The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[vikingatespam]

The location of the UKR offensive was dictated by the need to score a meaningful victory. Reach the coast near Berdiansk or at least cut the rail line at Tokmak and then you can knock down the rail bridge to Crimea. Anywhere else is territory the RU dont care about.

Unfortunately, the RU command wasnt totally asleep and they saw it too.

 

[Feanor]

The location of the UKR offensive was dictated by the need to score a meaningful victory. Reach the coast near Berdiansk or at least cut the rail line at Tokmak and then you can knock down the rail bridge to Crimea. Anywhere else is territory the RU dont care about.

Unfortunately, the RU command wasnt totally asleep and they saw it too.

A little more then "not totally asleep". Russia's defense worked better then even Russia had expected. Which means Russia had other contingencies ready to activate that didn't really come into play because Ukraine got bogged down in the first crumple zone. It seems to me that Russian command is holding back pretty hard. I suspect not being defeated matters more to them then actually winning. This is why I think Russia hasn't launched a single offensive with operational implications since the fall of Severodonetsk-Lisichansk.

 

[seaspear]

Why would you not consider the present offensive in Avdiivka an offensive with operational implications? It would seem material and manpower losses rivals if not exceeds Ukraine's losses on the southern front.

 

[Feanor]

Why would you not consider the present offensive in Avdiivka an offensive with operational implications? It would seem material and manpower losses rivals if not exceeds Ukraine's losses on the southern front.

What operational implications would it have? At best it's an operational-tactical level move intended to relive pressure on Donetsk from Ukrainian shelling. The goal might have significant political implications for Russian internal policy in Donetsk, but it's not something that can lead to anything further. Avdeevka doesn't open the road to further pushes, and Russia's attacks there are slow and not aimed at creating a breakthrough. Avdeevka is the goal, not a means to a further strategic end. Russian "successes" in the post-Kherson war effort have all been of this kind. Tactical, and completely achievable, but completely insignificant.

 

[SinisterMinister]

A little more then "not totally asleep". Russia's defense worked better then even Russia had expected. Which means Russia had other contingencies ready to activate that didn't really come into play because Ukraine got bogged down in the first crumple zone. It seems to me that Russian command is holding back pretty hard. I suspect not being defeated matters more to them then actually winning. This is why I think Russia hasn't launched a single offensive with operational implications since the fall of Severodonetsk-Lisichansk.

My assumption has been that they lost all the forces with real offensive potential during spring 2022 and have been working to rebuild them since the mobilization. I think you are correct though that they have exercised quite a bit of caution; there is good reason to believe that the current nature of the war does not lend itself to successful operational offensives without first attritting kill chains to a significant degree. If I had to guess I would say that Russia won't launch any full force offensives until the war of attrition heavily favors them.

I'd be curious, given the stalemate in the air war, if you think either side is capable of a successful operational offensive without achieving overwhelming superiority of numbers/firepower. Defensive tactics feel like they have a massive advantage and there is no real possibility of surprise.

 

[seaspear]

What operational implications would it have? At best it's an operational-tactical level move intended to relive pressure on Donetsk from Ukrainian shelling. The goal might have significant political implications for Russian internal policy in Donetsk, but it's not something that can lead to anything further. Avdeevka doesn't open the road to further pushes, and Russia's attacks there are slow and not aimed at creating a breakthrough. Avdeevka is the goal, not a means to a further strategic end. Russian "successes" in the post-Kherson war effort have all been of this kind. Tactical, and completely achievable, but completely insignificant.

Would the operational aims of the Avdiika attack be the claiming of the rest of the Donetsk region in time for Russian presidential elections? Can you identify the forces used by Russia in this present offensive there i.e. are Russia's prison population overly used here as per Bahkmut leading to high losses ?

 

[vikingatespam]

Would the operational aims of the Avdiika attack be the claiming of the rest of the Donetsk region in time for Russian presidential elections? Can you identify the forces used by Russia in this present offensive there i.e. are Russia's prison population overly used here as per Bahkmut leading to high losses ?

Avdiika is nominally low-hanging fruit. Close the pocket, bag a lot of POW, and win a huge propaganda victory. Of course, the UKR have a say in that, and it appears the RU are getting hammered there.

 

[Feanor]

Avdiika is nominally low-hanging fruit. Close the pocket, bag a lot of POW, and win a huge propaganda victory. Of course, the UKR have a say in that, and it appears the RU are getting hammered there.

This is a very surface level look. Avdeevka is a fortress, much more so then Artemovsk/Bakhmut. And Russia has launched several previous failed attempts to encircle it and approach it. This attempt appears to be much better supported, and Russia is playing their air power advantage with regular strikes all over the town and surrounding villages. However there is no guarantee it will fall. The fight is still ongoing.

Would the operational aims of the Avdiika attack be the claiming of the rest of the Donetsk region in time for Russian presidential elections? Can you identify the forces used by Russia in this present offensive there i.e. are Russia's prison population overly used here as per Bahkmut leading to high losses ?

This is fantasy. Konstantinovka, Druzhkovka, Chasoviy Yar, Novogorodskoe, Toretsk, Mar'inka, and many many other towns would have to fall. Avdeevka isn't much of a step in that direction. An operational move would seek a breakthrough bypassing this costly assault on a front line fortress.

 

[Feanor]

Update.

Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

It appears Russia has begun counter-attacking in this area. Russian forces are advancing on the north-west of Artemovsk/Bakhmut southward, recapturing the same ground south of the Berkhovka reservoir. There are also reports of Russian counter-attacks pushing back Ukrainian forces near Klescheevka and Andreevka.

Соледарское направление: контратака российской Армии у Бахмута

После почти нескольких месяцев активных попыток противника продавить рубежи ВС РФ у Бахмута и взять город в полуокружение возможности ВСУ...

rybar.ru

https://rybar.ru/piwigo/upload/2023/11/13/20231113113133-2dd29a1f.jpg?utm_source=t.me&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=t.me&utm_referrer=t.me

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

⚔️Армия России наступает на флангах Артёмовска, прорвав оборону ВСУ у Ягодного, взяв дамбу и ряд опорников ▪️За последние дни наши войска заметно продвинулись на северном фланге Артёмовска в районе Берховки и Ягодного. Идут ожесточённые бои. ▪️"Зафиксировано продвижение русских в районе...

t.me

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️Страшные героические кадры: как наши бойцы штурмуют Степовое на фланге Авдеевки под огнём врага ▪️Вражеские ресурсы опубликовали кадры боёв под Донецком – одни из самых ожесточенных столкновений идут у Степового. ▪️На кадрах наши штурмовики занимают восточную часть села под огнём вражеских...

t.me

Avdeevka.

Russia continues a slow advance near Avdeevka. It appears after a couple of Russian attacks, and heavy fires, the village of Petrovskoe/Stepove is contested, with Russian troops dug in on the outskirts, and allegedly Ukrainian troops withdrawn from the center of the village. Russian forces have also taken the pumping station near the chemical plant south of the refuse mound. In the south after a Ukrainian counter-attack, Russian forces have pushed into the town from the south-east, seizing part of a local industrial park. There are also reported minor Russian advances near Pervomayskoe, but nothing on Severnoe. Russian positions clearly across the rail berm are probably the most threatening development. With the fall of Petrovskoe Russian troops could push on Berdychy next and seriously threaten Ukrainian lines. Of course if reinforcements have to rush to stop the encirclement, Russia can use this to try and grab ground in the south of the town.

Рыбарь

❗️ Битва за Авдеевку: наступление ВС РФ в промзоне и успехи по всему фронту обстановка к исходу 14 ноября 2023 года Российские войска продолжают операцию по охвату Авдеевского укрепрайона в клещи. ▪️На севере украинские формирования под огнём российской артиллерии были вынуждены отступить из...

t.me

https://rybar.ru/piwigo/upload/2023/11/14/20231114210325-489e7962.jpg

Colonelcassad

Исходя из данных геолокации по опубликованных украинскими ресурсами видео, подразделения ВС РФ вошли в посёлок Петровское/Степовое. Занято часть улицы и идущая вдоль нее посадка, а также посадка к югу от посёлка. Вокруг посёлка раскинулось множество взаимосвязанных опорников, расположенные в...

t.me

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️Наступление на Авдеевку: армия России атакует на флангах, продолжая штурм Степового и Коксохима Тактическое поражение ВСУ снова признают и украинские военные аналитики, публикующие карты. ▪️"Авдеевское направление – ситуация для ВСУ достаточно сложная. Можно констатировать, что де-факто рубеж...

t.me

Russian helos striking Ukrainian LP/OPs in the chemical plant.

Colonelcassad

⚡️Цугундер от ВКС РФ. Авдеевка. Наши винтокрылые в предверии глобального праздника отправили подарунки безошибочно и точно в цель тем, кто плохо себя вёл, и променял Дедушку на Санту. иТарасы ничего лучше не нашли, как устроить наблюдательные пункты и огневные позиции в здании...

t.me

Ukrainian soldiers in the basements of the chemical plant.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A Russian BMPT is getting hit near the air defense unit base in Avdeevka, confirming Russian presence in the area.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian social media sources are reporting large casualties for Ukrainian forces near Avdeevka from the heavy fighting.

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️‍☠️Ад в Авдеевке: боевики ВСУ сообщают о самых страшных боях и готовятся, что крепость ВСУ падёт Украинские боевики в соцсетях пишут про обстановку у Авдеевки, где наступает армия России. ▪️"Авдеевка — это вопрос времени, многие мои знакомые оттуда уже по госпиталям и уже вышли на связь. П***...

t.me

Zaporozhye.

Russia has struck Ukraine's 128th Bde during an award ceremony, killing 28 and wounding 53 service members. Warning footage of corpses. It's unclear what munition was used, some sources mention the Iskander, others talk about a Kh-59.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian forces are actively using Chinese Desertcross 1000-3 light buggies. Reportedly Russia has 537 already, with another of 1590 planned for induction. Why Russia doesn't have a domestic alternative is quite the question. Russia does have a domestic automotive industry, and this isn't exactly a pinnacle of technology. It's possible this is China testing the waters for supplying equipment directly to Russia. Not for free of course. These are active in Zaporozhye.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian T-62MV mod'22s in Zaporozhye doing test fires. Note the condition. Fresh paint, plenty of K-1. These aren't the emergency pulled from storage vehicles we've seen earlier. These are clearly batches from the repair plant with upgrades. I can't make it out, but it's likely this has the thermal sight too.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Kherson.

Ukraine has managed to get some vehicles across to the foothold at Krynki, and Russia is already striking them. The situation remains tense, despite the lack of movement there is continued heavy fighting.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

 

[Feanor]

Interesting tidbits.

Ukrainian sources report that Russian raids into Sumy and Chernigov regions kill Ukrainian service members on a regular basis, possibly SOF raids. Unlike Ukraine's much publicized raids into Russia, these are mostly kept quiet, but seem to be having an impact.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

An interesting Russian Tor-M2 damaged by a GMLRS strike but repaired and returned to service. It's another sign that vehicles getting hit by munitions but not burned out might be very well repairable.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russia has begun adding aerodynamic cones to the front of OFAB gliding bombs. Incremental improvements to the design continue.

Colonelcassad

ФАБ-250 с УМПК отправились по своим делам. Расширение номенклатуры авиабомб с УМПК и их общего количества на фронте, существенное подспорье для наших войск, тем более что запасы авиабомб в стране очень большие и этого добра хватит надолго.

t.me

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian positions using cages to protect entrances to dugouts from FPV drone strikes.

Colonelcassad

А вот так защищают свои блиндажи от дронов камикадзе. Сразу видно, что учитывали опыт наших военных в СВО

t.me

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A scarce Russian BRDM-2 with side and roof cage armor, and camonetting. Based on the fresh paintjob and neatly sitting armor, I suspect this is a relatively recent delivery.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A Russian MT-LB with a BMP-1 turret, additional sidearmor and the frame for a roof cage, presumably in the process of being mounted.

Танк СМК одобряет своего мини-потомка.

shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com

An interesting looking Russian BMP-3M, with the extra armor kit, and covered in sand bags. We can see the upgraded sight well.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A Russian T-80BVM variant with practically a hut over the turret, and the fairly uncommon soft-shell ERA on the sideskirts.

Избушка

Интересно - "мягкие" блоки ДЗ? от которых потихоньку отказались

shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com

Russian BTR-82AT with the extra armor, and cage armor. We have quite a bit of footage that looks like Russian troops training with fresh vehicles in the rear. I have a suspicion that Russia has formed a full fledged second echelon of reserves.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

More odd HE-FRAG shells in Russian use, 122s and 152s. These might be DPRK or Iranian supplies.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A fresh Russian VDV formation training with their newly upgraded T-72B3 mod'22s (23s?) and Tayfun-VDV MRAPs with 30mm autocannons.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

An interesting Russian T-72B3 variant. We have the mod'22 featured but also a Sosna sight box. Pre-war survivor upgraded with more armor during the war? But look at the armored doors on the sightbox. I suspect Russia is still upgrading some portion of the B3s with Sosna-U FCS.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A Ukrainian erzats remote-mineclearing vehicle, on an MT-LBu chassis. It's allegedly already been destroyed by a Russian strike.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian BMW with 3 Grad tubes on it and trailer with 4 Grad tubes. A reminder that elite units get relatively modern western kit but territorial defense formations are left with whatever they can scrounge together.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian remote-controlled launch stations with twin RPG-7s set up for indirect fire.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Reportedly the US has purchased 60 Gepards from Jordan for transfer to Ukraine.

США выкупили у Иордании 60 ЗСУ Gepard для передачи Украине

Власти США приобрели у Иордании 60 зенитных самоходных установок Gepard немецкого производства. Об этом сообщает издание De Telegraaf со ссылкой на собственные источники. По информации издания, самоходные зенитки будут переданы американскими властями Украине. То есть, несмотря на

topwar.ru

VK.com | VK

vk.com

An Su-17 of some sort was spotted over Ukraine, possibly a remaining flying jet used by a Ukrainian factory, but also possibly a handover of Polish Su-22s.

Воздушные силы ВСУ подняли в воздух советский истребитель-бомбардировщик Су-17

Украинские Воздушные силы продолжают нести потери боевой авиации, число оставшихся на вооружении истребителей действительно мало, хотя в Киеве и не признают этого. Тем не менее украинские ВВС изыскивают способы восполнения парка боевых самолетов, в том числе и из запасов, оставшихся от советской

topwar.ru

Footage has surfaced that appears to show Ukrainian service members using an ambulance as a troop transport. Note allegations of this sort and some footage suggesting this has surfaced before.

Появились кадры использования ВСУ гражданских машин скорой помощи для перевозки военнослужащих и оружия

Вооруженные силы Украины используют при проведении ротации личного состава гражданские автомобили скорой медицинской помощи. Об этом сообщают российские военные корреспонденты. В интернете появились соответствующие кадры. На них видно, как в автомобили скорой медицинской помощи садятся

topwar.ru

Ukrainian forces have been spotted using Czech BM-21 MT Striga Grad variants. We see one in the footage and we don't know how many have been delivered though it's likely not many, since the type hasn't really seen mass production.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

British Ferret Mk 1 in Ukraine. It was likely purchased by private hands, rather then a government transfer.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukraine has reportedly received their first M-1 Abrams, along with Archer howitzers, additional AS-90s, PzH-2000s, M1150 ABVs, and other equipment.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Two 2S22 Bogdana howitzers on Tatra chassis were spotted recently. Note the type is a Ukrainian development but we can't be sure where it's being produced or with whose involvement.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukraine's 241st Territorial Defense Bde operating KS-19s on Tatra chassis.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

There are reports of Russia buying back VK-2500 engines from various foreign operators. Russia reportedly produces ~300 per year domestically but needs 500.

Западная пресса: Россия выкупает вертолетные двигатели у зарубежных клиентов

Россия предпринимает шаги по возврату вертолетных двигателей. Это касается как наиболее массового семейства Ми-8/17, так и менее распространенных машин. Россия выкупает вертолетные двигатели у зарубежных клиентов - говорится в издании The Wall Street Journal. Как утверждается, в апреле делегация

topwar.ru

Some more footage of Mariupol' reconstruction.

Colonelcassad

Восстановление Мариуполя продолжается @The_Wrong_Side

t.me

Ukraine SOF commander general Khorenko was reportedly removed and replaced by colonel Lupanchuk. The reasons are unclear but allegedly the decision came directly from Zelensky, bypassing Zaluzhniy.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

 

[Dead Money]

Is the cause of that "discount" more due to market cap, or due to previous financial market restrictions which result on shipping insurance costs and other premium on Russian trade costs? I tend to see the later one matter much more, and market cap more on political talks and not much matters on actual Russian Hydrocarbons traded prices.

Western financial market sanctions that hit Russian coffers more, than this oil price cap. The West after they have slap and close access to their financial market to Russia, actually has less arsenal left on sanctions effort. This what I have talk before, time to time. Price Cap more on political bravado and less matter to real traded price on Russian Hydrocarbons. The discount that Russia has to beared for their Hydrocarbons export more related to previous Western sanctions, not price cap.

Market mechanism actually has adjusted for Russian trades. Unless West want to sanctions Russian big buyers like India and China, not much else they can do nowdays. They (West) already spent much of their 'economics' arsenal toward Russia.

Hi Ananda, sorry for the delay in response, life has been hectic.

My understanding was that the market cap was implemented somewhat hand in hand with the financial market restrictions, and that the 'stick' to implement the price cap was to cut shipping insurance if the cap was exceeded. Is that correct?

I think we agree on the price cap target specifically being largely meaningless - I think it was intended as a price signal to India/China/Singapore for negotiating price with Russia following the insurance changes. And I agree that the market always guides the final price settlement regardless of what politicians want or pontificate about. I think the price cap as at today is largely meaningless, it should probably be abandoned.

But I would politely disagree with the idea that the combined price cap and insurance enforcement sanctions have not been meaningful during the year - I think that markets do take time to adjust, new contracts and approaches take time to resolve, and this time to adjust reflects a non-recoverable opportunity cost to Russia that leaves them with less income for 2023. And less income for Russia narrows government choices and makes decisions more difficult.

I agree with you that the West has spent most of its economic arsenal toward Russia. But my view is that a lot of this spending, though not 'fatal', and certainly not nearly as effective as politicians would like to claim, has in fact impacted Russia financially.

If I could put the discussion this way - My assertion is that if Elvira Nabiullina could have decided whether the West proceeded with the sanctions we are talking about, or instead took no actions - her preference would have strongly been for the West to do other than it has done.

Cheers either way,

Dead Money

 

[Ananda]

Almost no Russian oil is sold below $60 cap, say western officials

Allies discuss ways to ‘toughen up’ key sanction as Moscow circumvents limits on seaborne crude

www.ft.com

would politely disagree with the idea that the combined price cap and insurance enforcement sanctions have not been meaningful during the year - I think that markets do take time to adjust, new contracts and approaches take time to resolve, and this time to adjust reflects a non-recoverable opportunity cost to Russia that leaves them with less income for 2023. And less income for Russia narrows government choices and makes decisions more difficult.

Well the question is, thus Russia being hurt by earlier financial market sanctions, or this price cap have any meaningful outcome. Honestly my point is not only base on my own observations, but also talking with some of my colleagues from Energy Trade desks. Their answer mostly negligence effect from this price cap.

I do understand your arguments, but as one of my energy desk colleagues gave connotations; 'The West already tighten the screw from their financial market to Russia'. Thus further tightening will not effect much, cause Russia already using flow from channel that's not control by West.

So is Western sanctions hurt Russian oil Industry? Off course it is. However that's mostly results from earlier sanctions. The financial market sanctions already make Russia have difficulties sourcing tankers from western controls shipping exchanges, already have difficulties sourcing credit payment and insurances using western controlled channels.

Thus Market basically allready make adjustments before Western politicians put this Price Cap policies. Russian trades already adjusted with higher costs, which rendered Russian has to give discounts to cover the higher costs. All this because Russian trades already adjusted using to non western control channels (which is more costly). Already adjusted for tankers, payments, insurances, etc from non western channels. So when Western politicians increase tightening from their controlled channels to Russian trade, it doesn't effect much, as again Russian trade already adjusted to non western controlled channels.

So what's left can Western politicians do to Russian trade? Well not much, unless they are preparing to fight with other channels. Thus fight with other Non West, Non Russian market player, which are now mostly Russian customers. Will West want to fight on larger global trade war with China, India, Middle East, Latin America, or much of Global South ? Because that's the only avenues left for Western politicians.

As the article of FT shown, basically the effect of Price Cap is being sideline by market. USD 60 price cap being put, when market in USD 60, when market increase, so does Russian ones. So market already make adjustments before that price cap.

That's why from beginning whether in this thread or other Russian thread, I already say the sanctions only give emergence to alternatives channels. This will fasten emergences of multi polar trade channels. Alternatives to western control ones. Western politicians help fastening emergences of rivals channels.

 

[Vivendi]

The Independent reports today that Putin could face a new war crime case. Evidence suggest starvation of Ukraine was pre-planned.

When Russian tanks entered Ukraine on 24 February 2022 they deliberately targeted grain-rich areas and food production infrastructure first, a new report by international human rights law firm Global Rights Compliance found. GRC found that Russia’s defense contractor began purchasing trucks to transport grain, as well as three new 170-metre bulk carrier cargo ships, as early as December 2021, evidence of advance planning for the pillage of Ukrainian food resources “on an unprecedented scale”. Russia began commandeering Ukrainian farms within less than a week of its invasion, and at its peak was exporting 12,000 tonnes of grain per day from across occupied territories.

Sounds very possible, this would fit with how I understand Putin and his cronies "modus operandi".

Putin could face new war crime case as evidence suggests starvation of Ukraine was pre-planned | The Independent

See also: New report reveals large-scale, organised Russian plan to systematically pillage Ukraine’s grain, using proceeds to fund occupation and illegal war | Global Rights Compliance

 

[Feanor]

The Independent reports today that Putin could face a new war crime case. Evidence suggest starvation of Ukraine was pre-planned.

When Russian tanks entered Ukraine on 24 February 2022 they deliberately targeted grain-rich areas and food production infrastructure first, a new report by international human rights law firm Global Rights Compliance found. GRC found that Russia’s defense contractor began purchasing trucks to transport grain, as well as three new 170-metre bulk carrier cargo ships, as early as December 2021, evidence of advance planning for the pillage of Ukrainian food resources “on an unprecedented scale”. Russia began commandeering Ukrainian farms within less than a week of its invasion, and at its peak was exporting 12,000 tonnes of grain per day from across occupied territories.

Sounds very possible, this would fit with how I understand Putin and his cronies "modus operandi".

Putin could face new war crime case as evidence suggests starvation of Ukraine was pre-planned | The Independent

See also: New report reveals large-scale, organised Russian plan to systematically pillage Ukraine’s grain, using proceeds to fund occupation and illegal war | Global Rights Compliance

Not sure on the law here but from a fact-based stand point I have seen Russian sources reporting a targeted effort to ensure grain exports from newly-annexed territories. The Russian media spin was to talk about just getting the local economy going, but the effort struck me as deliberate and planned.

 

[KipPotapych]

Lots of misleading information in that article from The Independent. The most obvious one being

Beyond its impact on Ukrainian citizens, Russia’s invasion has affected millions around the world by increasing global food insecurity – Ukraine was the world’s largest wheat producer prior to the conflict.

Ukraine was never the largest wheat producer in the world, of course.

Which countries produce the most wheat globally? | World Economic Forum

I haven’t looked at the report itself yet, but seems like quite a stretch as far the accusation of war crime goes. It is also pretty weird that one of the people who compiled the report says something along the lines of that “it is highly likely that Russia will be found guilty”.

Sorry, Brits, but a lot of your media appears to be from mildly to extremely yellow.

 

[Larry_L]

Dan Rice makes a case for deployment of M26, and M26A1 munitions to Ukraine. He states that there are thousands of these rockets slated for disposal so the case can be made that there is no cost to the US. These munitions have a range of 30, and 45 km respectively, carrying 644, and 512 sub-munitions. These are fired from both the M14, and the HIMARS launchers, and would provide a cost effective boost to alleviate shortage of conventional artillery shells.

The President Should Approve this last weapon system and it will help win the war: M26/M26A1 HIMARS Rockets | Small Wars Journal

The United States can help Ukraine win the war with one final decision: Send the short to mid-range HIMARS cluster rockets in large quantities. We have tens of thousands of these rockets, and they are all being scheduled for destruction. They are obsolete. But they remain lethally effective.

smallwarsjournal.com

Several views of how the trenches look during this season.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1723328235344146519

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1725270706609357124

The long walk to rotate troops on the East bank of the Dnipro river. Warning: Footage of corpses.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1722351676273659950

The first view I have seen of a shahad UAV downed by a anti aircraft gun. This must be a daily task in Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1725109840857485732

Russian aviation adapts to the longer reach of Ukrainian missiles by dispersing their helicopters to forward operating and refueling points.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1681731246576259072

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1725167378420367679

 

[ngatimozart]

Not sure on the law here but from a fact-based stand point I have seen Russian sources reporting a targeted effort to ensure grain exports from newly-annexed territories. The Russian media spin was to talk about just getting the local economy going, but the effort struck me as deliberate and planned.

I think that the international law might be quite specific on this. Attacking food supplies and the associated infrastructure is likely to be proscribed somewhere. Where is @MrConservative when you need him. International law is his area of expertise. Yes, I know starvation of an enemy is a time honoured tactic; doesn't necessarily make it right though. Much like burning your enemy with white phosphorus or napalm or using dum dum rounds.

 

[Feanor]

I think that the international law might be quite specific on this. Attacking food supplies and the associated infrastructure is likely to be proscribed somewhere. Where is @MrConservative when you need him. International law is his area of expertise. Yes, I know starvation of an enemy is a time honoured tactic; doesn't necessarily make it right though. Much like burning your enemy with white phosphorus or napalm or using dum dum rounds.

I suspect there is a difference between attacking food supplies and exporting food stuff from an occupied territory. Russia will likely argue that this is Russian territory, lawfully annexed. If this were accurate, would it still be a war crime? Probably not. What about unlawfully annexed territory? A war crime?

 

[ngatimozart]

I suspect there is a difference between attacking food supplies and exporting food stuff from an occupied territory. Russia will likely argue that this is Russian territory, lawfully annexed. If this were accurate, would it still be a war crime? Probably not. What about unlawfully annexed territory? A war crime?

Well war is theft writ large. The areas that Russia annexed were annexed illegally and as such not recognised under international law. China, North Korea, and Iran might recognise the illegal annexations; but many other countries won't because it would create a precedent in modern international law, and they certainly don't want to lose any territory by fair means or foul. That's why I wish Mr C was still around because he would be able to explain it all for us.

 

[KipPotapych]

I still didn’t read the report yet, but took literally a minute to look into the following (it will take me much longer to type this post than it took to find the info below).

So here is wheat production map of Ukraine (and the source):

Crop Explorer for Major Crop Regions - United States Department of Agriculture

ipad.fas.usda.gov

According to the same source, which I should say is most reliable (I know this for a fact), Ukraine was the seventh largest wheat producer in the world in 2021/2022 (the report was updated on March 9, 2022, so there was no effect of the war on the 2021/22 marketing year). The total wheat production in the country in the year discussed equaled 33,000,000 metric tonnes, of which 19,000,000 metric tonnes was meant to exported, placing Ukraine at number five in the ranks of wheat exporters in the world.

https://fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf

Just by looking at the map above, we can assume that on its best day, Russia controlled about 15% (or less) of the wheat producing lands (as per 2021 production year because in 2022 these lands could look different due to seeding preferences as a normal practice of rotating the crops). Note that additional significant quantities of grain could have been held at ports ready to be exported. Given that nearly 60% of produced wheat was allocated to exports, as per the source above, the alleged starvation planning is a little bonkers. This should be clear as day to any reasonable person. It appears that Ms Catriona Murdoch, a partner at the Global Rights Compliance who created the report, is… let’s call it overly confident and optimistic in her assessment by asserting that it is highly likely that Russia will be found guilty of whatever it is they are accusing it of. Note that they very well may be found guilty of whatever it is because this is just the way it works, I guess.

It would also be nice to see those satellite images with plate numbers on the trucks registered in Crimea that the Independent claims to have seen or have in their possession.

The article also cited a number of brand new silos in Melitopol and elsewhere. Not sure if they are aware, but there was quite a bit of damage to and destruction of the existing (likely quite outdated) infrastructure when the war broke out.

Anyway, it would be nice if someone with a bit of knowledge of the subject chimed in, as ngatimozart suggested, but from what I know and see, it appears to be a complete rubbish article for the reasons stated above. There is no substance. I have yet to read the report and could have instead of posting this, but I really hate to spend my time reading what will end up being garbage. There is probably a reason that no respectable news agency had picked this up yet (the only ones I see so far are the British media, including The Guardian, and a number of Ukrainian outlets).