The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

seaspear

Well-Known Member
An interesting chart of Russian MBT losses in Ukraine. If these losses are indicative, it shows that newer T-90s are significantly more survivable then older tank types. Of course this doesn't account for the low numbers of T-90s being used not just relative to the older tanks (that's accounted for by the numbers being relative to their own fleet size) but low numbers used relative to their own fleet size. I.e. far more of the T-72B3M and T-80BVM fleet were used then the T-90A or the T-90M. I'm also not sure the totals of 67 T-90Ms are accurate. I suspect there's closer to 100 of them by now.

It could be interesting if this chart covered the number of tanks lost meaning as to captured to be used by opponents ,there are claims for instance that the Ukrainian army is reusing hundreds of captured tanks and other equipment , and that Russia is the largest foreign supplier (unwilling) of tanks and other equipment to Ukraine , a possible cause of some of these tanks being captured are they run out of fuel ,not all tanks have the same fuel the T-80 being the only Russian tank to be using a gas turbine ,I've only seen film of one t-90 captured and was wondering if the effects of sanctions on these more modern tanks are having an effect on their maintenance and availability or even if these tanks are being held back
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
An interesting chart of Russian MBT losses in Ukraine. If these losses are indicative, it shows that newer T-90s are significantly more survivable then older tank types.
in your opinion what factors would make the T-90 much more survivable than older types?
Is it partly due to better ERA and perhaps a slightly higher baseline protection level on newer variants? Would I be correct in saying that even in newer or improved variants rounds and charges for the are still stored unprotected in the hull?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
in your opinion what factors would make the T-90 much more survivable than older types?
Is it partly due to better ERA and perhaps a slightly higher baseline protection level on newer variants? Would I be correct in saying that even in newer or improved variants rounds and charges for the are still stored unprotected in the hull?
Not slightly but significantly. Remember in this war we have tanks with protection as poor as the T-72M, and as advanced as the T-90M. In the case of Russia the oldest they used was a T-72A, haphazardly uparmored with K-1. I suspect this matters.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member

STURM

Well-Known Member
I don't believe either the Shtora protection or ERA tiles protection on tank roof on the T-90
Shtora is intended against wire guided SACLOS rounds. As for ERA; it depends if it's a new generation one which can deal with tandem warhead rounds.
 

Exonian

Member
in your opinion what factors would make the T-90 much more survivable than older types?
Is it partly due to better ERA and perhaps a slightly higher baseline protection level on newer variants? Would I be correct in saying that even in newer or improved variants rounds and charges for the are still stored unprotected in the hull?
Might it also be possible that T-90 units are being deployed correctly as part of a combined arms force, and are therefore benefitting from mutual protection of accompanying infantry etc?
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Apart from this attack and the one by Houthi unmanned boats [which fall under the USV category] on a Saudi frigates some years ago; have there been other such attacks? Next we'll be seeing UUVs posing a threat to submarines.
That will be an order of magnitude much harder than anything attempted.

Underwater communications using ELF/VLF is extremely challenging and certainly not suitable for real-time decision making, unlike what Ukraine did with their unmanned boats using Starlink. UUVs therefore tend to be autonomous or at least surface at regular intervals.


 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Is it correct that although some focus has been on many of the mobilised being sent untrained to the front lines by Russia there are still over two hundred thousand currently receiving a few months of training currently in Russia?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Is it correct that although some focus has been on many of the mobilised being sent untrained to the front lines by Russia there are still over two hundred thousand currently receiving a few months of training currently in Russia?
Many of the ones who went to Ukraine didn't go to the front lines but instead ended up in training centers in the LDNR, or abandoned Ukrainian training grounds, and impromptu training areas set up by Russia in Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. The exact proportions are fuzzy, and yes many are still in Russia training.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
WRT Russian built tanks being destroyed by ATGM, FWIU most tanks don't have a lot of top armour hence why ATGM such as the NLAW etc., using a top down strike profile. If that is indeed the case then tanks such as the Leo2, M1, Challenger 2 etc., will also be vulnerable to so such an attack profile. This is really the first near peer high level war between armoured forces in 20 years.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates. Part 1/2
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
November 21, 7:45pm ET


Full article: Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.
Click
here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Two days of shelling caused widespread damage to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on November 20 and 21
. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated on November 21 that there are no immediate nuclear safety and security concerns and that the integrity of all six nuclear reactors and the spent and fresh fuel storage facilities remain uncompromised despite the intense shelling.[1] Russia and Ukraine both accused the other of conducting the artillery strikes on the ZNPP on November 20 and 21.[2] One Russian milblogger referenced a video of the shelling taken by Chechen forces and stated that it appeared the shelling came from positions in Russian-controlled territory south of the ZNPP, not Ukrainian-controlled territory north of the ZNPP.[3] Russian nuclear operator Rosatom Head Alexey Likhachev warned of a nuclear disaster at the ZNPP, and Russian milbloggers largely amplified his statements and called for the transfer of all Ukrainian nuclear power plants to Russian operation.[4] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have staged false flag attacks against the ZNPP and previously reported on Russian forces’ unlawful militarization of the ZNPP.[5] Artillery strikes themselves are unlikely to penetrate the containment units protecting each nuclear reactor and instead pose a greater threat to the spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, which could leak radioactive material and cause a radiological (as opposed to nuclear) disaster if compromised. The continued conflation of radiological and nuclear accidents and the constant discussion of the threat of disaster at the ZNPP is likely part of a wider Russian information operation meant to undermine Western support for Ukraine and frame Russian control of the plant as essential to avoid nuclear catastrophe in order to consolidate further operational and administrative control of Ukrainian nuclear assets and compel elements of the international community to recognize Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory at least obliquely.

The Russian government is continuing to increase its control of the Russian information space as a Russian milblogger noted that Russian efforts to shape the information space “look like a kitten against a rhinoceros” compared with foreign “think tanks,” non-profit organizations, and “independent media.”[6] Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on November 21 that the Russian State Duma may consider a bill before the end of 2022 on the regulation of online “recommender” algorithms that would ultimately allow the government to turn off specific algorithms.[7] The bill is reportedly being developed by Duma Deputy on Information Policy Anton Gorelkin and will include the regulation of social media networks, online cinemas, search engines, and internet marketplaces.[8] Kommersant noted that this bill will require the owners of all sites and platforms to ensure the government’s ability to fully or partially block the participation of specific users and that these provisions appeared before the beginning of the war in October 2021 to specifically target Western outlets such as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube due to the risk of “social conflict.”[9] Certain Russian milbloggers responded to the speculation regarding the bill and noted that such recommender algorithms make it harder for nations to disperse propaganda due to the prevalence of accessible and personally tailored information available on the internet.[10]The Duma is likely considering this bill in an attempt to address a consistent point of neuralgia in the Kremlin’s ability to present and defend the war to domestic audiences and to establish a direct means of countering both internal and external sources of online dissent.

The Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) additionally took steps to codify control over the information space and signed a decree on November 4 that approved a list of military and military-technical activities, which if received by foreign sources, can be used against the security of the Russian Federation.[11] The decree essentially codifies types of information relating to Russian military operations that the FSB regards as threats to Russian security that are not technically classified as official state secrets and includes a broad list of provisions relating to informational coverage of the war such as “information on the assessment and forecasts of the development of the military-political, strategic (operational) situation,” and “information about the observance of rule of law and the moral and psychological climate” of Russian troops.[12] This decree represents an extended effort on the part of the FSB to broadly ban a wide range of information on the Russian military, which would ostensibly place tighter controls on discourse among Russian milbloggers and other such sources who frequently discuss and criticize tactical, operational, and strategic dimensions of the war in Ukraine.

Both the proposed Duma bill and the FSB decree indicate that the Russian government is scrambling to take control of the information space as it is increasingly inundated by criticisms of the Russian military that are levied both internally and externally. Russian officials likely seek to consolidate censorship measures to crack down on the prevalence of foreign voices and domestic critiques by applying legislative pressure to fundamental algorithms and presenting a wide range of activities that can be considered detrimental to Russian state security.

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian special services are planning false flag attacks on Belarusian critical infrastructure in an attempt that would likely fail to pressure the Belarusian military to enter the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 20 that Russian special services are planning to conduct several false flag terrorist attacks on Belarusian critical infrastructure facilities, particularly on the “Ostrovets” Belarusian nuclear power plant.[13] GUR also reported that Russian special services will blame the attacks on Ukrainian and NATO member states to accelerate the Belarusian military’s involvement in Russia‘s war in Ukraine.[14] ISW has previously assessed that Belarus’ entry into the war remains highly unlikely due to the heavy domestic risk that involvement would pose to the survival of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime and that Russian and Belarusian highlight their bilateral defense cooperation to perpetuate an ongoing information operation that the Belarusian military will enter the war.[15] Potential false flag attacks remain unlikely to change the domestic factors that ISW continues to assess constrain Lukashenko’s willingness to enter the war on Russia’s behalf.

A Ukrainian official acknowledged on November 21 that Ukrainian forces are conducting a military operation on the Kinburn Spit, a location which would allow Ukrainian forces to better conduct potential operations on the left (east) bank in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on November 21 that Ukrainian forces are conducting a military operation on the Kinburn Spit and called for operational silence to be respected.[16] Humenyuk emphasized that the Kinburn Spit is the last piece of territory that Russian forces occupy in Mykolaiv Oblast.[17] The Kinburn Spit is only 4km across the strait from Ochakiv and allows for control of the entrance to the Dnipro and Southern Bug rivers as well as the Mykolaiv and Kherson city ports. Russian forces used positions on the Kinburn Spit to conduct routine missile and artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in Ochakiv, southern Mykolaiv Oblast, and other areas along the Ukrainian-controlled Black Sea Coast.[18] The Kinburn Spit is also out of the 25km range of 152mm artillery that Russian forces have accumulated on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. Control of the Kinburn Spit would allow Ukrainian forces to relieve Russian strikes on the Ukrainian-controlled Black Sea coast, increase naval activity in the area, and conduct potential operations to cross to the left (east) bank in Kherson Oblast under significantly less Russian artillery fire compared to a crossing of the Dnipro River.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates. Part 2/2
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
November 21, 7:45pm ET


Full article: Institute for the Study of War

The November 18 video of a Russian soldier opening fire on a group of Ukrainian servicemen while Russian troops were surrendering has served as a catalyst for further division between the Kremlin and prominent voices in the Russian information space. As ISW reported on November 18, a video widely circulated on social media shows a Russian soldier fire on Ukrainian troops as Ukrainian soldiers were taking prisoners in Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast, resulting in the deaths of the Russian prisoners. Open-source analysts and later a New York Times independent investigation confirmed that the Russian serviceman was the first to open fire but did not offer conclusions about how the Russian prisoners died.[19] While Russian officials responded to the video by adamantly accusing Ukraine of war crimes and calling for an investigation into the identities of the Ukrainian soldiers, several Russian milbloggers capitalized on the content of the video to criticize the Russian military and mobilization practices. One milblogger noted that the Makiivka shooting video is a clear example of how mobilized recruits lack the basic morale and discipline to properly fight for their beliefs and claimed that it is ridiculous that so many Russian soldiers even surrendered to Ukrainian troops in the first place.[20] The divide between milbloggers criticizing the Makiivka shooting is emblematic of Russian military failures, and the Kremlin’s using it to further an information operation against the Ukrainian military may further fragment the information space.

Key Takeaways

  • Two days of shelling caused widespread damage to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
  • The Russian government is continuing to escalate control over the Russian information space.
  • Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian special services are planning false flag attacks on Belarusian critical infrastructure in an attempt that would likely fail to pressure the Belarusian military to enter the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely Belarusian forces will enter the war.
  • A Ukrainian official acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are conducting a military operation on the Kinburn Spit, Mykolaiv Oblast.
  • The November 18 video of a Russian soldier opening fire on a group of Ukrainian servicemen while Russian troops were surrendering has served as a catalyst for further division between the Kremlin and prominent voices in the Russian information space.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine amid worsening weather conditions.
  • Russian forces continued ground assaults near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
  • Russian forces continued conducting defensive measures and establishing fortifications in Kherson Oblast south of the Dnipro River as Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian force accumulations in southern Ukraine.
  • Russian mobilized personnel continue to protest and desert as their relatives continue to publicly advocate against mobilization issues.
  • Russian occupation authorities intensified filtration measures and the incorporation of occupied territory into Russia.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There are unconfirmed reports that the Russians have fired one, possible more, KH-55 ALCM (NATO designation: AS-15 KENT) against Ukraine, but with the nuclear warhead removed and (in this case) replaced with a dummy warhead as ballast. If the Russians have a conventional warhead for the missile, it will be able to do significant damage if used against an unprotected target.


Germany is deploying a number of Patriot missile units to Poland to strengthen the Polish GBAD. The Polish Defence Minister has said that he will propose that the German missiles be based near the Polish Ukrainian border.


General Winter has announced his arrival and the Ukrainians are preparing for it.


There was an explosion at a natural gas pipeline in the Leningrad Oblast close to St Petersburg on Saturday and the Ukrainians have been blamed for that. Looks like it's a pretty decent sized blaze.



There are claims by the UKR Military that an Ukrainian SF sniper took out a Russian soldier at a distance of 2,710m. Said sniper probably using the using the Alligator 14.5mm x 114 sniper rifle. A couple of US veterans, both snipers who saw active service, doubt the veracity of the story but say that it is feasible.

Ukraine claims a sniper killed a Russian soldier from 1.68 miles away

Footage of a destroyed Russian R-330BMV Borisoglebsk-2B EW system reportedly near Chornobaivka, Kherson Oblast. It's a new system only been in service since 2015, and from the video looks like some documentation has survived.


A UKR Mil-8 helo attack run using unguided rockets. Looking at the ground I suggest that this earlier in the year; late summer / early autumn because the crop stubble looks fairly fresh and dry. Also note the burnt patches probably from the decoy flares.


 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
WRT Russian built tanks being destroyed by ATGM, FWIU most tanks don't have a lot of top armour hence why ATGM such as the NLAW etc., using a top down strike profile. If that is indeed the case then tanks such as the Leo2, M1, Challenger 2 etc., will also be vulnerable to so such an attack profile. This is really the first near peer high level war between armoured forces in 20 years.
The Australian armies M1A2sepV3 is to have the Trophy system installed to provide hard protection against overhead missiles
Australia Buys M1A2 SEPv3 Advanced Abrams Tanks To Lead Its Major Armor Upgrade (thedrive.com)
Trophy APS: The Best Defense Is Shooting Back - Breaking Defense
The U.K selected Trophy for their Challenger tanks
Trophy Active Protection System picked for Challenger 3 (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
If that is indeed the case then tanks such as the Leo2, M1, Challenger 2 etc., will also be vulnerable to so such an attack profile. This is really the first near peer high level war between armoured forces in 20 years.
Indeed, with regards to actual armour there is nothing to suggest that if faced with a tandem top attack warhead a M-1, Leo, Challenger or Lerclerc would fare any better.

This is really the first near peer high level war between armoured forces in 20 years.
When was the last one? Are you referring to Iraq? I would argue that the last war which saw extensive tank on tank combat and one in which both sides lost significant numbers was the Ramadhan/Yom Kippur war. I have no idea if there were any tank on tank engagements in Nargano Karabakh.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Indeed, with regards to actual armour there is nothing to suggest that if faced with a tandem top attack warhead a M-1, Leo, Challenger or Lerclerc would fare any better.



When was the last one? Are you referring to Iraq? I would argue that the last war which saw extensive tank on tank combat and one in which both sides lost significant numbers was the Ramadhan/Yom Kippur war. I have no idea if there were any tank on tank engagements in Nargano Karabakh.
Yes I was referring to Iraq because even though the Iraqi armoured forces were steamrolled in both wars, it was still a war where armoured forces were used by both combatants. Nargano Karabakh would also be an example, but in comparison to both the Russo - Ukraine War and both the Iraqi Wars it was a border skirmish.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Norway supports Ukraine with NOK 2billion (USD 195 million) to purchase gas for the winter: Norway to aid Ukraine’s gas procurement ahead of winter | Upstream Online

New Zealand increased it's military support for Ukraine. An additional 66-man team is sent to the UK to assist in training, until July 2023. NZ already had 135 soldiers dispatched to Europe to support Ukrania in various ways : New Zealand Increases Military Aid to Ukraine

More voices are raising concern about weapons stocks running low: US is running low on some weapons and ammunition to transfer to Ukraine | CNN Politics

What I find a bit strange is that e.g., Nammo back in September asked the Norwegian government to provide an extra 650 million NOK (Europa ruster opp: – Aldri sett noe lignende) to expand production capacity, the request was repeated again in October, and in November Nammo said they still did not get the extra funding! Nammo på Raufoss: Jobber dag og natt for Ukrainas frihet

Nammo is one of the major ammo producers in Europe. It is both surprising and disappointing that the Norwegian government has not acted on this already.

The UK government is asking BAE to increase ammo production -- but so far it seems through a "letter of intent": UK Asks BAE to Ramp Up Artillery Shell Production Amid Ukraine Drawdown

So the Norwegian government is perhaps not the only ones being terribly slow here.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Yes. There are production lines galore, including some in former WP countries now in NATO which are tooled up to provide Soviet-calibre ammunition which'd fit most of Ukraine's artillery. Why haven't they been asked how fast they can produce, & handed the money to keep making whatever Ukraine asks for flat out until told to stop? And much the same for the lines for western calibres. Considering the sums already given, the cost shouldn't be a problem.

Ukrainian artillery's sustainability problem should be barrel wear, not ammunition - & there are factories tooled up to deal with that, if Ukraine's own can't.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
It might be fair to suggest that the artillery exchange rates are unsustainable ,there are open sources suggesting Russia was firing 20,000 thousand rounds a day ,Russia may not have been concerned over accuracy with mass firings, being though able to access North Koreas reserves of ammunition that share similar Soviet D.N.A will assist Russia conversely South Korea has sold on artillery ammunition to America to be sent to Ukraine ,did South Korea consider Norths actions in this in making this decision , South Korea might possibly be relieved by large quantities of artillery ammunition being sent to Russia
North Korean Conventional Artillery: A Means to Retaliate, Coerce, Deter, or Terrorize Populations | RAND
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
It might be fair to suggest that the artillery exchange rates are unsustainable ,there are open sources suggesting Russia was firing 20,000 thousand rounds a day ,Russia may not have been concerned over accuracy with mass firings, being though able to access North Koreas reserves of ammunition that share similar Soviet D.N.A will assist Russia conversely South Korea has sold on artillery ammunition to America to be sent to Ukraine ,did South Korea consider Norths actions in this in making this decision , South Korea might possibly be relieved by large quantities of artillery ammunition being sent to Russia
North Korean Conventional Artillery: A Means to Retaliate, Coerce, Deter, or Terrorize Populations | RAND
There is always the looming possibility China will back up any Russian shortfall that NK and some others can’t makeup. Not sure about their ammo manufacturing capacity but I am guessing it is massive.
 
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