Totally agree with your points.Post 2 of 2
14. I am simply saying that the PN should consider installing at least a main gun and a Simbad RC to cover the stern sector as an affordable system (and in use in their navy) on their 2 unarmed Tarlac class LPDs for ship self defence. That way the PN don’t have too much logistics complexity to handle.
15. The last thing you want to see is BRP Davao del Sur LPD conducting a NEO, laden with civilians and hit by an anti-ship missile. UAE who was operating the HSV-2 Swift lost the ship to a rebel fired anti-ship missile. The Pinoys, as a Navy are so cheap, they don’t even have ESM systems or decoys installed in their navy ships. Yet, they persist in deploying them to conflict waters where there is an anti-ship missile threat. Are their leaders blind to the need for risk mitigation?
16. Lacking the proper equipment like chaff and decoys or even a 76mm main gun, the BRP Davao del Sur was sent for the NEO from the Middle East that took 5 months, and a fire resulting in 2 injured in the BRP Ramon Alcaraz to complete. It is self evident that the Pinoys are not trained to fight the unarmed LPD in a medium threat naval environment (like what they could face in the Persian Gulf, if shooting had started between the US and Iran). Yet they persist in sending their navy there without proper preparations or coordination with the Americans.
17. See paragraphs 18 to 21 below on what it means to train and be prepared for a mid to high end war fighting contingency, should the need arise. In every deployment, like Operation Blue Orchid (deploying the well armed Endurance class LPDs to Iraq in support of coalition efforts) or Operation Blue Sapphire (deploying frigates or LPDs to protect merchant shipping from pirates in the Gulf of Aden), the Singapore Navy conducts tough and progressive training for the various threat scenarios, before these maritime security deployments to mitigate the risk.
18. Having observed their prior poor performance at ADMM Plus Maritime exercises, other navies are certain that the Pinoys do not train like they need to fight. In contrast, the Singapore Navy’s frigates have been training in Guam, to fight as a combined task unit, in Exercise Pacific Griffin 2017 and in Exercise Pacific Griffin 2019. These realistic bi-annual bilateral exercises simulate the defence and protection by frigates and destroyers of high value units (like a LPD), going into harm’s way, should the need arise. In the 2017 edition of the exercise, RSN’s 2 frigates, RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme, protected the LPD, RSS Endurance (acting as the high value unit in the exercise).
19. In the 2019 iteration that ran from Sep. 27 through Oct. 10, the two navies covered a broad range of naval operations, including live-fire drills, and tactical ship maneuvers, aimed at enhancing combined proficiency at sea while strengthening relationships.
Exercise Pacific Griffin 2019, participating:
(a) naval assets included the littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Momsen (DDG 92), Los Angeles-class submarine USS Key West (SSN 722), Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Amelia Earhart (T-AKE 6), and Singapore’s frigates RSS Formidable (FFS 68) and RSS Intrepid (FFS 69); and(b) air assets included MH-60S helicopters from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 23 and 25, MH-60R helicopters from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, maritime patrol aircraft from Patrol Squadrons (VP) 1, 5 and 47, and B-52s Stratofortress bombers from U.S. Air Forces' Expeditionary 69th Bomb Squadron.
21. Additionally, both navies successfully executed a sinking exercise (SINKEX) of former USS Ford. “Our planners have worked very closely with one another and established very strong working relationship, and more importantly trust between us,” said Republic of Singapore Navy Commander First Flotilla and Commanding Officer of 185 Squadron, Colonel Lim Yu Chuan.
22. I would hope that either Myanmar or Indonesia would show the way forward in properly arming the Makassar-class/Tarlac-class LPD and having these weapons controlled by a CMS along with a military grade radar (no matter how low end).And about point 14 and 16, the Tarlac Class is designed to be equipped with the Oto Melara 76 mm gun and some secondary 25 mm guns and machine guns.
24. I think the Pinoys need more than guns. The PN also cannot maintain second hand Phalanxes, so let us not go down this rabbit hole.But like most other vessels of the PN, its FFBNW, an almost empty vessel.
You can almost say that the PN is nothing more than a FFBNW-navy.
I just wonder why the Philippines do not order some second hand Phalanxes from the US for their Gregorio del Pillar Class frigates.
BZ to the Indian Navy.Edit:
An update about the BRP Ramon Alcaraz.
Philippines Navy Chief Giovanni Carlo J. Bacordo has expressed gratitude to the Indian Navy for its "invaluable assistance" for helping out one of its navy ship after a fire broke out in engine room which injured two Philippines navy personnel. Fire had broken in Philippines' ship BRP Ramon...www.wionews.com
Why do you say that? From what I've heard from people who have operated the missile in the field it is effective against any target type as long as you have effective sensors and FC.
SIMBAD-RC provides an extremely effective defence capability against all threats including anti-ship missiles, combat aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, as well as small surface threats such as those presented by FIACs.
Ok, why don’t you tell me what are the sensors beyond the TRS-3D that are installed and how is the FC linked to the stern sector of this frigate?...I've heard from people who have operated the missile in the field it is effective against any target type as long as you have effective sensors and FC.
You might want to actually click on and read the links from the MBDA Mistral page you linked to.Why do you say that? From what I've heard from people who have operated the missile in the field it is effective against any target type as long as you have effective sensors and FC.
SIMBAD-RC is a short-range, anti-air self defence system deploying two fire-and-forget MISTRAL missiles. It has been designed to provide a primary self defence capability on all warships or to complement the main air defences of first rank warships.www.mbda-systems.com
I bolded certain text for emphasis. The Mistral Simbad-RC is really not designed in a way to be a considered an air defence weapon at this point. Instead it is much more akin to a missile-based CIWS not unlike the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).Providing a highly effective and reliable last ditch defence against leakers or late appearing threats
The Pinoys must be are aware of that the PLA(N)’s bombers carry 400km YJ-12 ASCMs and 2,000km CJ-20 ALCMs.I bolded certain text for emphasis. The Mistral Simbad-RC is really not designed in a way to be a considered an air defence weapon at this point. Instead it is much more akin to a missile-based CIWS not unlike the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).
Again, this is a VSHORAD system, for a last ditch defence which uses the Mistral SAM, the same Mistral missle which is also used in MANPADS, and is comparable to the FIM-92 Stinger missile, the Starstreak missile, or the RBS-70. The max engagement range is ~6 km, which is slightly more than half that of the RIM-116 RAM and well short of the capabilities of various short or short/medium-ranged air defence missiles in naval service which generally have a max range in the 20+ km range. At 6 km, any targeted inbound would be within the visible horizon well before the vessel could even hope to engage.
...If the Mistral Simbad RC system was used as an adjunct to a proper air defence capability, and therefore intended to only deal with a small number of 'leakers' which managed to get past the primary air defence system, then only having two missiles ready to fire would be less of an issue....
Honestly not sure. I did a quick check between working on things and did not come across an image with sufficient resolution to conclusively indicate what the fire arc coverage was. That was why I made the at best estimate of five inbounds required to overwhelm the VSHORAD systems. If there is indeed one or more gaps in radar and/or fire arc coverage, then a single AShM could be enough to achieve a mission-kill if not sink a frigate.Are there even missiles covering the bow of the ship? The ship carries 4 ready to launch Mistral missiles but they don’t provide full 360 degree coverage. I am not sure but from pictures released, the ship seems to have the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar installed on top of the bridge (to cue the Hyundai Wia K76L/62 76mm gun in air defence role). But the Selex ES NA-25X is pointing at the wrong sector to cue the rear mounted SIMBAD-RC, from what I can see but I am happy to be corrected. It seems the ship’s sensor coverage and defences are very limited.
From this pic, the 2 SIMBAD-RC launchers (after the RHIBS) have limited coverage of the Bow.Honestly not sure. I did a quick check between working on things and did not come across an image with sufficient resolution to conclusively indicate what the fire arc coverage was. That was why I made the at best estimate of five inbounds required to overwhelm the VSHORAD systems. If there is indeed one or more gaps in radar and/or fire arc coverage, then a single AShM could be enough to achieve a mission-kill if not sink a frigate.
I understand that the frigates are FFBNW, so it is possible that a VLS might be added in the future to provide short/medium-ranged air defence and/or an area air defence capability, but honestly until those are added (if ever) then the newest vessels in the PN are really unsuitable for modern combat operations.
1. This ship by its design and sensor placement is designed to have:Realistically, there would likely need to be a third launcher located between the gun and bridge to cover the forward arc. Radar coverage could still be problematic, and of course the limitations of the launchers themselves. Better than not having anything, but IMO these type launchers are not really suitable for much more than small patrol boats which have too little space and/or displacement to take a larger CIWS or VSHORAD system.
From which i understand, the Philippine Navy's Technical Working Group selected innitially a more integrated and logic package for the project:1. This ship by its design and sensor placement is designed to have:
(i) the VLS (equipped with MICA missiles that have a max range of 20km) along with the TRS-3D radar to provide 360 degree primary sensor and missile defence coverage;(ii) theoretically as a secondary line of defence, to protect against low sea skimming threats (and cued by a Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device), the 4 ready to launch short ranged Mistral missiles (with an effective range of 6km) to provide port, starboard and stern coverage for enemy SSMs that are able to evade the primary defences; and(iii) the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar with its 180 degree coverage of the bow is being used to cue the 76mm gun (aka naval gun fire radar) that can be used for last ditch air defence.
2. What the Pinoys really, really, really need is the VLS as the primary system — which is unfortunately FFBNW.
3. Even with the VLS installed, you can easily see the inherent ship air defence limitations by virtue of sensor and missile systems selected.
4. I am not sure where the Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device is located. Does it have full 360 degree coverage? For competent navies, their electro-optical devices would not only have 360 degree coverage, there is also software integration of these electro-optical devices with other sensors to provide a real time sea picture.
5. The Pinoys with the choices made in the sub-systems they buy show a more fundamental problem — they don’t know how to layer the sensor and shooter coverage. Their problem is they lack a concept of ops for naval air and surface warfare — having never owned a modern frigate.
6. For competent navies, electronic support measures (ESM) allows the ship’s primary radar to not emit as part of their tactics. And I don’t see a capable ESM mast installed. This means the Philippine navy does not a lack of knowledge for air warfare; rather it is more accurate to say that the Pinoys have no institutional knowledge on how to fight the ship.
7. In 12 years from now, when they would gain some basic institutional knowledge for air warfare and may realise that their sub-system choices were either lacking or not fit for purpose. At that time, they can plan the mid-life upgrade for the ship class at the 15 to 20 year mark.
You're right, I have no idea how effective the FC system on Jose Rizal is. I certainly didn't want to make it sound like I thought SIMBAD RC is an adequate first line missile defense or anything other than last - ditch.Ok, why don’t you tell me what are the sensors beyond the TRS-3D that are installed and how is the FC linked to the stern sector of this frigate?
Go google it or click on the link I provided earlier and explain to me why you think it is effective. I am happy to learn from you, when you explain the specific reasons, why the sensor coverage is great — and not just a generic statement. I am not trying to be difficult and really want to know, if anyone is willing to put in the work to find out.
Given that their notional enemy are PLA(N) destroyers and frigates — do you think that these Mistral missiles as the frigate's primary air defense system is adequate? What is the air defence system for the bow? Is it only a 76mm gun?
In the next 2 years, it is unlikely the the Pinoys will pay for a Vertical Launching System (VLS). This is a Fitted For But Not With (FFBNW) item. Why is the VLS missing? What did the navy want and why did they get a ship that is FFBNW in the end?
Dont worry, we will forgive you....You're right, I have no idea how effective the FC system on Jose Rizal is. I certainly didn't want to make it sound like I thought SIMBAD RC is an adequate first line missile defense or anything other than last - ditch.
My post was purely about target types and was based on a conversation I had with a French naval officer at SNA. My bad.
It's more complex than that. By Philippine law the TWG can not preselect an equipment by brand name or model number. It can specify minimum requirements and often this pretty much narrows down the field to a couple or even a single manufacturer, but in this particular case the list was selected from the bidder's offer.@Sandhi Yudha,
I see your point but let me share mine. The listing tells me that the Pinoy TWG can read brochures?
1. If you look at 3rd world weapons buying behaviour — TWG members always tell you, they recommended X (a top of the line system) but the country bought Y (a 3rd rate system) — when things suck, it is not their fault. But that is not budget reality for a 3rd world buyer. The reality is a good TWG knows how to choose 3rd rate systems that work well together to get better synergy.
Dare I even ask this, but given HHI's track record for giving bribes, shouldn't it be asked what the motivation was for those superiors to accept the changed equipment package?So in this one case the TWG (or at least it's pre-2017 incarnation) indeed did their best. The budget's ceiling was well published. The bidder, by participating, indicated their ability to meet the budget. The package they offered was indeed good. That the package was later changed, with the complicit acceptance of higher ranking officers and politicians, is indeed not their fault.
This does not change the fact that the whole thing is FUBAR, but there are people who did try their best but was stymied by their superiors both military and civilian.