This Canadian analysis of the Australian project seems flawed, superficial and doing my head in. It what you might expect if you had a coffee conversation at an airport with someone not familiar with the project at all. But looking at it more closely I wonder about the parts relating to the Canadian program. Also building a smaller ship doesn't scale costs particularly well. This is well known. The F-105 isn't just smaller, it has its radar mounted higher, different crewing, fewer gas turbine engines (2 verse 4). It has different operational and ongoing costs. It is differently configured for command operations for example. It also has 121 less crew. Purchase price is just a tiny fraction of total cost of ownership.. Valuing a ship purely by displacement seems problematic and limited, maybe the Canadians are going to end up just building oil tankers which have tremendous displacement and are cheap (except in Canada) to build? Also with the Canadian program, building one ship a year, are they intending to replace their entire combatant fleet every 15 years? In other places it assumes the final ship will be completed in 2041. Aren't the Canadians worried about the lesson Australia learned about scheduling on their minor ships production in Vancouver? The heuristic method? Are they just accounting 13% (the wage difference between a welder in Huntington and Halifax) as the the only cost difference other than exchange rate, and the fact the ships are ~75% smaller makes them 75% the cost? (4.7) and again in appendex D? Wikipedia seems to be a primary source of all info. I dunno.. Seems odd.