Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Sorry Mate but Noocokies is behind a Paywall.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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No big loss, it was just a story from the Australian regarding the Chinese recently hassling Australian Navy ships. The diplomats story probably provides more balance and less tabloid.
South China Sea: Australian Navy Vessels En Route to Vietnam Received Warnings From Chinese Navy
It isn't an existential threat to our nation. We aren't talking a Chinese invasion, or China hitting targets on mainland Australia. It will never be like that. But it is existential to reputation and credibility and our interests beyond our shores. China doesn't have to be strong enough to keep the US away. All that needs to happen is that countries like Australia and Japan no longer feel confident to challenge Chinese control and zones. When that happens then all the non-aligned nations are lost, as they will have no choice.
We need to maintain credibility and readiness. Sure you could challenge the SCS zones with an unarmed OPV, for a while. We are challenging them with an Anzac class, for a while.
At this stage, Harpoons might as well not be there. They were always a bit marginal against peers, and these days, the 5" is probably more of a deterrent. The UK was willing go without any Harpoons on its ships for the next 10 years (until the media got wind of it). It's deader than disco.
Pushing SM-6 wider across the whole fleet AWD/FF would also help.
IMHO waging a war in the South China Sea within range of China's land-based aircraft and missiles would be suicidal. That isn't to say a war would be unwinnable ... but it would be incredibly costly.
I think Australia probably needs to focus more on this region which would seem to be the next logical area into which China would want to extend their influence.
While it would be nice if the new frigates and submarines were ready to go Australia is at least fortunate in that the Airforce is in the process acquiring some pretty impressive capabilities.
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Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Thanks mate, very helpfull. The LRASM launched from a VLS is of course also a possible option
China will be an existential threat some time in the future but industrial capacity doesn't always deliver the end result.
It takes years of experience and learning to become a competent Naval Warfare operator, it takes decades to become a skilled and competent Warfare leader.
The PLA-N has expanded so quickly that the personnel required to lead and operate are new to their roles. I don't understate the Chinese capacity to learn but the conditions neede to learn have only existed in less than a decade.
So yes, I agree that they are capable of securing the SCS and the First Island chain but their capability to project power and to sustain that projection is some time off.
The complexities of naval aviation, of replenishment and sustainment at distance is a difficult and time consuming skill to master but have no doubt that they will master these skills, they will master TG leadership and deployment and one only has to look at their high quality strategic thought and application to know that they will become that existential threat, nothing is surer.
At the risk of taking a single sentence out of context, why will China be an existential threat in the future? I agree they will develop the capabilities to pose an existential threat to specific nations, but that's not the same thing at all.
All their actions are pretty consistent with a nation that is operating in its own national interest. It is attempting to gain some strategic depth over its primary adversary - the USA - but it is a huge leap from there to existential threat to anyone bar Taiwan. It's far more likely that China will attempt to gain its aims through economic arm twisting and a bit of opportunistic brinkmanship, rather than through any sort of general war in the pacific.
While I agree Australia and our allies need to develop our capabilities to provide a credible deterrent to Chinese expansion, we need to keep everything in perspective. It is pretty basic deterrence theory, on both sides, rather than building up for some sort of inevitable confrontation.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Given the SLOC which pass through the SCS, if the PRC manages to dominate that particular basin (which they are trying to) they will be able to exert control over something like 40% of world trade.
While this might not present itself as a direct, existential threat to different nations, it could be used by the PRC to direct other nations which are dependent on those SLOC for trade to take certain actions or inactions, which are not necessarily in the best interests of those nations being directed by the PRC.
While the PRC might not be able to threaten S. Korea of Japan with dissolution as a state by establishing control over an area like the SCS, there is certainly the potential to advise either/both nations that the PRC will be stopping/seizing merchant traffic either bound for, or departing from, Japan and/or S. Korea, unless certain conditions are met. How long could the economies of S. Korea and/or Japan last, if the flow of fuel from the Mideast to either nation was cut or reduced to a trickle? How long would it be before trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region started getting impacted or getting directed by the PRC to "cooperate".
We have already seen PRC vessels refusing to recognize (or recognizing and choosing to infringe upon) the EEZ claims of ASEAN members, and then PRC "Coast Guard" vessels interfering when patrol vessels of ASEAN members attempt to enforce the EEZ claims. Given that some of this interference has included a PRC Coast Guard vessel ramming a fishing vessel that Indonesian authorities had seized, within the 12 n mile limit of Indonesian home waters, it would be irrational IMO to believe that the PRC would not continue and or make even greater violations of the claims and sovereignty of other nations, if it is able to establish an even greater imbalance of power within the region. In point of fact, it would not shock me if in the next decade or so, the PRC were to start deploying assets (PLAN or Coast Guard) outside of the SCS to interfere with EEZ claims enforcement by nations like Australia, NZ, PNG and many of the various S. Pacific island/chain-nations.
Interdicting trade in the SCS works both ways though. Trade with China can be stopped just as readily as they can stop trade between other nations. This is a key reason why a China want to claim the SCS in the first place. How long would Chinese prosperity last if their access to world markets was stopped?
This is where, even though China and everyone else might be competitors, interests in the SCS largely align. Everyone wants access to the world markets, it’s just they want them on their own terms. Up until now, the terms have been dictated by the USA. Now the Chinese want to push the needle away from the USA and towards themselves. Everyone else is fighting this as the status quo is preferable to one that is dominated by China. This is where a credible military option (deterrence) on behalf of the USA alliance is necessary - to ensure the Chinese can’t force the needle too far without risk.
I agree there will be increasing competition between China and everyone else in coming years and decades, but I also think it is very easy to overstate the threat.
This is where, even though China and everyone else might be competitors, interests in the SCS largely align. Everyone wants access to the world markets, it’s just they want them on their own terms. Up until now, the terms have been dictated by the USA. Now the Chinese want to push the needle away from the USA and towards themselves. Everyone else is fighting this as the status quo is preferable to one that is dominated by China. This is where a credible military option (deterrence) on behalf of the USA alliance is necessary - to ensure the Chinese can’t force the needle too far without risk.
I agree there will be increasing competition between China and everyone else in coming years and decades, but I also think it is very easy to overstate the threat.
Which is why China's other strategic initiative of the new silk road is so important to them, and why they are prepared to spend mega billions to bring it about.
Compare this to the current US leadership mentality that is becoming more isolationist.
MB
Boagrius
Well-Known Member
I guess it all depends on how the PRC decides to behave going forward. I imagine the same blue water assets that could be used to simply protect China's shipping lanes could also be used to conduct gunboat diplomacy outside the first island chain (as Todj pointed out).
My hope is that China's rise will be a benign one, but recent behaviour is not encouraging. Hope for the best and prepare for the worst I suppose?
My hope is that China's rise will be a benign one, but recent behaviour is not encouraging. Hope for the best and prepare for the worst I suppose?
Re China
It could all go many ways.
We all hope for a peaceful future but I think we can also acknowledge that change can bring uncertainty.
China is militarily a much more potent force today than a decade ago, and in a decades time will be even more so both in terms of defence capability and military projection.
We can argue the reasons why, but this is the constant and this is why we are building up a first class Navy.
If the PLAN continued with many 100's of coastal patrol boats as in the past and not the blue water stuff: I'd speculate we wouldn't be acquiring a dozen large subs and a similar number of destroyers and OPV;'s.
There are always push and pull factors and I'd suggest we are reacting to,but not instigating, a Naval build up.
Regards S
It could all go many ways.
We all hope for a peaceful future but I think we can also acknowledge that change can bring uncertainty.
China is militarily a much more potent force today than a decade ago, and in a decades time will be even more so both in terms of defence capability and military projection.
We can argue the reasons why, but this is the constant and this is why we are building up a first class Navy.
If the PLAN continued with many 100's of coastal patrol boats as in the past and not the blue water stuff: I'd speculate we wouldn't be acquiring a dozen large subs and a similar number of destroyers and OPV;'s.
There are always push and pull factors and I'd suggest we are reacting to,but not instigating, a Naval build up.
Regards S
Existential simply means affirming the existence of a thing, in this case the capability of the PLA-N. It has no qualifier, no value or no inference so yes, the threat exists.
t68
Well-Known Member
Sorry Assail, not sure if you post was messed up or that "E" is supposed to mean some. can you clarify please
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
A few things about the SLOC through the SCS though.
The first is that the Malacca Strait as well as the related/connecting sea lanes around Indonesia, Malaysia, SIngapore and Thailand are really where the PRC's SLOC can be effectively interdicted. Not too surprising since one of the most commonly (and highly) used passages gets as narrow as 1.5 n miles in width. That is well within the internationally recognized distance of 12 n miles for a nation's home or territorial waters.
The buildup of PLAN and PLAAF assets, as well as their dispersion, is geared towards something other than being able to force open the Malacca Strait if a nation decided to close it. Instead, with the construction of essentially artificial islands and then establishing air and naval bases on them, the PRC has been pursuing a strategy of anti-access/area denial by being able to forward base naval vessels, strike and maritime patrol aircraft, as well as air defence and AShM batteries.
The PRC has already demonstrated that it is unconcerned about or does not recognize the EEZ claims of other nations, the authority of the UN to resolve EEZ claim disputed via the UNCLOS treaty (which the PRC is a signatory nation of). Even worse is the willingness on the part of the PRC gov't to deliberately violate the territorial sovereignty of another nation by sending in a PRC vessel into the home waters of another nation to regain control of a vessel seized by that gov't.
Imagine for a moment, what response the PRC would have, if an ABFC or ADV listed vessel came within less than 12 n miles of Hainan Island to free an Australian fishing vessel than the PRC had seized for EEZ violations. I suspect that there would be an armed response if something like that were to happen.
The context I used was literal.
Yes, sorry Raven but I've stuffed it again, I have a new computer and it's doing strange things, there was more to my answer which disappeared.
Basically the context was totally literal, no qualifiers, no inference, simply that the PLA-N would have all the capabilities to pose a threat should they decide to do so.
Existential, affirmation that it (PLAN-N threat capability) will exist in the future.
“Existential threat” though typically refers to a threat to existence.
AWDs & Frigates don’t really represent a response though. Subs most definitely do.
Regards,
Massive
Could this be an evolved 2 RAR in a decades time.
With spare accommodation across the fleet ( OPV , Type 26, Cantabria class, Amphibious ships ) I'm sure Army on many levels will get to wet its feet a lot more in the future.
Certainly becoming the integrated defence force that the future will demand.
Regards S
Whatever the language, the PLAN has more high end ships today compared to the past of much better quality across the full range of vessels, blue water fleets aspire. Back this with robust political language and money spent to seek this end and you can see a momentum that currently does not have an end.
Regards S
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