Hardly a significant impact to go from four to three per crew.

The Soviet Union under Khrushchev dealt with the WW2 caused baby drain in the late 50s, early 60s by reducing the size of the ground force and replacing their combat power with nuclear missiles. New vehicles like the BMP were the solution to the reduction in infantry bayonets in the 60s, not reducing tank crew size.

Another example of FT fantasy. Not as bad as his belief that tank gun depression is dependent on how steep the front of a tank is angled (as in the Sherman) when its all about turret roof height... nfloorl:

 

[Wooki]

This is probably correct when accuracy at long ranges is required. However, at the time of Soviet tank designs, and NATO, the average engagement range in Europe was 700-900m. Even in the North African Campaign of the Second World War the average engagement LOS was 1,100m.

Aside from the fact that at the time Soviet tanks were not doctrinally required to fight predominantly from hull-down positions, was this a significant consideration for NATO designers?

It seemed to me that the reasoning behind Soviet designs was that a penetration at the average range from a 105mm or a 120mm gun was likely to be disabling if not destructive to their tanks, and same applied to the effect of a 115mm or 125mm round on NATO tanks. It is virtually impossible to miss a tank at 900m even with a less accurate gun using even T-55 optics, regardless of it being 40t or 60t.
Penetration anywhere outside of the frontal armour at that range was likely with 1970s technology, and would be disabling even if no ammunition was detonated inside. There are just too many systems inside the fighting compartment of a Cold War tank since c.1956 for a penetration to miss everything. Even at the 80s level of computerisation, a single power surge would likely to have fried every chip in most systems.

Also, three crew in a turret and the gun's breech, even with more volume of a NATO tank, will still occupy more than 50% of the internal turret volume, and therefore there is at least a 50/50 chance of a wound on at least one crewman, or damage to the breech. I suspect, due to lack of published statements, that the thinking of Soviet designers was, if they must have a 50/50% chance of a casualty in the turret, they may as well reduce the number of crew to two. The autoloader also reduces the size of the breech somewhat. Mind you that's academic if the carousel is hit.

Was lack of accuracy in Soviet tanks considered a factor by US designers or British or German armoured forces?

In the XM1, "Crew survivability was the number one priority for the new tank.", however what many forget that the primary factor in this is, er....armour! With all the best intentions, the M1A1 HA did not enter production until 1988, and only just over 600 of these were available for the Gulf War in 1991. Depleted uranium has two and a half times the density of steel. It was only added on the front turret armour which is based on WW2 data of tank vs tank greatest number of hits in combat data.

Does that mean that despite knowing this the US designers neglected the crew for four decades and only woke up to the fact in 1988? Nope, its just that the science and technology were not there to offer the degree of protection desired in a head-to-head tank engagement until 1988.

It also means that they expected Soviet gunnery to be accurate enough to hit the front of the M1 turret at 900m under combat conditions and after a cross country march that may have affected stabilisation in Soviet tanks, and so they took appropriate steps to remedy this.

Ultimately all the upgrades, but chiefly armour, added 8t to the burden of the AGT-1500 engine. This may have been acceptable for a force that only fielded 5,000 vehicles, but the Soviet Army fielded more than that in T-64s alone! It was simply uneconomical to increase fuel consumption of such a much larger fleet that would include the T-72s and T-80s, a fleet of at least 15,000 tanks. Still they tried as anyone who remembers the "Dolly Parton" frontal armour upgrades knows.

It beggars my mind as to why you are still allowed to Post. The above is simply drivel. The M1's engine is more than capable of handling the extra weight derived from the HA package. In fact it has growth for more. The main reason it is governed is to prevent track separation at high speeds as it would simply run away and cause an accident.

The M1's survivability suite IS an iterative development of 1970's technology.

The ranges you quote are just nuts. No American TC will let an adversary approach to a range that makes the enemy's kill zone effective, period. They will be killed at the maximum range practicable and every relevant R&D program I am aware of is to extend the range and effectiveness of the M1's own kill zone to make this as sure a thing as possible.

And the list goes on and on. I just don't have the time and so admit defeat. It is my sincere wish that you be silenced as I am fed up with the pollution you attempt to pass as informed debate. It is a joke.

cheers

w

 

[Feanor]

So how many T-90s can be produced or can be purchased by the Russian Army? And how well does the T-90 address the points raised by Waylander and Eckerl about the accuracy?

I don't know how many can be produced, or can be purchased. I know this year 93 are/will be purchased (no confirmation of deliveries is available, but that's how many were planned).

I don't know that the T-90A does anything at all to address the stabilization issue, or the ammunition cooking off problem. Strictly speaking it's a T-72 layout, with all major subsystems replaced by a more modern variant.