Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[alexsa]

I had the same question, so I went looking. Apparently Jay Stefany, the Navy’s acting acquisition chief, mentioned it to a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee a couple weeks back. Not sure I see the feasibility of such an endeavor.

The U.S. Navy’s Next Amphibious Ship Aims To Blend In, Sneak Around

The U.S. Marine Corps wants a whole lot of new amphibious ships designed to look like commercial vessels so the Chinese wouldn’t be able to tell it apart from many thousands of fishing boats, trawlers and coastal tankers that also ply the Western Pacific.

www.forbes.com

US Navy’s light amphibious warship no longer on track for 2022 contract award

The U.S. Navy’s Light Amphibious Warship program is still on track for a fiscal 2022 start of construction, despite the program not appearing in the shipbuilding plan in the FY22 budget request, Navy officials told Defense News.

www.defensenews.com

Thanks for that. I would call that a highly optimistic aspiration.

 

[BigM60]

Yet, you has still not provided anything showing it as a "requirement". All that I have seen basically suggests that blending in with commercial traffic as a theoretical concept of operation. Not a design requirement.

I think the USN & USMC believe that characteristic of being able to hide in plain sight will flow from a commercial design. I am sure the designers are considering that - they will want to prove the customer’s theory and meet their aspiration.

 

[rand0m]

I think the USN & USMC believe that characteristic of being able to hide in plain sight will flow from a commercial design. I am sure the designers are considering that - they will want to prove the customer’s theory and meet their aspiration.

I read more into it that the US have a very specific budget for these vessels and are happy to leverage off commercial platforms to get best bang for buck. The idea of hiding a haze grey military ship in open sight seems like a bit of a stretch.

 

[BigM60]

I read more into it that the US have a very specific budget for these vessels and are happy to leverage off commercial platforms to get best bang for buck. The idea of hiding a haze grey military ship in open sight seems like a bit of a stretch.

What would a USN landing craft look like in a satellite image compared to a civilian landing craft? If you removed the helo pad off Dirt Dart’s Damen and added some cranes it would probably look like any civilian multi purpose geared cargo ship in a satellite image or on a radar - perhaps? These are well advised Admirals & Generals. I am not saying the concept is reasonable but they obviously have some belief in it. Wrong thread. I’m out.

 

[FormerDirtDart]

OK, let's try to close out this current US LAW discussion in the Royal Australian Navy thread.
As far as I can tell, this whole concept of the USN LAW vessels "blend in with commercial shipping" on the basis of their appearance has been misconstrued from a statement appearing in all 24 "Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress" CRS reports dating from May 27, 2020 to June 29, 2021 :

"... The survivability of the LAW ships would come from their ability to hide among islands and other sea traffic ... '

This is obviously in regard to the vessels size (as opposed to current USN amphibious warfare vessels) not the ships appearance. Why else would "islands" be mentioned.
At not point that I can find, from the concepts initial mention in the USMC July 2019 Commandant's Planning Guidance :

"... An inexpensive, self-deploying “connector” capable of delivering rolling stock on or near-shore in a contested littoral. ..."

has there been any requirement or expressed concept that the LAW would use it's physical appearance (other than vessel size) to avoid enemy detection.

And to the moderators &n staff I apologize for continuing the US Navy discussion in the Royal Australian Navy thread. Perhaps at the very least copies of the relevant posts can be moved to the US Navy thread.

 

[Redlands18]

OK, let's try to close out this current US LAW discussion in the Royal Australian Navy thread.
As far as I can tell, this whole concept of the USN LAW vessels "blend in with commercial shipping" on the basis of their appearance has been misconstrued from a statement appearing in all 24 "Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress" CRS reports dating from May 27, 2020 to June 29, 2021 :

This is obviously in regard to the vessels size (as opposed to current USN amphibious warfare vessels) not the ships appearance. Why else would "islands" be mentioned.
At not point that I can find, from the concepts initial mention in the USMC July 2019 Commandant's Planning Guidance :

has there been any requirement or expressed concept that the LAW would use it's physical appearance (other than vessel size) to avoid enemy detection.

And to the moderators &n staff I apologize for continuing the US Navy discussion in the Royal Australian Navy thread. Perhaps at the very least copies of the relevant posts can be moved to the US Navy thread.

July 2021 - Defence Technology Review

Austal contracted for US Navy Light Amphibious Warship design concept MCX Rattler weapon in use by Australian special forces USMC signs up for USV firing loitering munition Sea trials for Indonesian ‘tank boat’ Land 125 Phase 4 down-select Opportunities for Australian industry in UK SPH project...

dtrmagazine.com

It’s not totally out of place as there is a similar project for the RAN later in the decade for a LST up to 2000t. I actually started the conversation off referring the USN project as something Australia may take some interest in.
There are articles in this months DTR Magazine for both projects. They are actually quite critical of they way land 8710 is being done.

 

[alexsa]

OK, let's try to close out this current US LAW discussion in the Royal Australian Navy thread.
As far as I can tell, this whole concept of the USN LAW vessels "blend in with commercial shipping" on the basis of their appearance has been misconstrued from a statement appearing in all 24 "Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress" CRS reports dating from May 27, 2020 to June 29, 2021 :

This is obviously in regard to the vessels size (as opposed to current USN amphibious warfare vessels) not the ships appearance. Why else would "islands" be mentioned.
At not point that I can find, from the concepts initial mention in the USMC July 2019 Commandant's Planning Guidance :

has there been any requirement or expressed concept that the LAW would use it's physical appearance (other than vessel size) to avoid enemy detection.

And to the moderators &n staff I apologize for continuing the US Navy discussion in the Royal Australian Navy thread. Perhaps at the very least copies of the relevant posts can be moved to the US Navy thread.

I agree the discussion on undercover LAW can move to the USN thread if this discussion is to be continued. As noted by @Redlands18 the discussion on what option may be picked up for the LAW does have some relevance to the RAN noting Austal are bidding and they are also bidding for the Australian programme under Land 8710.

However it appears that Sea Transport Solutions (with their unusual stern landing craft) who are based in Australia were not short listed as indicated in the July edition of DTR

DTR ISSUE 77 JULY 2021 (partica.online)

If the pros and cons of this decision wish to be discussed that may be an issue for the USN thread as well.

 

[Stampede]

I agree the discussion on undercover LAW can move to the USN thread if this discussion is to be continued. As noted by @Redlands18 the discussion on what option may be picked up for the LAW does have some relevance to the RAN noting Austal are bidding and they are also bidding for the Australian programme under Land 8710.

However it appears that Sea Transport Solutions (with their unusual stern landing craft) who are based in Australia were not short listed as indicated in the July edition of DTR

DTR ISSUE 77 JULY 2021 (partica.online)

If the pros and cons of this decision wish to be discussed that may be an issue for the USN thread as well.

DTR July
A lot of good questions regarding the ADF's littoral / amphibious aspirations and the equipment needed / proposed to carry out the task.

Mirrors some of my concerns re the LCM8 replacement and other amphib stuff!
Suggest Army and Navy need to hold hands and work out what is needed.
Some important decisions need to be made promptly to get this skill set up and happening sooner rather than later.
The ADF need some urgent focus in this endeavor.
Crawl walk run is well and good, but some pretty pic's of staged landing craft hitting the beach in staged conditions, does not look very "real life."

Regards S

 

[DDG38]

"HMAS Perth is moved out of the dry dock at Australian Marine Complex at Henderson, WA after completing a major part of the Anzac Midlife Capability Assurance Program to upgrade radar capabilities, communications systems and crew habitable areas." Image source : ADF Image Library

 

[Anthony_B_78]

"HMAS Perth is moved out of the dry dock at Australian Marine Complex at Henderson, WA after completing a major part of the Anzac Midlife Capability Assurance Program to upgrade radar capabilities, communications systems and crew habitable areas." Image source : ADF Image Library
View attachment 48315

Question: So there are two Anzacs behind her, and the Perth will no doubt have some kind of work up period, what does that leave us with in the water? Three destroyers and five frigates?

Edit: Apologies. Googled it and got the answer. Yep, only eight warships in the water. Too few, IMHO.

 

[vonnoobie]

Question: So there are two Anzacs behind her, and the Perth will no doubt have some kind of work up period, what does that leave us with in the water? Three destroyers and five frigates?

Edit: Apologies. Googled it and got the answer. Yep, only eight warships in the water. Too few, IMHO.

How many would you want in the water? Generally things run off of a rule of 3 or 4. You can expect to have 25-33% of your assets out of action at anytime. Others going through training/transit and remainder deployed.

It's really no different then any other force in the world.

 

[John Newman]

Question: So there are two Anzacs behind her, and the Perth will no doubt have some kind of work up period, what does that leave us with in the water? Three destroyers and five frigates?

Edit: Apologies. Googled it and got the answer. Yep, only eight warships in the water. Too few, IMHO.

I don’t see what the problem is, if you are referring to the percentage of MFUs in major upgrade/maintenance vs those operational, then three out of 11 appears to be normal.

If it’s to do with the overall number of MFUs, well that’s a totally separate discussion.

 

[Redlands18]

Question: So there are two Anzacs behind her, and the Perth will no doubt have some kind of work up period, what does that leave us with in the water? Three destroyers and five frigates?

Edit: Apologies. Googled it and got the answer. Yep, only eight warships in the water. Too few, IMHO.

Those Anzacs are also getting Refits, primarily an improved AAW capability without which they would not survive in a modern battle. Any Warship has only got a maximum of about 10 years before they are obsolete and in need of a major Refit to bring them back up to scratch. Even the Hobarts are only a couple of years away from major Refits to upgrade their Aegis CMS to a newer standard and be able to better deploy the SM-6.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

I don’t see what the problem is, if you are referring to the percentage of MFUs in major upgrade/maintenance vs those operational, then three out of 11 appears to be normal.

If it’s to do with the overall number of MFUs, well that’s a totally separate discussion.

I was surprised to see that three out of the eight were out of the water at once. I would have thought they’d do maybe two at a time, not three. Granted, the upgrades are necessary. It relates to the overall number of warships because I think it reinforces that when you take into account those being upgraded and so forth 11 just is not enough. Just my opinion.

 

[Pusser01]

I was surprised to see that three out of the eight were out of the water at once. I would have thought they’d do maybe two at a time, not three. Granted, the upgrades are necessary. It relates to the overall number of warships because I think it reinforces that when you take into account those being upgraded and so forth 11 just is not enough. Just my opinion.

During the AMCAP's there is generally a 2 month overlap when there are 3 out of the water. Now that Perth is in the water, Stuart (in front of shed) will move to the bay where Perth was. Cheers.

 

[John Newman]

Video of Perth being lowered back into the water:

 

[Takao]

DTR July
A lot of good questions regarding the ADF's littoral / amphibious aspirations and the equipment needed / proposed to carry out the task.

Mirrors some of my concerns re the LCM8 replacement and other amphib stuff!
Suggest Army and Navy need to hold hands and work out what is needed.
Some important decisions need to be made promptly to get this skill set up and happening sooner rather than later.
The ADF need some urgent focus in this endeavor.
Crawl walk run is well and good, but some pretty pic's of staged landing craft hitting the beach in staged conditions, does not look very "real life."

Regards S

Gosh, that DTR article is, interesting....

Must admit, the lecturing tone about archipelago and the stupid comparison to the steppes put me right off, but I'll hit the big points.

The amphib stuff in FSP was developed as one item. The amphib force has always led the charge on joint, and the FSP team did it no differently. The concept was built by the one team who were (mostly!) within one cubicle. Two at least. The RAAF / Army / RAN / Other areas of responsibility were parcelled out, and volia. If the team was any closer there'd have been unacceptable behaviour complaints....

DTR confuses programs with fighting. The programs (the amphib = logistics ship) relate to delivering capability. They bear absolutely zero impact on the RTS or the operational side of Defence. Proof? Go find the Army CSS program...

The quickness to solutionise and then criticise LCM-8 replacement and the like further reflects a lack of knowledge of the CLC or even program management. Each of those projects has a list of needs. They were drafted/updated in a nested manner, they meet integration and joint issues. Will some of the needs be jettisoned? Possibly. It may be there is a better trade-off come tender time. But gosh - lets wait at least for the tender release....

The constant complaining about time is annoying. Does DTR honestly think if we could get 8710 Phase 2 into service in 2024 we wouldn't? We'd sit there with millions of $$, a bunch of boats and people and just.....drink beer? There was a whole bunch of stuff more important. FSP wasn't about finding the best solution - it was about finding the least worst. Because there will always be things that have to wait. We pull Ph 2 forward, what workforce and $$ get given up? MCM replacement? M113 replacement? DPN upgrades?

This ARCOPS bullshit acronym further highlights DTR hasn't done any deep reading. They haven't touched the various concepts and orders - because they'd see (a) the concept and (b) it couldn't be more purple. And not that silly purple we've tried in the past where we show you a green page and say it's purple - like really purple. Royal purple. ARCOPS - pshaw....

I'm not even dignifying their tank outbox with a response. It's ignorance is up there with anti-vax and QAnon. No, wait. One point. Do they honestly think, if HMAS Canberra (III) rocks up in Sydney in 1945, all 27 000 tonnes of her, (dwarfing HMAS Australia getting repaired in Cookatoo Dock and the same size as the recently lost HMAS Canberra (I)) do you think the planners for OBOE will go "gosh chaps, can't put the Matilda's on that. Keep the LSTs"?

Pshaw

 

[ADMk2]

@Takao
I quite agree. I like DTR, but of late they certainly have a high opinion of themselves and what they think should be done / bought etc, biased no doubt in part by their paid for adverts. Seems to be something of a trend lately with Sheridan, Gottliebsen (shudder) and whatnot.

Unfortunately I think Defence, being terribly comfortable with staged pictures, videos and fluff pieces in the various Army / Navy / Air force news etc, has itself to blame somewhat.

The fact that even we who are no longer in defence, yet still interested, have to trawl through Senate Estimates to get any kind of confirmation of what is “really” going on is a large part of the issue.

Defence is terrible these days at articulating (publicly) it’s reasons for certain decisions, acquisitions, how the rollouts of capability are proceeding and so on.

So all most people get to see is the rubbish in the broadsheet media and the slightly less rubbish, but still far from perfect stuff in the specialist defence media, all of who seem to be regurgitating more or less the same information, due to how little is actually getting out of Defence.

The last 2 defence stories I read before writing this, were all based on images posted on the defence website, but not a skerrick of information on these matters can be found from within defence, yet the images are posted publicly, so we are not talking about classified systems here…

(Full disclosure)

Droneshield being employed by 2 Cav on a trial basis.

MC-X weapons platform employed by SOCOMD units.

 

[spoz]

That DTR article is so full of holes and simplifications that I really don’t know where to start. Indeed, I wonder how many of the Pacific islands the author has been to, or how intensively he has really studied the Pacific campaign of WW2? He seems to think that the islands are pocket handkerchief size. While some are, many are not and, as WW2 proved, taking and holding them requires significant land warfare capabilities.

I’m an ex amphib sailor, so I’m predisposed to them (got me LCM ticket) but they are only a way of delivering the fighting force, and, once that is done, become more or less irrelevant to the battle, standfast resupply. Plus of course in any landing operation outside the major landings of WW2 and Inchon (which used the same enormous resource base) the waves are going to be fairly small - and even in those there was time between them. Australia by itself will never be able to afford the capability to be able to assuredly land a brigade over the beach in one wave. To do so would so skew the DCP as to ensure we had insufficient capability elsewhere.

The LCH, for all they were great little vessels and a lot of fun, had a passage speed of 10 knots. They couldn’t keep up with a task group and were never intended to so getting them to a landing anywhere in Pacific would be a lengthy process - and God help any pongos who had to make the whole passage in them. They performed logistics, including logistics over the shore, 99% of the time. That’s vital; but the idea of using them in some sort of repeat of Normandy or Iwo Jima is laughable. If Australia has to occupy the smaller Pacific islands by itself, it will need to pick ones where the landing is essentially uncontested.

 

[Gryphinator]

That DTR article is so full of holes and simplifications that I really don’t know where to start. Indeed, I wonder how many of the Pacific islands the author has been to, or how intensively he has really studied the Pacific campaign of WW2? He seems to think that the islands are pocket handkerchief size. While some are, many are not and, as WW2 proved, taking and holding them requires significant land warfare capabilities.

I’m an ex amphib sailor, so I’m predisposed to them (got me LCM ticket) but they are only a way of delivering the fighting force, and, once that is done, become more or less irrelevant to the battle, standfast resupply. Plus of course in any landing operation outside the major landings of WW2 and Inchon (which used the same enormous resource base) the waves are going to be fairly small - and even in those there was time between them. Australia by itself will never be able to afford the capability to be able to assuredly land a brigade over the beach in one wave. To do so would so skew the DCP as to ensure we had insufficient capability elsewhere.

The LCH, for all they were great little vessels and a lot of fun, had a passage speed of 10 knots. They couldn’t keep up with a task group and were never intended to so getting them to a landing anywhere in Pacific would be a lengthy process - and God help any pongos who had to make the whole passage in them. They performed logistics, including logistics over the shore, 99% of the time. That’s vital; but the idea of using them in some sort of repeat of Normandy or Iwo Jima is laughable. If Australia has to occupy the smaller Pacific islands by itself, it will need to pick ones where the landing is essentially uncontested.

This ex "Pongo" got an overnight lift around EM on HMAS Betano c2001. It was not fun at all!