Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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The ADF and particularly the RAN has been increasingly successful in attracting people from other navies.
Nocookies
Serving Down Under: Australia offers military jobs to US troops facing separation
Canada's defence issues are well known.
https://ipolitics.ca/2017/08/07/canadian-submariners-leaving-fleet-for-down-under/
Two big factors, Australia is nice place to emigrate to, warm, sunny, great for families. The pay is usually pretty attractive as well compared to most other forces. Defence also had some nice recruitment bonuses for key people, and the ADF is an expanding force that does real deployments.
In submarines, its rampant. It always has been. 20-30% of the force is probably ex-RN.
Australia also did quite well acquiring most of several air forces, including the NZ and much of Rhodesia's air forces when they folded. That was a long time ago.
It is possible Australia will acquire a lot of Canada's submarine and fighter pilots force if they decide to get out of the submarine business and if flight hours are significantly curtailed due to air frame limitations due to stalled aquisitions.
Nocookies
Serving Down Under: Australia offers military jobs to US troops facing separation
Canada's defence issues are well known.
https://ipolitics.ca/2017/08/07/canadian-submariners-leaving-fleet-for-down-under/
Two big factors, Australia is nice place to emigrate to, warm, sunny, great for families. The pay is usually pretty attractive as well compared to most other forces. Defence also had some nice recruitment bonuses for key people, and the ADF is an expanding force that does real deployments.
In submarines, its rampant. It always has been. 20-30% of the force is probably ex-RN.
Australia also did quite well acquiring most of several air forces, including the NZ and much of Rhodesia's air forces when they folded. That was a long time ago.
It is possible Australia will acquire a lot of Canada's submarine and fighter pilots force if they decide to get out of the submarine business and if flight hours are significantly curtailed due to air frame limitations due to stalled aquisitions.
Wow 20-30% thats a lot! If we consider that also canadians use RN system if they end up in RAN the % would go even higher.
What if scenario.
With this % of RN in your subs, if the RN had a High-Low combination of SSN and SSK , the british SSK would have been the winner of the SEA1000?
What if scenario.
With this % of RN in your subs, if the RN had a High-Low combination of SSN and SSK , the british SSK would have been the winner of the SEA1000?
Only if it did what we need. Seen any recent UK SSK? We have no idea what they'd consider appropriate to meet the RAN's need, but recent experience of BAE seems to me to be "They'll love what we have! It's the bestest" and the assumption that historical ties will overcome all.
Actually, we suffer from other suppliers telling us what we need is what they sell, not what we want, not just those from the UK. It seems to be rife from several EU nations and their boosters, particularly as we get close to naming the tender winner for the frigates...
oldsig
Heck, I have an exchange posting coming up with the RAN.
We'll see if I actually make it back.
I have never seen any figures but as Australia's armed forces continue to get new equipment and capabilities it will need to increase its manpower levels. We are currently struggling to man 6 submarines but over the next couple of decades we will need double that number. We will be replacing 13 patrol boats (crew of around 21) with 12 OPVs (crew of around 40 ). The new frigates will be bigger and more capable than the Anzacs and of course we will be getting an extra ship. My guess is that the crewing level will be closer to that of the Hobart than the Anzac. That will be an extra 30 or 40 crew per ship.
These numbers are rough but it would suggest that you would need another 900 or so sailors just to man these things. That doesn't include all the support personnel you would need. The final number could be over 2000.
These numbers are rough but it would suggest that you would need another 900 or so sailors just to man these things. That doesn't include all the support personnel you would need. The final number could be over 2000.
As I recall the sea5000 ships having crewing closer to Anzac, I think that was one of the issues to address with the F-5000 design. But again, details are sketchy on actual sea5000 submissions. There was much talk originally about crewing..
SEA5000 CEP: critical capability considerations for the future frigates – The Australian Naval Institute
1. Low Crewing Requirement: Due to RAN personnel shortages, the Future Frigates must be capable of safely operating with crews of less than 174.
I believe they are looking at having an east coast submarine base, which would make sense, as instead of drawing from the ~1 million people in an around Perth, you could draw on the ~15 million people on the east coast of Australia. I also think the sub manning levels have improved since the mining boom where service people might be offered impossible to refuse contracts. There has been huge automation and also most of the mega mines are now well and truly established.
SEA5000 CEP: critical capability considerations for the future frigates – The Australian Naval Institute
1. Low Crewing Requirement: Due to RAN personnel shortages, the Future Frigates must be capable of safely operating with crews of less than 174.
I believe they are looking at having an east coast submarine base, which would make sense, as instead of drawing from the ~1 million people in an around Perth, you could draw on the ~15 million people on the east coast of Australia. I also think the sub manning levels have improved since the mining boom where service people might be offered impossible to refuse contracts. There has been huge automation and also most of the mega mines are now well and truly established.
Not necessarily so. Buying 12 submarines is not the same as intending to operate 12 submarines simultaneously. If you consider the intention of starting a continuous build line it could equally mean an intention to build up to a fleet of nine, then retire one for one as the last few come on line. That would remove the least modern and introduce the most modern of that class while preparation and design is done for the replacement class. Then, if the replacement is delayed it reduces the risk that the navy gets stuck trying to support creaking hulls.
Not my idea by the way. This was suggested by someone in Defence around the time that the fleet of twelve was first mooted. And I've read it repeated here.
oldsig
Exactly.
If personnel issues were really so rigid, you'd have zero personnel at all.
And what about the 12 subs that will be built? Last I read online, we only have crew for 4.5 subs. Of course you can hire more crew and train them.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
From what I recall, the original plan for the 12 sub force was to build the subs in three blocks of four, with a goal of having a total sub force of eight in service. The first two would be built and commissioned and as the third sub was getting commissioned, one of the Collins-class SSG's would be decommissioned, with the numbers rolling along from there. Then as boat nine gets commissioned, one of the initial SEA 1000 production block subs would be decommissioned, with the numbers again rolling from there.
As for the difficulties the RAN had in crewing the six Collins-class SSG's, there were a number of reasons for that. Some due to external circumstances like the mining boom, where the mining industry was looking for people with certain skills and trades and was willing to pay to attract and keep them. Unfortunately the desired skills and talents were also relevant to the submarine service, so the RAN was having to compete with the mining industry to retain experienced personnel with the skills needed to serve aboard subs and the RAN just did not have the budget to match the pay and signing bonuses the mining industry could offer.
Another area which was essentially self-inflicted was having all the subs based at FBW which meant any sub crew member not from Perth or WA would be looking at either relocating their families or else face long periods of separation. Having some subs based at FBE should help relieve that to a degree.
Another area which was again essentially self-inflicted (by gov't I believe) was the maintenance and docking schedule that gov't authorized the RAN and ASC to conduct. By reducing the scale of some of the upgrades and maintenance to reduce cost and perceived risk the reliability and availability of the subs suffered. Add to that the desire of gov't to reduce some of the operating costs by having subs tied up alongside, then the sub crews can no longer deploy out to sea and needed skills start to wither, and/or service members who joined up to go to sea start looking at alternate careers (like mining) that pay better if they are going to be stuck ashore.
Lastly, there is the fact that the Collins-class sub fleet is only six vessels, requiring a total of 60 officers and 228 sailors. With such a small pool of crew, it becomes hard to maintain the sort of critical mass, especially when subs are undergoing long-term maintenance or tied up alongside and not going out to sea. Had the options for the two extra subs been exercised and then the maintenance and docking cycles been done as planned, then I suspect the RAN would not have had such difficulty getting subs out to sea.
The DWP 16 has allowed the RAN a "modest" increase in personnel, 400, to allow for the extra hulls in the shipbuilding plan.
Mid level serving officers don't decide on acquisitions.
There is enough experience in higher ranks who understand the capability being offered to settle on a preferred option for the Navy.
This decision is then considered as part of a wider caucus where inputs from several more interested groups combine to put forward a final selection from the Department of Defence to the government whose Cabinet processes decide on The winning tender. It is a government decision, not a Naval one, although one always hopes that the politicians take advice from the professionals.
An officer exchange programme would therefore have little influence on the final decision although it could provide some input.
The Australian visits by the Italian FREMM and Armada F100 would have been more useful as it would allow more senior officers a chance to view the ships just as the 9 month deployment of AOR Cantabria to the RAN no doubt helped influence the selection of the class for the RAN.
There is enough experience in higher ranks who understand the capability being offered to settle on a preferred option for the Navy.
This decision is then considered as part of a wider caucus where inputs from several more interested groups combine to put forward a final selection from the Department of Defence to the government whose Cabinet processes decide on The winning tender. It is a government decision, not a Naval one, although one always hopes that the politicians take advice from the professionals.
An officer exchange programme would therefore have little influence on the final decision although it could provide some input.
The Australian visits by the Italian FREMM and Armada F100 would have been more useful as it would allow more senior officers a chance to view the ships just as the 9 month deployment of AOR Cantabria to the RAN no doubt helped influence the selection of the class for the RAN.
Not on the choice, as Oldsig said you have to many people that say to you what you need. For that reason i never wrote "FREMM is the best you must choose it". I focused on showing the competitors shortcomings (economic), so you can have more information to make the choice.
When talking of borrowing officers I wasnt meaning now, I meant when the ships will enter in service. I meant like having a "manning buffer" so you have time to find the crews and have officers familiar with the system to help the transition.
When talking of borrowing officers I wasnt meaning now, I meant when the ships will enter in service. I meant like having a "manning buffer" so you have time to find the crews and have officers familiar with the system to help the transition.
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Can we please give it a rest and stop bringing up the 'economic viability' of the parent companies that have offered designs for the SEA 5000 project? Unless something has changed drastically that I am unaware of, none of the companies with competing designed will be taking ownership of or operating the shipyard where the SEA 5000 frigates will be constructed, regardless of which one is awarded the contract. By the same token, the through-life maintenance and potential future upgrades will also be done within Australia so the economic circumstances of a foreign company would not matter either.
It would be a different story if the RAN had to rely upon British, Italian or Spanish support for the frigates during their service lives but that is not the case.
As for having foreign officers seconded to the RAN for the vessel handovers, I highly doubt that would work out the way it seems to be getting suggested.
After all, the ship systems which are to be fitted are those selected by Australia, so unless the specific systems are already in service with the foreign navy the seconded personnel will be no more familiar with the system than potential RAN operators.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I would say it is a certainty! Why would any ambitious RCAF pilot stay in Canada in order to fly used Australian Hornets when immigrating to Australia you can fly SHs and eventually F-35s, ditto RCN submariners.
Agreed. The project will be managed from Australia and they will be sourcing equipment and materials from all over the planet.
If we are concerned about the economic viability of the parent company we should be equally concerned about the economic viability of the companies that provide the combat systems, engines, steel, and all the other components needed for this project.
All projects ... particularly large and complex ones, have inherent risks and at the end of the day it comes down to management.
Don't get me wrong ... there are hundreds of things that can, and will go wrong over the 20 to 30 years this project will run but these problems will be managed from Australia.
Just to clarify MY attitude....presenting a case for any option is okay. Bagging the opposition is not. And frankly, as I don't have any role in the decision you can present as much negative "information" here as you wish and it wont change the outcome. I should imagine that even IF someone involved IS reading, they'd have more actual insight than is provided here.
oldsig
Nav Aus and Bae aus just inked a deal for ongoin maintence for the awds. In the end many will have to work together.
Navantia and BAE Systems formalise AWD sustainment contract - Defence Connect
There are lots of opportunities, Australia wants the best kit. It has the money and interest to get it.
Navantia and BAE Systems formalise AWD sustainment contract - Defence Connect
There are lots of opportunities, Australia wants the best kit. It has the money and interest to get it.
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