Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

Hadn't seen this one before but it turned up in my search for the 1966 paper

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/Sea...ports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=30942817&isAv=N

A conventional CdG, or a CTOL version of a USN LPA/LPD flying F/A-18 after Invincible was retained by the RN. We all know the outcome, i.e. both sides of politics decided carriers cost too much, but I had no idea that CTOL was re-examined post Falklands. I will have to try and find this report the cabinet memo refers to.

 

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks 'Volkodav' I rocked up just minute after your second post but both links were inoperative and I do not know what terms you searched on. I find this site not easy to use but I guess I should practice more eh.

On this page found this GIF image attached: MELBOURNE replacement 1980-82 Sinclair

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=9574726

 

[Volkodav]

Thanks 'Volkodav' I rocked up just minute after your second post but both links were inoperative and I do not know what terms you searched on. I find this site not easy to use but I guess I should practice more eh.

On this page found this GIF image attached: MELBOURNE replacement 1980-82 Sinclair

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=9574726

I used "carrier replacement"

I've viewed it before but this is the first time I saw the other reference.

 

[SpazSinbad]

I used "carrier replacement"

I've viewed it before but this is the first time I saw the other reference.

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=9574726

Title
Replacement Aircraft Carrier for HMAS Melbourne [Submission Nos. 4305, 5234, 5318, 5322, 5333, 5338 and 5354 refer]

Contents date range
21 Aug 1980 - 28 Jul 1982

Series number
A10756

Control symbol
LC3015

Citation
NAA: A10756, LC3015

Item barcode
9574726

 

[Volkodav]

Thanks for that link, perfect! My wife is going to be pissed with me tonight as I pick my way through it.

 

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks for that link, perfect! My wife is going to be pissed with me tonight as I pick my way through it.

I had a hard day gardening so I'll pick up from about page 50 tomorrow probably. OMG there is a lot of bumpf pages in these things.

Would like to see a reference to F-4s - was that in the 1960s?

 

[Volkodav]

That is :
"RAN proposal for a replacement aircraft carrier and fixed wing aircraft"

 

[SpazSinbad]

That is :
"RAN proposal for a replacement aircraft carrier and fixed wing aircraft"

Roadblocks on this website are incredible (that text string is too long for example). Is this it?

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=1565492

Title
RAN proposal for a replacement aircraft carrier and fixed wing aircraft
Contents range
1964 - 1966

Series number
A1945

Control symbol
244/3/64

Barcode
1565492

 

[Volkodav]

Roadblocks on this website are incredible (that text string is too long for example). Is this it?

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=1565492

Title
RAN proposal for a replacement aircraft carrier and fixed wing aircraft
Contents range
1964 - 1966

Series number
A1945

Control symbol
244/3/64

Barcode
1565492

Once you get in its worth it. The RANs preferred option was an SBC27 Essex flying F-4B(likely J looking at the timings) Tracker, Tracer and Sea king while CVA01 and a new build "Oriskany" were also looked at.

 

[Tasman]

Thanks for that link, perfect! My wife is going to be pissed with me tonight as I pick my way through it.

Very interesting document even if it is 242 pages long. I thought the details from P8 - 36 were particularly relevant to the proposal to acquire a modified Oriskany class carrier and F-4B Phantoms, together with Trackers and Tracers.

The numbers to be acquired were:
28 F-4B Phantoms
24 S2E Trackers
8 E1B Tracers

Airgroup to be made up of:
16 F4B, 12 S2E, 4 E1B, 16 Wessex ASW and 2 Wessex SAR (50A)

Of course history showed that the government of the day opted instead to acquire S2Es and later A4G Skyhawks for a modified HMAS Melbourne as a cheaper alternative History also shows that the USN never operated Phantoms from carriers smaller than the Midway class.

The proposal remains a tantalising 'what if' in the development of the RAN.

I suspect that if it had gone ahead, Australia would have had huge trouble financially supporting the carrier force whilst maintaining a balanced ADF. Even the RN had to abandon large deck carriers as the 1970's came to a close and an Oriskany class carrier would have needed to be replaced by the early 80s.

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=1565492

Tas

 

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks for the link 'Tasman'. IIRC the USS Oriskany was discovered to be infested with PCBs that were very nasty, being removed before she was sunk? We dodged a bullet there methinks.

ADDITION: link to ORISKANY PCB info: https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/0596ba557b46787b852571170062cf36.html

 

[Volkodav]

Dear me the 1982 paper is making my eyes bleed, I see that quite frighteningly Dept PM&C, as questionable as their competence is today, was far far worse in the 70s and 80s.

The professional studies looked at all options, advantages, disadvantages, costs, opportunity cost etc. while PM&C distilled the available data down to:
- the primary purpose of a new carrier is ASW therefore it is its only purpose, completely ignoring command and control, air defence, disaster relief, troop transport and every other mission Melbourne and Sydney had actually done.
- they over estimated the cost of STVOL and underestimated its utility.
- they pretended that medium helicopters (that Australia was yet to select) were more capable that the in service Sea kings.
- the stated that dunking sonar was obsolete and already being replaced by better more modern technologies.
- the listed the second batch of 10 P-3Cs, the acquisition of Barra sonar buoys as if they were alternatives to the carrier that would be ordered if the carrier program was cancelled, ignoring the fact that they were updates and replacements for existing capabilities that were already being procured under separate programs.

I don't know if they were deliberately misleading cabinet or whether they were just lazy and / or stupid.

Oh yes they stated that aircraft were more effective and flexible than aircraft carriers, WTF did they think aircraft carriers did?

 

[SpazSinbad]

'Volkodav' said: "...I don't know if they were deliberately misleading cabinet or whether they were just lazy and / or stupid...."

Geebus IF we had have known these details then.... history sucks. I choose 'deliberately misleading cabinet' meself but perhaps that is too harsh.

Read somewhere (I'll look) that the RAN supplied only a second string team for deliberations whereas the RAAF provided a first team to confound matters.

123 page PDF here: http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA26.pdf (0.8Mb)

A Historical Appreciation of the Contribution of Naval Air Power by Ross & Sandison 2008 then the original paper from 1978

"...Central Studies Establishment (CSE) – a Defence analytical agency established in 1969, which no longer exists. CSE produced one of the most important studies in this saga: the Naval Air Power/Tactical Air Warfare System (NAP/TAWS) Study, which began in 1970 and dragged on for some years.

While the NAP/TAWS Study did not look favourably on the value of the capability provided by naval aviation, its findings were subsequently discredited by the Navy – but only after damage had been done to its case...."

 

[Volkodav]

I am wondering if the 30 year rule exists more to protect lying and incompetent individuals than to protect national security. Give the chance to die from old age before the damage they have done comes out. Looks like our public service heads and politicians were every bit as bad as the UKs just better hidden.

 

[Tasman]

Read somewhere (I'll look) that the RAN supplied only a second string team for deliberations whereas the RAAF provided a first team to confound matters.

It is no secret that RAAF staff training long left navy and army for dead when it came to teaching its potential future leaders to promote the air force ahead of the other services whenever considered necessary. Hopefully the RAN has finally learnt the need to have senior sirs who can play the political game and not just presume that a sound argument will be accepted by their political masters. To me the 1964/66 papers showed incredible naivety on the part of the RAN leadership at the time as well as prevarication and a lack of understanding by PM and cabinet. Having succeeded in convincing government to reduce the FAA from a two carrier strike force to a one carrier ASW oriented force in the second half of the 1950s, I believe there is no doubt whatsoever, that the RAAF senior brass was determined to undermine any effort to see its rebirth as a strike force. I don’t blame the RAAF for pushing its own needs but I thought it very disappointing that the RAN seemed incapable of doing the same.

I just hope that the RAN staff today is better trained and prepared to push its needs in the political arena.

Tas

 

[SpazSinbad]

My reference was not to the 1960s RAN/RAAF submissions (although they would appear to be what has been stated) but to the later 1980-82 STOVL carrier submissions (when I believe the RAN thought 'carrier truths were self evident').

GIF graphic attached as indicated:

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=9574726

Replacement Aircraft Carrier for HMAS Melbourne 21 Aug 1980-28 Jul 1982 from page 93-94

This quote is from above. Hindsight is wonderful but I just take joy that the RAN FAA is back in the dunkin' DipGang business:

"...S. The rapid pace of technological development of ASW systems is changing the capabilities and configuration of helicopters used for this work. "Dunking" sonar has been complemented and perhaps overtaken by other systems and its future relevance is doubtful...."

 

[Tasman]

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=9574726

Replacement Aircraft Carrier for HMAS Melbourne 21 Aug 1980-28 Jul 1982 from page 93-94

This quote is from above. Hindsight is wonderful but I just take joy that the RAN FAA is back in the dunkin' DipGang business:

You are a bit like me - I get joy from even small wins these days !

Thanks for the link even though it has made me have to change my plans for today as I now feel compelled to read the lot!

What I have read so far still leaves me convinced that the RAAF senior staff in the 1980's (as in the 1960s) was far more effective than their navy counterparts at convincing government. An example of this was the success of the CAS in convincing the minister and his department that the Sea Harrier had little capability against aircraft like the A-4 or F-5! I wonder if the Argentinian pilots who flew A-4s against Sea Harriers in 1982 would have agreed?

Maybe I am being optimistic but observing senior naval staff in recent parliamentary committee meetings has left me feeling a little more confident in the current RAN leadership group's ability to deal with the rubbish questions and comments that are constantly thrown at them.

Tas

 

[hairyman]

We must remember that the government of the day had John Gorton, ex RAAF fighter pilot in its ranks, who was Prime Minister after Harold Holt went missing. I dont recall any navy members of the government.

 

[SpazSinbad]

Personally I do not think Gorton is at fault. Happened to spend a few days with him [when Education Minister IIRC] in HMAS Anzac wardroom on way from Fiji to Tonga back in 1967. He did not strike me as being anti RAN or FAA.

What struck me when I started flying training with the RAAF a few months later was the complete negativity by all RAAF about anything to do with the RAN FAA. When joining NAS Nowra beginning 1969 that 'RAAF against RAN Fixed Wing' attitude was pronounced, indicated by many RAAF decisions not to participate in exercises (often informal) with the A4Gs for example. I'm told this attitude changed after the mid 1970s somewhat and 'today' I'm told things between RAAF and RAN are quite different - understandable as the RAN has no fixed wing and the RAAF no helicopters. Over the years people not in my position in the early 1970s just do not understand the RAAF antipathy to the RAN A4Gs. History is written by winners I guess.

 

[Volkodav]

We must remember that the government of the day had John Gorton, ex RAAF fighter pilot in its ranks, who was Prime Minister after Harold Holt went missing. I dont recall any navy members of the government.

Theres two documents being discussed, the mid 60s proposal for a strike carrier with Phantoms and the 82 one about the Frazer gov't machinations. The anti carrier slant from the higher echelons of the Public Service are quite enlightening due to their gross inaccuracies while the professional reports all seem to have been more even handed looking at pros and cons but deciding in favour of a new carrier.

The CAS' arguments that too much emphasis was being placed on a ship to replace a ship instead of looking at the desired capability outcomes is almost amusing, if the RAN didn't have a carrier it couldn't deploy its existing ASW helicopters or any sort of survivable reconnaissance, strike, or air defence hence had to operate with reduced capability across the board.