Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[ngatimozart]

The maths that we did differed slightly (in scenarios and numbers) but ended up with similar results. We identified that the number of escorts the ARE/ARG would need was probably greater than 1x DDG and 1-2x FFG and closer to 6 - 8 (that provides inner and outer escorts, weighted on threat axis), even up to 12 as a minimum for the full ARG (which may have 4 - 12 transport ships).** We also identified that any reasonable naval threat would have a better submarine capability than the IJN which, when combined with our greater reliance on imports than in 1940s, meant that convoying would likely be required and in turn probably use at least 4 MFU, all of a sudden our need goes up. Obviously those two Task Forces would not necessarily be simultaneous, but those two tasks chewed up hulls bloody quick at higher ends of conflict.

Even at lower ends of conflict, anything that spreads starts chewing hulls quickly. Anti-piracy in the West, medium-level (think Vietnam War level not against China) support in the East, supporting a rescue operation (or any other operation) in the Southern Ocean and all of a sudden the Fleet is over stretched; especially if unfriendly powers start supporting with materiel, intelligence or covert operations and it gets messy. Also note that some of these operations which may have been done by a single ship in the past (especially our Indian Ocean operations through 00's) may need to be done in pairs at least as the capability of the threat increases. If Hezbollah can have C-802s 15 years ago then who knows what can be supplied in 2025.

Regardless of the final decision(s) that may have been made, when, having done the maths, you have Army and RAAF peeps arguing for a massive increase to the FFG and DDG population (with the appropriate increases in all FIC), you know that it's serious.

** this came out later than our analysis, but provides some open source discussions on what an actual escort bill looks like for high value assets: Escorts

WRT the IJN sub fleet, I think it would've been a different story if the IJN had taken an approach similar to the Doenitz's U-Boat fleet, or that of the USN sub fleet. Those huge I Class subs were great but they could've been more aggressive and also had a larger fleet of smaller subs.

That Escorts article was a great read and his suggested escort group for a HVU - High Value Unit, was 38 DDGs, since he's USN. He notes that with the numbers of DDG-51s that the USN have at the moment, they can only form two escort groups. The HVU could be a CVN group, or convoy etc. He says that such a large number of escorts is required because in the modern world the axis threat is from any point, whereas during WW2 it was known because of the performance and range of the combat aircraft available at the time. They didn't have the fuel to spend circling around a HVU before attacking, which would also give the flak crews time to prepare a warm welcome. Today with cruise missiles the threat axis is around the whole compass. He notes that a ship will get 4 missiles off in time per engagement and no more, going on to say that "those ships with 1,000 VLS are a waste." What he suggests is a layered defence in 4 concentric rings with the furthest ring being 90nm from the HVA.


It's covering those sectors that are the issue and you need the ships to do it. Using those numbers it would take the current RAN, RCN, RN & RNZN combined just to form one escort group of their own. That's stunned mullet material.

 

[spoz]

That certainly doesn’t represent anything like the current doctrine, and seems to assume that the only defensive measures are surface combatants.

 

[Volkodav]

What we have now appears more akin to the old RN station ship / station squadron philosophy. This consisted of cruisers and sloops engaged in constabulary, trade protection, presence and flag showing / diplomacy.

Between the wars the RAN was predominantly a cruiser an sloop navy, they were or modern, capable ships. The destroyers were by comparison a second hand gap filler and training exercise. Submarines were, when actually part of the RAN, rarely more than a training capability, clockwork mice for ASW training.

 

[DDG38]

"HMA Ships Anzac and Stalwart have returned to their homeport of Fleet Base West following three-month Indo Pacific deployments. Anzac, one of five ships that visited 14 countries as part of Indo- Pacific Endeavour 2022, took part in a number of maritime exercises with regional partners and conducted seven international port visits, while Stalwart took part in a Regional Presence Deployment." Image Source : ADF Image Library

 

[MickB]

WRT the IJN sub fleet, I think it would've been a different story if the IJN had taken an approach similar to the Doenitz's U-Boat fleet, or that of the USN sub fleet. Those huge I Class subs were great but they could've been more aggressive and also had a larger fleet of smaller subs.

That Escorts article was a great read and his suggested escort group for a HVU - High Value Unit, was 38 DDGs, since he's USN. He notes that with the numbers of DDG-51s that the USN have at the moment, they can only form two escort groups. The HVU could be a CVN group, or convoy etc. He says that such a large number of escorts is required because in the modern world the axis threat is from any point, whereas during WW2 it was known because of the performance and range of the combat aircraft available at the time. They didn't have the fuel to spend circling around a HVU before attacking, which would also give the flak crews time to prepare a warm welcome. Today with cruise missiles the threat axis is around the whole compass. He notes that a ship will get 4 missiles off in time per engagement and no more, going on to say that "those ships with 1,000 VLS are a waste." What he suggests is a layered defence in 4 concentric rings with the furthest ring being 90nm from the HVA.

View attachment 49937
It's covering those sectors that are the issue and you need the ships to do it. Using those numbers it would take the current RAN, RCN, RN & RNZN combined just to form one escort group of their own. That's stunned mullet material.

Two quick thoughts, would not the outer ring be quickly swarmed under, operating without mutual support?

The 4th ring would be P8s and AWACs, the 3rd ring would be your CAP.

 

[Takao]

That certainly doesn’t represent anything like the current doctrine

Absolutely. It doesn't represent either RAN nor USN doctrine. But doctrine isn't 'the' answer, it's the best idea of what we do now. It should always be reviewed and modified if required.

In this case, it's looking at the threat and trying to defend against it, regardless of doctrine or availability. It may not be right, it 100% needs wargaming with current (and real) data but - I'd wager an escort for a ARG / CVBG looks closer to 60 ships than the 2 or 3 we think.

Two quick thoughts, would not the outer ring be quickly swarmed under, operating without mutual support?

The 4th ring would be P8s and AWACs, the 3rd ring would be your CAP.

seems to assume that the only defensive measures are surface combatants.

Unless you are escorting a CVBG, I think you have to assume the only anti-AShM capability is surface combatants. An SSN or two may help against SSGN/SSN...but when the missiles fly it's only the DDGs and FFGs that will stand. A CVBG may be able to throw up some F/A-18 or F-35 to hunt air-launched platforms or fulfil the outer ring - assuming an AIM-120 can catch an incoming missile, but the RAN cannot count on that.

As useful as E-7s and P-8s are (and if you are focusing on missile defence, the latter isn't unless it's after the moment hunting), I do not believe you can build them into a required escort. The reality is that the RAN will have to operate without RAAF support, in fact it's more likely to not have support than the other way. I'd be focusing on building escort doctrine as good as possible with DDG/FFG and then, if the range, weather and threat allows it, using P-8s and F-35s as nice to have force additions. Relying on a non-permanent capability is a quick ticket to losing.

 

[Lolcake]

Prudent military policy should plan against capacity more than intent.

If AUSMIN, AUKUS, the Quad, the Trilateral Security Dialogue with the US and Japan, the Five Eyes – and all the other acronyms we are part of – help us to acquire decisive capability and deterrence, then they are a very good thing.

If not, we may one day discover that you can’t defeat missiles with acronyms.

I pray we make the right decisions come March.

 

[ngatimozart]

Prudent military policy should plan against capacity more than intent.

If AUSMIN, AUKUS, the Quad, the Trilateral Security Dialogue with the US and Japan, the Five Eyes – and all the other acronyms we are part of – help us to acquire decisive capability and deterrence, then they are a very good thing.

If not, we may one day discover that you can’t defeat missiles with acronyms.

I pray we make the right decisions come March.

"Prudent military policy should plan against capacity more than intent."

Capacity? Using that logic then who do you plan against - US, PRC, Proletarian National Socialist Emu Peoples Republic? Does the US have harmful intent against Australia? Does the PRC have harmful intent against Australia? The Proletarian National Socialist Emu Peoples Republic may decide that they want to expand their borders and finish the Emu Wars once and for all. Prudent military would assess all geopolitical and geostrategic risks to the nation and plan accordingly. It has to be a holistic approach because there is far more to the art of warfare than just missiles.

 

[Dead Money]

@seaspear - absolutely not a dig at you...

But... anyone who still sees the $50 b / $80 b bill for SEA1000 as a 'gotcha' moment shows that they should not be considered for any further discussions on finance, let alone defence. The number is the same; one is in constant 2016 dollars; the other is in out-turned dollars (meaning, for those who don't know, inflation is taken into account).

This has been shown at a couple of Senate Estimates, and it stems from the Department (political and military sides) not being clear when publicly talking. There are reasons to use both, but generally speaking we use constant internally (so we can shift efforts across years as needed) and the Government (ie, every Department including Defence) uses outturned.

That's a great explanation on the difference between the constant vs out-turned figures.

However, I think the AG was right to give defence a rap on the knuckles and require some undertakings on this one;

See page 89-90 of the 2016 Integrated Investment Program. (Public Edition)

When Defence gives a figure for a program of >$50b in the summary table, and underneath that table, like all other summary decision tables in the document, is written "The figures in the table cover the acquisition element of the programs. There will be additional investment in whole-of-life sustainment and operating costs for each program. All figures are calculated on an out-turned price basis."

Defence mixing constant-year and out-turned estimates together into a single table, and then claiming that all figures in said table are 'out-turned' is not a "lack of clarity". It's either a mistake or a deliberate deception.

 

[MickB]

Absolutely. It doesn't represent either RAN nor USN doctrine. But doctrine isn't 'the' answer, it's the best idea of what we do now. It should always be reviewed and modified if required.

In this case, it's looking at the threat and trying to defend against it, regardless of doctrine or availability. It may not be right, it 100% needs wargaming with current (and real) data but - I'd wager an escort for a ARG / CVBG looks closer to 60 ships than the 2 or 3 we think.





Unless you are escorting a CVBG, I think you have to assume the only anti-AShM capability is surface combatants. An SSN or two may help against SSGN/SSN...but when the missiles fly it's only the DDGs and FFGs that will stand. A CVBG may be able to throw up some F/A-18 or F-35 to hunt air-launched platforms or fulfil the outer ring - assuming an AIM-120 can catch an incoming missile, but the RAN cannot count on that.

As useful as E-7s and P-8s are (and if you are focusing on missile defence, the latter isn't unless it's after the moment hunting), I do not believe you can build them into a required escort. The reality is that the RAN will have to operate without RAAF support, in fact it's more likely to not have support than the other way. I'd be focusing on building escort doctrine as good as possible with DDG/FFG and then, if the range, weather and threat allows it, using P-8s and F-35s as nice to have force additions. Relying on a non-permanent capability is a quick ticket to losing.

I was refering to to above model which clearly states 4th ring both ASW and early warning.
If that is not what the P8s and E7s are for what is?

I have read many times on this forum that it is RAAF doctrine that they can provide coverage to deployed RAN units.
Is this not correct? IF not how so?

Yes like many I would like to see a fast jet capabliity in the RAN but this is not an option right now.

All this also assumes that the RAN is operating alone without allies against a peer adversary, an unlikely event.

 

[ADMk2]

Prudent military policy should plan against capacity more than intent.

If AUSMIN, AUKUS, the Quad, the Trilateral Security Dialogue with the US and Japan, the Five Eyes – and all the other acronyms we are part of – help us to acquire decisive capability and deterrence, then they are a very good thing.

If not, we may one day discover that you can’t defeat missiles with acronyms.

I pray we make the right decisions come March.

Thanks Greg…

You can’t defeat missiles with half-baked ideas about the war you think you might have one day, either…

 

[DDG38]

"(L-R) Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy, Commodore Darron Kavanagh, Chief Platforms, Defence Science and Technology Group, Professor Emily Hilder and Senior Vice President Engineering, Anduril, Dr Shane Arnott stand with the ‘Dive-LD’ autonomous underwater vehicle at Anduril Australia’s Sydney Harbour base.
The stealthy extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle program (XL-AUV) being developed by Anduril Australia was named ‘Ghost Shark’ by Defence in a ceremony on Sydney Harbour today. The ceremony included the arrival of a 2.8 tonne ‘Dive-LD’ autonomous underwater vehicle at Anduril Australia’s Sydney Harbour base, which will be leveraged for rapid testing and development. The Dive-LD has arrived ahead of schedule in a major step forward in the $140M partnership between Royal Australian Navy, Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) and Anduril Australia to design, develop and manufacture three Ghost Shark XL-AUVs in Australia. The Ghost Shark program will deliver affordable, autonomous, long endurance and multimission capable submarines. They will be modular, customisable, and optimised with a variety of payloads for a wide range of missions. The 5.8m long Dive-LD will be used by Anduril Australia’s engineers as a testbed vehicle to enable experimentation, testing and validation as it develops the XL version, which will be the size of a school bus. The ambitious three-year Ghost Shark development program will involve capability assessment and prototyping in record time." Image Source : ADF Image Library

 

[Massive]

I'd wager an escort for a ARG / CVBG looks closer to 60 ships than the 2 or 3 we think.

I see this as a good thing in one way - as an island nation this reinforces just how hard amphibious operations are - ARG gives a reinforced battalion landing force.

On the other hand, as impressive as an ARG capability would be, is it realistic outside of semi-benign environments. That is, is it a real capability in the way it is envisioned to be?

Regards,

Massive

 

[Stampede]

I see this as a good thing in one way - as an island nation this reinforces just how hard amphibious operations are - ARG gives a reinforced battalion landing force.

On the other hand, as impressive as an ARG capability would be, is it realistic outside of semi-benign environments. That is, is it a real capability in the way it is envisioned to be?

Regards,

Massive

Probably one for the ADF thread, but with regard to the amphibious stuff it would be prudent to be realistic and work with what we have!

That is only one LHD.

HMAS Choules has its attributes, but with the ability to carry only one landing craft and a couple of slow mexeflotes plus a limited aviation capacity it is realistically limited to a support role as was the intent of its design. Would have this solo class of vessel as a bonus only if available

Availability with only three vessels will always be problematic.

Which leaves us with two LHD's which on a good day permits one to be available for service

Lets work with that scenario.

Suggest Army concentrates on what it can fit within one LHD and to be fair, acknowledge that the large Hanger / light vehicle space will realistically be aviation centric in a real world operation, thus restricting their vehicle load to predominantly the heavy vehicle / well dock area.

This may sound a bit pessimistic but I feel anything else is a bit lets pretend!

Down the track we will hopefully get replacement / additional small / medium and larger range of amphibious craft / boats / ships to compliment our amphibious needs.


Cheers S

 

[Massive]

Suggest Army concentrates on what it can fit within one LHD and to be fair, acknowledge that the large Hanger / light vehicle space will realistically be aviation centric in a real world operation, thus restricting their vehicle load to predominantly the heavy vehicle / well dock area.

This may sound a bit pessimistic but I feel anything else is a bit lets pretend!

I'm completely OK with this - effectively a raiding/shaping force.

Regards,

Massive

 

[seaspear]

"(L-R) Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy, Commodore Darron Kavanagh, Chief Platforms, Defence Science and Technology Group, Professor Emily Hilder and Senior Vice President Engineering, Anduril, Dr Shane Arnott stand with the ‘Dive-LD’ autonomous underwater vehicle at Anduril Australia’s Sydney Harbour base.
The stealthy extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle program (XL-AUV) being developed by Anduril Australia was named ‘Ghost Shark’ by Defence in a ceremony on Sydney Harbour today. The ceremony included the arrival of a 2.8 tonne ‘Dive-LD’ autonomous underwater vehicle at Anduril Australia’s Sydney Harbour base, which will be leveraged for rapid testing and development. The Dive-LD has arrived ahead of schedule in a major step forward in the $140M partnership between Royal Australian Navy, Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) and Anduril Australia to design, develop and manufacture three Ghost Shark XL-AUVs in Australia. The Ghost Shark program will deliver affordable, autonomous, long endurance and multimission capable submarines. They will be modular, customisable, and optimised with a variety of payloads for a wide range of missions. The 5.8m long Dive-LD will be used by Anduril Australia’s engineers as a testbed vehicle to enable experimentation, testing and validation as it develops the XL version, which will be the size of a school bus. The ambitious three-year Ghost Shark development program will involve capability assessment and prototyping in record time." Image Source : ADF Image Library
View attachment 49947

There was also a very low grade movie called Ghost shark
Ghost Shark (TV Movie 2013) - IMDb

 

[hauritz]

More on the Ghost Shark. Delivered 3 months early which kind of nicely fits in with the timing of the Defence Review.

First Anduril prototype 'Ghost Shark' drone sub delivered to Aussies 3 months early - Breaking Defense

"Due to its modular and multi-role nature, our adversaries will need to assume that their every move in the maritime domain is subject to our surveillance and that every [sub drone] is capable of deploying a wide range of effects, including lethal ones," says Rear Adm. Peter Quinn.

breakingdefense.com

Interestingly Admiral Peter Quinn suggested the larger, school bus sized system may carry weapons. These vessels could also be given new missions remotely. A nasty combo when you think about it.

 

[alexsa]

More on the Ghost Shark. Delivered 3 months early which kind of nicely fits in with the timing of the Defence Review.

First Anduril prototype 'Ghost Shark' drone sub delivered to Aussies 3 months early - Breaking Defense

"Due to its modular and multi-role nature, our adversaries will need to assume that their every move in the maritime domain is subject to our surveillance and that every [sub drone] is capable of deploying a wide range of effects, including lethal ones," says Rear Adm. Peter Quinn.

breakingdefense.com

Interestingly Admiral Peter Quinn suggested the larger, school bus sized system may carry weapons. These vessels could also be given new missions remotely. A nasty combo when you think about it.

It actually says 'warheads'

On top of showing off the prototype, to be used for testing and concept definition, Rear Adm. Peter Quinn made clear the still-to-come larger, schoolbus-sized system may carry warheads.

He then goes on to desribe the entire unit as a potential weapon

One of the key differences from a traditional manned sub is that most of this weapon can be flooded, with sensors and weapons encased in pressure sanctuaries, instead of the entire hull being primarily designed to protect the fragile humans inside.

The article indicates that this system may be used in a number of roles and could be 'controlled' from a number of domains. Essentially this system would have the potential to conduct recon (including very deep water recon), collect data or be tasked with a specific weaponised mission. It does not suggest the unit will 'carry weapons'.

With a 10 day slow speed endurance I expect this unit would be carried to its area of operation.

 

[hauritz]

To be honest I thought “warhead” was the author’s interpretation. I think the admiral said lethal effect which suggests a range of options. I know the USN is talking about using these sort of vessels as minelayers for example.

 

[seaspear]

At an ability to operate at a six thousand metre depth may bring up some interesting capabilities e.g checking on undersea cables, this article suggests that Russia has some sophisticated capabilities in this
5 Ways The Russian Navy Could Target Undersea Internet Cables - Naval News