Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Armchair

Well-Known Member
One does however start to scratch ones head and wonder why we need MASS launchers when as previously shown, there is nothing to fight on the way to this un-opposed landing we imagine will occur anyway, yet one landing that of course still requires M1A2 Abrams, Boxer CRV and UAS operations nonetheless…
just addressing the naval part of the quandary in this thread. If the anticipated threat is from shore and submarine launched anti ship cruise missiles then some (e.g. MASS launchers and not bothering about a bigger gun on Arafura), but not all, decisions might make more sense.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
just addressing the naval part of the quandary in this thread. If the anticipated threat is from shore and submarine launched anti ship cruise missiles then some (e.g. MASS launchers and not bothering about a bigger gun on Arafura), but not all, decisions might make more sense.
I appreciate that Navy has a thing called a budget but one senses were evolving a culture of unreality in parts of the ADF
Neat and nice doctrine confirming to scenarios that let’s face it reflect budget not real world circumstances.

Mike Tyson is quoted as saying everyone has a plan until you get punched in the face.

When a fleet unit has to actually need a MASS launcher in a real world scenario then we truly live in dangerous times
Not just for that unit involved but everything else painted grey as well.
Be it at sea or in harbour nowhere is safe in active conflict.

It’s not let’s pretend any more!

That said it’s not about placing a 16 inch gun on a Cape with a F35b on the backend but it is about utilising what we have the best we can.

As mentioned before,that planned mega future fleet is many,many years away.

Let’s do justice to our current fleet today.
It’s not that big and it’s not too difficult

Cheers S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I simply LOVE the concept whereby 6x ADF vessels need to land infantry and Cav, armed to the teeth with small arms, 30mm direct fire weapons all the way up to 120mm tank systems, supported by UAS, but not a single one of these vessels is actually armed with anything…

The same concept whereby a single USMC ACV 30 has more direct fire capability than does our entire LMV, OPV and Amphibious fleets and indirect fires in this environment beyond a single 127mm gun is an absolute heresy…

Planning for defence must be extremely easy when all you have to envisage is sending light and heavy armour, aviation and infantry over the beach against - well? Nothing at all, apparently…

You need a RAN vessel off-shore with 1x 127mm gun, heavy armour, heavy direct fire weapons and lots of infantry to attack nothing but empty land, but there is absolutely nothing to fight against, nor anything even to defend one self against, on the way there for most of that fleet.

I wonder if the same sort of imagination was employed with the decision to buy 1600t vessels for the RAN and arm them with, well, nothing much at all, apparently… (They like the rest of ADF won’t ever get involved in a real shooting war I guess….)

To buy $3b Landing Helicopter Docks and protect them with, well, nothing much at all, apparently…

To send forces overseas, subject to actual ballistic missile attacks and protect them with? Well, nothing much at all, apparently…

To buy the Rheinmetall MASS decoy system because our fleet is desperately short of self defence measures, but only fit it to 1/3rd of the fleet, but not to ANY of those landing craft, obviously…

One does however start to scratch ones head and wonder why we need MASS launchers when as previously shown, there is nothing to fight on the way to this un-opposed landing we imagine will occur anyway, yet one landing that of course still requires M1A2 Abrams, Boxer CRV and UAS operations nonetheless…

Given all the above, one does start to wonder if the “boffins” in Russell spend as much time on force protection, as they clearly do on calisthenics, especially given the amount of “force” we actually have to protect…
The problem in a word, well two words, is "Swim lanes".

I don't think it's a defence specific thing, I suspect it's an MBA thing, project management versus project engineering, tactics versus strategy, micro versus macro.

This is your swim lane, don't leave your lane, don't worry about what's happening in the other lanes.

Then you apply the next level, forward defence by non expeditionary, expeditionary forces, that will always be operating as part of a coalition with a powerful friend.

That way you can assume other lanes are actually occupied by friends and allies, so we don't need to worry about them.

Kym Beazley covered this in a podcast on Dence connect a couple of years ago.

He bemoaned that there was no over arching strategy not the willingness to properly fund what would be required under one.

A very good point he made was the ADF, apart from some token high-end and niche capabilities had been recast as an expeditionary and constabulary force, i.e. policing our EEZ and borders while sustaining a deployed force outside of our region.

This is why we have LHDs and C-17s, infantry mobility vehicles but no genuine armoured brigades. It was all about being seen to support our allies and protect our borders.

The rest of it, the undefended army amphibious fleet is pretty much copying the USMC and US Army logistics concepts. Someone else will protect the force in transit and the enemy will allow us to off load them in peace because someone else will protect the port or beach head.

The USMC concept does my head in to be honest. Big amphibs are too vulnerable so we will deploy small unarmed amphibs instead. I think they missed the memo on what a force HALE UCAVs would do to such a fleet, using tech from over a decade ago.

Step one, look at the geography, that gives us numbers.
Step two, look at the threat level, that gives us the minimum viable capability.
 
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