Todjaeger
Potstirrer
The Moderators seem to be pretty good at identifying posters who have or create multiple accounts. Preceptor in particular seems to be seriously lacking any sort of sense of humour about such activities.
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Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
It occurred to me that it might be worthwhile to outline a few of the things we know, and do not know, regarding the SEA 5000 requirements, as well as what are likely to be some safe assumptions.
The first is that the vessels are to be built in an Australian yard, so any efficiencies or problems at the overseas yards of the designer are irrelevant.
The second, third and fourth items (which are all related) are that phased radar arrays from CEA are to be utilized, as is the Aegis CMS, and a tactical interface developed by Saab Australia.
I would consider it a fairly safe assumption that the SEA 5000 frigates will use/re-use examples of existing kit already in RAN service to reduce the training, support and ongoing logistics costs. This would cover things like Mk 41 VLS, ESSM, various versions of the Standard missile, Mk 32 LWT launchers, either a 76 mm or (IMO more likely) 127 mm gun, and so on.
As a result, the designers will need to fit and integrate these various systems aboard their offering, and for companies which have analogous systems, one cannot just assume an exact, like-for-like change as the systems can have different displacement, volume, power and cooling requirements.. Failure to properly account for all such possible differences can lead to problematic operations or outright failure during service.
As for areas that we do not know yet, I have not heard or read anything announcing what power plant or propulsion system the SEA 5000 frigate is supposed to use. It could be MT30's, it could be LM 2500's, a mix or something else entirely. It is also possible that AusGov could indicate a preference for a specific system which the three contenders might need to incorporate. Given that current RAN frigates and destroyers all use versions of the LM 2500 and it has been (and might still be) produced in Australia, I would not be surprised if the SEA 5000 design were to be at least partially powered by more LM 2500's. IMO however, it would be pointless to argue which machinery the future frigate should be fitted with, since we do not know what the selected design is yet, or the degree of importance the AusGov has or will assign to domestic production and support for the power plant, or if there would be an option for licensed production.
The first is that the vessels are to be built in an Australian yard, so any efficiencies or problems at the overseas yards of the designer are irrelevant.
The second, third and fourth items (which are all related) are that phased radar arrays from CEA are to be utilized, as is the Aegis CMS, and a tactical interface developed by Saab Australia.
I would consider it a fairly safe assumption that the SEA 5000 frigates will use/re-use examples of existing kit already in RAN service to reduce the training, support and ongoing logistics costs. This would cover things like Mk 41 VLS, ESSM, various versions of the Standard missile, Mk 32 LWT launchers, either a 76 mm or (IMO more likely) 127 mm gun, and so on.
As a result, the designers will need to fit and integrate these various systems aboard their offering, and for companies which have analogous systems, one cannot just assume an exact, like-for-like change as the systems can have different displacement, volume, power and cooling requirements.. Failure to properly account for all such possible differences can lead to problematic operations or outright failure during service.
As for areas that we do not know yet, I have not heard or read anything announcing what power plant or propulsion system the SEA 5000 frigate is supposed to use. It could be MT30's, it could be LM 2500's, a mix or something else entirely. It is also possible that AusGov could indicate a preference for a specific system which the three contenders might need to incorporate. Given that current RAN frigates and destroyers all use versions of the LM 2500 and it has been (and might still be) produced in Australia, I would not be surprised if the SEA 5000 design were to be at least partially powered by more LM 2500's. IMO however, it would be pointless to argue which machinery the future frigate should be fitted with, since we do not know what the selected design is yet, or the degree of importance the AusGov has or will assign to domestic production and support for the power plant, or if there would be an option for licensed production.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
An area where I have questions regarding the potential ship machinery suitable for use aboard the SEA 5000 frigates is what are the 'normal' and peak power generation requirements, as well as what the Australian philosophy is on naval machinery/power plants.
Looking at the RAN Hobart-class DDG page, it appears that the DDG has a peak power production of 46.3 MW, using a pair of LM 2500 GT's, and a pair of Caterpillar diesels. This suggests to me that the RAN would prefer to have an onboard 'backup' in case of damage or a systems failure. It also suggests to me that the normal level of operations might require only around 23.15 MW or less of power.
With the MT30 efficiency diminishing when operating below 25 MW, I could see the potential for other machinery options to be more suitable for the RAN, depending on the normal power needs. By the same token, if the RAN wants duplicate power options aboard current and future warships, I could also see a pair of MT30's being excessive if the SEA 5000 frigate has a comparable peak power requirement as the DDG, since a pair of MT30's can produce between 72 and 80 MW.
The RAN had major issues trying to integrate the MU90 with the S-70B and in fact the project which it had been planned would do so was eventually descoped to remove that requirement; the aircraft continued to use Mk 46. The 60R comes with Mk 54. Whatever people might think of the relative merits of the two torpedos, we will see both of them in service for some time yet - and that might not be a bad thing given their differing competencies.
I think the safe assumption regarding the F-5000 in terms of lack of information is that it is in fact the Hobart class destroyer with the Australian combat stack designated for SEA 5000 - CEAFAR, 9VL etc. If the F-100 design is indeed to be modified to incorporate better noise signature hull, diesel engines in quiet compartments, electric drive etc., then doesn't this make it the least developed of the bids and the most risky? Are people aware of the complexity and cost of developing this capability?
In any case, I'm grateful for the recent statement from Christopher Pyne that it will be "capability" that will be the primary driver for the SEA 5000 decision.
The other factors referenced by many here - commonality, manning, training etc. - are given too much weight in my view and would never allow Australia to increase know-how, be part of new tech developments, change ways of working, and develop its overall military industry - which has been advocated as key by government.
In any case, I'm grateful for the recent statement from Christopher Pyne that it will be "capability" that will be the primary driver for the SEA 5000 decision.
Nocookies
The other factors referenced by many here - commonality, manning, training etc. - are given too much weight in my view and would never allow Australia to increase know-how, be part of new tech developments, change ways of working, and develop its overall military industry - which has been advocated as key by government.
'Unacceptable': Ministers Called for Action After Submarine Contractor Compla
(Source: Sydney Morning Herald; published May 30, 2018)
By Doug Dingwall
"The [Australian] Defence Department has moved to stop non-public servants from signing contracts after allegations were raised of contractor misbehaviour on Australia's $50 billion new submarines build.
Defence officials say it is investigating complaints raised in an internal memo about contractors on the project, which is expected to deliver 12 submarines over several decades as the nation's largest military procurement program.
The memo said contractors had signed contracts on behalf of the department's science and technology group, and paid invoices without apparent oversight by Defence staff, among several other complaints.
Associate secretary Rebecca Skinner told a Senate estimates hearing on Tuesday the group, following the claims, made changes requiring that only public servants sign contracts.
Defence's fraud and audit staff began investigating the allegations in the internal memo, prepared in March, about "probity and apparent nepotism issues" on the future submarines project after it received a media query about the claims."
Defence staff a less likely to be swayed by long lunches, etc!
(Source: Sydney Morning Herald; published May 30, 2018)
By Doug Dingwall
"The [Australian] Defence Department has moved to stop non-public servants from signing contracts after allegations were raised of contractor misbehaviour on Australia's $50 billion new submarines build.
Defence officials say it is investigating complaints raised in an internal memo about contractors on the project, which is expected to deliver 12 submarines over several decades as the nation's largest military procurement program.
The memo said contractors had signed contracts on behalf of the department's science and technology group, and paid invoices without apparent oversight by Defence staff, among several other complaints.
Associate secretary Rebecca Skinner told a Senate estimates hearing on Tuesday the group, following the claims, made changes requiring that only public servants sign contracts.
Defence's fraud and audit staff began investigating the allegations in the internal memo, prepared in March, about "probity and apparent nepotism issues" on the future submarines project after it received a media query about the claims."
Defence staff a less likely to be swayed by long lunches, etc!
The Hobart class is in CODOG configuration, which means that there is one GT and diesel for each propeller shaft. The GT and diesel can be switched between to supply power but they can never operate at the same time - this is how CODOG works. The Hobart class can therefore never have peak power production from all 4 of its engines as its either GT or diesels. Furthermore the LM2500s on the Hobart class are 17.5 MW, which means the peak power production is 35MW on GT and 11.3MW on diesel.
A single MT30 can provide power up to 40MW which in the case of T26 (which is the only SEA 5000 bid with this unit) would be when it needs to make a fast sprint. I agree that a pair of MT30s on a SEA 5000 ship would be excessive - I haven't seen this offered by anyone.
I think assumptions about what the normal/peak level of operations are for the Hobart class and what would be needed for SEA 5000 are two different conversations. ASW ships are often in silent cruise mode to ensure they can't be tracked by subs.
I don't think the LM2500 is dead yet, at least in RAN usage. The 7 RAAF KC30 has some base commonality on the engines (CF6-80E although I imagine almost no parts are shared), and the RAN has a significant LM2500 fleet, LHD's, DDG's, ANZAC's, etc. We will be operating some for the foreseeable future.
The government is now working out how to support the DDG's long term. So higher levels of commonality I think are reasonable, but then FREMM and F-5000 are likely to favored. It isn't just about supporting them for now, but going into the future. There are already a bunch of significant updates announced and funded for DDG upgrades, before they are even completed.
Eventually they may include propulsion upgrades. Of what ever wins Sea5000.
Why can't they basically put the FREMM propulsion into the F-5000? LM2500 and 4 diesels. Japan just built a ASW Destroyer with 2 x LM2500 in a combined diesel or gas arrangement. I don't think the F-5000 plant has to be high risk, there are OTS existing options for that. The Australian government has become better at dealing with and understanding risk.
The government is now working out how to support the DDG's long term. So higher levels of commonality I think are reasonable, but then FREMM and F-5000 are likely to favored. It isn't just about supporting them for now, but going into the future. There are already a bunch of significant updates announced and funded for DDG upgrades, before they are even completed.
Eventually they may include propulsion upgrades. Of what ever wins Sea5000.
Why can't they basically put the FREMM propulsion into the F-5000? LM2500 and 4 diesels. Japan just built a ASW Destroyer with 2 x LM2500 in a combined diesel or gas arrangement. I don't think the F-5000 plant has to be high risk, there are OTS existing options for that. The Australian government has become better at dealing with and understanding risk.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I admit I had overlooked the CODOG configuration for the Hobart-class DDG's, and therefore the vessels having different peak power generation levels depending on whether it was operating on diesels or GT's. However, that also means that the potential for the 'normal' power demand for the less than 25 MW which is the minimum level for efficient MT30 operation. After all there is about a 14 MW gap between what just the diesels can generate, and the minimum level for efficiency with the MT30, assuming the volume, displacement and trim could accommodate a single MT30 in place of the pair of LM 2500's. I would also be interested to know if the DDG's LM 2500's were de-tuned, since the LM 2500 can normally provide 23.2 MW, while LM 2500+ can do 31.9 MW, and the latest version, the LM 2500+ G4 generating 34.5 MW.
Honestly though, I am less concerned about meeting the peak power demands and more about meeting the normal power demands, though a single high output GT powering two shafts could make for some interesting gearing. Again using the Hobart-class as an example, how often and for how long does/will it actually operate just using the diesels? How often does/will it operate with one GT and one diesel going? I do not expect anyone to actually be able to provide the answers, but I just wanted to illustrate the potential for there to be advantages in having slightly more machinery which individually provide lower outputs.
With the F-5000 entry for SEA 5000 having space for a pair of helicopters, and with at least some of the machinery having been obsolescent and now out of production, I would not make the assumption that the F-5000 is virtually identical to the Hobart-class DDG.
In terms of what the RAN/AusGov is looking for, I am of the opinion that although the RFT extract states ASW frigates, I believe that the desire now is more for GP frigates that are broadly capable across a wider spectrum of naval warfare than just ASW operations. In essence more like what the RN's Type 22 and Type 23 frigates became, instead of just their original ASW focus. My reason for thinking that a change in focus had occurred for SEA 5000 was the media release 3 October 2017 from the PM that the Future Frigates will use the Aegis CMS. Given that the current FFH's and LHD's all use the 9LV CMS, and the system is to be fitted to the SEA 1180 OPV's (or are they the PSO, Patrol Ship, Offshore?), it struck me that the Aegis CMS had to provide some desired advantage that the 9LV and other combat management systems did not. Given that the Aegis CMS seemed to be predominantly fitted to warships tasked with area air defence roles, it seems unlikely IMO that the Aegis CMS would operate significantly better in an ASW role.
Indeed the value some posters, myself included, place in common systems and configurations across the fleet might be overstated. By the same token though, the advantages newer or 'other' systems provide could be similarly overstated, while the increased training requirements and support costs for disparate systems could also be understated. I have to disagree though, with the notion that taking advantage of common systems and configurations to reduce training, operations and support costs also means the RAN, ADF, and Oz is not increasing their respective corporate knowledge or 'know-how', or that doing so prohibits taking advantage of new technology and developments. If either case were true, then why and how would CEC be getting fitted to the Hobart-class DDG's? Taking that notion of commonality a step further, since the Future Frigates are to be fitted with the Aegis CMS, like the DDG's, it would seem likely for the Future Frigates to also be fitted with CEC so that the frigates and destroyers all have a common capability.
With respect to the Australian defence industrial base, the problem over the last few decades seems to be not so much technological, but that orders placed by gov't have been done in ways that make it difficult to sustain industry. Basically defence industries keep cycling between either feast or famine. Unfortunately the naval shipbuilding industry is a great example, with about a decade passing between when the DDG's were ordered, and when the next warships (the SEA 1180 OPV's) were ordered. Unless the build cycle for an order is able to bridge the gap between orders, it is difficult for an industry to sustain itself in the face of such gaps.
With rolling builds for Submarines, and I assume Frigates and OPV's, I think future for Australian ship building is very bright. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if in a few cycles Australian developed solutions are very compelling, as European nations seem to be struggling with making future viable orders (Spain, Italy, UK) due to economic issues and priorities. Systems tend to be light, weapons fit out, light, capability is light.
Australia isn't doing a one time build, the idea is is drum beats and continuous builds and continuous evolution. Build 4 of sea5000 will not be the same as build 1, regardless of the option selected. It isn't like we are going to stop building after 12 OPV's, 9 Frigates and 12 submarines either, we are going to continuously churn them out, improving and developing. We will own the designs and these will evolve into our own ships, which are likely to be different from any other ship.
At some point Australia will be spending more and building more than the original inspiration designs. I imagine the general plan with ship 1 of the sea5000 is a better ship, in every way, than ship 3 of the AWD program.
http://www.defence.gov.au/NavalShipBuilding/Plan/Docs/NavalShipbuildingPlan.pdf
It isn't a box flogging exercise. The future is assured. There is serious money in this.
Given the current situation, things are more likely to go even higher end than they currently are. While there are limitations on crewing, tech and capability seems to be a moving target upwards.
76mm will not be fitted to the future frigates, except as a secondary gun. All Anzacs and DDG's are 5" mod 4 already (I think they have all been upgraded now).
Propulsion isn't the only factor in this race. Australia will apparently want something with space for command and control of a task force, two combat systems, CEC, ballistic missile capability, land strike, ASW, two helos, massive radar horizon, endurance and range, basically every high end system out there etc. The sort of ship that could be sailing into SCS against a major power. Calling it a Frigate is the worlds greatest understatement, US cruisers have the sort of capability that is being spec'd. We might as well say the LHD's are through deck OPV's.
Australia has already announced the CMS will be rolled from the Sea5000 to the DDG's. I would imagine other systems would be upgraded on the DDG's in the future as well. It isn't like Hobart class Aegis isn't a capable combat system either.
Australia isn't doing a one time build, the idea is is drum beats and continuous builds and continuous evolution. Build 4 of sea5000 will not be the same as build 1, regardless of the option selected. It isn't like we are going to stop building after 12 OPV's, 9 Frigates and 12 submarines either, we are going to continuously churn them out, improving and developing. We will own the designs and these will evolve into our own ships, which are likely to be different from any other ship.
At some point Australia will be spending more and building more than the original inspiration designs. I imagine the general plan with ship 1 of the sea5000 is a better ship, in every way, than ship 3 of the AWD program.
http://www.defence.gov.au/NavalShipBuilding/Plan/Docs/NavalShipbuildingPlan.pdf
It isn't a box flogging exercise. The future is assured. There is serious money in this.
Given the current situation, things are more likely to go even higher end than they currently are. While there are limitations on crewing, tech and capability seems to be a moving target upwards.
76mm will not be fitted to the future frigates, except as a secondary gun. All Anzacs and DDG's are 5" mod 4 already (I think they have all been upgraded now).
Propulsion isn't the only factor in this race. Australia will apparently want something with space for command and control of a task force, two combat systems, CEC, ballistic missile capability, land strike, ASW, two helos, massive radar horizon, endurance and range, basically every high end system out there etc. The sort of ship that could be sailing into SCS against a major power. Calling it a Frigate is the worlds greatest understatement, US cruisers have the sort of capability that is being spec'd. We might as well say the LHD's are through deck OPV's.
Australia has already announced the CMS will be rolled from the Sea5000 to the DDG's. I would imagine other systems would be upgraded on the DDG's in the future as well. It isn't like Hobart class Aegis isn't a capable combat system either.
I don't think the LM2500 is dead either. In fact the +G4 versions of the unit are pretty awesome. What I don't understand is how the Hobart class ended up with 17.5MW models - were these old refurbished units or something?
I think the original discussion was on the appropriateness of MT30 for Australia, and given the number of countries adopting this and the power advantage it has, I don't see this as a risk. It don't think having both LM2500 and MT30 would be a bad thing for Australian industry.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The USN doesn't seem to be concerned by adding MT30s to its fleet (LCS, Zumwalt) despite being the largest LM2500 user. A shame the Type 26 doesn't have IEP instead of CODLOG.
Coupled with two MTU 12V28 33D STC's. This would have been thought through in exacting detail by the JDA, JMSDF and the prime contractor MHI.
I'm glad you mentioned the type of aviation response in a hot scenario.
However
Just wondering if we have ever flown two helicopters off the same ship at the same time.This would relate to our twin helicopter capable FFG's.
I would imagine from a safety perspective one would always want a free helicopter deck for emergencies. So I would speculate when ships operate as a part of a group it may be practical; but a solo ship away from land I guess this has an element of risk. My understanding anyway was that it was rare for the FFG's to sail with two helicopters, but still are curious for some feedback.
Maybe the RAN have conducted this as a one off exercise to at least test the feasibility for that "Hot scenario"
The question does not relate to UAV's and yes I acknowledge there future.
Regards S
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Until the SEA 5000 decision has been announced, and the different tender offers revealed we most likely will not know.
I would imagine that there would be more acoustic quieting done for the Italian FREMM ASW variants than was done for the Spanish F100 and F105 frigates or the related Hobart-class DDG. I am uncertain whether or not the same would also apply to the Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates which are another related class to the F100, though with a greater initial ASW focus than the others perhaps.
At present there is just too little to go on IMO for anyone not involved in the evaluation process to be able to make any sort of accurate claims.
Speaking broadly, a quiet hull should provide a better ASW platform than a noisy one, all else being equal. Having said that though, the acoustic properties of ASW vessels today have less importance than they used to, since much of the ASW work is now being carried out by embarked helicopters which operate away from or in advance of the vessels they are embarked on. My personal takeaway from that is that a 'noisy' ASW platform with two naval helicopters is now considered of greater benefit for ASW operations than a 'quiet' ASW platform with either a single naval helicopter, or no embarked helicopter at all.
Of course where it all becomes questionable is in the cost and effort required to manage the acoustic signature of a design. Take the RN's Type 45 DDG, which has an air defence role much like the RAN's Hobart-class DDG. This class an an ASW capability in the form of the embarked helicopter and hull-mounted sonar, but no ship-mounted LWT's and IIRC the hull/machinery combination has been described as 'noisy'. It is my understanding that little was done to isolate or dampen the noise when the machinery was installed and mounted, largely because the vessel's role was that of air defence and not ASW. Similarly, the USN's Arleigh Burke-class DDG's do not seem to be fitted with a towed sonar array and rely predominantly upon embarked helicopters in the Flight IIA for ASW operations. The US Center for Naval Analyses published an interesting assessment of US naval helicopter needs back in 2000 where can be found here, which seemed to strongly indicate that at the time, the importance of surface vessels in direct ASW operations was diminishing in favour of aerial/helicopter ASW operations. Given that at the time, it seemed like up to 80% of potential sub contacts were false positives, and the time it would take to get a surface asset on site to investigate a potential contact, it does seem logical shift resources to more appropriate systems and capabilities.
One of the things I noted with interest when reading the assessment was how ASW operations was broken up into three zones called the surveillance area, classification identification and engagement area, and vital area. It was only within the vital area that surface combatants operating in conjunction with helicopters kitted out with dipping sonar would be expected to persecute and screen high value targets. It seemed like the preference was to not let potentially hostile subs get past the middle zone where ship-based ASW helicopters operate, and that the surface vessels where the helicopters operated from were to stay in the vital area to assist helicopters in responding to any leakers.
In an Australian context, there might be a need to consider ordering extra/additional naval helicopters with a delivery timed to permit IOC at the same time or even just before the first Future Frigate reaches IOC.
What you have described is the diminishing importance of surface ship vs submarine conflict as was seen during WW2 and lingered on through the Cold War period although with decreasing importance as airborne ASW capability grew.
The airborne capabilities of today are outstanding with the development of processing power, micro electronics in Sonar buoys, tactical data links and improvement in battle management.
The third platform of importance in the ASW fight is blue submarines and their capabilities have developed along the same improvement path as those in the air.
Putting all those together and in relation to the zones you described, it's easy to understand surface ship ASW becomes a capability of last resort and if an enemy sub reaches that zone the battle is probably lost.
The RAN definitely needs more rotary assets, preferably manned but possibly UAV to complete the ASW ORBAT but the ADF is lucky that our enduring MPA fleet is highly professional and has a history of close integration with the RAN and USN.
Given the above, the level of importance placed on surface ship capability must be tempered with the other warfighting demands from the air and surface domains, the RAN is a small force and so naturally it wouldn't surprise me if a balanced capability is selected.
In contrast, the RN and RCN, who have been faced with the North Atlantic experience, have always placed a huge emphasis on surface ship ASW and the resulting hulls have been outstanding in this regard. But the downside of this is that when the RN was faced with an AAW threat during the FI crisis those specialist ASW units were found wanting and in some cases unable to be deployed.
What the RAN/ADF has to decide, when selecting SEA 5000, is what level of capability is desired to meet the strategic threat assessments for our region.
Interesting read. It makes me think that perhaps the most effective ASW asset we could have is one of our LHDs with a dozen Romeos on board.
Australia has 24 MH-60R's, enough to provide 8 helicopters at anyone time, normally. While Australia has 12 surface combatants, not all of those are going to be available all the time, and in a war time situation you could surge that number higher. 36 would be a nice to have and allow a permanent deployment of 12, so 6 ships each operating with two. But it is more likely to acquire UAV's to assist in this. Something like a fully kitted out MQ-8C Fire Scout, which is still in development and is likely to make significant capability in the 2020 period. The smaller Fire Scout is able to be operated on the LCS, so would be ideal on something like OPV's.
24 MH-60R's and 24 MQ-8C's would be a powerful combination. Each ship having a manned MH-60R and a large (man sized) UAV would give any task force significant capability, particularly when backed by a larger ship like a LHD or ASW flat top, which could then take on platforms for maintenance, allowing the ships to focus on operations.
Japan operates something like 50 SH-60K plus there were some older J's. So it isn't like Australia has nothing in this area. At this stage I think we are waiting to see what happens in the UAV space.
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