The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Forgot to add… and do you know how this public debate and the scandal about the missile transfer began in Poland? “Winston Churchill” publicly thanked the Polish people a few days ago for these missiles that were transferred months ago, clearly on the down-low side, out of public space and very discretely. The genius of these people is beyond understanding by us, regular mortals.
 

Redshift

Active Member
I could be wrong, but I do not recall anyone suggesting that the Russian view is the only one that should be considered. I think the point is that it should be considered as a real view. I also think the point is that it has been considered as nonsense or bullshit for decades now and look where we are. I don’t think the EU or Ukraine were claimed to be existential threats to Russia either.

It should also be considered that their view may be:

[…]this weird desire to swallow the bullshit that “the west” spouts about NATO not being an existential threat to Russia, I can't begin to imagine how utterly stupid these people would need to be to believe that.... It is propaganda, an excuse nothing more.

No?
You are wrong and you either don't read rsemmes posts, or rather perhaps , you don't read the subtext that threads through almost everything that he says.

Also I don't believe for one second that it is. REAL view, it is an excuse to do what Russia are doing nothing more.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
An addition to what I said yesterday and the day prior. Today’s thoughts from Stanovaya, who knows some about Russia.

Some thoughts on the current situation around the war:

- Putin appears to believe that Russia is winning and will ultimately win the war. In his view, taking Donbas is only a matter of time. He seems ready to pay almost any price to achieve that goal because he sees it as an existential issue for Russia. Those who expect that increasing pressure on Putin will create more room for negotiations are likely to be disappointed. More pressure is more likely to lead to further radicalisation in Moscow and a stronger military response.

- Economic difficulties, which are becoming more serious, together with battlefield losses and the fuel crisis, are unlikely to make Putin reconsider his approach to the war. Instead, they are more likely to harden his position, encourage further escalation, and increase the risk of scenarios that many have previously dismissed as bluff.

- There is a growing gap between the political leadership and the rest of the country, particularly the business community, which increasingly wants the war to end. At present, there is little room for internal debate or for questioning Putin’s course. Instead, the leadership appears committed to further escalation, with no clear limits. This is likely to make these internal contradictions more acute over time.

- Ukrainian strikes inside Russia are strengthening anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western sentiment, making it easier for the Kremlin to justify further escalation. At the same time, Russian public opinion is divided. Some argue that the war should end roughly along the current front line, while others call for far more extreme measures, including the destruction of Kyiv, the use of nuclear weapons, and mass violence against Ukrainians. A prolonged war of attrition will further strengthen both camps.

- The year 2026 appears to be a particularly important stage in the war. For the first time, the cumulative effects of the conflict are having a visible impact on Russia’s domestic situation, raising questions about the state’s ability to continue functioning in the same way. This weakens Putin politically, but it also appears to make him more radical, contributing to a growing sense among parts of the Moscow elite that a catastrophe may be approaching.

- There is a strong and growing expectation that significant changes lie ahead. There is little understanding on what form they will take, who will drive them, or how fast they may begin. However, there is an increasingly widespread belief that, if the current war of attrition continues, Russia’s resources will come under growing strain, while the economy remains constrained and growing numbers of businesses become unviable. The overall conclusion is that two processes are unfolding at the same time: increasing external escalation and deepening internal contradictions. The West should be prepared for unexpected developments.

From her twitter: Tatiana Stanovaya (@Stanovaya) on X


Edit: Zelensky says the US is to send an emergency Patriot missiles package:

 
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rsemmes

Active Member
you don't read the subtext
"Yet it remains heavily dependent on Western financial assistance, military equipment and technological support while facing mounting domestic pressures of its own." Zalushnii.

"The civilian part of Ukraine’s budget for next year is entirely dependent on foreign support. Unlike the 2025 budget, however, there is no certainty regarding the sources of financing for the full range of needs. It is unclear what portion of the required external financing of $49.3 billion (43% of expenditure) the country can currently count on, and the situation is further complicated by the likely increase in spending during the year, as occurred in previous years."

Earlier this year, Ukraine’s defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, admitted that Ukraine has 2 million draft-dodgers and hundreds of thousands more who are absent without leave (awol).

That is the text, I will leave the subtext to your imagination.
 

Redshift

Active Member
"Yet it remains heavily dependent on Western financial assistance, military equipment and technological support while facing mounting domestic pressures of its own." Zalushnii.

"The civilian part of Ukraine’s budget for next year is entirely dependent on foreign support. Unlike the 2025 budget, however, there is no certainty regarding the sources of financing for the full range of needs. It is unclear what portion of the required external financing of $49.3 billion (43% of expenditure) the country can currently count on, and the situation is further complicated by the likely increase in spending during the year, as occurred in previous years."

Earlier this year, Ukraine’s defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, admitted that Ukraine has 2 million draft-dodgers and hundreds of thousands more who are absent without leave (awol).

That is the text, I will leave the subtext to your imagination.
Yes but what about that bloke 200 years ago who once did something that is is a bit like what's being done today that makes it totally unimportant to even mention what's happening today. I mean WHAT ABOUT or "what about", you can't forget about that you know .
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Yes but what about that bloke 200 years ago who once did something that is is a bit like what's being done today that makes it totally unimportant to even mention what's happening today. I mean WHAT ABOUT or "what about", you can't forget about that you know .
Happening today... Well, in June.

“People are racing ahead of reality… No turning point in any war has ever been recognized in real time… Of course not. That's nonsense. Turning points are identified retrospectively.” “Claims that Ukraine has achieved a decisive turning point and is now heading straight toward victory are largely nonsense,” he added. “In November, we'll probably return to discussing how to survive another winter,” he warned. Kuleba also said “there are really only two major unanswered questions in this war. First: Will Ukraine develop a ballistic missile capability that can genuinely threaten Moscow and other major Russian cities? Second: If that happens, will Putin be willing to use nuclear weapons in response?”
Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine. Russia Analytical Report, June 8–15, 2026 | Russia Matters

Do you consider him (and Zalushnii) a Russian propagandist, someone who has no idea what he is talking about (like William J. Burns) or is just that they (all three of them) are expressing only the Russian point of view?
If you don't like reality, just ignore it.


Talking about "Russian" point of view, even if this is an old one...

Yet structuring a peace agreement around land for security guarantees has not worked yet and is unlikely to work in the future. And it neglects to address the key challenge in ending any war, which is what political scientists call the credible commitment problem: convincing a belligerent that its enemy will really commit to peace. (That applies to both sides.)
An eventual deal must give Ukraine the means to defend itself and deter a possible future invasion while assuring Russia that Kyiv will not be a beachhead for NATO and will only try to restore its territorial integrity via nonmilitary means. And it means treating negotiations not as a barter of land for security guarantees but as the foundation for stable—if hostile—relations between Russia and Ukraine and, eventually, Russia and NATO. (So, it has to work for both sides; not for high horses.)
But the United States and Europe cannot credibly offer such (NATO would enter the fight should Russia reattack) assurances. (And attack Ukraine too, of course; if needed.)
Negotiating this kind of multilateral package will be extremely hard and time-consuming, especially given the complex threat perceptions, deep resentments, and decades-long disputes involved. (Again, for both sides.)
Samuel Charap and Jennifer Kavanagh. (They are the true "only Russia" I guess.)
 
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