Thanks, ASSAIL and Alexa.
Msdf Destroyer Asahi Launched | Indian Defence Forum
There are a lot of OSV's sitting around at the moment without work so the price is down (and the quality variable). However, they are not really designed for OPV work and even OS is a bit of 'make do' option.
Japanese Wiki - 25DD Asahi class
From the decisions made on the tanker (HHI) and littoral operations vessel (out to tender), I'm pretty sure NZ will go with a new-build. The same oil crunch that has left OSVs tied up has left the yards that built them hungry for work.
There shouldn't be any adverse impacts upon the structure of the RNZN by the formation of a NZ Border Patrol Agency. They could take over the IPVs for a price. I would suggest that the IPVs be owned by the NZ Border Protection Agency but the RNZN contracted to crew them. That way the RNZN still have access to ships small enough that junior officers can command them and gain the experience needed before they progress to larger ships. It's a win win because the RNZN doesn't have to purchase the vessels and the NZ Border Protection Agency doesn't have to find experienced crew. The NZ Border Protection Agency would have to pay for the RNZN crews but not at NZ commercial crewing rates.
I have been following a conversation on the RAN thread about using their LHDs as ASW asset and Alexsa posted this:
I know that you haven't mentioned ASW but that would be the next logical extension of your argument. IMHO, I would rather 3 GP frigates and 4 Offshore Patrol Corvettes. LHD / LPDs with AAW capabilities would be ideal. I am in favour of Distributed Lethality, not just on LHD / LPDs but also logistical support ships such as the upcoming LWSC. Of course the NZG would not agree to such a thing because of upfront costs. However to me the upfront costs of equipping the ships would be less than losing the ship. Yes it is about assessing risk but these days the ASCM is very prevalent, especially in our area of interest.
Junior Naval Officers can be trained with respect to command at sea experience by a dedicated RNZN training vessel - the continuation of the CY in a training and reserve sealift role far more effectively. A civilian Border Protection agency would very reluctant to allow very inexperienced officers command with all the maritime law and command obligations let alone enforcement responsibilities. There has to be a clear demarcation, the 'NZBPA' has its role as essentially a law enforcement agency, it will find its own and develop experienced crew from where it needs to find them. The whole point of this division of NZDF responsibilities is to separate a grey area into two more coherent organisational structures - one military and one civilian law enforcement, which have different organisational cultures.
Lessons learnt from Op Warden were that two NZ Frigates were essential in providing and supporting INTERFET throughout its phases and therefore another future UN Chp VII if we were to contribute to a similar . Problem has been that the lesson was ignored when the frigate CY was not replaced. So yes 3 Frigates is pretty the minimum if we want to achieve two for an urgent vignette - we were incredibly lucky that we had TK and CY available to go as TM was brand new and not ready and WL though nominally still in commission it was fubar. IIRC TM was operational and CY was in its training phase when Cdr Cummins & crew on CY was ordered back from the east coast of Australia and given 4 days to ready the CY for ET.
I'm not at all sure about that. The JMSDF's ASW helicopter carriers (Hyuuga & Ise) don't have any amphibious capability, except what's inherent in having helicopters. The new Izumo class has some amphibious transport ability, like Cavour, & could carry out a heli-borne assault, but has no provision for landing craft, as far as I can see.
The Japanese flatdecks have deployed ASW helicopters (and MCM helicopters for that matter) and have done so for a number of years. That is the point I am making - not wandering off into detail about how they have chosen do their LOTS role.
I beg to differ. Command at sea is not something that can be thoroughly taught or absorbed in a block course that involves a short time at sea conning a ship with a senior officer and and instructor perched on each shoulder. It has to be learned by experience of being in command of your own ship with all the responsibilities and problems that come with it over an extended period of time. That is the value of small ships like the IPVs and the Patrol boats before them. Having experienced command at sea the young officer then goes on to be a better No 1 (XO) on a larger ship before taking the next step of commanding a larger ship.
There are many valid points to your argument, however equally so the US Coast Guard also achieves results using a para military structuring and it reverts to military control in wartime.
The ExLS is good but I think that I would be wanting more than just 3 cells. From my reading of Red Star of the Pacific current PLA planning is for multi layer saturation AShM attacks against enemy naval HVA (High Value Assets). This would include the DF21 ballistic missile, aka carrier killer, the FT2000 ground launched very high speed anti radar missile, plus ground, air, ship and sub launched anti ship missiles. Whilst people think that the DF21 has to actually hit the carrier to kill it, this may not be the case. If the warhead has submunitions then the defence would have to treat each submunition as a threat and target it, necessitating the expenditure of a minimum of 1 SAM per submunition. When the FT2000 is used in conjunction with the DF21, then the defence is in trouble because the FT2000 is designed to go after the SPY-1 radars of the AEGIS ships and it doesn't emit any radiation - its seekers are passive, homing in on the SPY-1 transmissions. Chinese literature suggests that the DF21 and FT2000 combi would be launched first and the DF21 not necessarily at the carriers but at the AEGIS ships. Once the AEGIS ships are sunk / rendered incapable then the carriers and other HVA such as transports and amphibs are open to attack by standard ASCM. I am using the PLA as an example of what we may have to face sometime in the future. They have a different approach to strategy and tactics than other nations such as Russia or western nations do.
Steel is cheap and air is free. The actual expensive costs in any frigate build are the sensors and weapons systems installed therein, hence IMHO transferring the systems from a frigate build to a flat deck will not make the end result inherently cheaper. A frigate is designed for high intensity modern combat whereas the LPD isn't and the LPD wouldn't meet all of the NZG policy requirements.
You called them amphibious flatdecks. I was pointing out that it'd be stretching things to call them that, especially the first two, which were designed & built entirely for ASW (everything needed for an ASW flotilla leader). The second pair appear to be mainly ASW ships but with secondary capabilities.
I agree with the steel is cheap and air is free comment as I have used it myself. My concern is that in the event of a shooting action anything NZ has will be extremely vulnerable given the lack of long range weaponry of NZ vessels. As noted in your own posts the threat from modern ordinance will overwhelm even the best equipped. So let's be realistic in our thinking regarding the use of mini flat tops in the context of NZ. In the event of a coalition operation one of the two GP frigates would be available to participate unless the LPD was desired. For SP operations the force projection of an upgunned LPD with its 5" gun and helicopters plus an embarked force with high speed CB90's would be an overwhelming force of diplomacy.
OK here is the quote from me.
They will get their command at sea experience on OPV's and other vessels within the Navy not seconded over to command small vessels that are part of the Govts Civilian organisations.
NZ is not the US and any wiff of a paramilitary organisation again would create such a political firestorm that no political party would touch it. That is one of the things about the Executive branch of the NZ Govt and the cabinet manual that guides it within our constitutional arrangements. Clear and strict separation of powers between agencies, between the military and civilian organisations.
Defence affordability is one of the great myths. It is not affordability that has been the problem. It has been unwillingness to pay for it.