Russia - General Discussion.

[Feanor]

It's a bit curious how a developing country with modest economic output and significant brain drain still manages to cause the West so many strategic headaches. What's the root of that leverage? Is it "just" the nuclear arsenal, the oil and gas, and the residual competence of the old Soviet intelligence apparatus? If that's the case, will that influence erode once (or if) the world transitions off fossil fuels?

It's really fascinating how it managed to dissuade the West for long enough to decisively support Ukraine for the longest time. Most of the support came a day late and a dollar short. And I don't think this will change with the minerals deal.

Moved to appropriate thread.

I think that your characterization of Russia as a developing country with a modest economic output is inaccurate. Nominal GDP is often looked for various reasons, but if you want to compare the size of an country's economic output you have to look at purchasing power parity. You'll notice that Russia is one of the largest economies in the world. It's certainly much smaller then true superpowers like the USA and China, and the combined EU (if it ever becomes properly combined it will likely be another superpower). But compared to a limited effort from the west, Russia can put up a decent showing. It's this point that I think many people keep missing about Russia. Russian automotive is unimpressive in a western car market, but it can be quite serviceable in supporting this war effort, consider the bukhanka vans. Russia is a major producer of metals including some fairly high tech stuff (consider both Boeing and Airbus want Russian titanium alloys), agricultural products, and of course energy resources.

Also consider that Russia's multi-vector foreign policy has borne fruit. Russia made friends with South Korea, played ball with Israel, expanded their influence in Africa, and maintained good relationships with China, India, and Indonesia. As a result Russia is harder to isolate. And the west itself isn't all that united. There isn't necessarily the will or appetite for a strategic defeat of Russia in all corners, and it seems when a country goes long term for that kind of goal (consider US sanctions), if it experiences a change of leadership it becomes likely that the opposition picks up the idea of improving relations with Russia, or at least spending less time focused on countering Russia. In part it's also important to note that outside of a strategic nuclear arsenal, Russia isn't really a an existential threat to Europe or the USA. Both would win in a conventional war if they were willing to keep fighting until victory. The EU could lose some sort of short hot war, if Russia plays their cards very well, the EU plays theirs poorly, and the circumstances are right. But it's hard to tell an Italian that he needs to see his already eroding quality of life take another dip because they need to spend money on a buildup to fight Russia... in Eastern Ukraine. It's why you saw a big boost in anti-Russian sanctions and sentiment during and shortly after the events of '14-'15, but then it waned and there was even talk of lifting sanctions. In a way by not being as threatening, but at the same time expensive to deal with, Russia can make it easier to not confront them while playing on the lack of unity in what is after all a fairly diverse group of separate sovereign nations, with their own interests, problems, and priorities. Remember there's always a scenario for Europe to hand Ukraine off to Russia and go back to buying cheap resources and selling Russia manufactured goods. The EU as a whole is highly unlikely to go down that path, but individual countries could, consider Hungary and Slovakia.

Russia also inherited far more than the Soviet intelligence apparatus. Russia inherited many cutting edge scientific and military capabilities that remained relevant much longer due to the post-Cold War draw down. Russia beat the US to a working hypersonic missile capability by years. And Russia had at least 3 hypersonic weapon systems in service before the US had one. Pieces of Soviet tech like the MiG-31, or Izd 4202, have yielded fruit in strange and sometimes unforseeable ways. A supersonic interceptor meant to down B-52s over the Arctic is now a platform for an air-launched ballistic missile? The US could theoretically mirror this, but the US doesn't have a MiG-31 and developing one is costly and timeconsuming. Sometimes having the right pieces in your hands enables you to do things that others could theoretically, but won't practically. Russia inherited aerospace and MIC capabilities out of all proportions to their economy, and made a wise choice to focus on exporting new-built military goods, while hanging on to much of their Soviet stockpile, instead of simply selling it off like Ukraine did. Consequently Russia managed to maintain large functioning pieces of the MIC and even made it commercially viable. The most exported MBT of the 21st century is?

I think the situation is a combination of the will for confronting Russia being weak due to competing priorities, Russia's economy being stronger then it gets credit for, and Russia inheriting far more than you mention. But I think a big part of this equation too, and something that probably goes well beyond the scope of this thread, is that the world is no longer quite so dominated by a handful of western countries. Which means it's not Russia vs the world, it's Russia vs an indecisive bloc of countries, and one superpower, both willing to support Ukraine but not willing to gear up for a large war.

On a side note, aid to Ukraine falls into an interesting paradox. Objectively speaking the volumes of aid Ukraine has received are staggering. At this point it's hard to count just how many artillery pieces, armored vehicles, and munitions Ukraine has received. But at the same time it hasn't been enough. It's both massive and insufficient at the same time. I think this is a good indicator that if the collective west really wants Ukraine to defeat Russia, they will have to get their shit together and drastically increase military production on a scale that they so far simply haven't been willing to.

 

[personaldesas]

I think that your characterization of Russia as a developing country with a modest economic output is inaccurate. Nominal GDP is often looked for various reasons, but if you want to compare the size of an country's economic output you have to look at purchasing power parity. You'll notice that Russia is one of the largest economies in the world. It's certainly much smaller then true superpowers like the USA and China, and the combined EU (if it ever becomes properly combined it will likely be another superpower).

I’d still call Russia a developing country - that’s how the IMF classifies it, and its GDP per capita rankings (68th nominal, 43rd PPP) support that.

As for PPP, I’m not sure it belongs in a strategic discussion like this. It’s useful for comparing domestic living standards or internal resource use, but it doesn’t say much about how much global weight a country can throw around. If we’re talking about strategic leverage, nominal figures seem more relevant.

 

[personaldesas]

Also consider that Russia's multi-vector foreign policy has borne fruit. Russia made friends with South Korea, played ball with Israel, expanded their influence in Africa, and maintained good relationships with China, India, and Indonesia. As a result Russia is harder to isolate. And the west itself isn't all that united. There isn't necessarily the will or appetite for a strategic defeat of Russia in all corners, and it seems when a country goes long term for that kind of goal (consider US sanctions), if it experiences a change of leadership it becomes likely that the opposition picks up the idea of improving relations with Russia, or at least spending less time focused on countering Russia. In part it's also important to note that outside of a strategic nuclear arsenal, Russia isn't really a an existential threat to Europe or the USA. Both would win in a conventional war if they were willing to keep fighting until victory. The EU could lose some sort of short hot war, if Russia plays their cards very well, the EU plays theirs poorly, and the circumstances are right. But it's hard to tell an Italian that he needs to see his already eroding quality of life take another dip because they need to spend money on a buildup to fight Russia... in Eastern Ukraine. It's why you saw a big boost in anti-Russian sanctions and sentiment during and shortly after the events of '14-'15, but then it waned and there was even talk of lifting sanctions. In a way by not being as threatening, but at the same time expensive to deal with, Russia can make it easier to not confront them while playing on the lack of unity in what is after all a fairly diverse group of separate sovereign nations, with their own interests, problems, and priorities. Remember there's always a scenario for Europe to hand Ukraine off to Russia and go back to buying cheap resources and selling Russia manufactured goods. The EU as a whole is highly unlikely to go down that path, but individual countries could, consider Hungary and Slovakia.

I think your assessment is fair overall - I don’t really take issue with any of it. What stands out most to me is how effectively Russia manages to punch above its weight. For a country with clear structural constraints, it’s remarkable how much friction it creates for the West.

I’d just flag that South Korea and Israel seem like weaker examples, more cases of realpolitik and tactical coexistence than true strategic alignment. South Korea remains firmly in the U.S. sphere, and their indirect delivery of artillery shells reflects that. Israel’s coordination with Russia mostly centers on managing the Syria situation. Still, your broader point about Russia resisting isolation holds.

 

[personaldesas]

Russia also inherited far more than the Soviet intelligence apparatus. Russia inherited many cutting edge scientific and military capabilities that remained relevant much longer due to the post-Cold War draw down. Russia beat the US to a working hypersonic missile capability by years. And Russia had at least 3 hypersonic weapon systems in service before the US had one. Pieces of Soviet tech like the MiG-31, or Izd 4202, have yielded fruit in strange and sometimes unforseeable ways. A supersonic interceptor meant to down B-52s over the Arctic is now a platform for an air-launched ballistic missile? The US could theoretically mirror this, but the US doesn't have a MiG-31 and developing one is costly and timeconsuming. Sometimes having the right pieces in your hands enables you to do things that others could theoretically, but won't practically. Russia inherited aerospace and MIC capabilities out of all proportions to their economy, and made a wise choice to focus on exporting new-built military goods, while hanging on to much of their Soviet stockpile, instead of simply selling it off like Ukraine did. Consequently Russia managed to maintain large functioning pieces of the MIC and even made it commercially viable. The most exported MBT of the 21st century is?

I largely agree again.

That said, I think the hypersonic “lead” deserves a bit of nuance. Russia deployed systems like Kinzhal first, but from what I understand, their actual capabilities and strategic impact are still debated. It’s also not exactly revolutionary, it reaches hypersonic speeds mainly through its ballistic launch profile, not through advanced maneuverability like a true HGV.

And yes, Russia has managed to keep parts of its military industry commercially viable. But sanctions, supply chain issues, and growing competition, especially from China, seem to be taking a toll.

 

[personaldesas]

On a side note, aid to Ukraine falls into an interesting paradox. Objectively speaking the volumes of aid Ukraine has received are staggering. At this point it's hard to count just how many artillery pieces, armored vehicles, and munitions Ukraine has received. But at the same time it hasn't been enough. It's both massive and insufficient at the same time. I think this is a good indicator that if the collective west really wants Ukraine to defeat Russia, they will have to get their shit together and drastically increase military production on a scale that they so far simply haven't been willing to.

I think if the West had delivered the same volume of aid earlier and more agressively, the outcome could’ve been far more impactful. Things geared up slowly, and key systems that might’ve shifted the balance were often held back until it was too late to fully exploit them.

Russia played its hand well. Between nuclear signaling, energy leverage, information warfare, and exploiting Western caution, it managed to delay serious commitments and shape the tempo of the response in its favor.

 

[seaspear]

Its a pity for this country with so much resource wealth that it did not share this with its citizenry as per Norway ,it seems basics of socialism never took hold

 

[PachkaSigaret]

It's a bit curious how a developing country with modest economic output and significant brain drain still manages to cause the West so many strategic headaches. What's the root of that leverage?

The brain drain isn't as significant as it is made out to be. Russia graduates over 500,000 STEM graduates per year. 4th in the world. Plus desperation often creates innovation not only on the battlefield but economically in general.

I’d still call Russia a developing country - that’s how the IMF classifies it, and its GDP per capita rankings (68th nominal, 43rd PPP) support that.

As for PPP, I’m not sure it belongs in a strategic discussion like this. It’s useful for comparing domestic living standards or internal resource use, but it doesn’t say much about how much global weight a country can throw around. If we’re talking about strategic leverage, nominal figures seem more relevant.

While it is true the IMF classifies Russia as a developing country, as they also do China, there are certain sectors and aspects about their economy that makes them resilient. They are ranked number 4 in world in terms of PPP.

Some reasons PPP is more accurate than nominal GDP:

1) Adjusts for differences in the cost of living and inflation across countries.

2) Provides a more accurate picture of relative economic productivity and living standards when comparing countries.

3) Used in international comparisons, especially when comparing per capita income or living standards.


Nominal figures are deceptive. How you utilize your money and industry goes a long way. Just a light example, how much more inflated is the European and especially the U.S. MIC compared to Russia? Now not saying that they can't really ratchet it up if need be, but it does takes it toll and bloated bureaucracy would need to be addressed at least to some degree.

Russia is by far the most sanctioned country in the world. However, the western countries that are sanctioning Russia don't make up the entire world. Their influence isn't what was in the 90s and at the end of the cold world. Bypassing SWIFT and maintaining a large commercial/air fleet to conduct trade has helped Russia evade in a long way.

 

[Feanor]

I’d still call Russia a developing country - that’s how the IMF classifies it, and its GDP per capita rankings (68th nominal, 43rd PPP) support that.

As for PPP, I’m not sure it belongs in a strategic discussion like this. It’s useful for comparing domestic living standards or internal resource use, but it doesn’t say much about how much global weight a country can throw around. If we’re talking about strategic leverage, nominal figures seem more relevant.

Developing yes, but we're not talking about the ability of individual Russian citizens, but the capabilities of a state. Total GDP is I think somewhat more relevant then per capita. PPP is useful for understanding how many goods and services an economy produces. Goods and services like bukhanka vans, and T-90M tanks and mercenary outfits, i.e. the types of things being used in both the war in Ukraine and in Russia's headache-production abroad.

I think your assessment is fair overall - I don’t really take issue with any of it. What stands out most to me is how effectively Russia manages to punch above its weight. For a country with clear structural constraints, it’s remarkable how much friction it creates for the West.

I’d just flag that South Korea and Israel seem like weaker examples, more cases of realpolitik and tactical coexistence than true strategic alignment. South Korea remains firmly in the U.S. sphere, and their indirect delivery of artillery shells reflects that. Israel’s coordination with Russia mostly centers on managing the Syria situation. Still, your broader point about Russia resisting isolation holds.

I mention them because they're outliers. Both were clear adversaries, and had very poor relations, if any, with the Soviet Union. Yet here is modern day Russia with a different picture. On a side note, while with Israel the relationship is certainly limited, the exact extent of Russia's partnership with the RoK remains unclear to me but it certainly ran quite deep at least at one point. Russia's Almaz-Antey was closely involved in the development of the KM-SAM, essentially a cousin of the S-350, Roscosmos is tied into the RoK space program, and RoK electronics are (or at least were) vital to Russia's GLONASS devices. The RoK was very hesitant to cut cooperation with Russia post '14, and has even been cautious with it's sanctions during the current war. Now here we are, in the 4th year of the war, and Russia recently launched a GLONASS-K2 satellite. Any RoK components in there? Would anyone tell us if there are, and can Russia even do this without their components?

It's one hell of a diplomatic achievement to have a strategic partnership with both the RoK and DPRK at the same time.

I also think some of those in the west are having a hard time facing the new geo-strategic reality. The center of global power and commerce is slowly shifting. I suspect Russia understands this far better and part of why they've been able to "punch above their weight" is because they played to the correct side of this historic trend.

I largely agree again.

That said, I think the hypersonic “lead” deserves a bit of nuance. Russia deployed systems like Kinzhal first, but from what I understand, their actual capabilities and strategic impact are still debated. It’s also not exactly revolutionary, it reaches hypersonic speeds mainly through its ballistic launch profile, not through advanced maneuverability like a true HGV.

And yes, Russia has managed to keep parts of its military industry commercially viable. But sanctions, supply chain issues, and growing competition, especially from China, seem to be taking a toll.

The Kinzhal is a way to slap things very hard from far away, in a way that's hard to intercept. Ordinary Iskanders are already hard to deal with, Kinzhals are worse. Based on what we've seen, there is currently no reliable way to deal with group-strikes by hypersonics. They can be intercepted, but the odds aren't great. And the fact that it's not revolutionary is exactly what I meant when I wrote about having the right pieces.

I think if the West had delivered the same volume of aid earlier and more agressively, the outcome could’ve been far more impactful. Things geared up slowly, and key systems that might’ve shifted the balance were often held back until it was too late to fully exploit them.

Russia played its hand well. Between nuclear signaling, energy leverage, information warfare, and exploiting Western caution, it managed to delay serious commitments and shape the tempo of the response in its favor.

Agreed. Russia often plays well. Which makes one wonder, why did they invade at all. It was a bad move, if they really expected to roll through Ukraine in a victory lap, then they badly misjudged the internal state of Ukraine post '14. If they didn't, why invade with such a small force, and then not mobilize for so long?

 

[Feanor]

Its a pity for this country with so much resource wealth that it did not share this with its citizenry as per Norway ,it seems basics of socialism never took hold

Russia went very hard in the opposite direction in the '90s. It destroyed a lot of the old Soviet mindset, and what was left was channeled in different ways. That having been said, Russia still does have more of a social safety net then many countries. They also have a very corrupt oligarchy running the show. Sharing the wealth with the people means not putting it in your own pocket. And if you're not putting it in your pocket, what even is the point?

 

[Ananda]

for PPP, I’m not sure it belongs in a strategic discussion like this. It’s useful for comparing domestic living standards or internal resource use, but it doesn’t say much about how much global weight a country can throw around. If we’re talking about strategic leverage, nominal figures seem more relevant.

If your production supply chain more domestics integrate, then PPP ones can matter more compare to nominal ones. On contrary if your production supply chain more dependent to external sources, then nominal GDP value shown better paramater.

Since 2014 and especially after the war, Russia increasingly have more integrate domestic production chain. More out off necesseties due to Western sanctions, but when one nation can replace external chain with domestic ones, then their own currency power will determine more on their production level.

Seems so far Russia domestic replacement production chain shown better performance that many Western think tank assesment during early days of sanctions. Off course there are still external chains that Russian needed, but now mostly come from China, India and other Global South. Most of them also reciprocal trade related to Russia Hydrocarbon export. Thus they mostly don't use USD or Euro anymore.

China production supply chains are one of the most domestic integrated in the World now. In sense they can sources from down to basic of nut and bolts domestically. This is why they can produce and invest more then their nominal GDP shown. That's just example on comparison of PPP value reflect more then Nominal one.

 

[personaldesas]

Developing yes, but we're not talking about the ability of individual Russian citizens, but the capabilities of a state. Total GDP is I think somewhat more relevant then per capita.

Sure, I agree - just pointing out that this number supports classifying Russia as a developing country with relatively low living standards. But in our context, that matters less. Better to have many citizens who can contribute at scale than few highly productive ones.

Agreed. Russia often plays well. Which makes one wonder, why did they invade at all. It was a bad move, if they really expected to roll through Ukraine in a victory lap, then they badly misjudged the internal state of Ukraine post '14. If they didn't, why invade with such a small force, and then not mobilize for so long?

I mean, based on the information they had at the time, I can see why they thought Hostomel might go differently - and that they had a real shot at Kyiv. That could have led to a very different outcome for Russia.

 

[personaldesas]

The Kinzhal is a way to slap things very hard from far away, in a way that's hard to intercept. Ordinary Iskanders are already hard to deal with, Kinzhals are worse. Based on what we've seen, there is currently no reliable way to deal with group-strikes by hypersonics. They can be intercepted, but the odds aren't great. And the fact that it's not revolutionary is exactly what I meant when I wrote about having the right pieces.

Fair, Kinzhal is definitely fast and hard to intercept, especially in saturation strikes. But it is possible, and Russia seems to use them sparingly, either due to cost or stock. I think their real-world impact is localized, and many other russian systems play far greater roles.

But to my earlier point: it’s not a true HGV in the modern sense. It’s essentially an air-launched ballistic missile that reaches hypersonic speeds, but does so by following a largely ballistic trajectory, not through sustained atmospheric maneuvering like the DF-17 or what the US is developing. It’s fast and hard to intercept, but it has limited maneuverability. In that sense, it’s more of an enhanced ballistic missile. It doesn’t represent a sustained technological edge in HGV, "just" a smart adaptation of existing capabilities. Impressive in its own right, though.