The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

GermanHerman

Active Member
Nevertheless it would be a positive if true. If the 80,000 casualty number is on the low end and reported recruiting efforts are falling short then the speculation is warranted.
I would hint you in the direction of Mark Galeotti when it comes to russian internal politics. Not only has he written quite some books on the russian society and history but also has a blog and an podcast that deals with this.

In short, a coup would be bad. Putin is known as a moderate under the nationalists and anyone who would replace him by means of force would be most likely a hardliner like Petrushev. This would mean further escalation and a greater risk of all out war between russia and the West.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It's probably the photo of that guy in swimwear posing in front of a S-300/S-400 launch unit on a sand dune near some salt lake on Crimea.

The image was discovered in July on Russian facebook equivalent VK.com by a Swiss guy working OSINT. He collated the information through searching for more pictures of the site as well as satellite imagery, precisely geolocating a S-400 site there. Then to publish his discovery "for some reason" he used a journalist who happens to work for RFE/RL, i.e. the US propaganda outlet.
It's interesting because the photo I saw shows the TEL in a packed up mode. So it's not clear that this is an air defense position, rather it's quite possible the vehicle was temporarily stopped while heading somewhere else. I guess we'll know if we see burned out S-400 TELs soon. Ukraine has been feeling out the air defenses of Crimea for about a week now, presumably in preparation for a major strike.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It's interesting because the photo I saw shows the TEL in a packed up mode. So it's not clear that this is an air defense position, rather it's quite possible the vehicle was temporarily stopped while heading somewhere else. I guess we'll know if we see burned out S-400 TELs soon. Ukraine has been feeling out the air defenses of Crimea for about a week now, presumably in preparation for a major strike.
Yep it was the one.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
New USD 2.98 Billion package from the US, including:

Six additional National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) with additional munitions for NASAMS;
Up to 245,000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition;
Up to 65,000 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition;
Up to 24 counter-artillery radars;
Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and support equipment for Scan Eagle UAS systems;
VAMPIRE Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems;
Laser-guided rocket systems;
Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.


This is of course not short-term but rather medium-long term. This is in addition to the USD 775 million announced recently (US to ship $775 million aid package of arms, drones to Ukraine, official says: Recap), and brings the US total to close to USD 13 billion. So far.

The UK also announced a new package this week: USD 64 million, including 850 hand-launched Black Hornet micro-drones (Made in Norway). Oslo contributed upward of $9 million to the transaction. Norway’s contributions to the British-led fund in support of Ukraine total roughly $41 million.

Germany, Slovakia sign tank swap deal: Germany, Slovakia sign tank swap deal to arm Ukraine

Germany has pledged to ship weapons valued at EUR 500 million during 2023: Russia-Ukraine updates: Germany to send €500 million in new weapons | DW | 23.08.2022 including three more Iris-T air defense systems, a dozen armored recovery vehicles, 20 pickup mounted rocket launchers, precision ammunition and anti-drone devices.

Macron vows long-term support for Ukraine: Macron vows ‘long term’ EU support for Ukraine on eve of Independence Day

Poland's support is "permanent, multidimensional": Poland's aid for Ukraine is permanent, multi-dimensional says dep MoD

Ukraine is not losing support -- not yet at least. To me it seems that what has been committed so far should keep Russia at bay at least until mid 2023.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
New USD 2.98 Billion package from the US, including:

Six additional National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) with additional munitions for NASAMS;
Up to 245,000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition;
Up to 65,000 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition;
Up to 24 counter-artillery radars;
Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and support equipment for Scan Eagle UAS systems;
VAMPIRE Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems;
Laser-guided rocket systems;
Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.


This is of course not short-term but rather medium-long term. This is in addition to the USD 775 million announced recently (US to ship $775 million aid package of arms, drones to Ukraine, official says: Recap), and brings the US total to close to USD 13 billion. So far.

The UK also announced a new package this week: USD 64 million, including 850 hand-launched Black Hornet micro-drones (Made in Norway). Oslo contributed upward of $9 million to the transaction. Norway’s contributions to the British-led fund in support of Ukraine total roughly $41 million.

Germany, Slovakia sign tank swap deal: Germany, Slovakia sign tank swap deal to arm Ukraine

Germany has pledged to ship weapons valued at EUR 500 million during 2023: Russia-Ukraine updates: Germany to send €500 million in new weapons | DW | 23.08.2022 including three more Iris-T air defense systems, a dozen armored recovery vehicles, 20 pickup mounted rocket launchers, precision ammunition and anti-drone devices.

Macron vows long-term support for Ukraine: Macron vows ‘long term’ EU support for Ukraine on eve of Independence Day

Poland's support is "permanent, multidimensional": Poland's aid for Ukraine is permanent, multi-dimensional says dep MoD

Ukraine is not losing support -- not yet at least. To me it seems that what has been committed so far should keep Russia at bay at least until mid 2023.
Keep Russia at bay as in prevent a collapse of the Ukrainian military? Perhaps, though I suspect the actual prosecution of the war will be more significant there. Keep Russia at bay as in prevent Russia from continuing their slow forward advance? I suspect not. The one thing this shows very clearly is that much of Europe and the US are committed to supporting Ukraine, despite the difficulties and costs associated with this.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Germany has pledged to ship weapons valued at EUR 500 million during 2023: Russia-Ukraine updates: Germany to send €500 million in new weapons | DW | 23.08.2022 including three more Iris-T air defense systems, a dozen armored recovery vehicles, 20 pickup mounted rocket launchers, precision ammunition and anti-drone devices.
Only the three additional Iris-T are new, and probably based around Diehl by now having decided to continue production past the first batch (the initial batch to be redirected to Ukraine was the one originally for Egypt, who was negotiated into deferring for later shipment).

The other equipment was already on the list and to some extent (example: anti-drone systems) has already been delivered with new gear intended as electronics upgrade to those systems.

Material cleared for export to Ukraine by Germany was officially valued at 644 million Euro as of August 8th; this includes significantly undervalued ex-Bundeswehr gear though. About the same amount (745m estimated, about 500 million more planned to end of year) has been provided under the moniker "humanitarian aid", of which about half went to equip Ukrainian civil protection outfits (the other half went to NGOs operating in Ukraine).
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
President Putin has enacted a decree increasing the size of the Russian military
Russia-Ukraine war: President Vladimir Putin orders troop replenishment in face of Ukraine losses (smh.com.au)
I understand that many of the Russian military are under contract , do the military currently serving in the Ukraine have the right to not continue their service in such once their contract has expired ? and can an emergency decree extend the length of these contracts for the duration?
Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2: Providing another view to reframe Feanor’s posts

1. There were a great many people in 1991 who were quite certain that Russia would attempt to disrupt the post-Cold War settlement, and a great many of those people decided that NATO expansion was a hedge against Russian revanchism. Eastern European countries wanted into NATO even before the Soviet occupation forces were gone.

Keep Russia at bay as in prevent a collapse of the Ukrainian military?
2. I disagree with your framing — there is no evidence to suggest an imminent Ukrainian Army collapse in any sector (only deliberate withdrawals).
(a) Ukraine is bleeding Russia for even the tiny gains they make. The essence of their strategy is to trade space for time. Since Russian forces resumed offensive operations following a pause on 16 July 2022, they have gained ~451 km2 (~174 sq. miles) of new territory. According to ISW in the last 39 days, Russian Army has only taken territory the size of Andorra (a tiny, independent principality situated between France and Spain) from Ukraine. It has led Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, to come up with claptrap about going slow to save citizen deaths.​
(b) Given the level of incompetence demonstrated by the Russian Army. Russian logistics deficiencies ensures that its advance into Ukraine has slowed to a crawl but there is no denying that the death rate for Ukraine is unbearably high. Meanwhile, Russian forces have lost roughly 45,000 km2 (~28,000 sq. miles) of territory since the date of their deepest advance from 21 March 2022.​
(c) Kharkiv Update: Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in northwestern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly retreated after attempting an unsuccessful offensive near Petrivka, approximately 15km northeast of Kharkiv City.​

Perhaps, though I suspect the actual prosecution of the war will be more significant there.
3. When an army invades another country, if it can’t advance or provide security due to internal C4I issues and logistics deficiencies — that army, in the mid-to-long term, is losing the war.
(a) Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest and northeast of Slovyansk, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and northwest of Donetsk City. If the Russian Army wants to continue to advance in Ukraine, it needs to:​
(i) generate enough forces to win;​
(ii) be able to cross rivers (with engineer bridging support); and​
(iii) win the recce, counter-recce fight — but that is not happening.​
Further, President Putin’s 25 Aug 2022 decree to increase the size of the Russian military is unlikely to generate significant combat power in the near future and indicates that he is unlikely to order a mass mobilization soon.​
(b) The Russian Army is not at that point of losing the war in Ukraine; but Ukrainian UAV and HIMARS strikes to Russian command posts, naval bases and ammo depots, results in unintentional comedy gold from Russian propagandists.​
(c) Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Antonivsky bridge again in a continued effort to prevent Russian construction units from restoring the bridge.​
(d) Unknown actors, likely Ukrainian partisans, reportedly conducted an explosive attack against the Russian headquarters for referendum preparations in Pryazovske, Zaporizhia Oblast.​

Keep Russia at bay as in prevent Russia from continuing their slow forward advance? I suspect not.
4. Despite the latest US$3 billion military aid package to Ukraine from Team Biden, the biggest problem Ukraine has — they don’t have fires superiority — this ensures that they can’t mass in offensive actions at brigade level (aka 5,000 troops) and above.
(a) The Ukraine Army has shown that it can fight at brigade level in defence but they can’t load up 5,000 troops in armoured vehicles to conduct coherent offensive ops, in multiple armoured battle groups (ABGs), to retake certain sectors.​
(b) While the delivery of artillery systems and ammo is important, I believe that the 6 NASAMs air defence systems (after the Ukrainians are trained), will have a bigger impact in the mid-term outcome, as they will help to defend certain Ukrainian sectors from Russian air attacks.​
 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Is there any information about whether or not the UKR armor brigades have been extensively engaged ? I can no longer find my link to a map that listed unit locations.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2: Providing another view to reframe Feanor’s posts

5. I believe the Ukrainian Army is at least 2 to 6 months away from generating the forces needed to conduct offensive action at ABGs or brigade levels and above. Until Ukraine can move a division, at a time, they can’t take the Russian Army head on. And the Ukrainian Army is at least 1 to 1.5 years away from generating a new division for offensive action.

The one thing this shows very clearly is that much of Europe and the US are committed to supporting Ukraine, despite the difficulties and costs associated with this.
6. Agreed.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2: Providing another view to reframe Feanor’s posts

1. There were a great many people in 1991 who were quite certain that Russia would attempt to disrupt the post-Cold War settlement, and a great many of those people decided that NATO expansion was a hedge against Russian revanchism. Eastern European countries wanted into NATO even before the Soviet occupation forces were gone.

2. I disagree with your framing — there is no evidence to suggest an imminent Ukrainian Army collapse in any sector (only deliberate withdrawals).
(a) Ukraine is bleeding Russia for even the tiny gains they make. The essence of their strategy is to trade space for time. Since Russian forces resumed offensive operations following a pause on 16 July 2022, they have gained ~451 km2 (~174 sq. miles) of new territory. According to ISW in the last 39 days, Russian Army has only taken territory the size of Andorra (a tiny, independent principality situated between France and Spain) from Ukraine. It has led Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, to come up with claptrap about going slow to save citizen deaths.​
(b) Given the level of incompetence demonstrated by the Russian Army. Russian logistics deficiencies ensures that its advance into Ukraine has slowed to a crawl but there is no denying that the death rate for Ukraine is unbearably high. Meanwhile, Russian forces have lost roughly 45,000 km2 (~28,000 sq. miles) of territory since the date of their deepest advance from 21 March 2022.​
(c) Kharkiv Update: Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in northwestern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly retreated after attempting an unsuccessful offensive near Petrivka, approximately 15km northeast of Kharkiv City.​
Point taken. However there's two sides here. One is, yes it doesn't appear Ukrainian military will collapse. However... if it were to, this aid would not prevent it.

3. When an army invades another country, if it can’t advance or provide security due to internal C4I issues and logistics deficiencies — that army, in the mid-to-long term, is losing the war.
(a) Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest and northeast of Slovyansk, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and northwest of Donetsk City. If the Russian Army wants to continue to advance in Ukraine, it needs to:​
(i) generate enough forces to win;​
(ii) be able to cross rivers (with engineer bridging support); and​
(iii) win the recce, counter-recce fight — but that is not happening.​
Further, President Putin’s 25 Aug 2022 decree to increase the size of the Russian military is unlikely to generate significant combat power in the near future and indicates that he is unlikely to order a mass mobilization soon.​
(b) The Russian Army is not at that point of losing the war in Ukraine; but Ukrainian UAV and HIMARS strikes to Russian command posts, naval bases and ammo depots, results in unintentional comedy gold from Russian propagandists.​
(c) Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Antonivsky bridge again in a continued effort to prevent Russian construction units from restoring the bridge.​
(d) Unknown actors, likely Ukrainian partisans, reportedly conducted an explosive attack against the Russian headquarters for referendum preparations in Pryazovske, Zaporizhia Oblast.​
Well they are advancing. Just much slower then they would like to. But I don't think the strategy is advancing. I think the strategy they're trying for is to break the Ukrainian military through infliction of destruction of equipment and horrific casualties. I don't think this is the right strategy, but it's the one they selected.

4. Despite the latest US$3 billion military aid package to Ukraine from Team Biden, the biggest problem Ukraine has — they don’t have fires superiority — this ensures that they can’t mass in offensive actions at brigade level (aka 5,000 troops) and above.

(a) The Ukraine Army has shown that it can fight at brigade level in defence but they can’t load up 5,000 troops in armoured vehicles to conduct coherent offensive ops, in multiple armoured battle groups (ABGs), to retake certain sectors.​
(b) While the delivery of artillery systems and ammo is important, I believe that the 6 NASAMs air defence systems (after the Ukrainians are trained), will have a bigger impact in the mid-term outcome, as they will help to defend certain Ukrainian sectors from Russian air attacks.​
This makes me wonder. Why do you think Ukraine will be able to mass for offensive actions in six months?
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
Post 2 of 2: Providing another view to reframe Feanor’s posts

5. I believe the Ukrainian Army is at least 2 to 6 months away from generating the forces needed to conduct offensive action at ABGs or brigade levels and above. Until Ukraine can move a division, at a time, they can’t take the Russian Army head on. And the Ukrainian Army is at least 1 to 1.5 years away from generating a new division for offensive action.
I mostly agree with your assesment, save on this one. This one I'm bit very sceptical. Many pundits in Western media talk much on how Ukranian bleeding Russian advance (which is true). However avoiding the elephant in the room, how Ukraine loss much more not just in manpower and equipment, but more importantly their own Industrial capabilities on replacing the lost.

Time will tell if Russian will commit much more man power (which they have more abundance then Ukraine, but not want to do it due to seems present internal political calculation). West can supplies Ukraine (which without that Ukraine already collapse), however I still not see what West supplies can be enough for Ukraine doing counter offensive.

So far what west supplies is doing more to dampen Russian advance but also put Ukraine on continues defensive posturing and possitioning. Even some in Westren media already put much doubt on Ukraine talk for big counter offensive in southern front.

As put before, some in the West put comparison of Western supplies to Ukraine will turn tide just like Western supplies to USSR. However that's something that can not be compared in my opinion. USSR still have their own MIC fully running, thus Western supplies buy them time until their own MIC can provide bulk of their supplies and equipments to do counter offensive. Ukraine does not have that.

On other hand Russian as Invading forces still have their MIC intacts and running (even some in west call it under much reduce rate, which still much debateable), while in WW2 Germany MIC also at same time being reduce to Western attacks from other front. Something that Russian not facing.

So, I just don't see how Ukraine can build enough forces to reclaim land they are already lost.

Note: Seems Feanor already asking similar points I have point out.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 3: Providing another view to reframe Feanor’s posts

I mostly agree with your assesment, save on this one. This one I'm bit very sceptical. Many pundits in Western media talk much on how Ukranian bleeding Russian advance (which is true). However avoiding the elephant in the room, how Ukraine loss much more not just in manpower and equipment…

So, I just don't see how Ukraine can build enough forces to reclaim land they are already lost.

Note: Seems Feanor already asking similar points I have point out.
7. You know me, my answers are all technical. It’s not about winning or losing but it is about scale and intensity of fighting. It is very unlikely the Ukrainian Army can gain ground easily at this point, as the front is pretty static.

I think the strategy they're trying for is to break the Ukrainian military through infliction of destruction of equipment and horrific casualties. I don't think this is the right strategy, but it's the one they selected.
8. That is so wrong at multiple levels — the Ukrainian Army will not break. They may have morale problems with some sectors but to break the Ukrainian Army — not possible with the amount of Western military aid currently committed.

This makes me wonder. Why do you think Ukraine will be able to mass for offensive actions in six months?
9. In 6 months, I am certain Ukrainian can fight at least at ABG level (a battalion of IFVs plus a platoon of tanks, supported by some artillery).

10. The stretch goal is if Ukraine can fight at an armoured brigade level (3 IFV battalions, a tank battalion plus a 6 gun battery in Direct Support) — this I have some doubt, until I see more evidence.
 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
I mostly agree with your assessment, save on this one. This one I'm bit very sceptical. Many pundits in Western media talk much on how Ukranian bleeding Russian advance (which is true). However avoiding the elephant in the room, how Ukraine loss much more not just in manpower and equipment, but more importantly their own Industrial capabilities on replacing the lost.
Maybe I am missing something but why are we assuming UKR has lost more in manpower than RU ?

As for equipment, UKR has more thanks than they started with, based off of Oryx data and deliveries of other tanks form former WP nations. Do we have good estimates of tube, rotor and airframe losses as a % of pre-war totals ?

Does UKR have any tank production capability ?
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Post 3: Providing another view to reframe Feanor’s posts

9. In 6 months, I am certain Ukrainian can fight at least at ABG level (a battalion of IFVs plus a platoon of tanks, supported by some artillery).

10. The stretch goal is if Ukraine can fight at an armoured brigade level (3 IFV battalions, a tank battalion plus a 6 gun battery in Direct Support) — this I have some doubt, until I see more evidence.
This is where I was kind of leading with my post #4491, but if UKR has not committed their armored brigades to heavy combat (I dont know), wont they already be trained for BDE level engagements ?
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1 of 3: Various factors that may change the battle geometry

This is where I was kind of leading with my post #4491, but if UKR has not committed their armored brigades to heavy combat (I dont know), wont they already be trained for BDE level engagements ?
1. The Ukraine Army does not have 20% of the validated capability of an advanced combined arms brigade nor do they have the resources to conduct complex multi-agency exercises, like Australia, Finland, Korea or Singapore — with role players for exercise injects.

2. The Ukrainians are very experienced in fighting the Russians in trench lines and in urban areas but they do not train for offensive action as a proper combined arms brigade in a division sector. They certainly don’t have money to do the detailed work-ups via a crawl-walk-run methodology, for higher level exercises at ABG or armoured brigade levels. This process of tri-service training with ABGs, cost time, plus a few hundred thousand dollars in staff costs and ammo.
(a) In most advanced countries, armies train at Company level (crawl), they then move up to Battalion level (walk), before they train to fight a Brigade level (run).​
(b) For a clue of what is next capability increment for the Ukrainian, the way the US Army trains:​
(i) its own brigades (at the US Army's National Training Center); or​
(ii) partners for operations at Brigade level (as demonstrated at Ex Super Garuda Shield),
is instructive.​
(c) Further, the division, itself also needs some level training to validate its C4IISR capability before that force is considered ready to fight.​

3. If the Ukrainians could fight at an armoured brigade level — a tank battalion advancing in support of 2 or more battalions of IFVs (with a battery of 155mm Caesar self-propelled guns (SPGs) in direct support for fires superiority), the battlefield geometry will change drastically. The US must have deployed a security force assistance brigade into Europe and are quietly training Ukrainian Forces — somewhere.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
8. That is so wrong at multiple levels — the Ukrainian Army will not break. They may have morale problems with some sectors but to break the Ukrainian Army — not possible with the amount of Western military aid currently committed.
Wrong as in you think Russia has a different strategy? Or wrong as in this approach won't work? If the latter, we agree.

9. In 6 months, I am certain Ukrainian can fight at least at ABG level (a battalion of IFVs plus a platoon of tanks, supported by some artillery).

10. The stretch goal is if Ukraine can fight at an armoured brigade level (3 IFV battalions, a tank battalion plus a 6 gun battery in Direct Support) — this I have some doubt.
This explains the what in detail but not the why. What makes you think Ukraine will gain this ability in the context of the ongoing conflict?
 
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