Rebuilding a smaller mid sized Navy

t68

Well-Known Member
Sorry for the OT but does the above imply that you believe Australias plans for 12 subs are unrealistic?
The enlarged 12 Collins class submarine replacement program was part of the ex PM Rudd leadership, not sure what the current leaderships position on the 12 subs but with current Defpros on here hinting at bigger budgetary concessions having to made for the AusGov to reach a surplus by 2013, 12 subs seem pretty slim. I do believe that we should build all 12 submarines but in batches of 4 with incremental upgrades between the submarine, if building the Collins is any standard to go by once building has started each boat will take 3plus years each to build with the hull each being laid down in approx 12 month intervals. It has also been noted in the RAN thread that if Australia was to reduce its buy of submarines that it may free up $ to balance the RAN with a light carrier and fast jet capability for the FAA.

I remember a comment by Abraham Gubler along the of that if Australia was to go down the smaller European submarine route that Australia would only require 4 submarines as they will only be required for ASW exercises with the fleet they won’t have the endurance, dive depth and electrical power to run combat system which the RAN desire, but would still be useful in defence of Australia operations close to the Australia coastline in the event of a invasion of Australia type scenario.

http://www.raytheon.com/businesses/...ments/content/rtn_bus_ids_prod_anbyg1_pdf.pdf
The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies, and Spin - Peter Yule, Derek Woolner - Google Books
Our submarine situation
Australia’s Next-Generation Submarines
http://www.navalofficer.com.au/inde...d=186:o-boats1&catid=44:submarines1&Itemid=80
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I'm sure there is a way to find a few hundred people capable of crewing subs at any one time. Sorry Todjarger, I just can't buy your 2-3% rule unless you're talking about the immediate short term. Australia is planning for 12 subs and has a much smaller population than Canada, and a Navy of similar size.

New navy:

15 Submarines (if Australia can build 12 I"m sure we can manage 15)
Kindly double check ones facts before stating them. One might find that their 'facts' are wrong. In the case of the RAN, there are currently a little over 14,000 regulars while the RCN has about 8,500 regular personnel. In other words, the regular establishment personnel strength of the RAN is ~67% greater than that of the RCN. Not exactly what I would call close in size.

Now, how about looking at things with a bit more realism? How viable and sustainable would it be for a nation to raise/sustain a Special Forces-only land force, or a land force where a significant percentage of personnel were Special Forces? That is effectively what is being suggested what advocating for a dramatic expansion of the submarine service.

Also, the suggestion still manages to ignore the strengths and limitations of submarines and surface warships. Canada will still need to be able protect surface shipping, whether they are Canadian-flagged merchant vessels operating abroad, merchant vessels moving rawmats and/or goods to/from Canada, or sealift ships moving, people, supplies and equipment to or from Canada. Subs are not the sort of naval asset which can on their own, escort a surface vessel of convoy. There is the rather small matter of the convoy needing to make a slow transit so the sub can keep up... Also, a sub can effectively combat a detected surface or subsurface threat, but can do SFA about inbound air threats, be they from MPA, maritime strike aircraft, or AShM launched from hostile subs, surface vessels, land bases or aircraft.

Sorry for the OT but does the above imply that you believe Australias plans for 12 subs are unrealistic?
It depends on just how the plan gets implimented. If the idea is that 12 'Son of Collins' subs are built and all in RAN service at the same time... Then yes, I think that a bit unrealistic unless a major war has broken out. OTOH if as t68 suggested, that a dozen are built over a thirty year span, and that they are built in lots of 4 and that at any given point in time there are perhaps 6 - 8 subs in RAN service... That I think is workable.

-Cheers
 

swerve

Super Moderator
It is also possibly worth noting that the RN's submarine crew complement stands at ~3.8% of total regular RN personnel, and that once the Astute-class SSN has completed replacing the Trafalgar-class, then the RN figure would be back down to ~3.3%. One reason why the RN figure is currently so high, is that that Trafalgar-class SSN has ~32 more crew members than the replacing Astute-class SSN. IMO there has to be some reason why the RN would desire a replacing SSN design with ~30% less crew than its predecessor.

-Cheers
Type 42: 287 crew
Type 45: 185 crew = 65% of Type 42 - in a much bigger ship

Type 23: 185 crew
Type 26: ca 120-30 crew expected (67-72% of Type 23)

Pretty standard reduction. More automation, fewer crew. Same in other navies. Not submarine-specific.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Type 42: 287 crew
Type 45: 185 crew = 65% of Type 42 - in a much bigger ship

Type 23: 185 crew
Type 26: ca 120-30 crew expected (67-72% of Type 23)

Pretty standard reduction. More automation, fewer crew. Same in other navies. Not submarine-specific.
Quite true, but it does sort of suggest that attempting a significant increase in specific types of personnel might be somewhat difficult. After all, part of the reason for more automation is to reduce the crew requirements for naval vessels. This is something which various navies wish to accomplish due to a variety of reasons, some of which involve the costs to raise, train and sustain personnel...

-Cheers
 

swerve

Super Moderator
My argument isn't that there would be no difficulties in increasing numbers either of personnel in general, or of a specific (& more difficult to recruit in general, I accept) type, but that increasing numbers of a specific type would require an increase in the rest. I find it hard to accept that the ratio of submariners to the total has to be within a very narrow range.

As far as I can see, the ratio depends on the perceived needs of navies. Of those which operate submarines, the ratio has varied from time to time & fleet to fleet, for example Norway's fleet of Kobben class subs used to need 360+ crew at a time when the RNoN had 7600 personnel, including 1000 coast artillery. Disregarding the coast artillery as not relevant to a discussion of Canadian manning levels, that's 5.5%. This suggests to me that the ratio is far more flexible than you think.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
My argument isn't that there would be no difficulties in increasing numbers either of personnel in general, or of a specific (& more difficult to recruit in general, I accept) type, but that increasing numbers of a specific type would require an increase in the rest. I find it hard to accept that the ratio of submariners to the total has to be within a very narrow range.

As far as I can see, the ratio depends on the perceived needs of navies. Of those which operate submarines, the ratio has varied from time to time & fleet to fleet, for example Norway's fleet of Kobben class subs used to need 360+ crew at a time when the RNoN had 7600 personnel, including 1000 coast artillery. Disregarding the coast artillery as not relevant to a discussion of Canadian manning levels, that's 5.5%. This suggests to me that the ratio is far more flexible than you think.
Ah, I see that the point I was attempting to make about the ratio was not quite understood, so I will attempt to clarify it.

What I was driving at was in a navy of N number personnel, where there has not been a particular/special emphasis on sub ops, only a small percentage of those personnel are going to be suited to submarine ops. There are some things which can be done to attempt to raise that percentage, via targeted and more selective recruiting, etc. but there are limits. If the entire pool of naval personnel is enlarged, then naturally there would be an increase in the number of personnel who would likely be suited for sub service... Otherwise the RCN might be stretching itself to crew submarines which a larger naval service could accomodate.

One thing I had not gotten into though, is also what sort of personnel numbers would be required to support so many submarines? Looking at the USN for numbers, there are ~60,000 personnel dedicated to submarine ops, but only ~10,000 are actually sub crews, the rest AFAIK training and support personnel for the sub service, sea/sub tenders, dockyard maintenance and support, training schools, etc.

While I doubt that current RCN or RAN sub support numbers would provide a reliable benchmark, historical numbers for these services, and/or current JMSDF sub support numbers might be a bit better.

-Cheers
 

Dodger67

Member
Although it is a far smaller navy and has severe budgetary constraints to cope with; the South African Navy has admitted to considerable difficulty in maintaining even two full crews for it's three Type 209s (out of a total of roughly 5000 uniformed personnel)
Their operational requirement is to have one in the water, one supporting a pier and the third in the shed.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
South Africa has squeezed the defence budget to the point where it's struggling to keep its relative handful (compared to Australia or Canada) of combat aircraft flying, due to lack of money for fuel - and they burn a lot less than an F-18. No lessons to be learned there, except what not to do.
 

Future Fleet

New Member
Kindly double check ones facts before stating them. One might find that their 'facts' are wrong. In the case of the RAN, there are currently a little over 14,000 regulars while the RCN has about 8,500 regular personnel. In other words, the regular establishment personnel strength of the RAN is ~67% greater than that of the RCN. Not exactly what I would call close in size.
The Australian Navy performs the roles of both the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian Navy. The Australian Coast Guard is an all volunteer service that is mostly good will and a little search and rescue. So with that in mind, look at the numbers again my friend. When you add the 4500+ Canadian Coast Guard to the 8500 Canadian Navy you get over 13,000 naval personnel to Australia's Navy of 14,200+. Now if you want to add in the reserves in Canada who almost exclusively staff the Kingston class ships you have another 5000+ to Australia's 2150. Looking more comparable now for you?

It doesn't matter anyway. Look up parkinson's law to learn more about the problems of comparing two bureaucratic institutions based on the number of people in the organization as a direct comparison of their performance. If you want more accuracy, it becomes important to look at the number and type of vessel each operates.

Both navies have 12 frigates. Canada has 12 patrol boats to Australia's 14 plus another 6 mine hunters converted into patrol boats but remember, their coast guard has no law enforcement ability. Keeping in mind that the Canadian Coast Guard has about 11 vessels dedicated to mid and offshore patrol we have a relative comparison of 23 Canadian patrol boats to Australia's 20. Canada has 6 Hydrographic survey ships, and Australia has 6 too. Australia has 6 subs to our 4 but they recognize the usefulness of subs to defend their island against an enemy so in their wisdom they are looking at 6 more.

Remember the Canada First Defence Plan? The one that tries to make it clear that defending the Nation and the continent from attack is the primary focus of the Canadian navy. Submarines are excellent defensive weapons. Layered defence my friend, look it up. Subs and properly armed coastal defence ships are the key for defending Canada. Large surface vessels may look nice on a poster and make some navy brass feel good when they walk on the bridge, but mostly our frigates were built for anti-submarine warfare remember? Guess someone thought subs were a big enough threat that all of Canada's large surface warships (our frigates and destroyers) were designed for anti-submarine warfare.

Now that defence of Canada is secondary to impressing allies and running off around the world, our frigates are pushed into roles that they weren't meant for. Our destroyers too have been refitted to attempt to protect our frigates in their new roles since they can't adequately protect themselves. Our coastal patrol vessels, the Kingston class ships, are so inappropriate for their roles that a mid-life upgrade was cancelled. The subs we bought are for war games with the US, not defending the Arctic waters.

Also, the suggestion still manages to ignore the strengths and limitations of submarines and surface warships. Canada will still need to be able protect surface shipping, whether they are Canadian-flagged merchant vessels operating abroad, merchant vessels moving rawmats and/or goods to/from Canada, or sealift ships moving, people, supplies and equipment to or from Canada. Subs are not the sort of naval asset which can on their own, escort a surface vessel of convoy. There is the rather small matter of the convoy needing to make a slow transit so the sub can keep up... Also, a sub can effectively combat a detected surface or subsurface threat, but can do SFA about inbound air threats, be they from MPA, maritime strike aircraft, or AShM launched from hostile subs, surface vessels, land bases or aircraft.
Canada's naval doctrine is about defending Canada and taking part in some foreign aide and adventures from time to time. It is not, and could not be about defending every ship flying a Canadian flag. You'd need a lot more than 15 SCSCP ships called for my the navy for that.

Military sealifts would be protected under my plan, just as they would under the current plan. The difference is under my plan, our 'adventuring surface fleet' is smaller while the home defence force grows. Layered, silent, effective.

To respond to your statement about subs being defenceless, do you understand the x+1 logic? Surface ships may be able to defend against a limited attack under ideal circumstances but keep in mind they are a lot easier to find and a capable enemy can easily overwhelm their defences. A submarine is much harder to spot and the Germans have anti-aircraft missiles for submarines to both protect themselves and attack with. Even a 30mm cannon is being designed that fires under water.

It depends on just how the plan gets implimented. If the idea is that 12 'Son of Collins' subs are built and all in RAN service at the same time... Then yes, I think that a bit unrealistic unless a major war has broken out. OTOH if as t68 suggested, that a dozen are built over a thirty year span, and that they are built in lots of 4 and that at any given point in time there are perhaps 6 - 8 subs in RAN service... That I think is workable.
Obviously if Canada / Australia / Germany were building the new subs, they are going to be delivered over the span of years in my scenario as well. Just to address one point above, it takes years to develop and build a submarine and put it in service with a competent crew. When a major war breaks out, it's too late to build more subs. Like Donald Rumsfeld said "you go to war with the army (or in this case navy) you have, not the army you might want, or wished to have at a later time.

Having 15 subs active isn't necessary at any one time in the present climate, but the ability to put 15 to sea would be a significant deterrence to any potential rival.

I hope you agree now that the two navies are indeed similar when looked at in a truly comparative way and that modern AIP submarines are a big part of the best defence for Canada.
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Well actually Australia also has something called Border Protection Command
From their web site:
Border Protection Command uses surveillance and response assets assigned from the Australian Defence Force and Customs and Border Protection. Surveillance assets currently available to Border Protection Command include:

•Commercial satellite imagery for the Southern Ocean;
•Customs and Border Protection contracted aircraft;
•Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft;
•Army Regional Force Surveillance Unit patrols;
•Customs and Border Protection patrol vessels (Australian Customs Vessels);
•Customs and Border Protection contracted patrol vessels (the ACV Triton, ACV Ocean Protector and ACV Ashmore Guardian);
•Royal Australian Navy (RAN) patrol boats; and
•Other Defence and contracted response assets as required and assigned.

So we are talking far more than just the RAN.

Oh by the way our mine hunters were not converted to patrol boats but rather some were temporarily deployed as such a decade ago when the governments Ill considered defence cuts and project cancellations resulted in a block obsolescence issue with our patrol boat fleet just as changing strategic circumstances meant we needed them more than ever.

The Customs and Border Protection Marine Unit Maritime Operations Support Branch fleet mentioned above currently operates a fleet of 8 patrol boats (soon to be replaced) and 3 other larger vessels.
 

Future Fleet

New Member
•Commercial satellite imagery for the Southern Ocean;
•Customs and Border Protection contracted aircraft;
•Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft;
•Army Regional Force Surveillance Unit patrols;
•Customs and Border Protection patrol vessels (Australian Customs Vessels);
•Customs and Border Protection contracted patrol vessels (the ACV Triton, ACV Ocean Protector and ACV Ashmore Guardian);
•Royal Australian Navy (RAN) patrol boats; and
•Other Defence and contracted response assets as required and assigned.
The equivalent duties of the ACBPS in Canada are shared between the Canadian Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard. To attempt to allocate those personnel in the three services in Canada is not a task I am willing or able to do. Our air force flies the Orion also, and our coast guard fills many of the roles the small surface ACBPS ships do and I didn't include many of those vessels in the above comparison as I was focusing on warships and mid and offshore patrol boats of both countries which is the focus of the debate.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The equivalent duties of the ACBPS in Canada are shared between the Canadian Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard. To attempt to allocate those personnel in the three services in Canada is not a task I am willing or able to do. Our air force flies the Orion also, and our coast guard fills many of the roles the small surface ACBPS ships do and I didn't include many of those vessels in the above comparison as I was focusing on warships and mid and offshore patrol boats of both countries which is the focus of the debate.
To be honest I am not paying much attention to the debate but felt compelled to correct some apparent misunderstandings that leaped out at me as I skimmed your post. There have been discussions over the years on whether Australia should form a separate Coast Guard and our RANR used to operate its own patrol boats. [ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_class_patrol_boat"]Attack class patrol boat - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame]

We could argue this round in circles for days but I can’t see much point in doing so. Basically Australia does things one way and Canada another and that is it in a nutshell.

I much concede though that Canada does have more ice breakers in service than does Australia for some unknown reason.


We could argue this round in circles for days but I can’t see much point in doing so. Basically Australia does things one way and Canada another and that is it in a nutshell.

I much concede though that Canada does have more ice breakers in service than does Australia for some unknown reason.
 

Future Fleet

New Member
We could argue this round in circles for days but I can’t see much point in doing so. Basically Australia does things one way and Canada another and that is it in a nutshell.

I much concede though that Canada does have more ice breakers in service than does Australia for some unknown reason.
I agree that the administrative bureaucracies of both countries don't have much in common when it comes to command an control of coastal defense. Seems like more agencies in Australia, perhaps more bureaucratic? They seem to have more total personnel doing similar things.

I can't answer for the ice breaking except for the need to be present in an area of the world that is now being contested by foreign countries including allies.

Regards
 

Belesari

New Member
I agree that the administrative bureaucracies of both countries don't have much in common when it comes to command an control of coastal defense. Seems like more agencies in Australia, perhaps more bureaucratic? They seem to have more total personnel doing similar things.

I can't answer for the ice breaking except for the need to be present in an area of the world that is now being contested by foreign countries including allies.

Regards
To operate in the north is going to require ice breakers and there are villages, towns and such that might need one to help them get through like the Alaskan town did last year.

The US Coast Guard has been wanting some more and they need them....of course everyone knows the CG always needs more ships.
 

Future Fleet

New Member
To operate in the north is going to require ice breakers and there are villages, towns and such that might need one to help them get through like the Alaskan town did last year.

The US Coast Guard has been wanting some more and they need them....of course everyone knows the CG always needs more ships.
Good point. Makes sense why the new Arctic Patrol ships are only required to be "slush breakers." Still too bad that they will spend the money on armament instead of higher ice breaking capability. The ability to get around all year long will only become more important in the future IMO.
 
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StevoJH

The Bunker Group
The US Coast Guard has been wanting some more and they need them....of course everyone knows the CG always needs more ships.
The US Coast Guard have a budget larger then most Tier 2 Navies, if they need more Ice Breakers they might want to reconsider some of their other purchases such as the NSC.
 

swerve

Super Moderator

Belesari

New Member
The US Coast Guard have a budget larger then most Tier 2 Navies, if they need more Ice Breakers they might want to reconsider some of their other purchases such as the NSC.
Yes they have a large budget but they still have the same limitations as the Navy. High personel cost, etc.

They need replacments for the Hamiltons and they need replacments for their Ice breakers.

Thats the problem with putting them off you end up needing everything at the same time.

Still think it would be better to develope a Multi Frigate class that can be used by both Navy and Coast guard. Stanflex like the Danes. Hanger, 5in gun up front common on all designs. After that fitted for the Mission.
 
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