Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Keep Hunters + Hobarts.
The Arrowhead 120 to replace the Anzac is a better option.
pro- Cheaper than a 140, 1/3 less crew than 140, fits on the Darwin and Cairns ship lifts. Potentially more hulls.
con- unlikely to escort far into the pacific as one of its main roles, lose some speed, 16 VLS and the second mission bay.

120m, 4,000 ton, 6,000nm range at 15 knts, 24-26knt max speed, 80 crew, 16 VLS, 8 ASM. stern ramp for rhib, mission bay for usv or uuv or potentially more VLS. Can be based in Darwin or Cairns with the lift taking ships 120mm 5,000ton


If we end up with type 83s replacing hobarts, our u.k aukus partner would be very happy.
You are headed for a serious warning .... This is again headed to fantasy fleet. The ANZAC had to undergo considerable modification to take the ASMD update. It still did not resolve the fact the vessel has an 8 cell VLS.

The Arrowhead 120 is a paper vessel likely equiped and manned. To bring it up to the same equipment level as the ANZAC will be a challenge noting it is not just weapons that matter but the combat system and the power generation capacity to support it. I suggest this may be why the MOD selected the 140 instead.


Please justify this suggestion

alexsa
 

Brissy1982

Active Member
@Volkodav has hit the nail squarely on the head with his recent post (#4978). In this and my next post I’m going to focus on the major combatants (destroyers and frigates) the RAN surface fleet is going to need in order play an effective role in protecting Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region over the coming decades. In discussing these capabilities, I’m going to break my thoughts up into two phases:
  • the short to medium term – the period from now until 2035-2040; and
  • the long term – the period from 2040 onwards into the second half of the 21st century.
I’ve broken my thoughts into these periods because I anticipate that the announced review of the RAN surface fleet to be undertaken in the third quarter of 2023 is also likely to look at these periods, or something similar to them. Whether the review of the RAN surface fleet adopts a two-tiered or three-tiered approach to capability remains to be seen, but the future RAN surface fleet will clearly need a mix of high-end, mid-level and lower-end vessels and capabilities.

Short to Medium Term Focus: In the years from now until 2040, the focus should be on increasing the RAN surface fleet’s size and capabilities using existing and already-planned platforms, to increase the RAN’s ability to effectively defend Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region, whether unilaterally or as part of a coalition of forces. I see this period as being one of initial growth in the RAN surface fleet’s size and capabilities, following several decades of the fleet’s numbers and capabilities being progressively eroded.

Long Term Focus: Beyond 2040, the focus should be on continued growth in the RAN's surface fleet size and capabilities through the acquisition of new, more capable surface platforms, in addition to the AUKUS-SSNs, to enable the RAN to more effectively protect Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region well into the second half of the 21st century, whether unilaterally or as part of a coalition of forces.

Short to Medium Term Increase in Fleet Numbers and Capabilities: What the RAN needs in the period from now until 2035-2040 is the development of a somewhat larger surface fleet with greater offensive and defensive capabilities that is capable of:
  • unilaterally deterring and if necessary defeating potential aggressors in the waters and airspace immediately surrounding Australia (our EEZ and the waters and airspace adjacent to our EEZ); and
  • contributing to deterring, and if necessary defeating, threats to the security of key trade routes and Australia’s interests in the wider Indo-Pacific region as part of a coalition of forces – in short, the RAN’s ships need to be capable of effectively integrating with allied naval forces.
Of the two capabilities above, I see the latter capability as being the one that should be prioritised – meeting threats to Australia's interests as far as possible from Australia's shores in co-operation with our allies and friends in the Indo-Pacific region is the key to Australia's security and prosperity. What does the RAN realistically require to achieve this in the short to medium term, and how could it be delivered?

More DDGs: If the government is serious about getting increased long-range missile capabilities into the ADF generally, and the RAN’s surface fleet specifically, as quickly as possible, the acquisition of three additional Hobart-class DDGs would be an achievable step. The Hobart-class DDGs are by far the most capable surface combatants the RAN has available.

Although unsolicited, Navantia’s proposal last year to build three more Hobart-class DDGs makes a lot of sense in the light of the DSR’s recommendations. Building three Hobart-class DDGs at Navantia’s yards in Spain at a cost of ~$2B each would be an efficient and effective way to increase the RAN's firepower in the short to medium term.

The Hobart-class design is mature, so building more of them should not be too risky. Navantia has said they could respond immediately to a request from the Australian Government and have ships in the water by 2030 – I think that is very achievable. If the RAN surface fleet review is delivered by early October 2023 and a decision to build three new Hobarts was to be taken by the Australian Government by the end of March 2024, then taking into account an average build time of 2.5 years per vessel followed by trials, delivery, acceptance and commissioning, the acquisition of three new Hobart-class DDGs for the RAN could be accomplished fairly comfortably by 2035.

Any argument that building the ships in Spain would somehow hurt Australia’s domestic shipbuilding industry is spurious – the reality is that Australia’s existing naval shipbuilding capabilities at Osborne are already fully occupied by the Hunter-class FFG program, and at Henderson by the Arafura OPV project. Potentially, at least some of the final fitout for new Hobart-class DDGs could be done in Australia, to provide opportunities for Australian contractors. Also, the sustainment program for the existing Hobart-class DDGs is in place – expanding it to accommodate three additional DDGs would provide more opportunities for Australian contractors in the short to medium term.

Recruitment and Crewing: With the right focus on recruitment, the RAN could bring in enough additional personnel to crew three additional Hobart-class DDGs by the early 2030s, without having to pull personnel from other classes of ships to crew them. An RAN that is expanding and getting new, more capable ships including modern DDGs, FFGs and SSNs is a very different organization to the RAN I left, where the RAN had consistently over decades been required to do more tasks with fewer ships with less capability. I think the RAN is going to become a much more attractive career option over the coming decade than it has been for several decades prior to this one.

However, if recruitment and crewing is a problem, then a solution would be to decommission three of the Anzac-class frigates earlier than planned, and move their crews to the new Hobart-class DDGs. Each Hobart-class DDG has a core crew complement of 186 (not counting aircrew for a single MH-60R). Each Anzac-class FFH has a complement of 177 – only 9 less than a Hobart-class DDG. This would see one ANZAC-class FFH replaced by a Hobart-class DDG as each new DDG enters service. If possible, each decommissioned Anzac-class FFH could be sold to a friendly nation to offset the cost of each new Hobart-class DDG to at least some extent – the Anzacs should still be quite serviceable, and they feature a world-class short-range anti-ship missile defence capability for both own-ship and high-value unit (HVU) defence based on the CEAFAR radar and ESSM, as well as a decent AShM load for their size, some ASW capability via an embarked helicopter, and a medium-calibre gun, which should make them attractive to countries looking for a frigate capability.

Increased Fleet Size: If three additional Hobart-class DDGs can be acquired and crewed without needing to decommission any Anzac-class FFHs, this would increase the RAN’s surface combatant numbers from 11 to 14 (6 Hobart-class DDGs and 8 Anzac-class FFHs) by the early to mid-2030s. Based on the rule of threes, this would enable the RAN to have two Hobart-class DDGs and two to three Anzac-class FFHs deployed or ready for immediate deployment at any given time. This represents a much better balance between higher-end and medium-level capabilities compared to the current RAN fleet.

Increased Firepower: Three additional Hobart-class DDGs would substantially increase the RAN’s missile firepower capabilities (both offensively and defensively) in line with the DSR. Currently the RAN’s 11 surface combatants have a total of 208 VLS cells between them (3x48-cell Mk 41 VLS on the three existing Hobart-class DDGs for a total of 144 cells, and 8x8-cell Mk 41 VLS on the eight Anzac-class FFHs).

Adding three new Hobart-class DDGs to the fleet would increase the number of VLS cells in the fleet by 144, to 352.

If the Anzac-class FFHs receive the upgrade that I think they are going to get (see post #4962) and each receives a second 8-cell Mk 41 VLS alongside the existing one, that adds a further 64 VLS cells, bringing the total in the fleet to 416.

In short, three more Hobart-class DDGs combined with an upgrade to the Anzac-class FFHs, could double the number of VLS cells in the RAN surface fleet within the next decade, prior to the first Hunter-class FFG joining the fleet. Assuming three Hunter-class FFGs are in service by 2040 and three upgraded Anzac-class FFHs have been decommissioned, that would bring the total number of VLS cells in the RAN surface combatant fleet to 464.

Of course, simply increasing VLS cell numbers is only a very crude measure of actual capability, but it is still helpful, it is in line with the DSR’s recommendations, and some politicians might even be capable of understanding the simple mathematics.

The strike-length Mk 41 VLS on the Hobart-class DDGs and the Hunter-class FFGs can be loaded with long-range strike weapons (e.g. Tomahawk) and long-range AShMs (e.g. LRASM), in addition to SM-2, SM-6 and ESSMs. They will also carry canister-launched NSMs. This would substantially increase the RAN surface fleet’s offensive capabilities in the short to medium term.

In my next post, I'll look at what the RAN surface fleet's long-term major combatant composition and capabilities should be. For now, I welcome responses to this post, provided they are expressed respectfully.
 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
I can understand the temptation of the ordering of more of the Hobart class ,but essentially on the delivery would be a design approaching twenty five years old , If it is to be considered by the government that a new DDG is required the navy should also have some input into the requirements of such a ship with considerations of present and future circumstances in naval warfare and comparisons of peer ships that are often larger ,I understood the Hunter class could be built in batches and perhaps a batch may be modified for such a role from a predominantly asw role
 

Lolcake

Active Member
Vice admiral Hammond has indicated that the subs being delivered to Australia will have a lifespan of "at least 20 years" which would suggest late build Block IV Virginia's, perhaps even the final three.

 
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hauritz

Well-Known Member
Australia will effectively be funding the construction of at least three to five extra submarines to be built by the US in the thirties. I am pretty sure that Australia investing that money is conditional of us getting late model submarines. Perhaps even a couple of new builds.

When you crunch the numbers it should give you an idea of what Australia will be looking at.

Prepare to be bored by math.

First assumption is that Australia wants to get to 8 submarines ASAP and maintain the fleet at that size. We are getting at least 3 SSNs in the 2030s. Presumably the third of these SSNs would replace HMAS Collins when it retires in the late thirties. Whether we would require additional Virginias would then depend on the progress of the AUKUS submarines. In the meantime Australia would need to withdraw one of its Collins class every two years.

Given that it is extremely unlikely that the AUKUS will be ready until the early forties I think it is likely that at least two more Virginias would be required to replace a couple more of the Collins subs.

In any case to maintain the sub fleet at eight all of the Collins class would need to be replaced before the first of the newer Virginias.

In order for Australia to maintain a continuous build program with 8 AUKUS class SSNs I think you would need to have a drumbeat of a new submarine delivered every 3 or 4 years.

So doing the math that would mean that if everything progresses to schedule and the first of the new AUKUS class actually enters service no later than the early 40s then you wouldn’t see replacements for the the Virginias until at least the early 50s.

That is my long and convoluted way of saying that the oldest of the Virginias purchased by Australia will still need to serve around 20 years from when it is acquired in around 2032.

Of course many things could happen between now and then but I would say Australia would probably be looking at either a late Block 3 or early Block 4 for its first Virginia.

It wouldn’t surprise me if we ended up with a couple of new builds as part of the package.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
More DDGs: If the government is serious about getting increased long-range missile capabilities into the ADF generally, and the RAN’s surface fleet specifically, as quickly as possible, the acquisition of three additional Hobart-class DDGs would be an achievable step. The Hobart-class DDGs are by far the most capable surface combatants the RAN has available.

Although unsolicited, Navantia’s proposal last year to build three more Hobart-class DDGs makes a lot of sense in the light of the DSR’s recommendations. Building three Hobart-class DDGs at Navantia’s yards in Spain at a cost of ~$2B each would be an efficient and effective way to increase the RAN's firepower in the short to medium term.

The Hobart-class design is mature, so building more of them should not be too risky. Navantia has said they could respond immediately to a request from the Australian Government and have ships in the water by 2030 – I think that is very achievable. If the RAN surface fleet review is delivered by early October 2023 and a decision to build three new Hobarts was to be taken by the Australian Government by the end of March 2024, then taking into account an average build time of 2.5 years per vessel followed by trials, delivery, acceptance and commissioning, the acquisition of three new Hobart-class DDGs for the RAN could be accomplished fairly comfortably before 2035.

Any argument that building the ships in Spain would somehow hurt Australia’s domestic shipbuilding industry is spurious – the reality is that Australia’s existing naval shipbuilding capabilities at Osborne are already fully occupied by the Hunter-class FFG program, and at Henderson by the Arafura OPV project. Potentially, at least some of the final fitout for new Hobart-class DDGs could be done in Australia, to provide opportunities for Australian contractors. Also, the sustainment program for the existing Hobart-class DDGs is in place – expanding it to accommodate three additional DDGs would provide more opportunities for Australian contractors in the short to medium term.

Recruitment and Crewing: With the right focus on recruitment, the RAN could bring in enough additional personnel to crew three additional Hobart-class DDGs by the early 2030s, without having to pull personnel from other classes of ships to crew them. An RAN that is expanding and getting new, more capable ships including modern DDGs, FFGs and SSNs is a very different organization to the RAN I left, where the RAN had consistently over decades been required to do more tasks with fewer ships with less capability. I think the RAN is going to become a much more attractive career option over the coming decade than it has been for several decades prior to this one.
TBH I am quite suspicious of Spain's claims about being able to building additional Hobart-class DDG's, or even anything else similar, and have them ready by 2030.

Spain likely could have hulls in the water by 2030, but IMO it would be quite unlikely that such hulls would be ready for ship and acceptance trials, never mind ready and available for RAN service. It would be more likely that hulls could be in the water and ready to start getting fitted out starting in 2030, but I just do not see any hypothetical order for more "Hobart-class" DDG's being ready before the first of the Hunter-class FFG's.

I used the quotes around the DDG class, because we already know that some of the systems fitted aboard the current Hobart-class DDG's is out of production and no longer available, and therefore new/different systems would need to be fitted instead. Needing to fit different kit/systems would of course trigger some design changes. The elephant in the room which many seem to keep overlooking when considering the Spanish/Navantia offer is what would need to happen in order for Aegis CMS and SPY arrays to be fitted, as well as how long that would likely take. I have run through these numbers somewhere earlier on in this thread a few months ago.

To re-cap what would need to happen in a nutshell, there would need to be a gov't to gov't FMS request from Australia (and poss Spain as well) to the US to purchase the CMS and radar arrays, this would then need to receive the various approvals required by US laws and regs, including okays from both the State Dept and US Senate which would then be followed by a DSCA announcement. Based off things I have read previously on other orders for advanced US kit like Aegis, I would expect any DSCA announcements to come out perhaps a year after the gov't to gov't req was made. Once the DSCA announcement gets released, then contracts ordering Aegis could get signed with LockMart reserving slots in the Aegis CMS and SPY radar production queues. Once contracts are signed and production slots are reserved, these long lead items take several years before delivery. Going off when the DSCA announcement was made (2018) for the systems which went into the Spanish F110's, with the lead ship getting laid down in 2022, then a delay of 5+ years from the time of the DSCA announcement to a CMS and radar system being ready to be fitted aboard a vessel sounds fairly reasonable. I would also not be surprised if it would take even longer now, since the USN's Constellation-class FFG programme had not been running when Spain placed their orders for the future F110's and therefore delivery dates for any new production slots might be pushed further back. So looking at the timeframes again, if a decision were made now, or at least the next couple of weeks, a DSCA announcement might come out in mid-2024. If Australia and/or Spain were ready to sign contracts and did so immediately, then the first Aegis and SPY systems might be ready to be installed aboard vessels under construction in mid-2029 with construction possibly finishing in mid-2030 before systems, ship, and acceptance trials would be conducted and likely taking another two years give or take.

OTOH, there could be issues with contracts which take time to come to an agreement, so a mid-2024 DSCA announcement might not result in contracts being signed until mid-2025 or later. It is also quite possible that LockMart's Aegis CMS and SPY production and testing schedule might be largely occupied to meet existing orders placed by the USN so that it might be seven years (or more) before new/additional orders for the RAN could be met. Looking at the potential timeline again, if the contracts to order the FMS kit were not signed until 2025, initial deliveries of Aegis and SPY might occur sometime between 2030 and 2032, to be fitted aboard vessels under construction. This in turn would likely leave the hull construction not being completed until 2031 at the earliest, and dates in 2033 to 2035 would be more likely IMO, and there would still need to be the various trials to make sure then everything functioned as required.

Since the first of the Hunter-class frigates is expected to be in service by sometime in 2032 IIRC, after having completed trials, I just do not honestly believe that something including some of the same complex systems can be ordered much later, and ready by the same time.
 

Going Boeing

Well-Known Member
TBH I am quite suspicious of Spain's claims about being able to building additional Hobart-class DDG's, or even anything else similar, and have them ready by 2030.

Spain likely could have hulls in the water by 2030, but IMO it would be quite unlikely that such hulls would be ready for ship and acceptance trials, never mind ready and available for RAN service. It would be more likely that hulls could be in the water and ready to start getting fitted out starting in 2030, but I just do not see any hypothetical order for more "Hobart-class" DDG's being ready before the first of the Hunter-class FFG's.

I used the quotes around the DDG class, because we already know that some of the systems fitted aboard the current Hobart-class DDG's is out of production and no longer available, and therefore new/different systems would need to be fitted instead. Needing to fit different kit/systems would of course trigger some design changes. The elephant in the room which many seem to keep overlooking when considering the Spanish/Navantia offer is what would need to happen in order for Aegis CMS and SPY arrays to be fitted, as well as how long that would likely take. I have run through these numbers somewhere earlier on in this thread a few months ago.

To re-cap what would need to happen in a nutshell, there would need to be a gov't to gov't FMS request from Australia (and poss Spain as well) to the US to purchase the CMS and radar arrays, this would then need to receive the various approvals required by US laws and regs, including okays from both the State Dept and US Senate which would then be followed by a DSCA announcement. Based off things I have read previously on other orders for advanced US kit like Aegis, I would expect any DSCA announcements to come out perhaps a year after the gov't to gov't req was made. Once the DSCA announcement gets released, then contracts ordering Aegis could get signed with LockMart reserving slots in the Aegis CMS and SPY radar production queues. Once contracts are signed and production slots are reserved, these long lead items take several years before delivery. Going off when the DSCA announcement was made (2018) for the systems which went into the Spanish F110's, with the lead ship getting laid down in 2022, then a delay of 5+ years from the time of the DSCA announcement to a CMS and radar system being ready to be fitted aboard a vessel sounds fairly reasonable. I would also not be surprised if it would take even longer now, since the USN's Constellation-class FFG programme had not been running when Spain placed their orders for the future F110's and therefore delivery dates for any new production slots might be pushed further back. So looking at the timeframes again, if a decision were made now, or at least the next couple of weeks, a DSCA announcement might come out in mid-2024. If Australia and/or Spain were ready to sign contracts and did so immediately, then the first Aegis and SPY systems might be ready to be installed aboard vessels under construction in mid-2029 with construction possibly finishing in mid-2030 before systems, ship, and acceptance trials would be conducted and likely taking another two years give or take.

OTOH, there could be issues with contracts which take time to come to an agreement, so a mid-2024 DSCA announcement might not result in contracts being signed until mid-2025 or later. It is also quite possible that LockMart's Aegis CMS and SPY production and testing schedule might be largely occupied to meet existing orders placed by the USN so that it might be seven years (or more) before new/additional orders for the RAN could be met. Looking at the potential timeline again, if the contracts to order the FMS kit were not signed until 2025, initial deliveries of Aegis and SPY might occur sometime between 2030 and 2032, to be fitted aboard vessels under construction. This in turn would likely leave the hull construction not being completed until 2031 at the earliest, and dates in 2033 to 2035 would be more likely IMO, and there would still need to be the various trials to make sure then everything functioned as required.

Since the first of the Hunter-class frigates is expected to be in service by sometime in 2032 IIRC, after having completed trials, I just do not honestly believe that something including some of the same complex systems can be ordered much later, and ready by the same time.
It’s been suggested before, that, if the Navantia offer of 3 additional AWD’s for the RAN is accepted, the AEGIS & radar upgrades planned for the existing AWD’s could be delayed thus freeing up the 3 AEGIS systems & SPY6 radars that were ordered some time ago to be used on the new build AWD’s. More systems can be ordered so that the current ships are upgraded at a later time, hopefully after the new vessels start to enter service.

If it wasn’t for the geopolitical situation, and there was time to do things properly, I think it would be preferable to build AWD‘s based on the Hunter hull which is much quieter and has more growth potential.
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
How about we counter offer Navantia and Spain.

They build three and we lease them for a decade. If they are not on time or not up to spec the deal is cancelled.

At the end of ten years each is returned to Navantia for resale to someone else, or if we decide to expand our fleet and the ships are deemed as suitable buy them outright.

This will cover the upgrades of the Hobarts and not interfere with the Hunters.
 

Brissy1982

Active Member
I can understand the temptation of the ordering of more of the Hobart class ,but essentially on the delivery would be a design approaching twenty five years old , If it is to be considered by the government that a new DDG is required the navy should also have some input into the requirements of such a ship with considerations of present and future circumstances in naval warfare and comparisons of peer ships that are often larger ,I understood the Hunter class could be built in batches and perhaps a batch may be modified for such a role from a predominantly asw role
I completely understand your concerns, @seaspear. I totally agree that a Hobart-class DDG is no match for a PLAN Type 055 DDG, at least on paper - the Type 055 is a bit faster, 30m longer, 4,000+ tons heavier, and has 64 more VLS cells capable of launching both offensive and defensive missiles.

However, my thinking is that in a confrontation with the PLAN in the South China Sea, which seems to me to be most likely conflict scenario out of those that I've explored in previous posts, RAN vessels are likely to be operating in conjunction with USN forces. In addition, the Hobart-class has Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and our existing DDGs have used it in conjunction with each other and with USN vessels. I think that CEC would help to offset the difference in size and firepower between individual PLAN and RAN vessels to at least some extent, although the limited magazine depth of both the Hobart-class and the initial batch of three Hunter-class FFGs is a concern which will need to be addressed in any long-term solution to the RAN's capability requirements.

The option of "do nothing and hope everything will be okay" is always available to governments, but having publicly accepted the DSR's finding that the ADF, and the RAN especially, is not fit for purpose for the current strategic environment, governments of any political colour realistically can't ignore the need to increase the RAN's capabilities in the short to medium term. Implementing a long-term solution to the shortcomings in the RAN surface fleet's capabilities is going to be a 15+ year endeavour, and the RAN needs increased capabilities much more quickly than than.

I agree with your observation that the Hunter-class is planned to be built in batches, and certainly I think a re-design of a future batch of the Hunter-class from a primary ASW role to a more heavily-armed multirole FFG/DDG would be feasible - indeed, it's where I'd put my money if I were a betting man. However, it's far too late to stop and redesign the first three Hunter-class FFGs, the first of which currently seems likely to enter RAN service around 2032-3, the second around 2034-5 and the third around 2036-7, without blowing out those planned in-service dates and those of subsequent vessels by at least a couple more years. The first in a batch of redesigned Hunter-class multirole FFGs/DDGs realistically couldn't be commissioned until around 2038-9 based on a two-year drumbeat.

If the RAN surface fleet hadn't been hollowed out as badly as it has been in terms of both numbers and capability by decades of cuts and short-sighted decision-making, I probably wouldn't be suggesting more Hobart-class DDGs. But the RAN surface fleet is so woefully under-armed in the deteriorating strategic environment the Australian Government has finally recognised that at this point three additional Hobart-class DDGs, while far from an ideal option, is the only viable option I can see to start the process of boosting the RAN surface fleet's capabilities within the next decade, until the Hunter-class FFGs start entering service. @Volkodav's suggestion of a "lease then return for resale or potentially buy" agreement with Spain and Navantia for three new Hobart-class DDGs is an interesting one - if acceptable to Australia, Spain and Navantia, I personally would have no objection to it if it enables the RAN to put more capable surface combatants out there in the short to medium term until a more suitable long-term solution to the RAN surface fleet's capability requirements can be identified, built, accepted and commissioned.

@hauritz raises some good points about the need for potential redesign of new Hobart-class DDGs, and the process involved in obtaining FMS approvals for the Aegis CMS and SPY-6 and then acquiring the systems themselves. However, I don't think those issues are insurmountable. For one thing, AUKUS is about much more than just SSNs - I think that AUKUS will help to smooth and speed up the FMS approval process, especially if the US sees benefit to its own interests, which it should. If there's a need to re-purpose the already-purchased Aegis and SPY-6 systems for use on new Hobart-class DDGs as @Going Boeing suggests, then I don't see the US standing in the way if it results in the number of systems purchased by Australia being increased from 3 to 6. Also, any necessary redesign seems likely to be relatively limited in scope - it wouldn't require a wholesale redesign of the entire platform.

I share @Todjaeger's concerns about Spain/Navantia being able to have three new Hobart-class DDGs in the water by 2030 - I would be very surprised if that was achieved. However, I do think it would be feasible to have two out of three new Hobart-class DDGs in service with the RAN by the time the first Hunter-class FFG enters service, with the third DDG in service by 2035. That would represent a respectable increase in the RAN surface fleet's capabilities in the short to medium term.

Further, I can see some scope for increasing the firepower of the Hobart-class using "bolt-on" systems (e.g. Mk 48 or Mk 56) for short-range ESSMs to free up the 48 strike-length Mk 41 VLS cells for more longer-range SM-2s, SM-6s, Tomahawk and LRASMs.

Accordingly, although I do have deep misgivings about the RAN being placed in the position it is currently in, I still think that the acquisition of another three Hobart-class DDGs is the most feasible option to increase the RAN's capabilities in the short to medium term.

Ultimately, we'll all just have to wait to see what the review into the RAN surface fleet recommends.
 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
Possibly a suggestion to increase the amount of vls available to the RAN would be to assess the Virginia class submarines to be acquired to consider the Virginia Payload module ,,if Australia is to acquire a number of the Virginia class submarines perhaps selecting these would be more useful they could be expected to have a complementary role to the AUKUS type submarine ,this would be instead of further Hobart class destroyers
The Navy’s ‘New’ Block V Virginia-Class Submarine Has A Secret | The Runway (airforce.gov.au)
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
So far as I am aware Sea 4000 Phase 6 does not involve replacing the SPY-1; according to the publicly released documentation I can find it upgrades Aegis to baseline 9 and replaces the current bespoke Australian Tactical Interface with one based around SAAB 9LV. There has been no mention of radar changes that I can see.
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
So far as I am aware Sea 4000 Phase 6 does not involve replacing the SPY-1; according to the publicly released documentation I can find it upgrades Aegis to baseline 9 and replaces the current bespoke Australian Tactical Interface with one based around SAAB 9LV. There has been no mention of radar changes that I can see.
If the additional Hobarts were considered they would due to the age of the originals have some different systems.
In this case could the new Hobarts be fitted with the same radar as the Hunters.
Thus cutting the whole FMS problem.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
If the additional Hobarts were considered they would due to the age of the originals have some different systems.
In this case could the new Hobarts be fitted with the same radar as the Hunters.
Thus cutting the whole FMS problem.
They wouldn't fit.

The Hunters are significantly larger than the Hobart's and still required redesign to fit the combat system including radars.

It's been mentioned quite a few times, the reason the Type 26 was selected as the reference design was it was significant larger and had more margin than the other shortlisted options.

What the RAN wanted was a 10000t multi role ship with superior ASW capability, while still having AEGIS.
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
They wouldn't fit.

The Hunters are significantly larger than the Hobart's and still required redesign to fit the combat system including radars.

It's been mentioned quite a few times, the reason the Type 26 was selected as the reference design was it was significant larger and had more margin than the other shortlisted options.

What the RAN wanted was a 10000t multi role ship with superior ASW capability, while still having AEGIS.
I should have been more specific.
I meant that with the experence of the Anzac upgrade to draw on, a custom mast for the new Hobarts could be designed, built and fitted in Australia to Spanish built hulls.
How this capability compares to SPY-1, I do not know but others might.
 

devo99

Active Member
I should have been more specific.
I meant that with the experence of the Anzac upgrade to draw on, a custom mast for the new Hobarts could be designed, built and fitted in Australia to Spanish built hulls.
How this capability compares to SPY-1, I do not know but others might.
In terms of capability, CEAFAR is a very significant improvement over SPY-1D(V), to the point where the AMCAP Anzacs are actually better equipped to deal with sea skimming threats than the Hobarts are.
SPY-1 can basically be called an antiquated system at this point so it wouldn't make any sense to build new ships fitted with it.
In terms of putting a custom mast on the Hobarts, the design of CEAFAR lends itself very well to this as it is by nature a scalable system.
It will be quite odd though if the DDGs end up with weaker radars than the ASW/GP frigates.
 
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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
So far as I am aware Sea 4000 Phase 6 does not involve replacing the SPY-1; according to the publicly released documentation I can find it upgrades Aegis to baseline 9 and replaces the current bespoke Australian Tactical Interface with one based around SAAB 9LV. There has been no mention of radar changes that I can see.
Pyne mentioned they would be fit with CEAFAR2 and the SAAB consoles, but when Ph6 materialized, it didn't include radars.

It appears the Hobarts are very tight room, power etc. A new radar would be a very big modification to the ship. CEAFAR2 while scalable may not be suitable to get a suitable result in this tight, existing application.

SPY1D(V) is a very powerful radar. But it isn't particularly new. The core of SPY 1D(V) appear to be first installed in 1998 based on a core from the 1980s. While the computers it used to plug into (UYK-43 etc) are updated to COTS stuff, it appears a lot of the electronics is inspired spec circa 1980-1990's. So its probably does a fine job with big objects at big distances.

If there is one part of the current RAN sensors that really should be upgraded, its those big brick of a things, SP1D(V). The designs predate Russia. I wonder if AN/SPY-6(V)4 would fit power/space/weight. They have been specifically designed to replace like for like as drop in replacements for SPY1D(V).

The new stuff they say can detect things at half the size at twice the distance. With the opposition fielding hypersonics, low observable aircraft and munitions and smaller drones, it would be a problem to throw a Hobart into a conflict in the 2030's with its existing radar.

We luckily have Anzac's that can escort our Air warfare destroyers, and provide air defence for them.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
While in time the SPY-6 may be back fitted into existing SPY-1 ships, it hasn’t been done as yet; SPY 6 is still a new system only really fitted in a couple of DDG 51 flight three about to commission. It’s going to be widely fitted but it isn’t yet. SPY-1 with SPQ-9B for horizon search, as fitted in the Hobarts, is still a pretty good combination.
 

devo99

Active Member
Pyne mentioned they would be fit with CEAFAR2 and the SAAB consoles, but when Ph6 materialized, it didn't include radars.

It appears the Hobarts are very tight room, power etc. A new radar would be a very big modification to the ship. CEAFAR2 while scalable may not be suitable to get a suitable result in this tight, existing application.

SPY1D(V) is a very powerful radar. But it isn't particularly new. The core of SPY 1D(V) appear to be first installed in 1998 based on a core from the 1980s. While the computers it used to plug into (UYK-43 etc) are updated to COTS stuff, it appears a lot of the electronics is inspired spec circa 1980-1990's. So its probably does a fine job with big objects at big distances.

If there is one part of the current RAN sensors that really should be upgraded, its those big brick of a things, SP1D(V). The designs predate Russia. I wonder if AN/SPY-6(V)4 would fit power/space/weight. They have been specifically designed to replace like for like as drop in replacements for SPY1D(V).

The new stuff they say can detect things at half the size at twice the distance. With the opposition fielding hypersonics, low observable aircraft and munitions and smaller drones, it would be a problem to throw a Hobart into a conflict in the 2030's with its existing radar.

We luckily have Anzac's that can escort our Air warfare destroyers, and provide air defence for them.
The thing about CEAFAR-S is that it is of the same generation as radars like SPY-6 and SPY-7 while being much more specialised for targeting stuff like sea skimmers while CEAFAR-L provides the powerful long range anti-air and BMD component. In this way they both outclass SPY-6 in their respective areas of specialisation as SPY-6 is designed for doing both missions adequately with a lean towards BMD capability over close defence.

The main tradeoff for using CEAFAR-S and L is more weight and since you have roughly twice as many faces, that could be prohibitive of what can be put on the Hobarts. But if the Hobarts are eventually fitted with SPY-6 then we will have DDGs with less capable radar than our frigates much like we have already.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
The thing about CEAFAR-S is that it is of the same generation as radars like SPY-6 and SPY-7 while being much more specialised for targeting stuff like sea skimmers while CEAFAR-L provides the powerful long range anti-air and BMD component. In this way they both outclass SPY-6 in their respective areas of specialisation as SPY-6 is designed for doing both missions adequately with a lean towards BMD capability over close defence.

The main tradeoff for using CEAFAR-S and L is more weight and since you have roughly twice as many faces, that could be prohibitive of what can be put on the Hobarts. But if the Hobarts are eventually fitted with SPY-6 then we will have DDGs with less capable radar than our frigates much like we have already.
Just curious because for years have tried to find capabilities of the CEAFAR radars but could never find squat, Is this based on something you read, personnel experience with the systems or an assumption? As an aussie I would love to think that our cheap little CEAFAR may outclass the big all powerful SPY radars but have yet to see any proof of this.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
CEAFAR radars in the same class as SPY are neither cheap nor little. As well, in a ship installation they move quite a bit of weight fairly high by comparison. All such systems are compromises in one way or another, and most evolve over time; saying one is “better” than another without providing context is, quite frankly, nonsensical.
 
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