The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[crest]

The zap direction is really rolling back at a record pace. Especially that first defensive line with all it's fortifications. From what I can gather the Russians are moving fast enough that even setting up new positions for drone operations are continuously disrupted.

Bringing up a larger issue of the attrition rates in drone crews recently. There at this point arguably the most important link in Ukraines defensive chain so to speak. I'm not sure how long it takes to train and equip a competent drone crews but I'm fairly certain that without a critical mass of such crews the whole concept becomes alot less effective.

 

[Feanor]

The zap direction is really rolling back at a record pace. Especially that first defensive line with all it's fortifications. From what I can gather the Russians are moving fast enough that even setting up new positions for drone operations are continuously disrupted.

Bringing up a larger issue of the attrition rates in drone crews recently. There at this point arguably the most important link in Ukraines defensive chain so to speak. I'm not sure how long it takes to train and equip a competent drone crews but I'm fairly certain that without a critical mass of such crews the whole concept becomes alot less effective.

Ukraine is reportedly really short on troops here. Russia just cut the road north out of Gulyaypole, taking Danilovka. It seems likely Gulyaypole will fall before the end of the year. Of course there's always the chance Ukraine will rush additional forces to try and hold the village. Those will have to come from somewhere though.

 

[crest]

Ukraine is reportedly really short on troops here. Russia just cut the road north out of Gulyaypole, taking Danilovka. It seems likely Gulyaypole will fall before the end of the year. Of course there's always the chance Ukraine will rush additional forces to try and hold the village. Those will have to come from somewhere though.

Ukraine has got to be seriously considering accepting Russia's terms at this point. They must be aware that if they force Russia to continue pushing forward the Russians have got to be close to adding another Oblast to there demands. Objectively it's strongest card the Russians can play to actually end the war.

 

[Feanor]

Ukraine has got to be seriously considering accepting Russia's terms at this point. They must be aware that if they force Russia to continue pushing forward the Russians have got to be close to adding another Oblast to there demands. Objectively it's strongest card the Russians can play to actually end the war.

I don't think so. Adding Kharkov region will require Russia to reasonably control a large part of it, not a small piece on the northeastern border. I think Ukraine has another 12-24 months before Russia will try to claim another region.

 

[crest]

I don't think so. Adding Kharkov region will require Russia to reasonably control a large part of it, not a small piece on the northeastern border. I think Ukraine has another 12-24 months before Russia will try to claim another region.

I think alot of that may depend on Ukraine ability to effectively reform a effective defensive line here. They absolutely do have the forces to fight effectively so, it's more they don't seem to be willing to make that decision to pullback far enough also to a not insignificant degree were? Drone ranges have indeed expanded and actually building effective defence positions require a earlier commitment then they did previously.
Im also guessing moral is still a growing issue. And imop the critical factor as I believe it's likely to break before the army itself does. Tho I do do try not to make a prediction on it I don't discard it as a real potential either.

I 100% agree the Ukrainian army is still a potent and effective force, but it's also never really been a truly cohesive force a factor that does not help with these issues.

Add in what control the top command does have appears to be a stubborn insistence on holding territory and political considerations over tactical or strategic ones. Something that has itself become a moral issue and I think despite the probloms the Russian army itself has there is a real threat of a breakthrough snowballing into a partial if not significant collapse somewhere along the front.

Especially in the areas mostly manned by understaffed and under equipped territorial defence brigades. they have shown a small but increasing breakdown in discipline in the last year there is a real risk of a unplanned retreat or a rout. And currently there is not alot of options for plugging holes. In short Russia may make that claim not due to the totality of occupation but on the speed of it. In such a case the added demand may increase pressure to accept such a deal.

Kharkov region also may not be the claim as much as it makes sence for Russia Dnipropetrovsk Oblast may also be a option if the current pace of operations continues. Or at least the parts east of the dinipr river. It's also Ukraines most important industrial region. Added to that is at least for now the lack of prepared defences compared to other directions and in general it's topography and i wouldn't be surprised to see it as a region Russia continues to push into. I don't think Ukraine has the forces to cut them off and it would also make logistics north to south a real headache. They also currently have a degree of momentum in the region. Granted I don't think they could occupy it in any reasonable length of time, but they could threaten it enough to bring Ukraine to the table

 

[rsemmes]

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=48.38711934476327%2C37.472708033649035&z=11

I have to wonder what is the Command Intent in Mirnograd.

Is it just to get Ukrainians soldiers killed so they can kill Russians soldiers? Is that going to be the 2025 Ukrainian offensive?
The first point would be knowing how many soldiers Ukraine has in town (we already know that Russia has 150.000 in the area) and why they didn't pull back to Pokrovsk. Then, we have those counterattacks in Szatishok. Is Ukraine going to attack south, towards Chervonii Liman to open a corridor to Mirnograd? Ukraine has to take the mine complex first, there are also 3 mounds in the area. Looking at the limited counterattacks we can see that Ukraine doesn't have enough troops for that operation. Even then, the whole eastern flank would be the front line, that would imply a retreat under fire; no to mention the western flank, Russia is advancing towards Grishine now.
Is there any actual Intent or is it just a case of keep holding... forever, to everything. Because Ukraine's High Command can see that it is not holding, it is slowly retreating wherever Russia decides (lately) to attack, to exert enough pressure. (Hitler was fond of declaring "fortresses"; in Vietnam, they had the Strategic Hamlets)

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, said he was not opposed to withdrawing amid the "very difficult" situation in Pokrovsk but it was a decision for commanders on the ground. "No one is forcing them to die for the sake of ruins. I will support our soldiers, especially the commanders who are there, in how they can control the situation, or it’s too expensive for us. The most important thing for us is our soldiers."

Ukraine war briefing: Flamingo flies into battle, Zelenskyy defers to commanders over Pokrovsk

President suggests leaders on the ground will decide whether holding city is costing too many lives; Kyiv apartments hit in ‘massive’ attack. What we know on day 1,360

www.theguardian.com

NYT calls it a dilemma.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/13/world/europe/ukraine-pokrovsk-russia-battle.html

Higher echelons should be planning for what is going to happen in 15 days, in 3 months. Holding out the next day doesn't sound like a plan.
Does Ukraine have resources to plan?

 

[crest]

Looks like shakove pocket is closing aswell, I'm a little surprised here to be honest, far as I know it's still the elite Ukrainian units grouped up in this area. I wonder if they were recently rotated out and if so we're Ukraine decided to put them next. They got alot of fires to put out

Zap and Dnipropetrovsk are still being rolled up quickly. With it being the mudy session and the shortage of appropriate transport aswell as the sparse (and condensed due to mud) logistics. One has to wonder how much artillery is being left behind or simply overrun. If there having problems setting up drone picket lines how much worse must it be for artillery?

On the other side it seams Ukraine has caused significant damage to novorossiky port with a combination of flamingo and Neptune missiles. They also reportedly hit the air defence hub.

Oil prices surge after Ukrainian attack hits Russian port - Daily Times

Oil prices jumped about 2% on Friday after a Ukrainian drone strike damaged an oil depot and ship at Russia’s Novorossiysk port, raising fears of major supply disruptions. Brent crude rose $1.24 to $64.25 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate climbed $1.25 to $59.94 per barrel.The...

dailytimes.com.pk

I think this is a rather important strike. It's going to severely limit Russian oil sales for however long it takes to repair there loading facilities..it's also notable due to the fact this area is heavily defended and not only the port but the air defence itself suggest some noteabley breakthrough in not just one but two missile families here. Or potentially two depending on just what is in the flamingo. Tho this might be a solid clue

 

[rsemmes]

It's going to severely limit...

Well, I don't know if 50% of Russian oil exports go through that port, but let's imagine that Russia is exporting oil through 9 other points (ports/pipelines), that would mean that Russian can only export 90% of its oil. Of course, if next day that port is at 50% capacity, that would mean at 95% capacity 24 hours later. If every other export point is not at 100% capacity already... I am not quite sure how severe is going to be "severely".

Obviously, those strikes are not helping Russia, but you need a long and continuous campaign to "severely" anything to a country.
On another note, did that hit influence Nvidia and the Fed? Markets are tricky, to say the least.

 

[crest]

Well, I don't know if 50% of Russian oil exports go through that port, but let's imagine that Russia is exporting oil through 9 other points (ports/pipelines), that would mean that Russian can only export 90% of its oil. Of course, if next day that port is at 50% capacity, that would mean at 95% capacity 24 hours later. If every other export point is not at 100% capacity already... I am not quite sure how severe is going to be "severely".

Obviously, those strikes are not helping Russia, but you need a long and continuous campaign to "severely" anything to a country.
On another note, did that hit influence Nvidia and the Fed? Markets are tricky, to say the least.

There is also the added issue of having to get ships to the other ports shipping times and the availability of loading time. Loading time is a actual checkpoint in Russia's oils shipping capacity. The extra time shipping will also add to the price per delivery and therefore may affect sales. Aswell as insurance costs and reliability for the buyer.

That's why I think this strike unlike the strikes on refineries is actually a big deal refinery strikes add cost to Russia's production. This directly affects sales and does it in a way that can't easily be countered. You are right in that it depends on how fast they can repair but its looking like it might be a few weeks. For the recorded this is a decent % of Russia's overseas capabilities at this port. I don't know how much exactly but far above 5%
Then there is also the issue of the fact these strikes hit this site is almost Moscow level in its defensive capabilities that is also a issue.

I don't factor in pipelines s in specifically talking about it's overseas shipping here there. Is no extra capacity to my knowledge to pipeline to countries that would be receiving tanker shipments. Pipelines are cheaper to ship so if there is buyers they max that first.

 

[rsemmes]

Painful, but not that unexpected.

Russia’s Far East ports ship record crude volumes amid Ukrainian attacks | Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide

www.hellenicshippingnews.com

 

[crest]

Painful, but not that unexpected.

Russia’s Far East ports ship record crude volumes amid Ukrainian attacks | Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide

www.hellenicshippingnews.com

No doubt Russia has been aware of this vulnerability for quite some time. Shifting logistics to the east has been going on for years and I suspect will continue even if this war were to stop today. With ports the issue will always be time to scale up volume as in many instances rail or pipelines are impossible options

 

[rsemmes]

“If the Russians keep hitting diesel and electric locomotives, the time will come very soon when the track will still be intact but we’ll have nothing left to run on it,” said Beskrestnov.

Russia increasingly targeting trains as attacks on Ukraine’s rail network intensify

Ukrainian minister says more than 800 attacks recorded since start of year as Moscow seeks to destroy country’s logistical capabilities

www.theguardian.com

We have to keep Ukraine in the fight by providing locomotives and cars too.

On a side note, he (Oleksii Kuleba, a deputy prime minister with responsibility for infrastructure) obviously knows that Russia is using it satellites to hit when the driver is back with his tea or after the toilet break...
"What we have seen in these escalating attacks is that they are going after trains, especially trying to kill the drivers.”

 

[Feanor]

Another area to watch right now is Kupyansk. Ukraine is conducting fairly intense counter-attacks there, aimed at cutting of Russia's ability to reinforce and resupply the forces inside Kupyansk on the right shore. Meanwhile Russia has been trying to advance southward on the left shore. In principle this could allow Russia to supply through Kupyansk itself, making the Ukrainian push at Rad'kovka irrelevant. Petropavlovka is quite significant in this respect, as to bypass Ukrainian forces there Russia has to move almost to the Oskol well north of Kupyansk and then advance southward into Kupyansk. If Russia succeeds, this means Ukraine's forces on the left shore of the Oskol need to withdraw. If Ukraine succeeds, this could mean Russia won't be able to take Kupyansk. I've always found it strange that they've chosen to attack it this way instead of focusing on a bigger push north of it, and then flanking it from the west along a wide front. Instead there's a small effort taking bites basically in the border area, going deeper, but slowly. And a nearly unrelated fight at Kupyansk. I'm wondering if the issue is that these are two separate commands, each with their own objectives.

 

[crest]

Another area to watch right now is Kupyansk. Ukraine is conducting fairly intense counter-attacks there, aimed at cutting of Russia's ability to reinforce and resupply the forces inside Kupyansk on the right shore. Meanwhile Russia has been trying to advance southward on the left shore. In principle this could allow Russia to supply through Kupyansk itself, making the Ukrainian push at Rad'kovka irrelevant. Petropavlovka is quite significant in this respect, as to bypass Ukrainian forces there Russia has to move almost to the Oskol well north of Kupyansk and then advance southward into Kupyansk. If Russia succeeds, this means Ukraine's forces on the left shore of the Oskol need to withdraw. If Ukraine succeeds, this could mean Russia won't be able to take Kupyansk. I've always found it strange that they've chosen to attack it this way instead of focusing on a bigger push north of it, and then flanking it from the west along a wide front. Instead there's a small effort taking bites basically in the border area, going deeper, but slowly. And a nearly unrelated fight at Kupyansk. I'm wondering if the issue is that these are two separate commands, each with their own objectives.

Could very well be a divided objective issue. Could also the overall attrition war aims presumably it's in Russia's interest for Ukraine to continue to try holding the pocket there as its a long and vulnerable supply routs. There is definitely a history of Russia perusing this strategy in areas the Ukraine seem willing accept such losses

The advance in novaploviska? In the fog has me thinking about winter and how effective this tactic will be well it's snowing. A event that lasts much longer then fog generally and this winter will face far less obstacles. I'm talking trenches minefields and dragons teeth here not just bunkers and fortifications or the manpower issues. It is also likey that drone ranges can shrink simply due to cold weather and battery life I'm not sure on the numbers but if my personal devices are any indication it's a significantly quicker battery drain in cold weather.
I live in Canada for reference perhaps a bit colder but then again not flying around at 60mph either

 

[Feanor]

Zap and Dnipropetrovsk are still being rolled up quickly. With it being the mudy session and the shortage of appropriate transport aswell as the sparse (and condensed due to mud) logistics.

Just a small piece of context. I always thought Gulyaypole was a village, a large one like Velikaya Novoselka, but still. Apparently it's actually a town that at one point had nearly 20 000 residents. There's even a couple of neighborhoods of multi-story housing. Geographically it sits on the Gaychur river, so outflanking or surrounding it properly will likely require Russia to cross the river. If they simply want to squeeze logistics before pushing through like they did in Pokrovsk, then they're likely almost ready to do that.

Could very well be a divided objective issue. Could also the overall attrition war aims presumably it's in Russia's interest for Ukraine to continue to try holding the pocket there as its a long and vulnerable supply routs. There is definitely a history of Russia perusing this strategy in areas the Ukraine seem willing accept such losses

I think that they may be trying to time Kupyansk to occur at the same time as Pokrovsk. They're currently inside Seversk, Liman, Konstantinovka, Pokrovsk, Volchansk, and Kupyansk. They're also rolling up on Gulyaypole. But in the case of Kupyansk specifically it's suboptimal at least locally. Russia is currently in a bad spot on the right shore part of Kupyansk because

The advance in novaploviska? In the fog has me thinking about winter and how effective this tactic will be well it's snowing. A event that lasts much longer then fog generally and this winter will face far less obstacles. I'm talking trenches minefields and dragons teeth here not just bunkers and fortifications or the manpower issues. It is also likey that drone ranges can shrink simply due to cold weather and battery life I'm not sure on the numbers but if my personal devices are any indication it's a significantly quicker battery drain in cold weather.
I live in Canada for reference perhaps a bit colder but then again not flying around at 60mph either

Winter has its own problems. For example vehicle tracks are very visible in winter and lack of leaves and greenery means it's harder to hide from drones. In this war drones seem to be a heavy defensive advantage, as attacking typically requires concentration of forces.

“If the Russians keep hitting diesel and electric locomotives, the time will come very soon when the track will still be intact but we’ll have nothing left to run on it,” said Beskrestnov.

Russia increasingly targeting trains as attacks on Ukraine’s rail network intensify

Ukrainian minister says more than 800 attacks recorded since start of year as Moscow seeks to destroy country’s logistical capabilities

www.theguardian.com

We have to keep Ukraine in the fight by providing locomotives and cars too.

On a side note, he (Oleksii Kuleba, a deputy prime minister with responsibility for infrastructure) obviously knows that Russia is using it satellites to hit when the driver is back with his tea or after the toilet break...
"What we have seen in these escalating attacks is that they are going after trains, especially trying to kill the drivers.”

Locomotives Ukraine can maintain and that can run on Soviet rail gauge.

 

[rsemmes]

Locomotives Ukraine can maintain and that can run on Soviet rail gauge.

Germany had to re-gauge. In Spain, at least since the 80's, some trains (loc & cars) were able to re-gauge to rail into France.
We are giving Ukraine everything, why not trains too? It's just going to make logistics (like with western tanks) even more complicated.

And someone will be making money out of it.

 

[John Fedup]

Germany had to re-gauge. In Spain, at least since the 80's, some trains (loc & cars) were able to re-gauge to rail into France.
We are giving Ukraine everything, why not trains too? It's just going to make logistics (like with western tanks) even more complicated.

And someone will be making money out of it.

What's worse, complicated logistics or no kit? Uniformity is great in a perfect world but in a desperate wartime situation....

 

[rsemmes]

Explosion on Polish railway was ‘unprecedented act of sabotage,’ says PM – Europe live

Donald Tusk says ‘worst fears confirmed’ over damage on route used to ferry aid deliveries to Ukraine

www.theguardian.com

Poland seems to be outraged by this terrorist attack and will bring these terrorists to justice.

(Nordstream was a singularity in the space-time continuum). I love the "unprecedented" part.

 

[rsemmes]

What's worse, complicated logistics or no kit? Uniformity is great in a perfect world but in a desperate wartime situation....

A desperate wartime situation? I thought Ukraine was doing great... (Reading some of the comments.)

 

[Vanquish]

A desperate wartime situation? I thought Ukraine was doing great... (Reading some of the comments.)

In perspective, the mere fact that Ukraine is still at war, nearing 4 years and has not been completely overrun, would indicate to a lot of people that yes indeed the Ukrainians are doing a lot greater than anyone would have imagined possible. Either that or Russia is doing poorly, what with their greater superiority in personal and equipment.