The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[STURM]

Most of the war it was literally the opposite

No it wasn't..For most of the war the Germans were normally at a numerical disadvantage. It is not a myth. To give you an example; I have just finished "From The Realm Of A Dying Sun : IV SS-Panzerkorps And The Battles For Warsaw, July- November 1994 [Volume 1]" [Nash]

As the author makes clear: from primary source material; throughout the battles fought during this period this Korps faced the equivalent of 3-4 Soviet Corps, plus armoured brigades and other elements. I can also provide other sources. I'm no scholar or expert on the Gernan/Soviet war but I've long been able to differentiate the myths from the facts..

On Babarossa a " good chunk of the Soviet Army" was indeed in Siberia but it wasn't the main chunk and Soviet forces deployed in the Western regions on the eve of Barbarossa still had a numerical advantage over the Germans and their allies.

many generals in the new german army of the GDR had to cover the truth in the same fashion they created the "gentlemen war" myth of the Africa Korps and of course Erwin Romel figure

The "myth" was largely the result of memoirs and reports written by former German officers like Halder, Balck, Guderian, Mellenthin, etc; in the 1960's and 1970's at a time when there were hardly any Soviet/Russian sources available.It wasn't due to former officers who rewrote history when in the NVA.

On North Africa it may not have been a "gentlemen's war" per see but compared to the war in the East and even to an extent the war in the West; it was relatively clean.

The Germans often had a number advantage locally because they had better recon and better ability to concentrate forces effectively.

Indeed. The Germans massed armour at the point of contact instead of in penny packets. In 1940 the French actually had more armour but they were in penny packets.

 

[vonnoobie]

For factual numbers when operation Barbarossa was launched the axis forces where under 4 million including the Romanian, Italian, Hungarian and Finnish forces, the Soviet union on the front had between 2.5 and 2.9 million personal. From 1942 onwards the Soviet numbers only continued to grow peaking at 6.8 million in '44 while axis numbers peaked at just over 3.9 million in '43. Soviets only lacked a numerical advantage in '41 because Stalin refused to believe Hitler would invade. Nothing more nothing less.

 

[vonnoobie]

Back onto the topic of Ukraine in regards to HIMAR's one could very well argue they need dozens of them but as pointed out the lack the ability to find enough targets quickly enough to take advantage of any great numbers of them.

They really need drones over Donbass to find the targets but they in effect are rendered useless due to large concentration of AA assets their, such assets that they could use HIMAR's to take out but again would require a drone to find them accurately... Very tricky situation to find a work around with limited assets.

 

[STURM]

Stalin was under no illusions that war would eventually break out but in 1941 he believed that the Non Agression Pact would hold. He was fed intel but believed it was British disinformation to draw him into a war. Even after war broke out, for a brief period he was willing to make concessions.

On the Ukrainians and HIMARS it also depends on what measures the Russians take or are able to in response. I would hazard a guess that intel provided by external sources plays a major part in enabling the Ukrainians to hit targets in the Russian rear.

 

[swerve]

Indeed. The Germans massed armour at the point of contact instead of in penny packets. In 1940 the French actually had more armour but they were in penny packets.

Not all of them. The French had seen what the Germans had done in Poland & like the British, learned from it (& some in both countries had already been advocating it). They were reorganising many of their tanks into armoured divisions.

They had six by May 1940, I think, & the force that moved into Belgium was spearheaded by two, acting together. They met the German advance through northern Belgium was spearheaded by two Panzer divisions, & they met at Hannut, in the biggest tank battle in the world up to that point. The French stopped the Germans dead. Unfortunately their victory was useless, because the Germans then broke out of the Ardennes & the French left hook into Belgium had to retreat hurriedly.

So, while many French tanks were still spread across the front in small packets for infantry support, they also had tank divisions, & used them en masse - just not as much as the Germans.

 

[IC_IC_IC]

No it wasn't..For most of the war the Germans were normally at a numerical disadvantage. It is not a myth. To give you an example; I have just finished "From The Realm Of A Dying Sun : IV SS-Panzerkorps And The Battles For Warsaw, July- November 1994 [Volume 1]" [Nash]

As the author makes clear: from primary source material; throughout the battles fought during this period this Korps faced the equivalent of 3-4 Soviet Corps, plus armoured brigades and other elements. I can also provide other sources. I'm no scholar or expert on the Gernan/Soviet war but I've long been able to differentiate the myths from the facts..

On Babarossa a " good chunk of the Soviet Army" was indeed in Siberia but it wasn't the main chunk and Soviet forces deployed in the Western regions on the eve of Barbarossa still had a numerical advantage over the Germans and their allies.



The "myth" was largely the result of memoirs and reports written by former German officers like Halder, Balck, Guderian, Mellenthin, etc; in the 1960's and 1970's at a time when there were hardly any Soviet/Russian sources available.It wasn't due to former officers who rewrote history when in the NVA.

On North Africa it may not have been a "gentlemen's war" per see but compared to the war in the East and even to an extent the war in the West; it was relatively clean.



Indeed. The Germans massed armour at the point of contact instead of in penny packets. In 1940 the French actually had more armour but they were in penny packets.

1 million men diference while also making a surprise attack, seems something meaningful ...
Also it is clear that many of those generals wanted to cover their XXXXX, both cause of the crimes comited and because the sensless operations like fallblau ...
Tik History channel has good 40 hour series and all the incoherences all those generals wrote after the war ...

@IC_IC_IC Text deleted for obscene language. Don't do it again, or there will be penalties applied.

Ngatimozart

 

[swerve]

Most of the war it was literally the opposite, Barbarosa had 4 million german soldiers and Soviet Union had 2.5, its one of those myths like "Winter defeated Germany", or "it was Hitler fault that we lost", many generals in the new german army of the GDR had to cover the truth in the same fashion they created the "gentlemen war" myth of the Africa Korps and of course Erwin Romel figure.

I think a bit under 4 million altogether, including Romanian, Hungarian, etc. And note that the Germans & their subordinates were fully mobilised & the Red Army wasn't. Figures extracted from Soviet archives show that the Red Army had more permanent losses (dead, captured) than the total number of front line troops facing the initial German attack, yet still had millions at the front six months later. A few hundred thousand Red Army reservists were taken by surprise by the speed of the Wehrmacht advance & captured while mobilising, having been called up after the attack began.

So no, it's not a myth, except at the very beginning of Operation Barbarossa. Red Army reserves began mobilising immediately, & over Barbarossa as a whole, the Red Army deployed considerably more men than the Germans etc.

 

[STURM]

Also it is clear that many of those generals wanted to cover their XXXXXX, both cause of the crimes comited.

It wasn't so much about the crimes but due to a host of other reasons.

and because the sensless operations like fallblau ...

Fall Blau was Hitler's idea and was sound; driven by the need for food supplies and oil. Rather than going for Moscow a decision was made to go south; oil in the Caucasus and wheat in the Ukraine.

"Stopped At Stalingrad" [Hayward] goes into great detail on why Hitler had no choice but to go south in 1942. In 1945 when his generals wanted him to allocate everything to the defence of Berlin sent Germany's last armoured reserves into Hungary; for oil.

Since you mentioned myths I strongly recommend "The Blitzkrieg Legend - The 1940 Campaign in the West" [Greenwood and Freiser].

 

[jref]

An interesting take on the number of artillery shells used so far by Russian forces in Ukraine, estimated arsenal and production capabilities:

Key takeaways:
- between 1 - 2.6 million fired artillery rounds so far in the war
- he puts Russias useable number of artillery shells after the Cold war at between 5 and 15 million
- if they continue in Ukraine at the same rate, that would leave them to last at worst until March 2023, without counting new rounds that can be produced in the meantime
- regarding the production capabilities, everything they need wrt artillery ammo can be found domestically and will not be affected by sanctions (unlike certain others, technically more demanding munitions); he puts their production capabilities at around 1 million per year
- he claims the number of munitions Russia is losing in recent Ukrainian strikes on ammo depots is negligible because each one is consisting of a few days use of artillery at most but it puts additional strain on their logistics

 

[Karl Franz]

And how many were on the West?
A good chunk of the Soviet Army was in Siberia until Germans were close to Moscow cause the feared japanese attack. Im talking about the Barbarosa itself, no the total numbers since then German one would be bigger too adding the rest of armies in other fronts like Africa. + all the allied countries of Germany like Italy, Romania, Hungary ...

Indeed, I believe that the Soviets achieved numerical superiority on the front at the end of the battle for Stalingrad. Up until that point the Axis had more men in total deployed at the front. It is interesting that even in the most critical part of the war for the Soviets (battle of Moscow) they had over one million men at Manchurian border (I forgot exact number 1.2m-1.3m), which shows how sure Stalin was that the Japanese would invade.

 

[IC_IC_IC]

An interesting take on the number of artillery shells used so far by Russian forces in Ukraine, estimated arsenal and production capabilities:

Key takeaways:
- between 1 - 2.6 million fired artillery rounds so far in the war
- he puts Russias useable number of artillery shells after the Cold war at between 5 and 15 million
- if they continue in Ukraine at the same rate, that would leave them to last at worst until March 2023, without counting new rounds that can be produced in the meantime
- regarding the production capabilities, everything they need wrt artillery ammo can be found domestically and will not be affected by sanctions (unlike certain others, technically more demanding munitions); he puts their production capabilities at around 1 million per year
- he claims the number of munitions Russia is losing in recent Ukrainian strikes on ammo depots is negligible because each one is consisting of a few days use of artillery at most but it puts additional strain on their logistics

I think the production capability for such low tech stuff is really dificult to guess if we look at history making aditional lines for a dumb 155mm shell would not take more than a year ...
This article is also interesting:

What Russian ammo ban? Loophole keeps it on US shelves, splitting gun rights groups

The ban on importing cheap Russian ammunition and a grandfather clause have split the top firearm lobbies as the war in Ukraine rages.

eu.usatoday.com

In 2021 US used around 900 million rounds made in Russia 16000 metric tons. 2022 is on the same pace

 

[STURM]

Indeed, I believe that the Soviets achieved numerical superiority on the front at the end of the battle for Stalingrad. Up until that point the Axis had more men in total deployed at the front.

David Stahel in his books goes into great detail on how worn out the Germans were; 4 months after the invasion German units were very short of manpower; common for companies to be down to less than platoon strength. The German Replacement Army could never fill in the losses. The Soviets in contrast had a larger pool of manpower they could draw on; in addition to units in Siberia.

which shows how sure Stalin was that the Japanese would invade.

He was actually uncertain they would invade but was extremely worried, thus he kept units there just in case.

 

[Ananda]

Some time ago I put in this thread potential deal between Ukraine and Russia with Turkey to guarantee safe passage on Grain Shipment. This deal from my understand talking on 3 ports, however from Turkish forum and media talk most likely with Odessa first.

Basically Turkish Navy will inspect any grain ships that will enter Odessa to make sure they come empty (thus satisfied Russian demand on detering potential Arms shipment from West), Russia will monitor the movement, Ukraine ships and pilots will guide the grain ships through their mine fields in and out. UN then monitor the operation through their station in Instanbul.

This will enhance Sultan Erdo diplomatic standing, as he basically shown to whole world he is the only guy that both Zelensky and Putin can work with.

 

[ngatimozart]

An interesting take on the number of artillery shells used so far by Russian forces in Ukraine, estimated arsenal and production capabilities:

Key takeaways:
- between 1 - 2.6 million fired artillery rounds so far in the war
- he puts Russias useable number of artillery shells after the Cold war at between 5 and 15 million
- if they continue in Ukraine at the same rate, that would leave them to last at worst until March 2023, without counting new rounds that can be produced in the meantime
- regarding the production capabilities, everything they need wrt artillery ammo can be found domestically and will not be affected by sanctions (unlike certain others, technically more demanding munitions); he puts their production capabilities at around 1 million per year
- he claims the number of munitions Russia is losing in recent Ukrainian strikes on ammo depots is negligible because each one is consisting of a few days use of artillery at most but it puts additional strain on their logistics

I would treat that with a reasonable degree of caution because he doesn't list his sources and the numbers cited have far to great an error factor to be of any use at all. The real point is that we simply don't know. The only way that we can tell how effective the attacks on the Russian ammo dumps are is by any changes in the intensity of the Russian artillery strikes, over what period of time the changes occur, and if they are unrelated to any Russian combat operations.

The assumption is that the Ukrainians are using the HIMARS to strike the ammo dumps in order to reduce the Russian artillery intensity and it appears to be working. That is only one part of the plan because they also need to strike the logistics hubs as well in order to reduce as much as possible to transport of artillery powder and shell to the front lines from Russia. HIMARS is quite capable of doing that because it is a precision weapons system. Note that the US apparently haven't sent the real long range rockets.

 

[ngatimozart]

Indeed, I believe that the Soviets achieved numerical superiority on the front at the end of the battle for Stalingrad. Up until that point the Axis had more men in total deployed at the front. It is interesting that even in the most critical part of the war for the Soviets (battle of Moscow) they had over one million men at Manchurian border (I forgot exact number 1.2m-1.3m), which shows how sure Stalin was that the Japanese would invade.

Stalin had excellent intelligence that the Japanese wouldn't invade Siberia from Richard Sorge who was a NKVD operative in te German Embassy in Tokyo. The Imperial Japanese Army had tried to teach the Red Army a lesson in 1939 and a young Soviet Col General Gregoriy Zhukov taught them a harsh lesson instead, by giving them a real thrashing which the IJA never forgot. IIRC it was the Japanese 8th Army based in Manchuria, which was also the cream of the IJA. It expected and received all the best troops and equipment right up until late 1944. With such an assurance Stalin was free to move troops and equipment from the east to the west of Russia which he did during 1942, leaving a relatively small force in Siberia to mind the fort and watch the Japanese. It was on 9th August 1945 that Stalin crossed the border into Manchuria and served chastisement upon the Japanese.

 

[Karl Franz]

David Stahel in his books goes into great detail on how worn out the Germans were; 4 months after the invasion German units were very short of manpower; it was common for companies to be down to less than platoon strength. The German Replacement Army could never fill in the osess. The Soviets in contrast had a larger pool of manpower they could draw on; in addition to units in Siberia.

I haven't had the time recently to read as much as I want to although I am a big fan of the subject. The last one I read "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler" by David M. Glantz few months back. To not go too far from the subjects of the thread, basically after the World War 2 people outside the communist block had no real information about the eastern front and as the iron curtain fell no way to get them so they turn to the only source they had the official German documents which were basically like any other thing the Nazi government told a good lie (a lie wrapped around the truth). Recently as archives became available there are more and more good books on the subject but i simply haven't had the time to read as much as i wanted.

Regarding attrition of the German forces it was indeed high and got worse the further they went east with as you said few replacements . As an economist, I am fascinated by the wars logistics and organizational problems that both Germans and Soviets had to overcome. The guys in charge to make sure that both armies function properly had some amazing organizational skills.

 

[Karl Franz]

Stalin had excellent intelligence that the Japanese wouldn't invade Siberia from Richard Sorge who was a NKVD operative in te German Embassy in Tokyo. The Imperial Japanese Army had tried to teach the Red Army a lesson in 1939 and a young Soviet Col General Gregoriy Zhukov taught them a harsh lesson instead, by giving them a real thrashing which the IJA never forgot. IIRC it was the Japanese 8th Army based in Manchuria, which was also the cream of the IJA. It expected and received all the best troops and equipment right up until late 1944. With such an assurance Stalin was free to move troops and equipment from the east to the west of Russia which he did during 1942, leaving a relatively small force in Siberia to mind the fort and watch the Japanese. It was on 9th August 1945 that Stalin crossed the border into Manchuria and served chastisement upon the Japanese.

Indeed Stalin had great intelligence on Japanese plans, he simply did not trust them, just as he had about the German invasion, I believe that he even had the date of the start of Barbarosa and did not act upon that. Whatever else Stalin was, he was a shrewd politician and knew that the best time for Japanese attack was now and if he had led Japan he would definitely attack. He did not realize what favor Zhukov did for him at Khalkhin Gol (one of the most unknown and at the same time most consequential battles in history). Later especially after Pearl Harbor he was much more free to move his forces.

 

[ngatimozart]

I haven't had the time recently to read as much as I want to although I am a big fan of the subject. The last one I read "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler" by David M. Glantz few months back. To not go too far from the subjects of the thread, basically after the World War 2 people outside the communist block had no real information about the eastern front and as the iron curtain fell no way to get them so they turn to the only source they had the official German documents which were basically like any other thing the Nazi government told a good lie (a lie wrapped around the truth). Recently as archives became available there are more and more good books on the subject but i simply haven't had the time to read as much as i wanted.

Regarding attrition of the German forces it was indeed high and got worse the further they went east with as you said few replacements . As an economist, I am fascinated by the wars logistics and organizational problems that both Germans and Soviets had to overcome. The guys in charge to make sure that both armies function properly had some amazing organizational skills.

I think that the logistics capabilities of the Germans and the Russians were decades apart and that's what was a war winner for the Russians. The Russians made great use of trucks, especially American Lend-Lease trucks which they given by the tens of thousands. From memory the vast majority were Studebaker and White trucks. So they were able to truck just about everything to the frontline. They also used their rail system efficiently and effectively, and it wasn't being destroyed like the German one was in Europe. Also Stalin placed Russia on a war economy immediately and moved the essential industries behind the Ural mountains, well beyond German strike capabilities.

On the German side, the Wehrmacht logistics was poor in comparison. They didn't have a large motorised logistics fleet comprised of trucks. Their logistics fleet was mostly horse drawn, as was their artillery. Even in 1944 this was so and graphic evidence of this an be seen in film and photos taken after finish of the Battle of the Falaise Gap in France in 1944, where Allied Forces decimated the German Army Group B, 7th Army, and 5th Panzer Army. Hitler also never put the German economy on to a war footing until 1942 and that was a mistake.

 

[ngatimozart]

Indeed Stalin had great intelligence on Japanese plans, he simply did not trust them, just as he had about the German invasion, I believe that he even had the date of the start of Barbarosa and did not act upon that. Whatever else Stalin was, he was a shrewd politician and knew that the best time for Japanese attack was now and if he had led Japan he would definitely attack. He did not realize what favor Zhukov did for him at Khalkhin Gol (one of the most unknown and at the same time most consequential battles in history). Later especially after Pearl Harbor he was much more free to move his forces.

Yes well Stalin was so suspicious he did even trust himself. I wouldn't be surprised if he even had himself placed under surveillance because he was that paranoid about traitors.

 

[STURM]

I haven't had the time recently to read as much as I want to although I am a big fan of the subject. The last one I read "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler" by David M. Glantz few months back.

His works are essential reading but not easy reading; not for me personally. I highly recommend stuff done by Douglas Nash, George Nipe and David Stahel.

We're seeing a lot of parallels with what's happening in the Ukraine and what the Germans and Soviets faced. Ironically a lot of what the Russians are now facing were the same problems the Germans faced; i.e. worn out units; a lack of infantry to close pockets, etc.

The guys in charge to make sure that both armies function properly had some amazing organizational skills.

Indeed and it's not so much that the Germans were bad at logistics but the fact that the German military was built for short continental wars; not protracted ones. German logistics actually improved as the war dragged on; it was a host of various issues [a lack of raw materials, the distances; Allied bombing; flawed policies at home; production capacity] and not bad logistics per see which hampered things. We also have to bear in mind that the Germans; unlike the Brits; didn't have the resources of a Commonwealth to fall back on and they didn't have an ally with the industrial capacity the Americans had.

We often hear of logistics being a major factor in their defeat in North Africa but for two over years they sustained themselves there when the odds were stacked up against them; apart from brief periods the RN dominated the Med; North Africa was seen by Hitler as a sideshow in contrast with the Brits for whom it wasn't a sideshow; the Italians were reluctant to fully commit their navy for convoy escort; the Allies had Ultra; etc.