Sounds good to me.
In terms of what we could actually do that we’re not already to meaningfully increase capability quickly that wouldn’t be wasteful in the medium to long term I think it would be hard to go past more P-8s and MRTT as Stampede says.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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In terms of what we could actually do that we’re not already to meaningfully increase capability quickly that wouldn’t be wasteful in the medium to long term I think it would be hard to go past more P-8s and MRTT as Stampede says.
When looking for solutions to the navy’s woes it is easy to forget that the P8 is in fact a naval aircraft specifically designed to perform a whole range of naval roles. Its primary operator is of course the US navy. If you want a quick solution to plugging holes in the navy’s capabilities and the choice came down to lightly armed corvettes or additional P8s I would probably lean towards the latter.
Aircraft are of course no long term replacement for warships but it might work as a stopgap solution until a class of larger more capable ships can be built.
Aircraft are of course no long term replacement for warships but it might work as a stopgap solution until a class of larger more capable ships can be built.
My thoughts exactly.
The fact that it can also do double duty as a medium bomber doesn’t hurt either.
I like the idea but This was discussed at length around 12 months ago when it was confirmed LRASM was going to be integrated into P8 and the pros decided we had enough P8s. reasons I can’t exactly recall but think it was to do with any prospective opponent having a CAP. To me it makes sense as I imagine a P8 could be delivered a bit faster than a DDG and gives range out to deliver LRASM.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
From what I recall of the issue with getting more P-8's, the question was more about what else could be done with the funding rather than getting more Poseidons, At this point though, it is uncertain what/where Australia is believed to face threats from as well as what nature of threats. Similarly, the DSR has left uncertainty over what will and should be funded.
From my POV, particularly with the notion that Australia can pursue an A2AD strategy (given targeting issues) getting more assets which can be used for target detection and identification would be a good thing. Particularly since some of these assets can also be used as launch platforms for ordnance.
Added to that objection.
Let’s assume the missions are 1. escorting small amphibs, 2. escorting resupply vessels, 3. contributing to a taskforce screen (being an additional shooter) and 4. supplementing ASW patrols 5. Other naval warfare tasks (drop off recover SF, deploy and recover air and sea drones)
The extra MPA can only do 3 and 4 of that list (and other things a ship can’t do obviously). It is unprotected against enemy fighters. It needs to return to a base that itself needs to be protected after every mission on every day.
If the threat is another MPA or a bomber P8 offers next to nothing.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Yet another ASPI report on the future of the navy. This one seemed reasonable to me. It tried to set out Australia’s maritime context and need for numbers of long range ships, then discussed what those ships should be.
It made the case for a larger number of major surface warships (16 to 20 instead of 12). Given the uncertain future it argued a strong preference for general purpose ships rather than specialist ASW like the Hunter. it recommended cutting Hunters from 9 to 6 and then building a GP successor. The report considered it was too late to change from Hunter to a different build immediately.
It regarded the Hobart as more like a general purpose frigate than a true AWD (agreed). It also pointed out the lack of clarity in “tier one/tier two” definitions and suggested whatever we build should be capable of self defence. Hence OPVs needed to be better armed or replaced by a corvette/light frigate and handed over to a constabulary role, which was all they were designed for.
I’m curious about the views of others; this one made sense to my layman’s level of knowledge.
www.aspistrategist.org.au
It made the case for a larger number of major surface warships (16 to 20 instead of 12). Given the uncertain future it argued a strong preference for general purpose ships rather than specialist ASW like the Hunter. it recommended cutting Hunters from 9 to 6 and then building a GP successor. The report considered it was too late to change from Hunter to a different build immediately.
It regarded the Hobart as more like a general purpose frigate than a true AWD (agreed). It also pointed out the lack of clarity in “tier one/tier two” definitions and suggested whatever we build should be capable of self defence. Hence OPVs needed to be better armed or replaced by a corvette/light frigate and handed over to a constabulary role, which was all they were designed for.
I’m curious about the views of others; this one made sense to my layman’s level of knowledge.
An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN | The Strategist
As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of ...
www.aspistrategist.org.au
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy (amazonaws.com)Yet another ASPI report on the future of the navy. This one seemed reasonable to me. It tried to set out Australia’s maritime context and need for numbers of long range ships, then discussed what those ships should be.
It made the case for a larger number of major surface warships (16 to 20 instead of 12). Given the uncertain future it argued a strong preference for general purpose ships rather than specialist ASW like the Hunter. it recommended cutting Hunters from 9 to 6 and then building a GP successor. The report considered it was too late to change from Hunter to a different build immediately.
It regarded the Hobart as more like a general purpose frigate than a true AWD (agreed). It also pointed out the lack of clarity in “tier one/tier two” definitions and suggested whatever we build should be capable of self defence. Hence OPVs needed to be better armed or replaced by a corvette/light frigate and handed over to a constabulary role, which was all they were designed for.
I’m curious about the views of others; this one made sense to my layman’s level of knowledge.
An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN | The Strategist
As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of ...
That is actually an article on a far more detailed report the Author done, available in pdf form.
One thing that struck me was the idea of a 10 year warning time of a conflict in our region. What a dumb notion that really was. Even if we had a ten year warning time it wouldn’t be enough time anyway. Back in 2009 we got our less than ten year alarm bell when the Rudd government issued its Defence White paper.Yet another ASPI report on the future of the navy. This one seemed reasonable to me. It tried to set out Australia’s maritime context and need for numbers of long range ships, then discussed what those ships should be.
It made the case for a larger number of major surface warships (16 to 20 instead of 12). Given the uncertain future it argued a strong preference for general purpose ships rather than specialist ASW like the Hunter. it recommended cutting Hunters from 9 to 6 and then building a GP successor. The report considered it was too late to change from Hunter to a different build immediately.
It regarded the Hobart as more like a general purpose frigate than a true AWD (agreed). It also pointed out the lack of clarity in “tier one/tier two” definitions and suggested whatever we build should be capable of self defence. Hence OPVs needed to be better armed or replaced by a corvette/light frigate and handed over to a constabulary role, which was all they were designed for.
I’m curious about the views of others; this one made sense to my layman’s level of knowledge.
An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN | The Strategist
As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of ...
That was 14 years ago and counting. Realistically we won’t see the recommendations of that White Paper enacted for another decade.
In other words the ten years warning time is almost meaningless in the context of building a navy ready for war.
This article is being used as evidence to cut hunter.Yet another ASPI report on the future of the navy. This one seemed reasonable to me. It tried to set out Australia’s maritime context and need for numbers of long range ships, then discussed what those ships should be.
It made the case for a larger number of major surface warships (16 to 20 instead of 12). Given the uncertain future it argued a strong preference for general purpose ships rather than specialist ASW like the Hunter. it recommended cutting Hunters from 9 to 6 and then building a GP successor. The report considered it was too late to change from Hunter to a different build immediately.
It regarded the Hobart as more like a general purpose frigate than a true AWD (agreed). It also pointed out the lack of clarity in “tier one/tier two” definitions and suggested whatever we build should be capable of self defence. Hence OPVs needed to be better armed or replaced by a corvette/light frigate and handed over to a constabulary role, which was all they were designed for.
I’m curious about the views of others; this one made sense to my layman’s level of knowledge.
An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN | The Strategist
As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of ...
Australia urged to cut back $45bn Hunter-class frigate project as part of ‘bold revamp’ (msn.com)
But I also believe much of what is in this document will be or is in the DSR. We know the Americans are recommending more surface combat capability.
I believe this is what BAE was shooting at with their story about Hunter possibly have 96 VLS.
I get the argument that the Hunter as now spec is very ASW focused. However, there is the ability that it could also meet a more demanding surface combat/air defence capability. I think Hunter with a single MH60R and 96 VLS is something we should consider before throwing everything out.
I think up arming the Arafurua with NSM and C Dome is stupid. Trying to use a non-integrated air defence missile at sea and hoping that Arafurua with its punny sensors and no hangar can target NSM at any reasonable ranges to get first shot is dangerous thinking. It is not crew, dollars, risk, ship yard and platform efficient. CDome is fine for home made Hamas missiles, not peer threats from China. It is again another system the RAN doesn't have, from a supplier we don't usually buy marine systems from. Cdome isn't as capable as ESSM.
I still think 6 MMPV90 with 16vls 4x16 ESSM, 57-76mm gun, a ~30mm rws and 4-6 x NSM with a proper combat radar, a hangar, would be far more capable. It would be cheaper, faster, better, with less risk. It would be useful.
We still need more than 12 major surface combatants. We should be budgeting for 14.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Redlands yes true the article only refers to the report. I did read (most of) the report this morning and a lot of my comments are based more on the report than the article. The report link is below.
Personally I’d like to see a cut to just 5 ASW focused Hunters followed by 5 AWD Hunters or Type 83s. In the 2030s we will have 7-8 subs, (3 Virginias and 4-5 Collins). Likely a significant number of USVs and UUVs plus a giant up tick in underwater surveillance systems.
5 ASW, 5 AWD + 10 GPF gives you the 20 major surface combatants Jennifer Parker suggested.
equivalent cost and crewing to a 6-6-6 split.
5 ASW, 5 AWD + 10 GPF gives you the 20 major surface combatants Jennifer Parker suggested.
equivalent cost and crewing to a 6-6-6 split.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
TBH those type numbers sounds rather... poor. IIRC five vessels in service should provide one available at any given moment either on a deployment or available for deployment, with the potential to surge one or two more. I would rather a bit more in terms of both the Hunter-class FFG for ASW ops as well as whatever would become the replacement for the Hobart-class DDF for air defence, and a reduced number of GP frigates which I suspect would be of greater capability than the current ANZAC-class frigates, but less than either dedicated ASW frigates or air defence destroyers in their respective specialties.
An obvious question is when would the RAN be able to have such a fleet built, as well as have the crew to operate so many vessels?
Also, I doubt that the Type 83 would be ready in time for the RAN to select that design as a replacement for the Hobart-class DDG's if the Hunter-class build is in fact cut back to only six instead of the originally planned nine vessels. IIRC the RN has started the planning for the Type 83, to replace the Type 45/Daring-class DDG's in the late 2030's. If the RAN replacement destroyer design is to start building once the reduced Hunter-class build is completed, then construction would likely start ~2036-ish. Additionally, if GP frigates were to be built, who would build them and where? Osborne/ASC is likely to be occupied with either the Hunter-class, or the replacement destroyers. Pretty much the only reason why ASC might have spare space & capacity is if someone, likely in gov't seriously dropped the ball so that the replacement destroyer programme was not ready to immediately follow the end of the SEA 5000 build. If that were to happen, then perhaps keel-hauling might need to be brought back.
It depends on how ambitious the spec is.
If we just want a more VLS and the current combat system, propulsion, power and mech services are up to it, then it might be a minor modification, within the weight and scope of the current design. Perhaps no slow down or cost penalty.
If we start specing longer endurance, higher speeds, bigger radar etc, then that could be a complete redesign maybe a complete retender. Decades and billions. Plus break of contract.
Honestly for Australia speed isn't a huge issue. We aren't in hot contested space, we have lots of depth, and our biggest issue is range, which usually implies a speed more like 20kts. I don't know why we would ditch Aegis + 9LV. And Ceafar looks already to be at the very high end. For the UK a Type 83 they may need speed, they may care less about radar height as they have carriers. I'm not sure UK and AU destroyer specs are that much alike.
It may come down to the power and cooling avalible on the Hunter if it can growth support more high tech systems.
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I would kind of figure that the replacement destroyer would require a bit more than minor modifications to the Hunter-class frigate design to really be suitable. For one, the destroyer is unlikely to have the same ASW requirements since the likely primary role would be air defence with a possible secondary role of strike. This would likely mean that at least some of the noise reduction efforts for the frigate, like rafting and machinery isolation, which as I understand it add to the complexity and cost of the build, would be unnecessary. This would then likely mean some rearrangement of machinery spaces, before any consideration would be applied to possible needs like increasing gensets and/or gen capacity, more/extra space for computing power and enlarged areas for the CMS, the ability to meet increased cooling demands, or feature in improvements for sensors. Once must remember that the replacement destroyer would like first enter RAN service some time in the later half of next decade (i.e. 2036-2039) with the class likely serving at least into the 2060's.
The Hunter-class hull might be suitable, but the fittings would likely be a bit different, and I would expect the superstructure to also be different. In some respects, it might be similar to how the USN had the hull design of the Spruance-class DDG serve as the base for both the Kidd-class DDG and the Ticonderoga-class CG.
My opinion here, but if the RAN and gov't are smart, there would be a re-tender so that the replacement destroyer, when it gets ordered, gets a decent number actually ordered so that multiple vessels could be either available for deployment, or operational on concurrent deployments. Going with another three vessel class build is likely to leave periods where insufficient air defence vessels are available.
This talk of 16 - 20 MFUs is not about going down to the local used warship yard and buying them because we have a sudden, unexpected requirement. It is about recognising that we have needed them as a bare minimum for several decades and that they are the same numbers put forward under Fraser in the late 60s and again by Beazley in the late 80s are still correct and that we need to build up to them.
In fact the numbers when Frazer was DefMin was 23 destroyers and frigates, an increase to three carriers and eight submarines, with possibly 4 of them being SSNs.
To make this happen it needs to be policy asap, then as the first two batches of Hunters are building, get the selection and design of what's next done.
In fact the numbers when Frazer was DefMin was 23 destroyers and frigates, an increase to three carriers and eight submarines, with possibly 4 of them being SSNs.
To make this happen it needs to be policy asap, then as the first two batches of Hunters are building, get the selection and design of what's next done.
Well again depends on the timeframe, threat and ambition.
It is likely that by 2040 the standard missile will be twice the size/weight of the SM-6. That radar will be perhaps one or two orders of magnitude more powerful, and direct energy weapons will be a real thing, and AI will likely form part of the combat system to merge data from multiple sensors from multiple platforms as well as the ability to launch/retrieve multiple armed drones.
I think we will still end up with BAE building 9 ships based off the Type 26 hull. But I imagine the later ones may be ~175m long and nearly 50% larger displacement.
Will probably need 2x MT30, 4-6 large diesels, There might also be a proliferation of larger caliber guns. I think requirements for noise isolation will go up as will some degree of reduced radar/IR signature.
But this is all high risk. We will have to batch ourselves there.
I doubt a Hunter DDG will be able to support most of the new gizmos being developed. Lasers and Hypersonics i cannot see being integrated onto the Hunter Hull. Timeline also does not add up, 3 Hunter ddgs built post Hunter ASW would they not be pretty much obsolete with the equipment required for new systems?. Power generation and storage alone…
Speculating but I think it’ll go down like this…
2024-2032 Spain potentially building more Hobart class, not disrupting either the Arafura or Hunter programs.
2032 (Hunter 1)
2034 (Hunter 2) (1st U.K Type 83 build begins around this time)
2036 (Hunter 3)
2038 (Hunter 4) (1st U.K Type 83 in service)
2040 (Hunter 5) (1st AUS Type 83 build begins around this time)
2042 (Hunter 6?)
2044 (1st AUS Type 83 in service) (Hobart decommissioned around this time)
2047 (T83-2)… (Brisbane decommissioned around this time)
2050 (T83-3)… (Sydney decommissioned around this time)
2053 (T83-4)… (Hobart 4 decommissioned around this time)
2056 (T83-5)… (Hobart 5 decommissioned around this time)
2059 (T83-6?)… (Hobart 6 decommissioned around this time)
2062 (Hunter replacement in service)
Speculating but I think it’ll go down like this…
2024-2032 Spain potentially building more Hobart class, not disrupting either the Arafura or Hunter programs.
2032 (Hunter 1)
2034 (Hunter 2) (1st U.K Type 83 build begins around this time)
2036 (Hunter 3)
2038 (Hunter 4) (1st U.K Type 83 in service)
2040 (Hunter 5) (1st AUS Type 83 build begins around this time)
2042 (Hunter 6?)
2044 (1st AUS Type 83 in service) (Hobart decommissioned around this time)
2047 (T83-2)… (Brisbane decommissioned around this time)
2050 (T83-3)… (Sydney decommissioned around this time)
2053 (T83-4)… (Hobart 4 decommissioned around this time)
2056 (T83-5)… (Hobart 5 decommissioned around this time)
2059 (T83-6?)… (Hobart 6 decommissioned around this time)
2062 (Hunter replacement in service)
I HIGHLY doubt they will have Spain produce more Hobart class and even if they did I doubt you would get one before the first Hunter class in the early 30s.
If you want more larger ships like Hobart/Hunter the best solution would be to simply speed up the drumbeat. The shipyard has been stated to be at its most efficient with a continuous build of 16 ships (compared to the aim of 12 at the moment) so this is the most likely number. As well as every review thats ever happened since federation recommending ~16 ships this would make sense. Hunter is a large ship with growth margin built in so I'm not sure why they wouldn't be able to support additional capability and even if they can't you are talking nearly 20 years before you have to start the new build so there is time to run a competition/design program.
If the review states that we need more hulls quicker alongside the introduction of Hunter my prediction is a tier 2 general purpose frigate like the Type 31 which I believe there is space to build at Henderson. This would be on top of the Arafura's and minor warfare vessels as those vessels are still required. The constabulary role the Arafura's have in mind has not gone away and the RAN will still need a vessel to do these roles.
Even IF you could build all these additional ships that still means defence has to find a way to both pay for them (this would have to be new money) and crew them.
Ok so if it’s 16-20 ships what would it be..Yet another ASPI report on the future of the navy. This one seemed reasonable to me. It tried to set out Australia’s maritime context and need for numbers of long range ships, then discussed what those ships should be.
It made the case for a larger number of major surface warships (16 to 20 instead of 12). Given the uncertain future it argued a strong preference for general purpose ships rather than specialist ASW like the Hunter. it recommended cutting Hunters from 9 to 6 and then building a GP successor. The report considered it was too late to change from Hunter to a different build immediately.
It regarded the Hobart as more like a general purpose frigate than a true AWD (agreed). It also pointed out the lack of clarity in “tier one/tier two” definitions and suggested whatever we build should be capable of self defence. Hence OPVs needed to be better armed or replaced by a corvette/light frigate and handed over to a constabulary role, which was all they were designed for.
I’m curious about the views of others; this one made sense to my layman’s level of knowledge.
An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN | The Strategist
As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of ...
6 Hunters
3 Hobarts
3 AWD hunters
what else?