I still have reservations on their use in our environment, big difference between the Mediterranean and the conditions we will use them in. Time will tell
+1
Daft idea IMO
I still have reservations on their use in our environment, big difference between the Mediterranean and the conditions we will use them in. Time will tell
I still have reservations on their use in our environment, big difference between the Mediterranean and the conditions we will use them in. Time will tell
Is it true that they won't be equipped with side armaments?
I've heard unofficial rumours that LHD01 is going to trials in the next couple of weeks...
I still have reservations on their use in our environment, big difference between the Mediterranean and the conditions we will use them in. Time will tell
How? Big, wet and salty. Saw conditions matching where AAvn generally stops now. Didn't reach the full ADF-specified maritime criteria; but met everything that we've done (flying ops; not transit) in the past decade. Arguably the LHD has different pitching and rolling characteristics than the Tonnerre, but they still met every mission and no corrosion has raised its head.
How would the weather in the Med (sea state etc) compare to the weather in the Indian or Pacific Oceans?
Can be just as bad. I've been in HMS Bacchante (Leander) in some horrific weather south of Toulon where we've just about destroyed every upper deck fitting.
The Mistral can reach nearly cyclonic speeds but usually only lasts for 2 or 3 days.
On a slightly different topic if Australia opts for 6 Type 26 frigates to fill the SEA 5000 requirement the RAN would be returning to their pre Dibb structure of 3 destroyers and 6 high end frigates, i.e the ANZAC replacement would in actual fact be FFG replacements leaving the possibility for the OCV to morph into a light frigate and replace the ANZACs.
Assuming an Australian Type 26 opted for CEAFAR or AUSPAR combined with a suitable CS and replaced Sea Ceptor with additional Mk41 cells there is no reason why they could not be equipped with SM-2 and SM-6 in addition to ESSM. This would be a more than capable FFG replacement.
Give them to the army or the navy reserve. I am certain the LCM 8 crews would love the upgrade and it would provide a better career path for any who wanted to stay on the water, I.e I imagine the army would use a WO2 to command a LCH vs a CPL for a LCM.
How? Big, wet and salty. Saw conditions matching where AAvn generally stops now. Didn't reach the full ADF-specified maritime criteria; but met everything that we've done (flying ops; not transit) in the past decade. Arguably the LHD has different pitching and rolling characteristics than the Tonnerre, but they still met every mission and no corrosion has raised its head.
Not too sure on that one, I don't recall seeing anything official at least on how they will be rigged, Abe or Raven might have a better idea on that one ?
Lets be honest at the end of their lives the T12's were just capable of low level conflict given the weapons fit.
But for most of their life they were capable ASW escorts which fitted well with the ASW Hunter Killer Task Group which was the RAN (S2's, Wessex/Seaking/Ikara).
In that role they were equal to any but when Melbourne retired and the force structure changed they became an anachronism.
The LCH were built for the Army in the first place. Just at the time the RAN finally managed to take over the Army’s long standing water transport division. The Army operated its fleet of coastal transport ships like the merchant navy. So crews were much smaller and ships were commanded by Warrant Officers. The water transport service was highly efficient and would have remained as such except for the Navy’s attempts to destroy it.
When the Navy took over the LCH as they were being delivered they had a significant sea billet shortage for officers. As the force structure became more balanced later on the Navy withdrew many of the LCHs from active service and transferred others to other Navy roles (survey, clearance divers). Leaving the Army without the ships that they routinely used to sail stores and vehicles around the country in. The Army was forced to use more land based transport to make up the shortfall of their capability the Navy and stolen and dismembered.
Apart from the LSM Mk 2/LCH debacle the Army tried to buy a new transport ship to fill a capability gap in the early 1960s. They liked this nice Swedish ferry but the Navy blocked the plan to buy it in the higher defence committee. Because the Army lacked this ship the Government was forced to lease a bunch of merchant ships to support the deployment to VietNam which ended up costing something like 10 times more than the cost of the Army ship.
The story of the Navy destroying the Army’s water transport capability in the 60s and 70s is a pretty bleak one.
There is more to the demise of Army's water transport than the above.
Most of the tasking in the 60's and early 70's involved Water Transports roles in support of the Vietnam effort and extensive operations in PNG.
When these ended in the 70's and combined with the block obsolescence of the LSM's and the terrible ALC 50's and the post Vietnam downsizing, the result was inevitable IMHO.
There is a very good personal account of the rise and fall in Peter Bayliss' "The Forgotten Fleet"
http://www.32smallshipsqn.org.au/Forgotten%20fleet.pdf