Philippine Navy Discussion and Updates

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Yes, I also have read that claim on MBDA sites and if not mistaken on one of MBDA press release on Mistral "NG". Seems this is part of MBDA possitioning Mistral as RIM-116 competitors.

However, haven't seen any trial of Mistral that shown capabilities as anti missile environment.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Post 2 of 2
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14. I am simply saying that the PN should consider installing at least a main gun and a Simbad RC to cover the stern sector as an affordable system (and in use in their navy) on their 2 unarmed Tarlac class LPDs for ship self defence. That way the PN don’t have too much logistics complexity to handle.

15. The last thing you want to see is BRP Davao del Sur LPD conducting a NEO, laden with civilians and hit by an anti-ship missile. UAE who was operating the HSV-2 Swift lost the ship to a rebel fired anti-ship missile. The Pinoys, as a Navy are so cheap, they don’t even have ESM systems or decoys installed in their navy ships. Yet, they persist in deploying them to conflict waters where there is an anti-ship missile threat. Are their leaders blind to the need for risk mitigation?

16. Lacking the proper equipment like chaff and decoys or even a 76mm main gun, the BRP Davao del Sur was sent for the NEO from the Middle East that took 5 months, and a fire resulting in 2 injured in the BRP Ramon Alcaraz to complete. It is self evident that the Pinoys are not trained to fight the unarmed LPD in a medium threat naval environment (like what they could face in the Persian Gulf, if shooting had started between the US and Iran). Yet they persist in sending their navy there without proper preparations or coordination with the Americans.

17. See paragraphs 18 to 21 below on what it means to train and be prepared for a mid to high end war fighting contingency, should the need arise. In every deployment, like Operation Blue Orchid (deploying the well armed Endurance class LPDs to Iraq in support of coalition efforts) or Operation Blue Sapphire (deploying frigates or LPDs to protect merchant shipping from pirates in the Gulf of Aden), the Singapore Navy conducts tough and progressive training for the various threat scenarios, before these maritime security deployments to mitigate the risk.

18. Having observed their prior poor performance at ADMM Plus Maritime exercises, other navies are certain that the Pinoys do not train like they need to fight. In contrast, the Singapore Navy’s frigates have been training in Guam, to fight as a combined task unit, in Exercise Pacific Griffin 2017 and in Exercise Pacific Griffin 2019. These realistic bi-annual bilateral exercises simulate the defence and protection by frigates and destroyers of high value units (like a LPD), going into harm’s way, should the need arise. In the 2017 edition of the exercise, RSN’s 2 frigates, RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme, protected the LPD, RSS Endurance (acting as the high value unit in the exercise).

19. In the 2019 iteration that ran from Sep. 27 through Oct. 10, the two navies covered a broad range of naval operations, including live-fire drills, and tactical ship maneuvers, aimed at enhancing combined proficiency at sea while strengthening relationships.

20. For an idea of the complexity of Exercise Pacific Griffin 2019, participating:
(a) naval assets included the littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Momsen (DDG 92), Los Angeles-class submarine USS Key West (SSN 722), Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Amelia Earhart (T-AKE 6), and Singapore’s frigates RSS Formidable (FFS 68) and RSS Intrepid (FFS 69); and​
(b) air assets included MH-60S helicopters from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 23 and 25, MH-60R helicopters from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, maritime patrol aircraft from Patrol Squadrons (VP) 1, 5 and 47, and B-52s Stratofortress bombers from U.S. Air Forces' Expeditionary 69th Bomb Squadron.​

21. Additionally, both navies successfully executed a sinking exercise (SINKEX) of former USS Ford. “Our planners have worked very closely with one another and established very strong working relationship, and more importantly trust between us,” said Republic of Singapore Navy Commander First Flotilla and Commanding Officer of 185 Squadron, Colonel Lim Yu Chuan.
Totally agree with your points.

Singapore is one of the few countries of ASEAN who takes defence seriously.

And about point 14 and 16, the Tarlac Class is designed to be equipped with the Oto Melara 76 mm gun and some secondary 25 mm guns and machine guns.
But like most other vessels of the PN, its FFBNW, an almost empty vessel.
You can almost say that the PN is nothing more than a FFBNW-navy.

I just wonder why the Philippines do not order some second hand Phalanxes from the US for their Gregorio del Pillar Class frigates.

Edit:
An update about the BRP Ramon Alcaraz.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 3 of 3
And about point 14 and 16, the Tarlac Class is designed to be equipped with the Oto Melara 76 mm gun and some secondary 25 mm guns and machine guns.
22. I would hope that either Myanmar or Indonesia would show the way forward in properly arming the Makassar-class/Tarlac-class LPD and having these weapons controlled by a CMS along with a military grade radar (no matter how low end).

(i) In contrast, the first Peruvian Νavy Makassar-class landing platform dock, BAP Pisco (AMP-156) that was commissioned on 6 June 2018 is much more capable than the Tarlac class! The ship is armed with a OTO Breda Twin 40mm gun mount (removed from the cruiser Almirante Grau), two Rafael Typhoon 30mm remote weapon stations (RWS) and four Rafael Mini Typhoon 12.7mm remote-controlled units. The ship can accommodate 157 crew members, including 14 officers and air group personnel, as well as up to 400 marines. It can carry 636t of fuel, 600t of fresh water, 360m³ of dry cargo and 136m³ of food. It can also integrate mission-specific modules such as containerised hospital and surgical units.​
(ii) The two Peru ships in the class were designed by South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) in collaboration with the Peruvian state-owned shipyard SIMA. DSME also built 1 for Myanmar and provided the base design for Indonesia. Indonesian shipbuilder PT PAL subsequently built two vessels for the PN as the Tarlac-class.​

23. But thus far, no real news of a serious attempt to make this class of ship a warship by any of these 3 ASEAN navies. Once any of the other 2 ASEAN navies does the weapons integration properly, there will be pressure on the Philippines to do the logical.
But like most other vessels of the PN, its FFBNW, an almost empty vessel.
You can almost say that the PN is nothing more than a FFBNW-navy.

I just wonder why the Philippines do not order some second hand Phalanxes from the US for their Gregorio del Pillar Class frigates.
24. I think the Pinoys need more than guns. The PN also cannot maintain second hand Phalanxes, so let us not go down this rabbit hole.

25. The Gregorio del Pillar Class frigates need time in the yard to install the AN/SPS-77 Sea Giraffe AMB 3D air/surface search radar (given by the US), for basic maintenance and a PHP1.5 billion upgrade to enhance the ships' combat management systems, electronic support and sonar capability.

26. To expand on what I posted earlier, the Tarlac class needs to be fitted with:
(a) at least an ELTA EL/M-2228(X) radar or such other more capable system. Keeping in mind that the ELTA EL/M-2228(X) Radar was in the past was paired with Simbad twin missile launcher for the Mistral missile; an ESM system, including a sub-system like the NS 9010C radar warning receiver; and fixed chaff/decoy launchers.​
(b) an Aircraft Ship Integrated Secure and Traverse (ASIST) system making the LPDs capable of carrying out helicopter operations both in the day and at night under high sea state conditions. Without ASSIST, helicopter operations are more time consuming and dangerous. Further, most Philippine military helicopters are not shielded against strong electronic interference and the LPD’s main radar would have to be shut down during helicopter operations.​
Edit:
An update about the BRP Ramon Alcaraz.
BZ to the Indian Navy.
 
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JohnJT

Member
These under armed Pinoy vessels are equipped with the Mistral VSHORAD Missile. IMO, the wrong type of missile to defend against anti-ship missiles and only effective against helicopters or other slow movers.
Why do you say that? From what I've heard from people who have operated the missile in the field it is effective against any target type as long as you have effective sensors and FC.
From MBDA:
SIMBAD-RC provides an extremely effective defence capability against all threats including anti-ship missiles, combat aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, as well as small surface threats such as those presented by FIACs.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
...I've heard from people who have operated the missile in the field it is effective against any target type as long as you have effective sensors and FC.
Ok, why don’t you tell me what are the sensors beyond the TRS-3D that are installed and how is the FC linked to the stern sector of this frigate?

Go google it or click on the link I provided earlier and explain to me why you think it is effective. I am happy to learn from you, when you explain the specific reasons, why the sensor coverage is great — and not just a generic statement. I am not trying to be difficult and really want to know, if anyone is willing to put in the work to find out.

Given that their notional enemy are PLA(N) destroyers and frigates — do you think that these Mistral missiles as the frigate's primary air defense system is adequate? What is the air defence system for the bow? Is it only a 76mm gun?

In the next 2 years, it is unlikely the the Pinoys will pay for a Vertical Launching System (VLS). This is a Fitted For But Not With (FFBNW) item. Why is the VLS missing? What did the navy want and why did they get a ship that is FFBNW in the end?
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Why do you say that? From what I've heard from people who have operated the missile in the field it is effective against any target type as long as you have effective sensors and FC.
From MBDA:

You might want to actually click on and read the links from the MBDA Mistral page you linked to.

The below is quoted from the MISTRAL SIMBAD-RC datasheet PDF download;
Providing a highly effective and reliable last ditch defence against leakers or late appearing threats
I bolded certain text for emphasis. The Mistral Simbad-RC is really not designed in a way to be a considered an air defence weapon at this point. Instead it is much more akin to a missile-based CIWS not unlike the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).

Again, this is a VSHORAD system, for a last ditch defence which uses the Mistral SAM, the same Mistral missle which is also used in MANPADS, and is comparable to the FIM-92 Stinger missile, the Starstreak missile, or the RBS-70. The max engagement range is ~6 km, which is slightly more than half that of the RIM-116 RAM and well short of the capabilities of various short or short/medium-ranged air defence missiles in naval service which generally have a max range in the 20+ km range. At 6 km, any targeted inbound would be within the visible horizon well before the vessel could even hope to engage.

Now I do not wish for people to misunderstand and think I am "bashing" the Mistral Simbad RC system, but I do want to make clear to people that the system has some significant limitations. Three of the major ones IMO are that the system is mounted on a directional turret as opposed to VL, and that each turret only holds two missiles before requiring reload, and the limited engagement range. The reason being turret-mounted is an issue IMO is that limits the VSHORAD use to the available firing arcs of the turret. I understand why making a VL Mistral might not have been an option, but a vessel would then require multiple launchers to provide 360 degree coverage of fire. The second issue, that of the turret only holding two missiles, is a potentially major problem as it limits just how many inbounds the system can possibly engage successfully. If the Mistral Simbad RC system was used as an adjunct to a proper air defence capability, and therefore intended to only deal with a small number of 'leakers' which managed to get past the primary air defence system, then only having two missiles ready to fire would be less of an issue. As it stands now though, with a pair of these systems fitted, only five AShM would need to be launched at one time before the frigate's self-defence capabilities were overwhelmed, assuming everything aboard functioned flawlessly. IMO it would be more realistic to expect that two Mistrals would be launched in an attempt to down a single inbound AShM. The issue of the limited range, apart from providing very little time to engage high speed hostile inbounds, is that when coupled with the fire arc limitations, means that the Mistral Simbad RC system can really only be effectively for the ship the system is fitted to. In other words, the VSHORAD system cannot really be used to defend another vessel that the PN frigate might be escorting through threatened waters, which would essentially mean that the frigate cannot escort other vessels and provide protection vs. aerial threats.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Are there even missiles covering the bow of the ship? The ship carries 4 ready to launch Mistral missiles but they don’t provide full 360 degree coverage.

I am not sure but from pictures released, the ship seems to have the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar installed on top of the bridge (to cue the Hyundai Wia K76L/62 76mm gun in air defence role). But the Selex ES NA-25X is pointing at the wrong sector to cue the rear mounted SIMBAD-RC, from what I can see but I am happy to be corrected. The Safran PASEO NS is an optical and IR sensor installed in the stern of the ship and if used as a sole detection method offers much less in detection capability than an US made CIWS. Therefore, I hope that HHI has enabled the combination of scan and track radar, internal fire control arrangements and optics. If the HHI designed vessel has an air search radar located high on the ship and you would want to be using that to cue the 4 ready to fire Mistral missiles. It seems the ship’s sensor coverage and defences are very limited.
I bolded certain text for emphasis. The Mistral Simbad-RC is really not designed in a way to be a considered an air defence weapon at this point. Instead it is much more akin to a missile-based CIWS not unlike the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).

Again, this is a VSHORAD system, for a last ditch defence which uses the Mistral SAM, the same Mistral missle which is also used in MANPADS, and is comparable to the FIM-92 Stinger missile, the Starstreak missile, or the RBS-70. The max engagement range is ~6 km, which is slightly more than half that of the RIM-116 RAM and well short of the capabilities of various short or short/medium-ranged air defence missiles in naval service which generally have a max range in the 20+ km range. At 6 km, any targeted inbound would be within the visible horizon well before the vessel could even hope to engage.

...If the Mistral Simbad RC system was used as an adjunct to a proper air defence capability, and therefore intended to only deal with a small number of 'leakers' which managed to get past the primary air defence system, then only having two missiles ready to fire would be less of an issue....
The Pinoys must be are aware of that the PLA(N)’s bombers carry 400km YJ-12 ASCMs and 2,000km CJ-20 ALCMs.

These Chinese missiles will make the US made block 2, Harpoon missiles, in Taiwan’s inventory, look very short ranged by comparison. Unlike the Taiwanese, the Pinoys do not even have fighters that can launch anti-ship missiles.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Are there even missiles covering the bow of the ship? The ship carries 4 ready to launch Mistral missiles but they don’t provide full 360 degree coverage. I am not sure but from pictures released, the ship seems to have the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar installed on top of the bridge (to cue the Hyundai Wia K76L/62 76mm gun in air defence role). But the Selex ES NA-25X is pointing at the wrong sector to cue the rear mounted SIMBAD-RC, from what I can see but I am happy to be corrected. It seems the ship’s sensor coverage and defences are very limited.
Honestly not sure. I did a quick check between working on things and did not come across an image with sufficient resolution to conclusively indicate what the fire arc coverage was. That was why I made the at best estimate of five inbounds required to overwhelm the VSHORAD systems. If there is indeed one or more gaps in radar and/or fire arc coverage, then a single AShM could be enough to achieve a mission-kill if not sink a frigate.

I understand that the frigates are FFBNW, so it is possible that a VLS might be added in the future to provide short/medium-ranged air defence and/or an area air defence capability, but honestly until those are added (if ever) then the newest vessels in the PN are really unsuitable for modern combat operations.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Honestly not sure. I did a quick check between working on things and did not come across an image with sufficient resolution to conclusively indicate what the fire arc coverage was. That was why I made the at best estimate of five inbounds required to overwhelm the VSHORAD systems. If there is indeed one or more gaps in radar and/or fire arc coverage, then a single AShM could be enough to achieve a mission-kill if not sink a frigate.

I understand that the frigates are FFBNW, so it is possible that a VLS might be added in the future to provide short/medium-ranged air defence and/or an area air defence capability, but honestly until those are added (if ever) then the newest vessels in the PN are really unsuitable for modern combat operations.
From this pic, the 2 SIMBAD-RC launchers (after the RHIBS) have limited coverage of the Bow.
1596902041201.jpeg
Source of pic: Naval News.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Realistically, there would likely need to be a third launcher located between the gun and bridge to cover the forward arc. Radar coverage could still be problematic, and of course the limitations of the launchers themselves. Better than not having anything, but IMO these type launchers are not really suitable for much more than small patrol boats which have too little space and/or displacement to take a larger CIWS or VSHORAD system.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Realistically, there would likely need to be a third launcher located between the gun and bridge to cover the forward arc. Radar coverage could still be problematic, and of course the limitations of the launchers themselves. Better than not having anything, but IMO these type launchers are not really suitable for much more than small patrol boats which have too little space and/or displacement to take a larger CIWS or VSHORAD system.
1. This ship by its design and sensor placement is designed to have:
(i) the VLS (equipped with MICA missiles that have a max range of 20km) along with the TRS-3D radar to provide 360 degree primary sensor and missile defence coverage;​
(ii) theoretically as a secondary line of defence, to protect against low sea skimming threats (and cued by a Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device), the 4 ready to launch short ranged Mistral missiles (with an effective range of 6km) to provide port, starboard and stern coverage for enemy SSMs that are able to evade the primary defences; and​
(iii) the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar with its 180 degree coverage of the bow is being used to cue the 76mm gun (aka naval gun fire radar) that can be used for last ditch air defence.​

2. What the Pinoys really, really, really need is the VLS as the primary system — which is unfortunately FFBNW.

3. Even with the VLS installed, you can easily see the inherent ship air defence limitations by virtue of sensor and missile systems selected.

4. I am not sure where the Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device is located. Does it have full 360 degree coverage? For competent navies, their electro-optical devices would not only have 360 degree coverage, there is also software integration of these electro-optical devices with other sensors to provide a real time sea picture.

5. The Pinoys with the choices made in the sub-systems they buy show a more fundamental problem — they don’t know how to layer the sensor and shooter coverage. Their problem is they lack a concept of ops for naval air and surface warfare — having never owned a modern frigate.

6. For competent navies, electronic support measures (ESM) allows the ship’s primary radar to not emit as part of their tactics. And I don’t see a capable ESM mast installed. This means the Philippine navy does not a lack of knowledge for air warfare; rather it is more accurate to say that the Pinoys have no institutional knowledge on how to fight the ship for both air and surface warfare.

7. In 12 years from now, when they would gain some basic institutional knowledge for air warfare, they may realise that their prior sub-system choices made were either lacking or not fit for purpose. At that time, they can plan the mid-life upgrade for the ship class at the 15 to 20 year mark.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
1. This ship by its design and sensor placement is designed to have:
(i) the VLS (equipped with MICA missiles that have a max range of 20km) along with the TRS-3D radar to provide 360 degree primary sensor and missile defence coverage;​
(ii) theoretically as a secondary line of defence, to protect against low sea skimming threats (and cued by a Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device), the 4 ready to launch short ranged Mistral missiles (with an effective range of 6km) to provide port, starboard and stern coverage for enemy SSMs that are able to evade the primary defences; and​
(iii) the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar with its 180 degree coverage of the bow is being used to cue the 76mm gun (aka naval gun fire radar) that can be used for last ditch air defence.​

2. What the Pinoys really, really, really need is the VLS as the primary system — which is unfortunately FFBNW.

3. Even with the VLS installed, you can easily see the inherent ship air defence limitations by virtue of sensor and missile systems selected.

4. I am not sure where the Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device is located. Does it have full 360 degree coverage? For competent navies, their electro-optical devices would not only have 360 degree coverage, there is also software integration of these electro-optical devices with other sensors to provide a real time sea picture.

5. The Pinoys with the choices made in the sub-systems they buy show a more fundamental problem — they don’t know how to layer the sensor and shooter coverage. Their problem is they lack a concept of ops for naval air and surface warfare — having never owned a modern frigate.

6. For competent navies, electronic support measures (ESM) allows the ship’s primary radar to not emit as part of their tactics. And I don’t see a capable ESM mast installed. This means the Philippine navy does not a lack of knowledge for air warfare; rather it is more accurate to say that the Pinoys have no institutional knowledge on how to fight the ship.

7. In 12 years from now, when they would gain some basic institutional knowledge for air warfare and may realise that their sub-system choices were either lacking or not fit for purpose. At that time, they can plan the mid-life upgrade for the ship class at the 15 to 20 year mark.
From which i understand, the Philippine Navy's Technical Working Group selected innitially a more integrated and logic package for the project:

Thales TACTICOS Baseline 2 Combat Management System (CMS)
Thales NS-106 Active Electronically Scanned Array S-band Radar
Thales TS82521 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) System
Thales STIR Mk 1.2 Fire Control Radar
Thales Bluewatcher Hull Mounted Sonar
Thales Link Y Mk 2 Tactical Data Link
Thales Vigile LW Electronic Support Measure (ESM), upgraded to Thales Vigile 100
Terma C-Guard countermeasures system
Safran Paseo NS Electro-Optical Tracking System (EOTS)
MSI DS30mm RCWS as secondary weapon
L3 MAPPS Integrated Platform Management System

But after securing the contract, the sensors and weapon systems later then changed to a different configuration: a cheaper collection of different brands from multiple countries, the system package now installed.

Btw, even with 4 SIMBAD Mistral launchers, it stays a modified MANPADS. A single decent CIWS like the Oerlikon Millennium is maybe more effective for a little bit more money.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
@Sandhi Yudha,

I see your point but let me share mine. The listing tells me that the Pinoy TWG can read brochures?

1. If you look at 3rd world weapons buying behaviour — TWG members always tell you, they recommended X (a top of the line system) but the country bought Y (a 3rd rate system) — when things suck, it is not their fault. But that is not budget reality for a 3rd world buyer. The reality is a good TWG knows how to choose 3rd rate systems that work well together to get better synergy.

2. Prior to this ship, they were a WWII navy. They did not as a naval institution grow, over the years — from missile gunboats, to corvettes and to frigates. WITHOUT crawl, walk and run process — how could they acquire the required knowledge to fight the ship?

3. Did the TWG have a test plan for the sub-systems proposed? And if they tell you they did tests — how was it done? Do the Pinoys have labs to design and redesign the man-machine interface to determine the cognitive workload of the ship crew manning the system?

4. If they have a coverage gap, how do they use an analysis of alternatives to fill the gap? The solution may not be more missiles but a better ECM and decoy system. The test of a TWG is integrating 3rd rate systems in a way that the navy can still fight the ship via good tactics.

5. When compared against the smaller and cheaper 30 year old Victory Class (that are armed with Barack 1 and Harpoon missiles), the sad reality is that this Pinoy TWG has rubber stamped the purchase of a warship in 2020 that is less capable than a Singapore ship commissioned in Aug 1990. The modern sensor systems aboard the Victory Class includes for ESM, Elisra SEWS and for ECM, RAFAEL RAN 1101 Jammer, and the Sea Giraffe AMB radar.

6. Thanks to astute the purchase of an ESM system by DSTA, a Singaporean warship will be able to detect a Pinoy warship at a longer ranger than them. If shooting occurs, there is ECM jamming available before the deployment of chaff and decoys — making the ship more survivable against a missile attack.
 
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JohnJT

Member
Ok, why don’t you tell me what are the sensors beyond the TRS-3D that are installed and how is the FC linked to the stern sector of this frigate?

Go google it or click on the link I provided earlier and explain to me why you think it is effective. I am happy to learn from you, when you explain the specific reasons, why the sensor coverage is great — and not just a generic statement. I am not trying to be difficult and really want to know, if anyone is willing to put in the work to find out.

Given that their notional enemy are PLA(N) destroyers and frigates — do you think that these Mistral missiles as the frigate's primary air defense system is adequate? What is the air defence system for the bow? Is it only a 76mm gun?

In the next 2 years, it is unlikely the the Pinoys will pay for a Vertical Launching System (VLS). This is a Fitted For But Not With (FFBNW) item. Why is the VLS missing? What did the navy want and why did they get a ship that is FFBNW in the end?
You're right, I have no idea how effective the FC system on Jose Rizal is. I certainly didn't want to make it sound like I thought SIMBAD RC is an adequate first line missile defense or anything other than last - ditch.
My post was purely about target types and was based on a conversation I had with a French naval officer at SNA. My bad.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
You're right, I have no idea how effective the FC system on Jose Rizal is. I certainly didn't want to make it sound like I thought SIMBAD RC is an adequate first line missile defense or anything other than last - ditch.
My post was purely about target types and was based on a conversation I had with a French naval officer at SNA. My bad.
Dont worry, we will forgive you....
:-D

But seriously, im also a civillian, just visiting this place to discuss, read news reports/articles and get more knowledge about defence.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
@Sandhi Yudha,

I see your point but let me share mine. The listing tells me that the Pinoy TWG can read brochures?

1. If you look at 3rd world weapons buying behaviour — TWG members always tell you, they recommended X (a top of the line system) but the country bought Y (a 3rd rate system) — when things suck, it is not their fault. But that is not budget reality for a 3rd world buyer. The reality is a good TWG knows how to choose 3rd rate systems that work well together to get better synergy.
It's more complex than that. By Philippine law the TWG can not preselect an equipment by brand name or model number. It can specify minimum requirements and often this pretty much narrows down the field to a couple or even a single manufacturer, but in this particular case the list was selected from the bidder's offer.

So there was a specified budget (18 billion peso) and a specific set a requirement and a tender process. One of the bidder offered a package with those included at a price within the budget and they won the bid. Once they won the bid they changed the list, replacing it with cheaper equipment.

Several Philippine officers in charge of the bidding process refused to accept the change. They were overridden by their higher ups. A vice-admiral was forced to retire when he refused to comply. The changes then were signed off and now that's what the Philippine Navy got.

Look up Philippine news mentioning the frigate circa 2016-2018 for more details. You can find a summary at Wikipedia but the usual disclaimer on Wiki stuff applies.

So in this one case the TWG (or at least it's pre-2017 incarnation) indeed did their best. The budget's ceiling was well published. The bidder, by participating, indicated their ability to meet the budget. The package they offered was indeed good. That the package was later changed, with the complicit acceptance of higher ranking officers and politicians, is indeed not their fault.

This does not change the fact that the whole thing is FUBAR, but there are people who did try their best but was stymied by their superiors both military and civilian.
 

JohnJT

Member
So in this one case the TWG (or at least it's pre-2017 incarnation) indeed did their best. The budget's ceiling was well published. The bidder, by participating, indicated their ability to meet the budget. The package they offered was indeed good. That the package was later changed, with the complicit acceptance of higher ranking officers and politicians, is indeed not their fault.

This does not change the fact that the whole thing is FUBAR, but there are people who did try their best but was stymied by their superiors both military and civilian.
Dare I even ask this, but given HHI's track record for giving bribes, shouldn't it be asked what the motivation was for those superiors to accept the changed equipment package?
 
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