John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Isn't the overall corruption of the oligarch Russian regime more significant than Shoygu's failures? Just asking, I have no idea on his failures. Putin owns the Ukraine C-F IMHO.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
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- #14,362
2009-2014 the Russian Armed Forces developed quite quickly. They overcame many issues that had built up since the Soviet era and made substantial institutional improvements, including making their payrates competitive, living conditions significantly better, and creating a situation where an enlisted military career (as an NCO) was a viable option even for some college graduates. There was also a lot more openness with military units working together with civil society organizations, and even opening their doors to bloggers during press events rather than just officially accredited media. This time period was marked by many problems coming to light but also many problems being corrected. Hard decisions had to be made, but overall the improvement was dramatic and it showed in the Russian deployments to Ukraine in '14-'15 and to Syria in '15-'18. However after 2014 the pace of improvement started to dramatically slow down, and some improvements were even rolled back. Lessons learned from Russia's engagement in the Donbas were not institutionalized. This is how we ended up with the return of tank divisions at a time when this clearly served no purpose. The entire 90th TD didn't have a single UAV unit in it, even though the fighting in the Donbas clearly showed the need of UAV operators down to the company and platoon level. The Ukrainian army with it's poorly trained and insufficient infantry ran into problems unable to advance into the urban areas of Lugansk, Donetsk, or Gorlovka. But Russia didn't take away the correct lesson of needing fairly numerous and robust dismounts, reducing dismount elements for some units from 6 to 5. The professionalization of the NCOs also slowed down and even partially reversed course. We can see the results of that in the current war where often rank among enlisted means little, and a soldier is often assigned to lead based on their personal characteristics rather than rank. Also information sharing systems that were under development were either not completed, or completed in more limited form. So the link of UAVs to artillery was there to some extent, but it wasn't nearly enough, and the ability to share information with other units wasn't great. The Sozvezdie system was never implemented, despite a version of it even getting exported to India. The Andromeda-D for the VDV went into service but only for them, and it's ability to share data with other units is limited. As a result we have some Russian units coordinating well and having quite a bit of success against Ukrainian forces like the 8th Army's run to Mariupol', or the push into northern Lugansk. Other units flounder hopelessly (like that same 90th TD on the approach to Kiev).
So there are specific issues related to military development that saw the whole thing change course and lead to problems. Note this doesn't take away the overall corruption problems. Those are still there and very much exist. But there was a scenario where an overall corrupt state could have a reasonably competent and large military capable to accomplishing things.
rsemmes
Active Member
Well...
It seems that Russia may have suffered (up to) 3.000.000 casualties, more that 2 million anyway; according to GCHQ, of course.
www.bbc.co.uk
GCHQ has nothing to say about Ukrainian casualties, for some reason.
It seems that Russia may have suffered (up to) 3.000.000 casualties, more that 2 million anyway; according to GCHQ, of course.
Almost 500,000 Russian soldiers killed since start of Ukraine war
GCHQ's director Anne Keast-Butler set out the threats facing the UK in her inaugural public speech.
www.bbc.co.uk
Hoover
Member
Putin/the Russian GHQ made two major (deadly) mistakes.
1. They mistook the UA army of 2022 with the (chaotic) army in 2014. They missed that the UA army made huge improvements in training, leadership of the lower tactical levels and antitank capabilities.
2. The Russian army have seen themselves as a mighty, overwhelming force, which is wasn´t.
So 2014 was a wake up for the UA and a sleepover for the Russians. Both made their decisions from 2014, the ones took the right changes the others not.
Underestimating the enemy and overestimating the own forces is always the key to loose a war.
personaldesas
Active Member
I don’t fundamentally disagree, but I think there’s some hindsight bias here. Russia clearly underestimated Ukraine and overestimated itself, but if a few things had gone slightly differently in the first days, Kyiv, Hostomel, command and control, Western support, we might be viewing 2022 very differently now.
So yes, the assumptions were wrong. But I’m not sure it was as obviously doomed from the start as it looks now.
ComradeVortex
New Member
Sweden announced that they are donating 16 JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighter jets to Ukraine, with the first aircraft expected to be delivered in the next 10 months.
They will also enable Ukraine to purchase up to 20 Gripen E/F aircraft using €2.5B of the EU Ukraine Support Loan, with Sweden providing maintenance and training support for the aircraft.
Furthermore, Sweden announced a military aid package for Ukraine worth approximately $2.7 Billion, including $400 million for drone production. This package likely includes the 16 AS 39 Gripen C/Ds.
rsemmes
Active Member
Shares in Saab were up 4.4% at 1141 GMT, making it the top gainer in Europe.
That "letter of intent" is old news. Now that Ukraine will get those €90bn, it will buy some aircraft and next year will get some old Gripen. Then, it just needs to start a new supply line for a new aircraft model, train mechanics and pilots and... win the war, like with the F-16?
Hoover
Member
The stiff Ukrainian defence of Hostomel and the effective rearguard action against the advancing Russians were a result of the points I mentioned, I think.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #14,369
The problem runs deeper for Russia at least. The engagement in Syria was very successful for Russia, and lasted quite a while, creating a misleading sense that all was well in the armed force, since such a complex operation was being carried out so well. And the ability to carry out small operations to a fairly high standard was there. Some units were quite capable. Modern loitering munitions, guided artillery shells, and other pieces of fairly advanced kit were available, just not to most units. If 2022 wasn't Ukraine but Georgia, I think things would have gone much better for Russia. I don't literally mean Georgia itself (though that obviously would also hold true) but rather the scale.
rsemmes
Active Member
There was no "defence" of Hostomel, and all I can remember about the rearguard action was the engineers blowing up a bridge. I tend to agree more with Feanor, thinking that just because you send a lot you are going to be successful was... wishful thinking; a bluff. (What it was, a coup de main.)
In Georgia, the Red Army was ready for the enemy action. In Ukraine, there was no plan B, my impression was that only in the Mariupol area there was a clear plan of action with the correct proportion of troops/objectives and the level of fighting that was going to take place to achieve them.
rsemmes
Active Member
Romanians demand strong response after drone crash
www.bbc.co.uk
The same "strong response" that the Baltic states (and Greece) demanded against Ukraine, I guess.
Nato criticises Russia's 'reckless behaviour' after drone hits Romanian apartments, injuring two
Romania says this is the "most serious" incident in its territory since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has seen drones from both sides hit Nato countries in the region.
www.bbc.co.uk
The same "strong response" that the Baltic states (and Greece) demanded against Ukraine, I guess.
ComradeVortex
New Member
They're gonna have the same meetings, same talks, same conversations and all that.
Nothing is going to happen, maybe some increased air policing in my opinion.
personaldesas
Active Member
We’ll probably get another round of statements, but nothing that really changes the equation.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
What is it that people would like to happen regarding Romania incident? Anyone here from Romania? I see a lot of comments in the likes of “oh yeah, all talk and “strong” statements, but no action”. What action(s) do people see as reasonable or would be in line with their personal expectations?
What are the expectations in regard to the Ukrainian drones that Russia intentionally (highlighted because so declared) redirects to the Balts?
What are the expectations in regard to the Ukrainian drones that Russia intentionally (highlighted because so declared) redirects to the Balts?
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
What people would like is different from what is possible. For now, more and better military kit for Ukraine is a start along with increased cyber attacks.
rsemmes
Active Member
I say CNN went there asking some soldiers where were the Russians, CNN was talking to Russian paras.
There was a skirmish and the Ukrainians left, there was no counterattack.
There is no security concern about any intelligence that could be revealed now, nor for the last two years for that matter. How many heroes has Ukraine brought forward from that, the battle honours for all those units? We had (have) the headlines from then, the Five O'clock Follies and nothing else.
It would be a great propaganda coup for Ukraine, don't you think? All day, everyday in the news.
Talking about the Five O'clock Follies...
The media keep repeating the 500.000 Russian dead figure. At the end January CSIS was giving the estimate of 1.2m Russian casualties since 2022, 4 years, in 4 months, with no major operations, we (UK) add 800.000 more; maybe 1.8m more.
Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine
Despite claims of success in Ukraine, new CSIS data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains, with over 1.2 million casualties. Russia is also in decline as a major economic power with slow growth, weak productivity, and declining manufacturing.
personaldesas
Active Member
If that is true, and Ukraine only managed a limited skirmish and withdrawal, yet Russia still failed to secure Hostomel quickly enough to use it as an air bridge, that'd make the operation look somewhat embarrassing.
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vikingatespam
Well-Known Member
Comrade rsemmes, glad to see you are consistently dubious on anything but the official RU line of opinion !Talking about the Five O'clock Follies...
The media keep repeating the 500.000 Russian dead figure. At the end January CSIS was giving the estimate of 1.2m Russian casualties since 2022, 4 years, in 4 months, with no major operations, we (UK) add 800.000 more; maybe 1.8m more.
Nothing about Ukrainian casualties. We have to sell a Fairy Tale, by whatever means necesary.Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine
Despite claims of success in Ukraine, new CSIS data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains, with over 1.2 million casualties. Russia is also in decline as a major economic power with slow growth, weak productivity, and declining manufacturing.www.csis.org
Here are a reasonable set of estimates from Mediazona, which form the basis of most recent casualty estimates. Im sure we have provided these to you many times, but you keep forgetting.
Russian losses in the war with Ukraine. Mediazona count, updated
221,200 deaths confirmed by May 22
en.zona.media
Confirmed RU deaths by funeral notices, etc are 221K, while probate registry gives ~350K. Given that either of these will underestimate the actual number of RU dead, 500K dead is within the realm of possibility, although personally I wouldnt bet a lot of money yet on 500K. 400K, sure.
As for UKR casualties, you must of not read the csis article (Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine) as the UKR casualty estimate is right there:
"Ukrainian forces likely suffered somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025"
If you object to any of these figures I look forward to you laying out which parts of the Mediazona methologies (for example) that you find questionable ("Fairy Tale"). Perhaps you can provide better estimates to this audience.
vikingatespam
Well-Known Member
Well it looks like Tu-95 season is still in swing, with 2 more Tu-95 killed off in drone strikes. While the RU losing more strategic bombers is nothing new, maybe more shocking is that these were destroyed on the Taganrog air base, which is very close to the front lines (why.would.you.send.your. Tu-95.there ?). I look forward to further confirmation, but the video appears convincing.