Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
True, but it is available and it's launch systems are compatable with other weapons. They will fill a gap in what we have, out until something better can be acquired.

In particular, if we are talking land based systems, their launchers and control systems will be suitable for many other loadouts.
As it stands now though, the ones approved for sale to Australia are the ship-launched ones, not any land-based systems. In short, the missile is compatible with kit already installed aboard the Hobart-class destroyers (the strike length Mk 41 VLS) rather than the acquisition being one which provides Australia with kit that can be re-used if/when Australian Tomahawks are replaced with something else.

It is almost as though you are suggesting that we need a ship borne long range reconnaissance platform. Global hawk and Orion are nice, but expensive.. satellites might be good option also.. that sea guardian thing starting to look attractive
Not really. My point is much more that the strike mission scenario, in which the Hobart-class destroyers would have a role, seems as that it should really be re-thought. Any extreme range strikes are going to be problematic for Australia, simply because of the lack of real time and near-real time ISR targeting capabilities at such ranges. Strikes against critical or important fixed infrastructure are easier because they are not thinks which will take off and fly, sail , or drive away in the hour or more that it might between the launch of a standoff LACM strike package and its arrival in a targeted area. If one is going to plan a strike on roadway infrastructure like bridgeheads for long distance strikes, there are other potential assets to use. An example would be the F/A-18F SHornets in a strike loadout. A six SHornet flight would have the same overall JASSM loadout as a Hobart-class DDG with half the VLS cells filled with Tomahawks, without gimping much of the fleet's available area air defence. Additionally, IMO a JASSM strike is more likely to be able to penetrate IADS and GBAD than a Tomahawk one.

As time progresses and hopefully RAN warship procurement starts to deliver more vessels, fitted with more VLS cells, then a time might come were dedicated strike missile cells might be worthwhile for RAN surface vessels. Right now though, IMO, the RAN has better loadout options for the too few cells in service. FWIW, across the entirety of the RAN at present there are a maximum of 208 VLS cells, which is less than the number of VLS cells found aboard three USN Arleigh Burke-class Flight I DDG's.

Now if VL versions of the LRASM are developed with a secondary land attack role, or variants of the NSM AShM which are also capable of land attack are developed, then fitting the Hobart-class destroyers with some of these becomes a better idea IMO.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
As it stands now though, the ones approved for sale to Australia are the ship-launched ones, not any land-based systems. In short, the missile is compatible with kit already installed aboard the Hobart-class destroyers (the strike length Mk 41 VLS) rather than the acquisition being one which provides Australia with kit that can be re-used if/when Australian Tomahawks are replaced with something else.



Not really. My point is much more that the strike mission scenario, in which the Hobart-class destroyers would have a role, seems as that it should really be re-thought. Any extreme range strikes are going to be problematic for Australia, simply because of the lack of real time and near-real time ISR targeting capabilities at such ranges. Strikes against critical or important fixed infrastructure are easier because they are not thinks which will take off and fly, sail , or drive away in the hour or more that it might between the launch of a standoff LACM strike package and its arrival in a targeted area. If one is going to plan a strike on roadway infrastructure like bridgeheads for long distance strikes, there are other potential assets to use. An example would be the F/A-18F SHornets in a strike loadout. A six SHornet flight would have the same overall JASSM loadout as a Hobart-class DDG with half the VLS cells filled with Tomahawks, without gimping much of the fleet's available area air defence. Additionally, IMO a JASSM strike is more likely to be able to penetrate IADS and GBAD than a Tomahawk one.

As time progresses and hopefully RAN warship procurement starts to deliver more vessels, fitted with more VLS cells, then a time might come were dedicated strike missile cells might be worthwhile for RAN surface vessels. Right now though, IMO, the RAN has better loadout options for the too few cells in service. FWIW, across the entirety of the RAN at present there are a maximum of 208 VLS cells, which is less than the number of VLS cells found aboard three USN Arleigh Burke-class Flight I DDG's.

Now if VL versions of the LRASM are developed with a secondary land attack role, or variants of the NSM AShM which are also capable of land attack are developed, then fitting the Hobart-class destroyers with some of these becomes a better idea IMO.
It is hard to work out why we are buying 200 Tomahawks for, it is an ageing missile with a replacement probably by the mid 30s, Australia has a very limited launch capability which cannot be re-loaded at sea. Even if you had 2 Hobarts available for an operation, what are we looking at, 16 missiles at most, By the time you loaded a decent amount of SM family and ESSMs?
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
It is hard to work out why we are buying 200 Tomahawks for, it is an ageing missile with a replacement probably by the mid 30s, Australia has a very limited launch capability which cannot be re-loaded at sea. Even if you had 2 Hobarts available for an operation, what are we looking at, 16 missiles at most, By the time you loaded a decent amount of SM family and ESSMs?
Your post does very well summing up issues I have with the apparent plan, as well as why I keep having WTF moments.

IIRC there is something like AUD$1.3 bil. allocated for the purchase. How much other defence kit and/or capabilities could Australia acquire for that $1.3 bil. instead? By the time Australia will potentially have sufficient platforms able to launch the missile in numbers, the missile will have been in service for 50 years. It is also possible that the service life of the missiles purchased might be coming up, depending on how long missiles are supposed to be good for before requiring recertification or remanufacture as well as when production and delivery of the order takes place. Incidentally, the later the deliveries start, the more of a bad idea this would be IMO, as this would push Australia's expected service life out even further.

I still cannot but help feeling that the announcements have been made and orders placed more to make it look like something is being done, without there being any coherent overall plan behind the purchases. That or decisions are being made by people who do not realize that the pieces being ordered do not really fit together to make an overall capability.

In many respects, such purchases can fulfill the Act portion of an OODA loop, but it appears that the Observe and possibly Orient portions of the OODA loop are being neglected or ignored. Of course there are still the non-public portions of the DSR and subsequent reviews, but I am unaware of anything current in Australian service, or even likely to be in the near future, which could provide quality contact data for identification and target discrimination from hundreds of km's away. The closest I am aware of would be systems like the P-8 Poseidon or the E-7 Wedgetail and even those I rather doubt could handle proper targeting at the more extreme edge of potential ranges.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Your post does very well summing up issues I have with the apparent plan, as well as why I keep having WTF moments.

IIRC there is something like AUD$1.3 bil. allocated for the purchase. How much other defence kit and/or capabilities could Australia acquire for that $1.3 bil. instead? By the time Australia will potentially have sufficient platforms able to launch the missile in numbers, the missile will have been in service for 50 years. It is also possible that the service life of the missiles purchased might be coming up, depending on how long missiles are supposed to be good for before requiring recertification or remanufacture as well as when production and delivery of the order takes place. Incidentally, the later the deliveries start, the more of a bad idea this would be IMO, as this would push Australia's expected service life out even further.

I still cannot but help feeling that the announcements have been made and orders placed more to make it look like something is being done, without there being any coherent overall plan behind the purchases. That or decisions are being made by people who do not realize that the pieces being ordered do not really fit together to make an overall capability.

In many respects, such purchases can fulfill the Act portion of an OODA loop, but it appears that the Observe and possibly Orient portions of the OODA loop are being neglected or ignored. Of course there are still the non-public portions of the DSR and subsequent reviews, but I am unaware of anything current in Australian service, or even likely to be in the near future, which could provide quality contact data for identification and target discrimination from hundreds of km's away. The closest I am aware of would be systems like the P-8 Poseidon or the E-7 Wedgetail and even those I rather doubt could handle proper targeting at the more extreme edge of potential ranges.
As expensive as they are $1.3B would still buy a lot of NSM, SM-6 and ESSM Blk II for the RAN and we have 208 VLS + whatever NSM launchers we acquire for them as against the 2-3 dozen at most we could afford to use for the Tomahawk.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
As expensive as they are $1.3B would still buy a lot of NSM, SM-6 and ESSM Blk II for the RAN and we have 208 VLS + whatever NSM launchers we acquire for them as against the 2-3 dozen at most we could afford to use for the Tomahawk.
AUD$1.3 bil. is getting into the territory where additional vessels could be purchased instead. IIRC the per vessel cost for the Arafura-class OPV's is around AUD$300 mil. not that I am saying more should be acquired beyond the dozen currently planned. An alternate option would be to use the funds to purchase AS21 Redbacks, which at current exchange rates should cover~256 more vehicles.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Noting I agree with everything @Todjaeger has said, I do think there is a sensible reason for buying Tomahawk. I just think it has nothing to do with deterrence.

Of note, he has touched two key holes in the concept - targeting and throw weight. The first is self-explanatory, and honestly I can only think that the answer is SF or satellite. Both have significant negatives for Australia, but if the answer is P-8 or MQ-4 then the threat is low, so the launch platform can get closer. Note that with unprecedented and unrivalled ISR over years, 50 strikes against Hussain and other key personnel all failed... For the second one, look at Syria. We have nearly 70 missiles failing to knock out an airfield, and 105 failing to either deter or destroy Syrian chemical weapon facilities. With that in mind, and against such a poor IADS (although better than ours...), what exactly is the throw weight needed? And with all that in mind - what are we deterring?

In addition to the above, I'd throw in the political cost of striking PRC mainland. The PRC is a nuclear power, and we are talking about striking strategically significant targets? How separate are they from the PRCRF chain of command? What is the response to nuclear C2 being targeted? What is Beijing's definition of PRC mainland? Does it include the islands and the SCS?

So, if no good against PRC mainland, for strategic targets, or for big/hardened/heavily defended targets, why buy Tomahawk? Simply put, it complicates the threat's air defence and can be used to allow land or air components freedom of action. Striking a Theatre or Corps C2 node could cripple air defence or long-range fires, allowing F-35s to strike elsewhere, or a Bde to form up and conduct an assault. You aren't going to throw Tomahawks at a BG or Bde HQ, but there will be high priority targets for the JTF Commander that would be perfect. Strike the AD node from the east while F-35s move in from the south-west to kill a number of rocket/artillery command positions that in turn allows the Bde to form up and seize terrain, that in turn the land long-range fires swith to GBAD sites to help the F-35s exfil or the F/A-18s in as well. A proper Joint Force, using manouver warfare to offer multiple delimmas to the enemy.

With such a concept in mind, now it's okay for a FFG or DDG to carry only 2 - 6 Tomahawks. They won't be alone, so could throw up to 30, which could hit 5 - 8 targets. That's 5 - 8 significant command or logistic nodes.... imagine the Australian Army loosing 5 - 8 of those nodes.....
 

OldTex

Well-Known Member
Personally I find the question even more fundamental. In what scenario would the ADF need a Tomohawk missile?

It feel that this is very unclear.

Regards,

Massive
My impression is that rush by the government (past and present) to acquire long-range strike missiles etc has more to do with being seen by the voting public to be doing something about the "threat" which has been presented (in vague and nebulous ways). The fact that the voting public have virtually no interest in and knowledge of defence just makes it so much easier.

Senior Sirs may have provided their advice on which missiles to pick, but was it a case of pick from these 3 missiles rather than pick from this ship or this plane or this vehicle, on which to spend some money.
 

Armchair

Active Member
Personally I find the question even more fundamental. In what scenario would the ADF need a Tomohawk missile?
It feel that this is very unclear.
Massive
Agreed this is the best question but some of it should be unclear.

if it were clear that the intended use was for Australia, on its own, to launch a first strike on a superpower at home then I don’t believe the US would sell the missiles. If it did the potential adversary could deter the attack by establishing larger long term iron ore contracts in Brazil. Even a bad idea might work though if it is a total surprise.

If the strategic goal were to “encourage an allied but strategically unpredictable US to believe that Australia would make a small but significant effort in coalition efforts at deterring a distant superpower and/or an erratic nuclear power from projecting power in, and from, mainland Asia” then having lots of Tomahawks is a bit like having F-35 training exercises with Japan and ASEAN forces or acquiring Virginias and AUKUS subs. Those are expensive too, but the reasons for them and the intended use of, say, subs are left unclear in public (and are often, I believe, misrepresented in national media and by public intellectuals in, for example, ASPI). That broad coalition use sounds (kind of) plausible to me (would a single Hobart without SM-3 under USN and USAF cover need lots of missiles to defend other ships? An SSGN unlike a Hobart, can dive of course, but its job is to fire Tomahawks). Maybe the large purchase is political - showing the RAN could deliver lots of missiles (compared to the RN submarine off Libya in 2012). I think that coalition scenario is worth discussing but is not a great intended use (the geopolitics stuff is best discussed in another thread).

My guess (based on the public DSR and urgent need for more littoral lift) is the intended use is much closer to mainland Australian (“our immediate region”, which, of course, is also deliberately unclear) and the use assumes support and cover from land-based (or coalition) air. There are very good diplomatic and local political reasons for Australia not to make any of the scenarios clear but asking where Takao’s second scenario might take place probably helps clarify things. I don’t want to spell out my version of such a scenario, because largely based on the discussion in this thread, I don’t think Australia will have the other capabilities necessary to conduct the operation for a long time (with or without Tomahawks).

Given that the immediate region comprises inhabited islands then, with likely Australian rules of engagement that close targeting mentioned by Todjaeger is even more essential for Tomahawk. A moving target in a populated area is probably not Australia’s target (at least for that weapon and from 1600 km away).

Why so many missiles now? I guess they want the capability to do that sort of operation more than once ( perhaps in different conflicts separated by months or years) and are anxious about resupply times for that missile and are optimistic (perhaps unreasonably) about the arrival of Hunters (assumed in Takao’s scenario), or have other unannounced options (some of which have been broached in this thread).
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Cutting it back to first principles, when you have limited numbers and limited capability, the answer is range.

This is not only range in terms of reach or distance, but also in terms of the types of effects deliverable from different platforms.

Basically a greater number of existing and future capabilities being expanded to include strategic strike, anti ship strike, air defence and ABM.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
My impression is that rush by the government (past and present) to acquire long-range strike missiles etc has more to do with being seen by the voting public to be doing something about the "threat" which has been presented (in vague and nebulous ways). The fact that the voting public have virtually no interest in and knowledge of defence just makes it so much easier.

Senior Sirs may have provided their advice on which missiles to pick, but was it a case of pick from these 3 missiles rather than pick from this ship or this plane or this vehicle, on which to spend some money.
I see Tomahawk as a niche capability. Really the 200 or so we are acquiring won't be any game changer. The real asymmetric capability in my opinion will be smart sea mines. The ADF may end up with thousands of them.
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
I see Tomahawk as a niche capability. Really the 200 or so we are acquiring won't be any game changer. The real asymmetric capability in my opinion will be smart sea mines. The ADF may end up with thousands of them.
I don’t agree.

Australia’s real leverage over China is our ability to hold the country western approaches to the Straits of Malacca at risk, and make it impossible (or at least uneconomic) for commercial traffic to transit without our say so. They are particularly vulnerable to threats to oil and gas imports via this route.

What would make this threat even more pertinent?

Say, maybe 12 tomahawks targeting various parts of the gas pipelines into China?
 
I hope the members do not mind too much,, if I take a break from the normal posts,, and do something different.

I have been thinking about a small AWACs type aircraft for many years,, something reasonably small,,light,, with very low landing speed, able to be recovered by a net on the stern of a large ship,, launched off the bow with a very short takeoff run...

Anyway I drew something up ten years ago,, I post if here today, just a once of curiosity, then I leave you to it, The only change after ten years is to go from turbojet to turboprop.. I think that if something after then years thought is almost unchanged,, maybe is not all bad

Some serious thoughts about a sensor capability for the Australian Navy. At present long range sensors are limited, options include Global Hawk, Wedgetail and P3C Orion. All are expensive platforms and are deployed in limited numbers. The hope that there would always be an one of these aircraft on hand to support a fleet would seem problematic, even more so if the fleet is working far away.

One option would be to always attach surface vessels to the American Carrier Battle Group, and use the air power of another nation to provide situation awareness at long range. However this might not always due to political or availability issues.

One solution might be a small ship borne AEW capability, examples at moment are the EH101 AEW helicopter of the Royal Navy. This solution does work, however it is expensive to purchase and operate, the large helicopter uses a lot of fuel which would affect fuel supplies on board. Additionally the manned helicopter has limited ceiling, and limited endurance. An unmanned helicopter or unmanned tilt rotor aircraft might be superior, with lower weight and cost.

An unmanned platform can be much lighter, smaller and additionally uses closer to potential threats as loss of a drone is far less damaging than is the loss of service personnel

A fixed wing platform has advantages over a rotor platform in being having much greater endurance, and able to fly higher, permitting greater radar range due to the curvature of the earth.

The problem is that the Navy really lacks the capability to launch and recover fixed wing aircraft.

However IMHO there is a solution. Small STOL aircraft unmanned with carrying an air search and surface search radar. One solution is the General Atomics Mojave STOL aircraft. However this aircraft may well be able to launch are recover from the Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers, but is almost certainly too large to recover on the Canberra class LHDs of the Australian Navy.

Perhaps something similar to the Mojave but smaller and with an even shorter take off and landing distances would be suit well. In order to get ever shorter takeoff and landing distances, takeoff and landing speeds need to be reduced. One way is to reduce weight and accept less operational range and less endurance. Another way is to increase wing area creating greater lift.

Wing area can be increased by having a longer wingspan, however the Canberra class has a relatively narrow flight deck, and the less that is used the better. Thus a very compact design in terms of overall dimensions has great advantages. Ideally the UAV would be able to travel from the rear of the LHD to near the bow, whilst passing helicopters parked off the center line

In terms of endurance long thin wings are most efficient and give long endurance. However the low speed fixed wing UAV platform is already highly efficient and there is plenty of room for compromise here. An example of a highly efficient low speed UAV platform is the General Atomics Predator, able to remain on station up to 24 hours. A UAV with shorter stubbier wings will be less efficient, however because the starting endurance of 24 hours is so high, there is plenty of scope for compromise in this area.

So what layout can give large wing area, low stall speeds, high lift and compact dimensions? The two classic designs that come to mind are the biplane and the tandem wing. Both have the advantage of a lof of wing area in a small size, and high lift. Obviously both are out of fashion now as they are not as efficient as monoplanes, however monoplanes very rarely face the constraints of very small overall dimensions which is the case in this very specific scenario. A Cessna type aircraft has for example a wingspan of about 36ft

The Canberra class does not have arrestor wires, so how would the UAV be recovered? I propose a net at the stern with vertical rubber bands. This has been used on smaller drones before, however there is no reason it could not be scaled up to some degree. The vertical strips would obviously get in the way of a puller propeller, thus a pusher setup would be needed, the prop may well need to be shrouded.

If the landing speed could be reduced to say fifty knots with full flaps and with the UAV light on fuel, then with the ship going forward, the relative speed of the UAV compared to the ship could be around 20 knots, or approximately 40km an hour of 11 meters per second. If deaccelleration is at a modest 2G this gives a landing run of three meters, a deacceleration of one G gives a landing run of 6 meters. Obviously there needs to be some contingency, landing speeds may need to he higher to take into account gusts, unexpected tailwinds, however a landing run of 15 to 20 meters should be well sufficient. maths formula here v squared equals 2as

The vertical rubber strips would need to be positioned somehow. One potential mechanism is to have two wires supported by two columns. The wires could be rubber which has give, another menthod might be a stiffer material than is tensioned and released by spinning the columns, laying out and retrieving wire, controlled by electronics to give the smoothest and low force recovery possible.


When choosing between biplane and tandem wing, IMHO the tandem wing has greater appeal in carrier operations due to large aft and forward control surfaces giving greater maneuverability, which is very useful when landing at low speed, when gusts might affect the glide slope. The tandem wing also permits the attitude of the aircraft to be somewhat independent of the direction of travel. What this means is the aircraft can fly front up aft low and fly horizontal, or fly front down with the aft section high and still fly horizontal. However more useful the tandem wing layout permits the aircraft to fly with a perfect horizontal attitude whilst descending down a glide slope. Thus the last second flare, usually found on landings would not be needed

lastly tandem wing aircraft are not new. One example is the Miles Libellula Tandem Wing aircraft from 1942. Flight characteristics where said to be indistinguishable from conventional aircraft.

My proposal I first drew up ten years ago, I put in online just for fun but never really promoted it. I have come back to it after ten years, and have made one change, and that is to replace the turbofan engine with a turboprob, which is better suited to low speed, longer endurances missions. I set dimensions at a wingspan of 29ft and a length of 33ft. The ability to fold wings and tail booms would be useful, allowing for a more compact aircraft to store onboard. Weights is getting a little problematic and getting into guesswork. Very rough numbers might be a fully loaded weight of 2000kg and an empty weight of 1000kg. The extra wing area on similar weights should give lower landing speeds and takeoff speeds compared to the conventional UAV mentioned above
 

Attachments

south

Well-Known Member
This link regarding the USS Carney engagement in the Red Sea demonstrates 2 things.

Firstly, the value added by the mobility and persistence Naval forces can provide. In this case Area Air Defence of ally.

Second, along with the previous discussion regarding Tomahawks it emphasises how Hobart/Hunter may be compromised for cell count.

Load up these ships with say 8-16 Tomahawks (per previous discussion), 8-10 cells with ESSM and the remainder SM-2 (let’s not even worry about SM-3/6 or future weapons Like Hypersonics just now). After an engagement such as this - 24 targets, engaged with SM-2, Hobart/Hunter would find a significantly exhausted magazine.

A lack of cells will reduce flexibility and potentially impact mission endurance in what are otherwise incredibly capable vessels.
 

Armchair

Active Member
Cutting it back to first principles, when you have limited numbers and limited capability, the answer is range.

This is not only range in terms of reach or distance, but also in terms of the types of effects deliverable from different platforms.

Basically a greater number of existing and future capabilities being expanded to include strategic strike, anti ship strike, air defence and ABM.
I am pretty sure I have seen the following item on this site but reposting here for context.


Also here


To summarise
JMSDF is purchasing 400 Tomahawks (bringing forward the purchase to get some less advanced Block IV available now) and the reasons claimed in the article are for deterrence and that there are political difficulties with placing US Army missiles in Japan.

Yes Japanese ships have more cells (but more choices to put in them) than RAN ships but presumably they have similar targeting challenges to those of the RAN given the same mission.

In relation to the political rationale for Australia’s acquisition there is this:


Other media reporting the visit has focused on the Aus subsidies to US shipbuilding but the linked article rehashs the issue of the research briefing to Congress about the possible unreliability of Australia as an ally in a Taiwan conflict (the researchers are not saying Australia is an unreliable ally but that opponents of AUKUS in Congress could argue that).

I would suggest the two bits of evidence firm support for the “contribute to coalition deterrence efforts” as a driver of the Tomahawk acquisition.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
As expensive as they are $1.3B would still buy a lot of NSM, SM-6 and ESSM Blk II for the RAN and we have 208 VLS + whatever NSM launchers we acquire for them as against the 2-3 dozen at most we could afford to use for the Tomahawk.
Just to be clear, I am in full support of acquiring Tomahawk, it is just the numbers I don't quite understand. We are severely limited in the number we can deploy at any one time and this is not going to change for 10 years and then not by much.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I think another issue with the Tomahawk is simply that it is old tech. In this day and age we are seeing a blurring of the line between long range cruise missiles and UCAVs. The benefit of a UCAV is that not every mission is a suicide mission.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
To summarise
JMSDF is purchasing 400 Tomahawks (bringing forward the purchase to get some less advanced Block IV available now) and the reasons claimed in the article are for deterrence and that there are political difficulties with placing US Army missiles in Japan.

Yes Japanese ships have more cells (but more choices to put in them) than RAN ships but presumably they have similar targeting challenges to those of the RAN given the same mission.

In relation to the political rationale for Australia’s acquisition there is this:


Other media reporting the visit has focused on the Aus subsidies to US shipbuilding but the linked article rehashs the issue of the research briefing to Congress about the possible unreliability of Australia as an ally in a Taiwan conflict (the researchers are not saying Australia is an unreliable ally but that opponents of AUKUS in Congress could argue that).

I would suggest the two bits of evidence firm support for the “contribute to coalition deterrence efforts” as a driver of the Tomahawk acquisition.
I would argue that the security situation Japan finds itself in, is rather different from that of Australia. IMO this is particularly true when considering scenarios where a weapon like Tomahawk could/should/would be used.

To begin with, the JMSDF, at ~50k personnel, is nearly as large as the entire ADF (~60k IIRC) with a fleet sized to match. There are ~40 destroyers or frigates in service with Japan, most of which have VLS for air defence as well as other types of missiles. Eight of the destroyers are kitted out with Aegis and sufficient numbers of large enough (i.e. strike length) VLS to make potential LACM loadouts worthwhile. The Kongo-class DDG has 90 VLS cells, whilst the Atago-class and Maya-class each have 96 VLS cells per vessel. Thus the JMSDF does not have the same shortage of VLS cells that the RAN has, nor such a shortage in platforms which can further complicate TF air defence.

Of what I would consider much greater importance though, is the location of Japan and it's position relative to potential threats. The city of Shanghai on the mainland is less than 900 km from the island of Kyushu, one of the main islands of Japan. This means that LACM's loaded into VLS cells in JMSDF vessels in Japan's home waters could launch a strike against targets in mainland PRC, or land-based launchers for that matter. By the same token, an anti-access/area denial strategy which IMO is not really workable in an Australian context does have significantly better prospects and certainly more merit for Japan.

One of the major strategic differences between Japan and Australia, and likely also why even though the Japanese conventional subs are very advanced, they still were not quite what Australia was looking for, has to do with patrol areas and likely areas of conflict between Japan and powers in the nearby vicinity. For Japan, direct clashes with other powers is possible, with both sides operating from bases located on home territory. With Australia, the airspace or waters of intervening nations would need to be transited, with clashes either taking place well away from bases or else one side or the other, possibly both, would need to establish forward bases to support and sustain forces in a conflict.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
A positive article related to the U.S. sub production capabilities Which flows through to the ability of the USN to release Virginias. Interesting the number of additional staff hired in the past few years.…assuming some wastage probably in excess of 5000 new hires.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
In addition, Japan's security situation is a lot more focused. Not as much as, say, Israel or India, but they really only have one threat and one theatre.

We don't have that 'advantage'. Even simplifying to the Indo-Pacific covers ~1/3 Southern hemisphere, over 50 countries and however many issue motivated non-State actors. It could see ADF forces deployed across locations with up to 8000 km between them.

A key phrase coming out is minimal viable capability. We simply cannot afford more (and anyone who suggests otherwise needs to indicate where the money is coming from).
 
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