Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[seaspear]

Since the AUKUS and Virginias to be acquired by the RAN will have vls tubes ,this may possibly lead into hypersonic missiles for these RAN submarines irrespective of VPM , this may alleviate some of the disparity in anti ship missiles from surface platforms
Britain's New Attack Submarine To Be First With VLS - Naval News

 

[John Fedup]

Will future hypersonic missiles have the same diameter? I assume the missile modules could be adapted for larger diameter missiles albeit with some reduction in numbers.

 

[Going Boeing]

Will future hypersonic missiles have the same diameter? I assume the missile modules could be adapted for larger diameter missiles albeit with some reduction in numbers.

I recall one article that indicated there would be 3 hypersonic missiles in each 87” diameter payload tube instead of 7 Tomahawks.

Conventional Prompt Strike: The US Navy’s Hypersonic Weapons Programme

 

[buffy9]

While most Australians would welcome the increased deterrent effect of VPM equipped submarines, our politicians probably would not want to upset our neighbours who may be concerned about the significant increase in firepower.

I think this is true to the extent that Australia will be able to generate larger precision strike packages, though it also fits with what we are openly saying we need. It seems strange to pursue enhanced long-range strike, a GWEO Enterprise and some 220 TLAMs* and then say "no we don't want the capability to launch them togethed in large numbers." So much as ASEAN countries understand our desire for long-range weapons, they would understand our desire for launch platforms.

Still I'd say the cost would be prohibitive when the sovereign SSN-AUKUS is the main effort, while the USN is likely to emphasise any VPM-equipped SSNs in order to maintain its own VLS count as the Ohio-class SSGN are retired.

* I'm aware they are the surfaced-launched RGM variant, though if we aren't able to buy/build more we should seek to renegotiate a portion to the UGM variant for delivery in the 2030s for the Virginia VLS.

 

[hauritz]

The first Block 5 Virginia is being built without the VPM (all the subsequent ones will have it) so no modification would be required, they already have the design.

The VPM is estimated to add US$5-600 million per boat so it’s a large increase in price.

While most Australians would welcome the increased deterrent effect of VPM equipped submarines, our politicians probably would not want to upset our neighbours who may be concerned about the significant increase in firepower.

Not so sure I would rule out the VPN. We are talking about the 2030s and beyond. Australia’s strategic situation will probably become even more dire then as the Chinese navy and influence in our region continues to grow.

Also an extra $500-$600 million sounds like a bargain given that you are more than doubling the missile loadout of the base line Virginia.

As for offending our neighbours, we may be moving into even more unpredictable times as India and Indonesia look set to become the third and fourth most powerful economies in the world. We could end up being the small kid on the block as the US, China, Indonesia, India and perhaps even a reinvigorated Japan are all pushing to establish themselves in our region.

We are moving into interesting times.

 

[StingrayOZ]

The VPM is more than just Tlam launch, its drones, its special forces, its future capabilities. 40 TLAM is however, a turnkey weapon capability.

It is a lot of capability. It also doesn't require any extra crewing, or much to maintain, just a one off acquisition cost. I guess the question comes down to do we need that capability in our region and separately from the US. Ultimately it may be the US's decision depending on what they want, what they are building and what they see us needing.

 

[Todjaeger]

The current plan is for 3 batches of 3 ships. The current design work being done is for Batch 1 only (Hunter, Tasman, Flinders) and the ordering will be done for those 3 ships only. Once the design is finished and construction is underway (due 2023-24, then design work will begin on improvements for Batch 2, which may include stuff not currently available, or not currently considered, with ship 4 laid down around 29-30, Batch 3 will be a repeat, with further improvements. Why on Earth would you be ordering anything for a ship you are not going to build for another 14 or so years?

Actually if one were to look back into history, specifically the history of the Hobart-class DDG build, then one would foresee some of the dangers in placing orders for kit too far in advance. IIRC Australia spent a significant amount of coin back in 2005 pre-ordering parts for the Aegis systems and SPY arrays for all three vessels. Again going from memory, the ordered parts were delivered well before the parts were needed for installation aboard the lead ship, never mind the other two. One of the results of this is that warranties for some of the parts lapsed or expired well before their installation.

The review will be less than 6 months. It will be due out at the end of Q3 this year which is basically three months.

For that reason I am not expecting any big decisions beyond what has already been foreshadowed in the DSR.

The DSR has recommended regular reviews be conducted every two years so really there is no rush to make any decisions on the future of the Hunter program.

The things I think will be dealt with initially will be littoral vessels, more capable minor combatants to perhaps replace the Arafura build, improving the capability of our existing fleet and accelerating other existing programs as much as possible.

I think realistically there is only so much that can be done in a 5 to 10 year timeframe.

Conducting, or attempting to conduct a review every two years or so is something I would be concerned about growing into an irrelevant and unduly burdensome effort. How comprehensive could a bi-annual review really be, and also how much impact could there be in projects?

As a practical matter, most major acquisition and/or upgrade programmes are lengthy, multi-year efforts. For some of the really significant programmes, it can be over a decade between when the idea first is raised as a possibility, and when first steel gets cut. Again looking at the Hobart-class, initial planning started circa ~2000, with SEA 4000 being assigned as the project number in 2003, whilst the lead ship was not laid down until Sept. 2012.

Given that such timelines on major projects are so long, I suspect that attempting to change existing plans to accommodate changed perceptions in two year cycles are not going to be capable of major improvements.

 

[Redlands18]

Actually if one were to look back into history, specifically the history of the Hobart-class DDG build, then one would foresee some of the dangers in placing orders for kit too far in advance. IIRC Australia spent a significant amount of coin back in 2005 pre-ordering parts for the Aegis systems and SPY arrays for all three vessels. Again going from memory, the ordered parts were delivered well before the parts were needed for installation aboard the lead ship, never mind the other two. One of the results of this is that warranties for some of the parts lapsed or expired well before their installation.



Conducting, or attempting to conduct a review every two years or so is something I would be concerned about growing into an irrelevant and unduly burdensome effort. How comprehensive could a bi-annual review really be, and also how much impact could there be in projects?

As a practical matter, most major acquisition and/or upgrade programmes are lengthy, multi-year efforts. For some of the really significant programmes, it can be over a decade between when the idea first is raised as a possibility, and when first steel gets cut. Again looking at the Hobart-class, initial planning started circa ~2000, with SEA 4000 being assigned as the project number in 2003, whilst the lead ship was not laid down until Sept. 2012.

Given that such timelines on major projects are so long, I suspect that attempting to change existing plans to accommodate changed perceptions in two year cycles are not going to be capable of major improvements.

We don't have to go far to see how long it takes the RAN to procure a class of 8 Surface combatants +2 for the RNZN. The Anzac class acquisition comes as a result of the 1987 Dibb Report, it took 6 years to get to the stage where construction started on Anzac and another 13 years until Perth was the last of 10 ships built. So basically 20+ years from identifying what is required to full FOC on a class of 6-8 ships, and that is a minimum of 7 election cycles the project has to survive.

 

[hauritz]

We don't have to go far to see how long it takes the RAN to procure a class of 8 Surface combatants +2 for the RNZN. The Anzac class acquisition comes as a result of the 1987 Dibb Report, it took 6 years to get to the stage where construction started on Anzac and another 13 years until Perth was the last of 10 ships built. So basically 20+ years from identifying what is required to full FOC on a class of 6-8 ships, and that is a minimum of 7 election cycles the project has to survive.

You just have to go back to the 2009 Rudd Defence White paper that recommended new frigates, submarines and OCVs. Fourteen years later and we are yet to see even one of them enter service. The frigates and submarines are in fact still another decade away.

 

[John Newman]

You just have to go back to the 2009 Rudd Defence White paper that recommended new frigates, submarines and OCVs. Fourteen years later and we are yet to see even one of them enter service. The frigates and submarines are in fact still another decade away.

It always gives me a chuckle when someone refers back to the 2009 Rudd DWP as if it was God handing down the 10 Commandments to Moses.

It’s as if some people believe the 2009 DWP was a document set in stone, and the clock was supposed to start ticking from the day it was published, but it wasn’t, was it?

The 2009 Rudd DWP may well have ‘recommended’ 8 x Frigates (‘Future’ Frigates in fact), 12 x Submarines and 20 x OCVs, but not one was actually ordered, not one, true?

Roll the clock forward to the 2013 Gillard DWP, and still not one ship, or sub, from the 2009 Rudd DWP was on order, again, not even one.


The 2013 Gillard DWP also put the 20 x OCVs on the back burner and instead planned to replace the ACPBs with yet another class of PBs (would most likely have been Cape class PBs).

Late 2013 we then have a change of Government (from ALP to LNP), firstly led by Abbott, that Government starts the ball rolling on what would eventually become the 2016 Turnbull DWP.

The 2016 Turnbull DWP adds an additional Frigate (now 9), it reinstated the OCV project as an OPV project, initially 12 (subsequently to 20 at the 2020 ScoMo DSU).

The Hunter FFG design was selected in June 2018 (nine years after the 2009 Rudd DWP).

The Arafura OPV design was selected in November 2017 (eight years after the 2009 Rudd DWP).

The Attack SSG design was selected in April 2016 (seven years after the 2009 Rudd DWP).


So let’s roll the clock a bit further forward:

Attack class - cancelled by ScoMo in September 2021 - creation of AUKUS - early 2023 Albo confirms the decisions taken by ScoMo will proceed for a fleet of SSNs (Albo has no choice but to follow the path set out before him).

Arafura class - six OPVs currently under construction, yes there does appear to be delays, in addition, 10 Cape class PBs (ordered by the LNP) are either under construction or already in service to ensure the RANs patrol boat capability is maintained until sufficient OPVs enter service.

Hunter class - yes construction has been delayed - five prototype blocks to be made before construction starts - it was initially reported those five block would not be to production standard - more recently reported the last three blocks will be to production standard and used in actual real production - it was also reported that BAE Australia said that by the time Ship 03 is delivered the previous delays will have been caught up with.


So here we are now, the 2023 Albo DSR was delivered, but also kicked the can down the road with a separate review for the RAN, due late this year.


So yes we are 14 years down the road from the 2009 Rudd DWP (and 10 years down the road from the 2013 Gillard DWP), but not one ship or sub was ordered by Rudd/Gillard/Rudd during their time in Government (2007-2013).

It wasn’t until 2016 (subs), 2017 (OPVs) and 2018 (frigates) that ‘real’ designs selected and ‘real’ orders placed.

Maybe now people will stop using the 2009 Rudd DWP as some sort of starting point, it was a starting point that never ever happened.

All smoke and mirrors, all hot air too.

(PS, all documents referenced by me above are available online if anyone is bothered to check).

 

[Volkodav]

It always gives me a chuckle when someone refers back to the 2009 Rudd DWP as if it was God handing down the 10 Commandments to Moses.

It’s as if some people believe the 2009 DWP was a document set in stone, and the clock was supposed to start ticking from the day it was published, but it wasn’t, was it?

The 2009 Rudd DWP may well have ‘recommended’ 8 x Frigates (‘Future’ Frigates in fact), 12 x Submarines and 20 x OCVs, but not one was actually ordered, not one, true?

Roll the clock forward to the 2013 Gillard DWP, and still not one ship, or sub, from the 2009 Rudd DWP was on order, again, not even one.


The 2013 Gillard DWP also put the 20 x OCVs on the back burner and instead planned to replace the ACPBs with yet another class of PBs (would most likely have been Cape class PBs).

Late 2013 we then have a change of Government (from ALP to LNP), firstly led by Abbott, that Government starts the ball rolling on what would eventually become the 2016 Turnbull DWP.

The 2016 Turnbull DWP adds an additional Frigate (now 9), it reinstated the OCV project as an OPV project, initially 12 (subsequently to 20 at the 2020 ScoMo DSU).

The Hunter FFG design was selected in June 2018 (nine years after the 2009 Rudd DWP).

The Arafura OPV design was selected in November 2017 (eight years after the 2009 Rudd DWP).

The Attack SSG design was selected in April 2016 (seven years after the 2009 Rudd DWP).


So let’s roll the clock a bit further forward:

Attack class - cancelled by ScoMo in September 2021 - creation of AUKUS - early 2023 Albo confirms the decisions taken by ScoMo will proceed for a fleet of SSNs (Albo has no choice but to follow the path set out before him).

Arafura class - six OPVs currently under construction, yes there does appear to be delays, in addition, 10 Cape class PBs (ordered by the LNP) are either under construction or already in service to ensure the RANs patrol boat capability is maintained until sufficient OPVs enter service.

Hunter class - yes construction has been delayed - five prototype blocks to be made before construction starts - it was initially reported those five block would not be to production standard - more recently reported the last three blocks will be to production standard and used in actual real production - it was also reported that BAE Australia said that by the time Ship 03 is delivered the previous delays will have been caught up with.


So here we are now, the 2023 Albo DSR was delivered, but also kicked the can down the road with a separate review for the RAN, due late this year.


So yes we are 14 years down the road from the 2009 Rudd DWP (and 10 years down the road from the 2013 Gillard DWP), but not one ship or sub was ordered by Rudd/Gillard/Rudd during their time in Government (2007-2013).

It wasn’t until 2016 (subs), 2017 (OPVs) and 2018 (frigates) that ‘real’ designs selected and ‘real’ orders placed.

Maybe now people will stop using the 2009 Rudd DWP as some sort of starting point, it was a starting point that never ever happened.

All smoke and mirrors, all hot air too.

(PS, all documents referenced by me above are available online if anyone is bothered to check).

Dangerous listing time spans. When you look back over decades, as a rule of thumb, nothing much defence wise, apart from cancellations, seems to happen in the first term of any new government. Very little happens in the second term, and the big ticket items happen in the third term, assuming there is one.

It's the nature of political parties, they each have their political, social, educational and industrial policies that take precedence over defence. Government tend to get dumped for those things, not defence, defence doesn't become a priority until they have put their stamp on the core issues, or unless a big bad is looming.

 

[Wombat000]

Looking at the submarine program from a simplistic point of view, its numerous delays resulted in perhaps a very inconvenient blessing - well disguised.

im thinking that an earlier initiated and more advanced replacement program, with perhaps the first of class already launched, and momentum already rolling, it would be much harder to justify the transition to a SSN solution that we have today.

the holes in the Swiss cheese of dithering and procrastination has played a roll in a AUKUS outcome.

an SSN in RAN service was a fantasy before the current evolved strategic situation, so even the last minute Attack solution was not conceived as a SSN.

 

[vonnoobie]

Looking at the submarine program from a simplistic point of view, its numerous delays resulted in perhaps a very inconvenient blessing - well disguised.

im thinking that an earlier initiated and more advanced replacement program, with perhaps the first of class already launched, and momentum already rolling, it would be much harder to justify the transition to a SSN solution that we have today.

the holes in the Swiss cheese of dithering and procrastination has played a roll in a AUKUS outcome.

an SSN in RAN service was a fantasy before the current evolved strategic situation, so even the last minute Attack solution was not conceived as a SSN.

Im actually of the opinion has we started earlier and got the ball rolling (ideally with a SoC) it would have been of greater benefit towards a transition to an SSN as we would have industry, skills and workforce in place to transition to an SSN, would have new boats with plenty of life reducing any risk in delays and the ability to keep building them should there be any delays in the SSN. As it sits we will be paying a pretty penny to get a few years more out of the Collins, a big penny to get 2 second hand and 1 new US built boats and stuck in a very short time frame which cant afford to have anything go wrong or our submarine service will be in big trouble.

 

[Wombat000]

Im actually of the opinion has we started earlier and got the ball rolling (ideally with a SoC) it would have been of greater benefit towards a transition to an SSN as we would have industry, skills and workforce in place to transition to an SSN, would have new boats with plenty of life reducing any risk in delays and the ability to keep building them should there be any delays in the SSN. As it sits we will be paying a pretty penny to get a few years more out of the Collins, a big penny to get 2 second hand and 1 new US built boats and stuck in a very short time frame which cant afford to have anything go wrong or our submarine service will be in big trouble.

Yes, I agree.
the workforce would already be mobilised.
but the componentry of the new-build SSK solution would’ve been acquired, contracts signed and paid and work further advanced.
in such a time window perhaps a new-build hull first of class might not have even reached IOC by now, and it’d be an orphaned redundant system?

Govt and detractors might likely argue that the continued new-build SSK solution will have to do, because the expense would be further compounded if solutions were swapped at such a stage of the originals construction and introduction.

Lucky that didn’t happen, and AUKUS has bipartisan and general approval instead.

 

[John Fedup]

Looking at the submarine program from a simplistic point of view, its numerous delays resulted in perhaps a very inconvenient blessing - well disguised.

im thinking that an earlier initiated and more advanced replacement program, with perhaps the first of class already launched, and momentum already rolling, it would be much harder to justify the transition to a SSN solution that we have today.

the holes in the Swiss cheese of dithering and procrastination has played a roll in a AUKUS outcome.

an SSN in RAN service was a fantasy before the current evolved strategic situation, so even the last minute Attack solution was not conceived as a SSN.

I think if the Attack class got underway, at some point, the transition to a SSN could well have happened. The French would have been enthusiastic.

 

[Redlands18]

I think if the Attack class got underway, at some point, the transition to a SSN could well have happened. The French would have been enthusiastic.

The French option was never going to be a starter for several reasons. The need to replace the reactor every 10 years or so, the fact that the reactor on the US and UK boats don't require refuelling for 33 years is a major reason for the change of policy. Refuelling the reactor would have to be done in France and that would make acquiring the US CMS unlikely.

 

[John Fedup]

The French option was never going to be a starter for several reasons. The need to replace the reactor every 10 years or so, the fact that the reactor on the US and UK boats don't require refuelling for 33 years is a major reason for the change of policy. Refuelling the reactor would have to be done in France and that would make acquiring the US CMS unlikely.

All true, but AUKUS did not exist at the time, no (seemingly) interest that the US wanted to expand the SSN club. As for refuelling, even the US is looking into LEU reactors albeit a long way off.

 

[hauritz]

Dangerous listing time spans. When you look back over decades, as a rule of thumb, nothing much defence wise, apart from cancellations, seems to happen in the first term of any new government. Very little happens in the second term, and the big ticket items happen in the third term, assuming there is one.

It's the nature of political parties, they each have their political, social, educational and industrial policies that take precedence over defence. Government tend to get dumped for those things, not defence, defence doesn't become a priority until they have put their stamp on the core issues, or unless a big bad is looming.

Very true. This is a problem faced by just about every democracy.

In Australia’s case it is even worse because it could even just be a change of leadership that can change the direction of defence policy.

For example Rudd proposed an expansion of the military. Gillard almost immediately pushed back against that idea. Abbot wanted Japanese subs, Turnbull wanted French, Morrison decided on Nuclear.

None this is a problem for regimes like China however who just push forward ruthlessly.

 

[alexsa]

Any reason why we wouldn't just want the Block V standard? Surely it's a bit silly to ask to modify a design off a hot line to ask for a reduction in capability?

Because the initial three unit Virginia Class buy is a stepping stone to the AUKUS class and these will be second hand. The extra two vessels discussed appears to be a fall back if the AUKUS class is delayed. The additional two may also be second hand as indicated in the Whitehouse fact sheet

FACT SHEET: Trilateral Australia-UK-US Partnership on Nuclear-Powered Submarines | The White House

• Sale of U.S. Virginia Class Submarines. Beginning in the early 2030s, pending approval from the U.S. Congress, the United States intends to sell Australia three Virginia class submarines, with the potential to sell up to two more if needed. This action is critical to continue growing Australia’s ability to own and operate a fleet of SSNs, and to provide Australia with a sovereign capability at the earliest possible date. It also ensures Australia sustains its undersea capabilities until SSN-AUKUS is ready, given the planned retirement of Australia’s current fleet of submarines.

As this is in the public domain and I suggest that such material should be considered when suggesting what the RAN should get. The pathway is also pretty clear from Australian DoD pages ....

AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway | About | Defence

The Optimal Pathway | About | Defence



Once again, in respect of looking to the future any ambit recommendations consider material that is in the public domain. This will reduce the frustration of many and avoid being pinged for suggesting a fantasy fleet.

Cheers
alexsa

 

[Beam]

Interesting article in Defence Connect regarding a recent presentation from BAE Australia to the Fed Govt showcasing a new Air Warfare Destroyer design base on an evolved Hunter Class design, also apparently pitched to the Brits as their new Type 83 Air Warfare Destroyer, to replace the type 45.
128 Mark 41 Cells each!

I spy with my little eye: BAE presentation reveals interesting next-gen Destroyer concept

Australia isn't alone in facing questions about the amount of firepower available to our surface fleet and recognising this, it appears that BAE Systems have been quietly working away on an impressiv

www.defenceconnect.com.au