The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Feanor]

An interesting piece from Zaluzhniy discussing the current state of affairs. Note he's talking largely about conditions on the front lines. He's also willing/able to admit the overall negative tendencies for Ukraine. At the same time he clearly thinks victory is possible for Ukraine, or at least wants to deliver the message that it is. He notably doesn't discuss the staffing issues Ukraine faces, only hinting at it when he talks about the possible end of the stalemate. Notably, he also doesn't trace the trend line of expanding drone capabilities to it's logical conclusion. Camera-equipped Shaheds have already appeared, the range of Lancets is considerably longer now, Orlan and Molniya drones are being used to seed FPV drones deeper behind Ukrainian lines, we saw our first wire-guided Molniya drone with allegedly a 40km range, and there are apparently Russian drones showing up with completely autonomous guidance. They're a nightmare for civilians, since it's unlikely they'll be good at distinguishing a civilian car from a SUV being used by Ukrainian Armed Forces. With manually guided drones we've seen Russian drone operators pausing and aborting when encountering civilians, but we've also seen strikse on vehicles that are simply assumed to be Ukrainian military. The far end of this is a situation where at least Russian, I suspect also Ukrainian, drones will be able to hunt vehicles at will for a depth of 100+ kms. Unless drone interceptors become sufficiently cheap and effective to be able to clear the skies over an area completely, it will mean the effective war zone will extend deeper and deeper. Cities like Donetsk, Severodonestk-Lisichansk, Sumy, Kharkov, and Zaporozhye will all be effected. We've seen the early phases of this start sort of already. Initially Ukraine had to rely heavily on man-power intensive drone-defense teams armed with mostly HMG technicals. Ukraine eventually gave up, the manpower requirements were too much, and the soldiers were needed at the front. Downing Russian Shaheds has become far less consistent since January. At the same time Ukraine's volume of strikes with longer ranged drones has increased to the point where Russia has had to go beyond traditional GBAD and start standing up their own drone defense teams in a similar manner, first a few but now many more. Russia has much more manpower, Ukraine generally has fewer long range drones to throw and far fewer missiles, and Russia has a functioning defense industry with good experience producing GBAD. As a result we have the Pantsyr-SMD with small anti-UAS missiles, we have the modern Flakturm in Russia, and we have Russian forces testing other options include the 2S38, a HMG-based solution with an EO system, and a domestic laser system. None are in widespread use though. We may see Russia finding a way to resolve this issue with some sort of technological solution. But if we don't, we may see Russia having to make the same decision about simply allowing many more Ukrainian drone strikes to get through eventually.

Innovation as Core of Strategic Resilience: Denying Russia the Power to Dictate Terms Through War

Ukraine presented its defense innovations at DSEI-2025 in London. Valery Zaluzhny explains how drones, electronic warfare, and AI are changing warfare and why the current stalemate resembles World War I.

zn.ua

 

[Redshift]

Russia delivers from 70 to 130 strikes deep into the territory of Ukraine daily, which would overload any air defense system in the world and the main problem lies not in the means, but in the targets.

During the Iraqi campaign, strikes by the USA against pumping stations, water treatment and power supply systems led to a humanitarian catastrophe. Millions of people were left without electricity, drinking water and sewage.

Over three years of the conflict, Kyiv, despite demonstrative strikes against the energy system, continues to function. Russia consciously does not deliver systematic strikes against the critical infrastructure of the capital, government buildings, television centers, data processing centers and the financial system.

Please provide proof that

"Russia consciously does not deliver systematic strikes against the critical infrastructure of the capital, government buildings, television centers, data processing centers and the financial system."

 

[rsemmes]

Please provide proof that
"Russia consciously does not deliver systematic strikes against the critical infrastructure of the capital, government buildings, television centers, data processing centers and the financial system."

Before getting into the "actual" proof and what "proof" would that be...

How many: a/government buildings b/television centres c/data processing centres d/financial system, have been hit?
How many missiles has Russia launched against buildings in Ukrainian cities or Kiev?

 

[rsemmes]

Innovation as Core of Strategic Resilience: Denying Russia the Power to Dictate Terms Through War

Ukraine presented its defense innovations at DSEI-2025 in London. Valery Zaluzhny explains how drones, electronic warfare, and AI are changing warfare and why the current stalemate resembles World War I.

zn.ua

I couldn't help but noticed...
Finally, newly-formed units lacked even a minimum level of armament or were inadequately armed—a situation entirely dependent on the choices and resources of our partners.
Ukraine decided to attack (2023 offensive) but the defeat is not Ukraine's fault.

In sum, the essence of the stalemate is not only the impossibility of breaking through defensive lines but, above all, the inability to achieve operational aims, including reaching operational depth. ...
Any massing of troops invites near-instant destruction by FPV strike drones or by artillery adjusted by UAVs.
I have to disagree with that. No massive superiority has been achieved, yet, for that break through.

Has there been any success in breaking free of this cul-de-sac, which, from the standpoint of Ukraine’s resources, is already predictably unacceptable?
Is Valery Zaluzhny conceding defeat?

Naturally, not only are lines of communication wrecked; the very idea of a secure rear is fading, since its customary location behind the forward echelons -anywhere within 40km- is no longer tenable under persistent enemy fire control.
I have to wonder if he is talking about the Germans in the Western Theatre in 1944-45.

...at times leaving even commanders uncertain of the actual layout of their positions.
That is warfare, in what war have commanders been “certain”.

...

 

[rsemmes]

Can Russia slightly decrease the use of ammo and accumulate enough drones, Gerans missiles, glide-bombs, shells and troops to launch a one/two weeks campaign in a 20-50km front to achieve such a superiority that enables one breakthrough?

Russia has decided to surround towns through infiltration, and it is working.

 

[Redshift]

Before getting into the "actual" proof and what "proof" would that be...

How many: a/government buildings b/television centres c/data processing centres d/financial system, have been hit?
How many missiles has Russia launched against buildings in Ukrainian cities or Kiev?

I see so none that they are "consciously" refraining from such activity just observational evidence that they haven't actually done it?

How many hairdressing salons have they hit? None? Well in that case they must be "consciously" avoiding hitting hairdressers to.

You ascribe a motive to an inaction on somebody else's part, how much of a stretch of the imagination must that take?

 

[Feanor]

I see so none that they are "consciously" refraining from such activity just observational evidence that they haven't actually done it?

How many hairdressing salons have they hit? None? Well in that case they must be "consciously" avoiding hitting hairdressers to.

You ascribe a motive to an inaction on somebody else's part, how much of a stretch of the imagination must that take?

I think you're splitting hairs. Russia's long range strikes into Ukraine are conducted with PGMs. Targets for these PGMs appear to be selected in advance. Anything Russia isn't consciously targeting, they're consciously not targeting. And we've seen evidence of Russia selecting for certain target types and focusing on them over a period of time to achieve certain results. If Russia had chosen to hit government buildings, data processing centers, financial industry facilities, etc. we would know it. That having been said, I'm of the opinion that strikes such as these would have relatively little impact on the war. I think the reason Russia doesn't hit these targets is because they don't consider it worthwhile. Not killing Ukraine's political leadership is a good way to leave some escalation potential in play, while simultaneously minimizing risks for similar attempts on Russian leadership. And it's not like killing some Rada deputies would accomplish anything. For the rest, it's not clear how much any of it would matter. Shutting down online banking and ATMs for a few days while Ukraine re-orients towards other facilities, possibly from outside the country, would be unpleasant for the population but certainly not critical. Russia has systematically targeted other critical infrastructure that they considered more worthwhile, namely powerplants, bridges, industrial facilities, and even hydroelectric dams.

 

[Redshift]

I think you're splitting hairs. Russia's long range strikes into Ukraine are conducted with PGMs. Targets for these PGMs appear to be selected in advance. Anything Russia isn't consciously targeting, they're consciously not targeting. And we've seen evidence of Russia selecting for certain target types and focusing on them over a period of time to achieve certain results. If Russia had chosen to hit government buildings, data processing centers, financial industry facilities, etc. we would know it. That having been said, I'm of the opinion that strikes such as these would have relatively little impact on the war. I think the reason Russia doesn't hit these targets is because they don't consider it worthwhile. Not killing Ukraine's political leadership is a good way to leave some escalation potential in play, while simultaneously minimizing risks for similar attempts on Russian leadership. And it's not like killing some Rada deputies would accomplish anything. For the rest, it's not clear how much any of it would matter. Shutting down online banking and ATMs for a few days while Ukraine re-orients towards other facilities, possibly from outside the country, would be unpleasant for the population but certainly not critical. Russia has systematically targeted other critical infrastructure that they considered more worthwhile, namely powerplants, bridges, industrial facilities, and even hydroelectric dams.

No I'm applying logic, you can't say that because they aren't observably doing something in particular, then that is a strategy. If Russia came out and said it then THAT is a strategy .

They could be NOT doing it because they have other targets and limited resources, or they don't believe they have the accuracy without killing tooany cibillians, there are innumerable reasons why they DON'T hit certain targets. It is pointless to make up reasons on behalf of others why they DON'T do something and they declare that as a conscious strategy

It is simply a guess at best as to why someone DOESN'T do something until that entity has at least suggested that there is a real and specific reason in advance.

In all likelihood a more reasonable reason for NOT doing something is that the resources to do so are too valuable for that task and more useful doing other things, but that too is stretch without more evidence.

The "reason" I have above suggests Russia has limitations on what it can do, the reasons RSEMMES gives (conscious avoidance) suggests (and is meant to suggest) is that Russia could do anything it likes without limit if it really chose to.

Both (mine and his) are no more than propaganda exercises when proffered without deeper evidence of an actual a)strategy because Russia are invincible or b) limitations because Russia are running out of missiles.

Neither are viable to be honest.

Also most of your post supports my contention that ascribing motives to someone's inaction can be for many many reasons, but RSEMMES actively claiming "consciously" not doing it implies strategic restraint, possibly humanitarian, possibly simply because they are just lovely people doing as little harm as possible. RSEMMES knows this and chooses his words carefully to imply things that he cannot possibly know.

 

[Redshift]

I think you're splitting hairs. Russia's long range strikes into Ukraine are conducted with PGMs. Targets for these PGMs appear to be selected in advance. Anything Russia isn't consciously targeting, they're consciously not targeting. And we've seen evidence of Russia selecting for certain target types and focusing on them over a period of time to achieve certain results. If Russia had chosen to hit government buildings, data processing centers, financial industry facilities, etc. we would know it. That having been said, I'm of the opinion that strikes such as these would have relatively little impact on the war. I think the reason Russia doesn't hit these targets is because they don't consider it worthwhile. Not killing Ukraine's political leadership is a good way to leave some escalation potential in play, while simultaneously minimizing risks for similar attempts on Russian leadership. And it's not like killing some Rada deputies would accomplish anything. For the rest, it's not clear how much any of it would matter. Shutting down online banking and ATMs for a few days while Ukraine re-orients towards other facilities, possibly from outside the country, would be unpleasant for the population but certainly not critical. Russia has systematically targeted other critical infrastructure that they considered more worthwhile, namely powerplants, bridges, industrial facilities, and even hydroelectric dams.

It is a logical fallacy to ascribe an outcome to an action without evidence, usually known as a "false cause"

You could equally say that as Russia has not struck any pig barns then they are consciously avoiding hitting pig farms, that is correlation not causation. Simply asserting that something is a fact is just not good enough, and when asked for evidence RSEMMES provided none.

 

[Redshift]

I think you're splitting hairs. Russia's long range strikes into Ukraine are conducted with PGMs. Targets for these PGMs appear to be selected in advance. Anything Russia isn't consciously targeting, they're consciously not targeting. And we've seen evidence of Russia selecting for certain target types and focusing on them over a period of time to achieve certain results. If Russia had chosen to hit government buildings, data processing centers, financial industry facilities, etc. we would know it. That having been said, I'm of the opinion that strikes such as these would have relatively little impact on the war. I think the reason Russia doesn't hit these targets is because they don't consider it worthwhile. Not killing Ukraine's political leadership is a good way to leave some escalation potential in play, while simultaneously minimizing risks for similar attempts on Russian leadership. And it's not like killing some Rada deputies would accomplish anything. For the rest, it's not clear how much any of it would matter. Shutting down online banking and ATMs for a few days while Ukraine re-orients towards other facilities, possibly from outside the country, would be unpleasant for the population but certainly not critical. Russia has systematically targeted other critical infrastructure that they considered more worthwhile, namely powerplants, bridges, industrial facilities, and even hydroelectric dams.

It can equally be said that as Ukraine has hit oil refineries but not television stations in Russia that Ukraine is consciously avoiding hitting television stations in Russia.

Is that true? I doubt it.