I have just read a very interesting article in Foreign Affairs Blundering on the Brink but unfortunately its paywalled.
Recently released declassified Soviet Union documents from the CPSU archives and the Military archives have given an unhitherto view of the USSR decision making and reasoning for their placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. According to the documents Khrushchev had devised a cunning plan to place the missiles there, because he believed that when discovered, Kennedy wouldn't do anything due to the US Jupiter nuclear missiles based in Turkiye. "Khrushchev expected the United States to simply put up with Soviet deterrence, just as he had put up with U.S. deterrence." Khrushchev's driving reason for this ill-fated plan was his "... resentment of U.S. assertiveness in Europe and his fear that Kennedy would order an invasion of Cuba, overthrowing Castro and humiliating Moscow in the process." It was a humongous gamble that backfired.
Khrushchev sent an envoy, Sergei Biryuzov, the commander of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, to broach the idea with Fidel Castro in Havana. Castro was absolutely enthralled with the proposal and he saw it as protection from a further US invasion after the US sponsored Bay of Pigs debacle. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, Biryuzov was an artilleryman not a missile SME (Subject Matter Expert), and this incompetence would have drastic repercussions. Biryuzov was tasked to scout the island and identify sites for the missile batteries. When he returned to Moscow he said that the palm trees would hide the missiles. However when General Igor Statsenko, the commander of the Cuban Missile Group arrived in Cuba and visited each site, he quickly identified that whilst there were indeed palm trees, they were to far apart for camouflage purposes. The gaps in-between were completely open to the sky with the palms only covering 1/16th of the required area. The Cuban vegetation wasn't as described by Biryuzov who had "... told Khrushchev that the missiles could be safely hidden under the foliage of the island’s plentiful palm trees." When Statsenko reported back to Moscow that the sites were untenable, the STAVKA withheld that information from Khrushchev. What is not known is whether or not Khrushchev would've have continued with the plan if he had been aware of the Statsenko report.
It was definitely a very large group and many of the soldiers were transported in cargo ships, living in the holds with their equipment. Not the most pleasant of experiences for a voyage from the Black Sea to Cuba. When they did arrive and got down to work, they found that the required construction equipment and materials hadn't arrived in time, important parts for the missiles were absent, their equipment wasn't at all suitable for Cuban conditions with the hot air temperatures and high humidity. Worst of all the construction of the missile emplacements, and assembly of the missiles was during the hurricane season.
The whole exercise was a gamble based on luck and the military planners hadn't adequately researched the Cuban environmental, political, military, and geographic conditions. When faults and mistakes in the plan were reported back, they were generally ignored because the planners and Moscow based staff hid their mistakes from their superiors, who in turn didn't want to annoy Khrushchev. This was a hypercentralisation of control where people avoided responsibility, especially when things turn to custard. Because a plan had been approved no one was willing to deviate from it. Their logistics was also a problem because they had never deployed such a large contingent so far before, especially by sea. So Soviet personnel were deployed on a mission that required lack of detection by the US and under strict secrecy. It was a failure before the ships sailed because of the hypercentralisation and secrecy. In the end it was the lack of adequate preparation and inflexibility within the Soviet C2 structure that caused Soviet personnel to be deployed to Cuba without being told of the real reasons, and that it could cause conflict with the US. The rest, as they say, is history.
Khrushchev had a fall back position; an escape clause so to speak. Khrushchev knew when he had to back down and fully understood the dangers, especially of nuclear war. He succeeded in that he gained a promise from Kennedy never to invade Cuba, and the removal of the US Jupiter missiles from Turkiye. He was also aware that a massive embarrassment and failure on his part would severely reduce the reputation and image of the USSR within international communist circles and the third world. But most importantly of all he understood that if such a thing did occur the CPSU & USSR would lose its leadership of international communism, handing it over to the CCP & PRC which the CPSU definitely didn't want to concede.
The 1962 Cuban Crisis was much studied both in the west and within the USSR, but sometimes the more things change the more they stay the same. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine we see exactly the same mistakes occur with poor logistics, planning, and the misleading of Russian troops about what they are doing. Some troops were told that they were going on extended exercises and many weren't even told that they were invading a neighbour country. The Russian political and military belief was that they would be welcomed by the Ukrainians, however the truth on 24/2/22 was far different and the invasion galvanised and united the Ukrainian population, with differences between ethnic Ukrainians ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine being set aside.
Putin has been rattling the nuclear sabre off and on over the last year and unlike Khrushchev he doesn't have a fall back position. He doesn't know when to back down or retreat in order to preserve the long term vision and national aims. He has wrecked the reputation of Russia and shown his military to definitely not be the feared and unbeatable force it once was. He has reduced Russia to almost the vassal state of the PRC and the damage that he is inflicting on the Russian polity, people, and economy will take long to repair. Putin doesn't have the political nous or skills of Khrushchev or Stalin. Whilst Khrushchev was removed from his position as General Secretary of the CPSU in 1964 and sent into retirement, Putin's more than likely to die in office, either from natural causes or by other means.
I do not believe that Russia will collapse; it's not impossible but improbable. Russia will survive Putin, but the Kremlin is another story. Putin isn't Stalin and Stalin was many things, but stupid he wasn't. Stalin was a good planner and knew what he had to do in the running of his Russian empire, and generally how he was going to do it. He was a control freak and very ruthless in achieving his aims. He used the NKVD as his tool for controlling those around him and the wider population. Large purges were not uncommon and ordering the death of millions wasn't an issue for him. He had an innate sense of survival and never left his enemies or opponents any opening to move against him. Putin, despite all of his blustering and bellicose, doesn't have those skills of Stalin and he's leaving opportunities for his enemies within the Kremlin to conspire and work against him. That may be his downfall in the end.
Whilst we say that the Russian military are poorly performing, it would both be very remiss and dangerous for us to assume that this is the status quo. They can still be a formidable enemy and underestimating them, or any enemy for that matter, is both foolish and dangerous. The longer this war goes on the more the Russian military will both learn and understand. The poor leaders in the field will be killed or replaced, enabling those leaders who have succeeded in learning the hard lessons taught in combat, to come forward and move up the command chain. Natural selection is the term. However the overall concern must be whether, or not, the Russian military as an institution, can change for the better and undertake a thorough, honest, truthful, reappraisal of itself. Time will tell.
Recently released declassified Soviet Union documents from the CPSU archives and the Military archives have given an unhitherto view of the USSR decision making and reasoning for their placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. According to the documents Khrushchev had devised a cunning plan to place the missiles there, because he believed that when discovered, Kennedy wouldn't do anything due to the US Jupiter nuclear missiles based in Turkiye. "Khrushchev expected the United States to simply put up with Soviet deterrence, just as he had put up with U.S. deterrence." Khrushchev's driving reason for this ill-fated plan was his "... resentment of U.S. assertiveness in Europe and his fear that Kennedy would order an invasion of Cuba, overthrowing Castro and humiliating Moscow in the process." It was a humongous gamble that backfired.
Khrushchev sent an envoy, Sergei Biryuzov, the commander of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, to broach the idea with Fidel Castro in Havana. Castro was absolutely enthralled with the proposal and he saw it as protection from a further US invasion after the US sponsored Bay of Pigs debacle. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, Biryuzov was an artilleryman not a missile SME (Subject Matter Expert), and this incompetence would have drastic repercussions. Biryuzov was tasked to scout the island and identify sites for the missile batteries. When he returned to Moscow he said that the palm trees would hide the missiles. However when General Igor Statsenko, the commander of the Cuban Missile Group arrived in Cuba and visited each site, he quickly identified that whilst there were indeed palm trees, they were to far apart for camouflage purposes. The gaps in-between were completely open to the sky with the palms only covering 1/16th of the required area. The Cuban vegetation wasn't as described by Biryuzov who had "... told Khrushchev that the missiles could be safely hidden under the foliage of the island’s plentiful palm trees." When Statsenko reported back to Moscow that the sites were untenable, the STAVKA withheld that information from Khrushchev. What is not known is whether or not Khrushchev would've have continued with the plan if he had been aware of the Statsenko report.
"According to the proposal, the Soviet army would send to Cuba the 51st Missile Division, consisting of five regiments: all of the group’s officers and soldiers, about 8,000 men, would leave their base in western Ukraine and be permanently stationed in Cuba. They would bring with them 60 ballistic missiles: 36 medium-range R-12s and 24 intermediate-range R-14s. The R-14s were a particular challenge: at 80 feet long and 86 metric tons, the missiles required a host of construction engineers and technicians, as well as dozens of tracks, cranes, bulldozers, excavators, and cement mixers to install them on launching pads in Cuba. The troops of the missile division would be joined by many other soldiers and equipment in Cuba: two antiaircraft divisions, one regiment of IL-28 bombers, one air force squadron of MiG fighters, three regiments with helicopters and cruise missiles, four infantry regiments with tanks, and support and logistics troops. The list of these units filled five pages of the proposal on May 24: 44,000 men in uniform, plus 1,800 construction and engineering specialists."
It was definitely a very large group and many of the soldiers were transported in cargo ships, living in the holds with their equipment. Not the most pleasant of experiences for a voyage from the Black Sea to Cuba. When they did arrive and got down to work, they found that the required construction equipment and materials hadn't arrived in time, important parts for the missiles were absent, their equipment wasn't at all suitable for Cuban conditions with the hot air temperatures and high humidity. Worst of all the construction of the missile emplacements, and assembly of the missiles was during the hurricane season.
The whole exercise was a gamble based on luck and the military planners hadn't adequately researched the Cuban environmental, political, military, and geographic conditions. When faults and mistakes in the plan were reported back, they were generally ignored because the planners and Moscow based staff hid their mistakes from their superiors, who in turn didn't want to annoy Khrushchev. This was a hypercentralisation of control where people avoided responsibility, especially when things turn to custard. Because a plan had been approved no one was willing to deviate from it. Their logistics was also a problem because they had never deployed such a large contingent so far before, especially by sea. So Soviet personnel were deployed on a mission that required lack of detection by the US and under strict secrecy. It was a failure before the ships sailed because of the hypercentralisation and secrecy. In the end it was the lack of adequate preparation and inflexibility within the Soviet C2 structure that caused Soviet personnel to be deployed to Cuba without being told of the real reasons, and that it could cause conflict with the US. The rest, as they say, is history.
Khrushchev had a fall back position; an escape clause so to speak. Khrushchev knew when he had to back down and fully understood the dangers, especially of nuclear war. He succeeded in that he gained a promise from Kennedy never to invade Cuba, and the removal of the US Jupiter missiles from Turkiye. He was also aware that a massive embarrassment and failure on his part would severely reduce the reputation and image of the USSR within international communist circles and the third world. But most importantly of all he understood that if such a thing did occur the CPSU & USSR would lose its leadership of international communism, handing it over to the CCP & PRC which the CPSU definitely didn't want to concede.
The 1962 Cuban Crisis was much studied both in the west and within the USSR, but sometimes the more things change the more they stay the same. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine we see exactly the same mistakes occur with poor logistics, planning, and the misleading of Russian troops about what they are doing. Some troops were told that they were going on extended exercises and many weren't even told that they were invading a neighbour country. The Russian political and military belief was that they would be welcomed by the Ukrainians, however the truth on 24/2/22 was far different and the invasion galvanised and united the Ukrainian population, with differences between ethnic Ukrainians ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine being set aside.
Putin has been rattling the nuclear sabre off and on over the last year and unlike Khrushchev he doesn't have a fall back position. He doesn't know when to back down or retreat in order to preserve the long term vision and national aims. He has wrecked the reputation of Russia and shown his military to definitely not be the feared and unbeatable force it once was. He has reduced Russia to almost the vassal state of the PRC and the damage that he is inflicting on the Russian polity, people, and economy will take long to repair. Putin doesn't have the political nous or skills of Khrushchev or Stalin. Whilst Khrushchev was removed from his position as General Secretary of the CPSU in 1964 and sent into retirement, Putin's more than likely to die in office, either from natural causes or by other means.
I do not believe that Russia will collapse; it's not impossible but improbable. Russia will survive Putin, but the Kremlin is another story. Putin isn't Stalin and Stalin was many things, but stupid he wasn't. Stalin was a good planner and knew what he had to do in the running of his Russian empire, and generally how he was going to do it. He was a control freak and very ruthless in achieving his aims. He used the NKVD as his tool for controlling those around him and the wider population. Large purges were not uncommon and ordering the death of millions wasn't an issue for him. He had an innate sense of survival and never left his enemies or opponents any opening to move against him. Putin, despite all of his blustering and bellicose, doesn't have those skills of Stalin and he's leaving opportunities for his enemies within the Kremlin to conspire and work against him. That may be his downfall in the end.
Whilst we say that the Russian military are poorly performing, it would both be very remiss and dangerous for us to assume that this is the status quo. They can still be a formidable enemy and underestimating them, or any enemy for that matter, is both foolish and dangerous. The longer this war goes on the more the Russian military will both learn and understand. The poor leaders in the field will be killed or replaced, enabling those leaders who have succeeded in learning the hard lessons taught in combat, to come forward and move up the command chain. Natural selection is the term. However the overall concern must be whether, or not, the Russian military as an institution, can change for the better and undertake a thorough, honest, truthful, reappraisal of itself. Time will tell.
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