yasin_khan
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Pakistan army has done good operations in 1965 Indo-Pak war.If any operations are missing then send.
Pak army's operations in 1965 war.
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yasin_khan
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India is Rattled
As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chhamb and Jurian. The Indians had prepared concrete bunkers, interlinked by covered communication trenches and planned to meet all possible eventualities. They had a top story for observation, the ground story with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for living. It was a proper defensive line and it succeeded in creating the defensive mentality. All defenses are double edged weapons. The stronger they are the greater is the intensity of defensive attitude produced by them. The close atmosphere acts on the minds of defenders very adversely thereby creating fear and queer type demoralization which engenders the quest for freedom of movement and is only removed by coming out in the open. When such defenses are subjected to heavy shelling, the explosion and their reverberating echoes produce a near concussion effect and the men inside either wish to run away or lie down listlessly. The Indian could not know the after effects of Maginot Line type of defenses. They had never experienced them. They thought it was good for prestige to have modern defenses and they adopted them1.
The Indians had started advancing in Haji Pir Pass area and due to the few troops in that sector it was more than likely that the link up between Indians advancing from Uri and those advancing North from Punch would soon take place. The Indians had thought that they would then be in a position to push westward in a view of the area being very thinly held by AK troops.
The only way to force India to release pressure in that area was to force her to pull out substantial portion for her forces assigned for the conquest of AK areas. An attack on Chhamb-Jurian which would threaten Akhnoor nerve center of Indian Line of Communication to Punch, was the correct answer. The Indian High Command when making grandiose plans for the invasion of Pakistan did think of this weak link in their chain of defenses and that was the precise reason why they had paid extra attention to this sector and constructed seemingly impregnable concrete defenses.
The troops available to Pakistan for an attack on Chhamb were:
102 Infantry brigade
4 Azad Kashmir
Two Companies of 12 FF (R and S)
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers
In view of shortage of troops 7 Infantry Division minus 25 Infantry Brigade, 14 Para Brigade, 22 Cavalry and some other elements was moved to Gujrat area on August 30, 1965. Apart from elements of divisional troops the only formation left with 7 Infantry Division now was 10 Infantry Brigade. This was placed under command 12 Infantry Division for the initial phase. This meant that 12 Infantry Division now had three infantry brigade to attack with. It thus had the following
10 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): commanded by Brig. Hayat
102 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): Commanded by brig. Zafar Ali Khan
4 Azad Kashmir : Commanded by brig Abdul Hameed Khan
Two companies 12 FF
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers
Divisional artillery and other services.
The Indians had then in the areas 10 Indian Mountain Division, 191 Indian Independent Infantry Brigade and parts of 93 Infantry Brigade.
The task allotted to 12 Infantry Division was to destroy enemy in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnoor. The Divisional Commander Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik decided to undertake the task in two phases. In phase one, he decided to destroy the enemy West of Tawi in area in area Lalial, Dewa and Chhamb. The second phase was to cross Tawi and pose a threat to Akhnoor by destroying enemy in the enemy of Jurian.
One September 1, the attack went in at first light. The Corps artillery supported the attack led by 9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 11 Cavalry less one squadron. By 1030 hours the enemy position at Phur, Dalla, Barsala, Jhanda, Malgotian, Chak Pundit and Munawwar had been rolled up. The strong fortification were of no avail to the Indian troops not used to live under artillery shells directed at them.
The enemy at Moel and Burejal felt insecure soon after the enveloping movement very nearly cut off their threat. They were, however, quick enough to realize it and managed to retreat before they were completely cut off. In the process they gave a good deal of casualties.
The enemy AMX tanks were trying desperately to stop the advance of Pakistani tanks. Which had by now swung North East of Phagla and were heading for Chhamb. Dewa was in the hands of Pakistanis by 1400 hours.
It was at 1630 hours that the Indian Air Force came to the rescue of the Indian Army2. Four of them all, Vampires, were taken on by Pakistan Air Force , and were bagged within minutes. One of the JCOs of 13 Punjab whose Platoon had been earlier strafed by the Vampires said afterwards, "I wasted time over trying to remember what a Vampire looked like. They never visited us again in this front." A few Hunters came near last night and strafed our leading troops but did not stay long enough to give battle to Pakistan Air Force. The example of vampires was still fresh in Indians minds to venture over Pakistani troops for long.
On the left of 102 Infantry Brigade, 4 Azad Kashmir had advanced at an equally rapid speed. The brigade objective had been Dewa and Lalial. 5 AK contained Pir Jamal and a few other localities, on the right, and 19 AK put in an attack on Patrara. The position was well dug in and supported by a number of MMGs in addition to artillery. All the likely approaches had been mined intensively by the Indians. In a well conducted attack the leading company of 19 AK assaulted the position from the left flank and by 0730 hours had pushed the enemy out of Patrara. The brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Hameed Khan, desirous of maintaining the momentum of attack ordered the C.O. to continue the advance and roll up the rearward defenses of the enemy. Chakla and Dewa had fallen into our hands by the evening.
5 Azad Kashmir which had, earlier in the morning, contained enemy positions at Dalla, Paur, Pir Jamal and Maira, put I attack on Maira at 1100 hours. The Indians put in very little resistance and place was in Pakistan Army's hands very soon. The incident of capture of 53 Indian other ranks of 6 Sikh Light Infantry, by Lt. Col. Babr of A.O.P deserves mention. He had seen a collection of Indians, lurking in a nullah (creek) from the air. He landed his helicopter nearby and between himself and his companion Capt. Akbar rounded up 53 Indians. They had no officer or J.C.O. with them. They had all deserted them and ran away in their command vehicles.
Moel was attacked by 5 Azad Kashmir in the after noon and was occupied by them by 1700. Mopping up operations were undertaken by the battalion in the rest of the area including Dalla and small pockets of the enemy were cleared in places where they had been bypassed by 102 Infantry Brigade and 19 AK except Pir Jamal.
Headquarters 7 Infantry Division had arrived in the area and it was felt that the command of this sector would be exercised more expeditiously if 7 Division commanded by Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan, controlled the operations. 12 Division Headquarters was too far from the area of operations and the C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa, felt that the command of operations should be exercised from the headquarters which was located closer at hand rather than the headquarters from a distance. It was inconvenient to continue controlling the battle from Tactical Headquarters for too long which had to be done until then. As a result of this decision 7 Infantry Division assumed of operations from 1100 hours on September 2.
Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan gave orders for the completion of Phase I. 102 Infantry brigade and 10 Infantry Brigade consolidated positions along river Munawwar Tawi. 102 brigade was at this stage in the North and 10 Brigade to its immediate South. 4 AK brigade further North consolidated the position captured by it on the previous day.
The position having been consolidated the GOC ordered 10 Infantry Brigade to cross Munawwar Tawi at 1730 hours on 2 September and established a brigade head across it.
The brigade head was complete by 1930 hours and both the battalions of 10 Infantry Brigade, 6 FF and 14 Punjab with 13 Lancers under command 10 Brigade crossed this formidable obstacle. It is surprising at the complete paralyzing of the enemy ground forces. The water in the river was no where less than 4 feet deep and it was a very wide stream. The going was not easy and the banks were fairly steep. The crossing was expected to be opposed by the enemy very stubbornly but it seemed Indian troops had lost all relish of opposing, the day before. Inspite of the whole day at their disposal to dig in and establish themselves across the river they had not been able to make up their mind that they would resist the crossing.
5 AK to the West, cleared Pir Jamal by 1630 hours after a very stiff and hand to hand fight. The Indians had fought stubbornly and accepted a large number of casualties before being forced to withdraw.
As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chhamb and Jurian. The Indians had prepared concrete bunkers, interlinked by covered communication trenches and planned to meet all possible eventualities. They had a top story for observation, the ground story with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for living. It was a proper defensive line and it succeeded in creating the defensive mentality. All defenses are double edged weapons. The stronger they are the greater is the intensity of defensive attitude produced by them. The close atmosphere acts on the minds of defenders very adversely thereby creating fear and queer type demoralization which engenders the quest for freedom of movement and is only removed by coming out in the open. When such defenses are subjected to heavy shelling, the explosion and their reverberating echoes produce a near concussion effect and the men inside either wish to run away or lie down listlessly. The Indian could not know the after effects of Maginot Line type of defenses. They had never experienced them. They thought it was good for prestige to have modern defenses and they adopted them1.
The Indians had started advancing in Haji Pir Pass area and due to the few troops in that sector it was more than likely that the link up between Indians advancing from Uri and those advancing North from Punch would soon take place. The Indians had thought that they would then be in a position to push westward in a view of the area being very thinly held by AK troops.
The only way to force India to release pressure in that area was to force her to pull out substantial portion for her forces assigned for the conquest of AK areas. An attack on Chhamb-Jurian which would threaten Akhnoor nerve center of Indian Line of Communication to Punch, was the correct answer. The Indian High Command when making grandiose plans for the invasion of Pakistan did think of this weak link in their chain of defenses and that was the precise reason why they had paid extra attention to this sector and constructed seemingly impregnable concrete defenses.
The troops available to Pakistan for an attack on Chhamb were:
102 Infantry brigade
4 Azad Kashmir
Two Companies of 12 FF (R and S)
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers
In view of shortage of troops 7 Infantry Division minus 25 Infantry Brigade, 14 Para Brigade, 22 Cavalry and some other elements was moved to Gujrat area on August 30, 1965. Apart from elements of divisional troops the only formation left with 7 Infantry Division now was 10 Infantry Brigade. This was placed under command 12 Infantry Division for the initial phase. This meant that 12 Infantry Division now had three infantry brigade to attack with. It thus had the following
10 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): commanded by Brig. Hayat
102 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): Commanded by brig. Zafar Ali Khan
4 Azad Kashmir : Commanded by brig Abdul Hameed Khan
Two companies 12 FF
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers
Divisional artillery and other services.
The Indians had then in the areas 10 Indian Mountain Division, 191 Indian Independent Infantry Brigade and parts of 93 Infantry Brigade.
The task allotted to 12 Infantry Division was to destroy enemy in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnoor. The Divisional Commander Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik decided to undertake the task in two phases. In phase one, he decided to destroy the enemy West of Tawi in area in area Lalial, Dewa and Chhamb. The second phase was to cross Tawi and pose a threat to Akhnoor by destroying enemy in the enemy of Jurian.
One September 1, the attack went in at first light. The Corps artillery supported the attack led by 9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 11 Cavalry less one squadron. By 1030 hours the enemy position at Phur, Dalla, Barsala, Jhanda, Malgotian, Chak Pundit and Munawwar had been rolled up. The strong fortification were of no avail to the Indian troops not used to live under artillery shells directed at them.
The enemy at Moel and Burejal felt insecure soon after the enveloping movement very nearly cut off their threat. They were, however, quick enough to realize it and managed to retreat before they were completely cut off. In the process they gave a good deal of casualties.
The enemy AMX tanks were trying desperately to stop the advance of Pakistani tanks. Which had by now swung North East of Phagla and were heading for Chhamb. Dewa was in the hands of Pakistanis by 1400 hours.
It was at 1630 hours that the Indian Air Force came to the rescue of the Indian Army2. Four of them all, Vampires, were taken on by Pakistan Air Force , and were bagged within minutes. One of the JCOs of 13 Punjab whose Platoon had been earlier strafed by the Vampires said afterwards, "I wasted time over trying to remember what a Vampire looked like. They never visited us again in this front." A few Hunters came near last night and strafed our leading troops but did not stay long enough to give battle to Pakistan Air Force. The example of vampires was still fresh in Indians minds to venture over Pakistani troops for long.
On the left of 102 Infantry Brigade, 4 Azad Kashmir had advanced at an equally rapid speed. The brigade objective had been Dewa and Lalial. 5 AK contained Pir Jamal and a few other localities, on the right, and 19 AK put in an attack on Patrara. The position was well dug in and supported by a number of MMGs in addition to artillery. All the likely approaches had been mined intensively by the Indians. In a well conducted attack the leading company of 19 AK assaulted the position from the left flank and by 0730 hours had pushed the enemy out of Patrara. The brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Hameed Khan, desirous of maintaining the momentum of attack ordered the C.O. to continue the advance and roll up the rearward defenses of the enemy. Chakla and Dewa had fallen into our hands by the evening.
5 Azad Kashmir which had, earlier in the morning, contained enemy positions at Dalla, Paur, Pir Jamal and Maira, put I attack on Maira at 1100 hours. The Indians put in very little resistance and place was in Pakistan Army's hands very soon. The incident of capture of 53 Indian other ranks of 6 Sikh Light Infantry, by Lt. Col. Babr of A.O.P deserves mention. He had seen a collection of Indians, lurking in a nullah (creek) from the air. He landed his helicopter nearby and between himself and his companion Capt. Akbar rounded up 53 Indians. They had no officer or J.C.O. with them. They had all deserted them and ran away in their command vehicles.
Moel was attacked by 5 Azad Kashmir in the after noon and was occupied by them by 1700. Mopping up operations were undertaken by the battalion in the rest of the area including Dalla and small pockets of the enemy were cleared in places where they had been bypassed by 102 Infantry Brigade and 19 AK except Pir Jamal.
Headquarters 7 Infantry Division had arrived in the area and it was felt that the command of this sector would be exercised more expeditiously if 7 Division commanded by Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan, controlled the operations. 12 Division Headquarters was too far from the area of operations and the C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa, felt that the command of operations should be exercised from the headquarters which was located closer at hand rather than the headquarters from a distance. It was inconvenient to continue controlling the battle from Tactical Headquarters for too long which had to be done until then. As a result of this decision 7 Infantry Division assumed of operations from 1100 hours on September 2.
Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan gave orders for the completion of Phase I. 102 Infantry brigade and 10 Infantry Brigade consolidated positions along river Munawwar Tawi. 102 brigade was at this stage in the North and 10 Brigade to its immediate South. 4 AK brigade further North consolidated the position captured by it on the previous day.
The position having been consolidated the GOC ordered 10 Infantry Brigade to cross Munawwar Tawi at 1730 hours on 2 September and established a brigade head across it.
The brigade head was complete by 1930 hours and both the battalions of 10 Infantry Brigade, 6 FF and 14 Punjab with 13 Lancers under command 10 Brigade crossed this formidable obstacle. It is surprising at the complete paralyzing of the enemy ground forces. The water in the river was no where less than 4 feet deep and it was a very wide stream. The going was not easy and the banks were fairly steep. The crossing was expected to be opposed by the enemy very stubbornly but it seemed Indian troops had lost all relish of opposing, the day before. Inspite of the whole day at their disposal to dig in and establish themselves across the river they had not been able to make up their mind that they would resist the crossing.
5 AK to the West, cleared Pir Jamal by 1630 hours after a very stiff and hand to hand fight. The Indians had fought stubbornly and accepted a large number of casualties before being forced to withdraw.
yasin_khan
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Morning Tea that never reached Kasur
The Indian invasion of Kasur sector had been synchronized with that of Lahore sector. 11 Infantry Division raised, on an ad hoc basis, a few months earlier, had been assigned to defend this sector and to destroy any enemy break through either from Ferozpur, through Hussainiwala or via Bedian and Hem Karan, in an effort to outflank Lahore. The division having been raised during the emergency had not been brought up to full strength and apart from other shortages had only seven infantry battalions. The divisional commander, Major General Abdul Hamid, had decided to fight in front of the BRB canal and to carry the battle into the enemy territory as soon as opportunity arose.
The Indians had been seen carrying our reconnaissance of the border are a few days before the invasion. The suspicion of the GOC had been aroused and he had ordered the diggings of defensive positions on 4 September but, in order not to worsen the political situation, had taken care that all work on defensive positions was to be done during the hours of darkness only.
The position became weaker on 5 September when 21 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig. Sahib Dad Khan, 13 Baluch and 5 FF, was moved out of the area. This left only five infantry battalions, with the division to defend a front of approximately 28 miles.
News came into Division Headquarters at about 345 hours on 6 September that Indian movement had been observed in front of the ranger post at Bedian. By 0500 hours, it was clear that the Ranger posts all along the border were under enemy attack. Soon the Indians decided to forego the element of surprise, which had already been lost, and opened up with mortars and artillery. The enemy had planned a two pronged attack, one aimed against Bedian Head Works and the other directly leading to Kasur along the road Patti-Khem-Karan-Kasur.
The two main enemy attacks were directed against Bedian, by 5 Guards battalion, and Kasur along Khem Karan axis by 9 J and K battalion. By 0900 hours both the attacks had come to standstill. Both attacks had been of a battalion strength each and supported by armour. Defending Bedian facing the enemy attack was a company of 1 East Bengal Regiment. They withstood the assault most admirably. The enemy received the proper reception. The senior Tigers, as the battalion was called, held their fire as seasoned troops are expected to do. They had a plucky young gunner Captain as F.O.O., who had his O.P. on top of a tree. He gave them an excellent supporting fire even though wounded during the early hours of the morning.
HQ 106 Infantry Brigade was shelled at about 0600 hours but the Indians did not achieve much. There was only one casualty as a result of it.
One Kasur - Khem Karan road, which appeared to be the main axis, the battalion holding up the Indians was 7 Punjab. The first attack having been held up, the right flank was attacked the second time. 7 Punjab forward platoon, on this flank, had to fall back in initial stages. This encouraged the Indians and 13 Dogra, came rushing on and took Rohiwala village, only to find themselves in a trap. 7 Punjab put in a well planned counter attack with one company and put the Dogras to flight. Their battalion 2nd in command Major Milkiat Singh with 14 others was taken prisoner and the rest managed to extricate themselves, leaving over 60 dead on the field.
There had been subsidiary attacks along the rest of the front also. They had been directed against village Punwan and Ballanwala with the idea of securing crossing BRB canal. These were not allowed to develop and were stopped efficiently.
1 East Bengal Regiment faced another battalion attack at 1000 hours in front of Bedian. This also was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.
Enemy 4 Indian Mountain Division, had the support of 2 Indian Independent Armoured Brigade and an unusually large compliment of Infantry and artillery. It had under it 17 infantry battalions. Opposing it were 5 battalions stretched out over a large front. As a result the point of Indian attack, selected at will due to the initiative being in their hands, gave to the Indians a superiority of 5 to 1 in addition to armour. The artillery support of 11 Division was also much less on 6 September as compared to what the Indians had.
The Indians continued to attack again and again throughout the day. An intercepted wireless message, earlier in the day had said, "Speed up". The morning tea will be issued in Kasur." That cup of tea was not to be tasted. Many tastes another kind of cup that day and to no purpose. The old says, "There is many slip a between the cup and the lip", was said for precisely such occasions. The whole sector from Kasur to Bedian was under constant pressure, but the pattern was the same. The armour had been spread out over the whole front in the
The Indian invasion of Kasur sector had been synchronized with that of Lahore sector. 11 Infantry Division raised, on an ad hoc basis, a few months earlier, had been assigned to defend this sector and to destroy any enemy break through either from Ferozpur, through Hussainiwala or via Bedian and Hem Karan, in an effort to outflank Lahore. The division having been raised during the emergency had not been brought up to full strength and apart from other shortages had only seven infantry battalions. The divisional commander, Major General Abdul Hamid, had decided to fight in front of the BRB canal and to carry the battle into the enemy territory as soon as opportunity arose.
The Indians had been seen carrying our reconnaissance of the border are a few days before the invasion. The suspicion of the GOC had been aroused and he had ordered the diggings of defensive positions on 4 September but, in order not to worsen the political situation, had taken care that all work on defensive positions was to be done during the hours of darkness only.
The position became weaker on 5 September when 21 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig. Sahib Dad Khan, 13 Baluch and 5 FF, was moved out of the area. This left only five infantry battalions, with the division to defend a front of approximately 28 miles.
News came into Division Headquarters at about 345 hours on 6 September that Indian movement had been observed in front of the ranger post at Bedian. By 0500 hours, it was clear that the Ranger posts all along the border were under enemy attack. Soon the Indians decided to forego the element of surprise, which had already been lost, and opened up with mortars and artillery. The enemy had planned a two pronged attack, one aimed against Bedian Head Works and the other directly leading to Kasur along the road Patti-Khem-Karan-Kasur.
The two main enemy attacks were directed against Bedian, by 5 Guards battalion, and Kasur along Khem Karan axis by 9 J and K battalion. By 0900 hours both the attacks had come to standstill. Both attacks had been of a battalion strength each and supported by armour. Defending Bedian facing the enemy attack was a company of 1 East Bengal Regiment. They withstood the assault most admirably. The enemy received the proper reception. The senior Tigers, as the battalion was called, held their fire as seasoned troops are expected to do. They had a plucky young gunner Captain as F.O.O., who had his O.P. on top of a tree. He gave them an excellent supporting fire even though wounded during the early hours of the morning.
HQ 106 Infantry Brigade was shelled at about 0600 hours but the Indians did not achieve much. There was only one casualty as a result of it.
One Kasur - Khem Karan road, which appeared to be the main axis, the battalion holding up the Indians was 7 Punjab. The first attack having been held up, the right flank was attacked the second time. 7 Punjab forward platoon, on this flank, had to fall back in initial stages. This encouraged the Indians and 13 Dogra, came rushing on and took Rohiwala village, only to find themselves in a trap. 7 Punjab put in a well planned counter attack with one company and put the Dogras to flight. Their battalion 2nd in command Major Milkiat Singh with 14 others was taken prisoner and the rest managed to extricate themselves, leaving over 60 dead on the field.
There had been subsidiary attacks along the rest of the front also. They had been directed against village Punwan and Ballanwala with the idea of securing crossing BRB canal. These were not allowed to develop and were stopped efficiently.
1 East Bengal Regiment faced another battalion attack at 1000 hours in front of Bedian. This also was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.
Enemy 4 Indian Mountain Division, had the support of 2 Indian Independent Armoured Brigade and an unusually large compliment of Infantry and artillery. It had under it 17 infantry battalions. Opposing it were 5 battalions stretched out over a large front. As a result the point of Indian attack, selected at will due to the initiative being in their hands, gave to the Indians a superiority of 5 to 1 in addition to armour. The artillery support of 11 Division was also much less on 6 September as compared to what the Indians had.
The Indians continued to attack again and again throughout the day. An intercepted wireless message, earlier in the day had said, "Speed up". The morning tea will be issued in Kasur." That cup of tea was not to be tasted. Many tastes another kind of cup that day and to no purpose. The old says, "There is many slip a between the cup and the lip", was said for precisely such occasions. The whole sector from Kasur to Bedian was under constant pressure, but the pattern was the same. The armour had been spread out over the whole front in the
yasin_khan
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Side Show the Sulaimanki
The defence of Sulaimanki Sector was the operational responsibility of 105 Infantry Brigade located in the Bhalwalpur. When the situation became tense in early September, the Brigade Group moved into the defence localities on 5 September.
The Brigade Commander, brigadier Mohammad Akbar decided not to give the Indians an opportunity to take the initiative in their hands. He decided to attack Sadiqa and Jhangar, the moment it was known that the Indian Army had invaded Pakistan. The task was allotted to 10 Punjab. Opposite them was an Indian Brigade group supported by a Squadron of medium tanks. The attack was mounted at 1820 hours on 6 September. It was led by Major Hikmutullah with one company of 10 Punjab and a platoon of the Rangers. The Indians tried to bring in all the fire at their disposal but only for 5 or 10 minutes. At the end of this short burst of activity, they left their posts and all their arms seeking safety in flight. Four of them were taken prisoners, a few were killed and the rest escaped. There were no casualties to our troops.
The other objective decided upon for the closing hours of 6 September was Jhangar. D Coy 10 Punjab under command of major Mohammad Aslam Janjua attacked this objective without any H Hour shelling. Here the Indians put up better resistance. Hand to hand fight ensued and grenades had to be used to ferret them out of their bunkers. The Indian casualties inside the bunkers were large including the company commander of the area. The remaining Indians fell back to a discarded kiln in the vicinity but were chased out of this position also. Hand grenades had to be used once again. A few were able to get away. The Indians left 19 bodies in the kiln. 3 prisoners were taken. The second phase of this attack was a small post in village Noor Mohammad. This proved to be an easy affair. A platoon was able to deal with this post.
The objective given to the 10 Punjab had been achieved but the Commander Lt-Col. Amir Hamza Khan was tempted to keep up the momentum of the advance and continue upon village Pakka which had been kept for the final phase to be undertaken by 4 Punjab. This unscheduled attack brought about as it should have done , the situation , which often happens, and its recurrence cannot be avoided under such circumstances. The battalion became a target to our own artillery and enemy MMG for simultaneously. The battalion commander was quick to appreciate the situation and at once halted the battalion advance. Although dark, he quickly managed to reform the battalion and left enough room for 4 Punjab to carry out their share of task.
4 Punjab had done a march of 16 miles to reach the battle positions that very morning but the news of Lahore having been attacked and they so far away was enough to redouble their determination to avenge the losses which they thought, their companions must have suffered at Wagah and Gawandi.
The attack of 4 Punjab was led by C Coy under Major Mohammad Abdul Rashid. They left their positions at 2200 hours. The movement had perforce to be slow as the enemy positions were behind water-logged area. The deeper portions of the Sem lake were waist-deep but they waded through it under heavy small arms and mortar fire and by 2230 hours the enemy had evacuated pakka village also. Five prisoners were taken. The major portion of the enemy had disappeared in the dark. 4 Punjab had only 4 ORs wounded.
One could not expect the Indians not to retaliate. They started shelling our positions early next morning, 7 September and continued this economic method of retaliation throughout the day. Pakistani positions had no overhead cover but fortunately there were no direct hits. As night approached the intensity of enemy shelling increased. The patrols reported enemy concentrations near Gurmukh Khera. AT 2000 hours, a battalion of Indian 14 Punjab Regiment composed of Sikhs, put in an attack on A Company of 4 Punjab. This company behaved in an extremely cool and calm manner. It showed very high quality of fire control. The Sikhs were allowed to come right up to the middle of the company position . The Indians saw the villages ablaze as a result of their shelling and were happy to have reached the objective without any opposition. In their joy they sent up their success signals. The very light showed them up as nothing else could have done and they received well aimed rifle and LMG firm from very close quarters. This sudden volley of small arms fire in the middle of rejoicing, produced the shock effect, which in other circumstances , thousands of artillery shells could not have done. The Indian commanders , were shouting orders on vain:
Take positions
Charge
Hamala Karo
Jai Hind
All these calls were of no avail. The men could think of nothing except their safety. They ran back as they had seldom run before. The Indians reinforced this sector by 67 Indian Infantry brigade but did not venture to attack our positions until after the cease-fire. 1 Baluch was planning its further attack on 15 September when it was pulled out of this sector. 4 Punjab was relieved by 22 Punjab, a newly raised battalion, mainly composed of retired soldiers.
105 Infantry Brigade, in spite of its numerical inferiority, kept up pressure on the Indians and was able to reduce a number of small posts one by one. By the time cease-fire was agreed, this brigade had at least 30 Indian villages under its control and had succeeded in capturing over 150 square miles of Indian territory. The Indians tried hard on 25 September to recapture the territory, they had lost but had to sit quiet after the unpleasant experience of 3/0 Gurkhas, who apart from heavy casualties in dead and wounded, lost 5 tanks and 2 officers, 4 JCOs and 45 ORs as prisoners, during only one night of operations. The Indian brigadier came forward the next morning and requested for stopping the battle which he himself had started. His request was agreed to as he promised not to attack again.
The defence of Sulaimanki Sector was the operational responsibility of 105 Infantry Brigade located in the Bhalwalpur. When the situation became tense in early September, the Brigade Group moved into the defence localities on 5 September.
The Brigade Commander, brigadier Mohammad Akbar decided not to give the Indians an opportunity to take the initiative in their hands. He decided to attack Sadiqa and Jhangar, the moment it was known that the Indian Army had invaded Pakistan. The task was allotted to 10 Punjab. Opposite them was an Indian Brigade group supported by a Squadron of medium tanks. The attack was mounted at 1820 hours on 6 September. It was led by Major Hikmutullah with one company of 10 Punjab and a platoon of the Rangers. The Indians tried to bring in all the fire at their disposal but only for 5 or 10 minutes. At the end of this short burst of activity, they left their posts and all their arms seeking safety in flight. Four of them were taken prisoners, a few were killed and the rest escaped. There were no casualties to our troops.
The other objective decided upon for the closing hours of 6 September was Jhangar. D Coy 10 Punjab under command of major Mohammad Aslam Janjua attacked this objective without any H Hour shelling. Here the Indians put up better resistance. Hand to hand fight ensued and grenades had to be used to ferret them out of their bunkers. The Indian casualties inside the bunkers were large including the company commander of the area. The remaining Indians fell back to a discarded kiln in the vicinity but were chased out of this position also. Hand grenades had to be used once again. A few were able to get away. The Indians left 19 bodies in the kiln. 3 prisoners were taken. The second phase of this attack was a small post in village Noor Mohammad. This proved to be an easy affair. A platoon was able to deal with this post.
The objective given to the 10 Punjab had been achieved but the Commander Lt-Col. Amir Hamza Khan was tempted to keep up the momentum of the advance and continue upon village Pakka which had been kept for the final phase to be undertaken by 4 Punjab. This unscheduled attack brought about as it should have done , the situation , which often happens, and its recurrence cannot be avoided under such circumstances. The battalion became a target to our own artillery and enemy MMG for simultaneously. The battalion commander was quick to appreciate the situation and at once halted the battalion advance. Although dark, he quickly managed to reform the battalion and left enough room for 4 Punjab to carry out their share of task.
4 Punjab had done a march of 16 miles to reach the battle positions that very morning but the news of Lahore having been attacked and they so far away was enough to redouble their determination to avenge the losses which they thought, their companions must have suffered at Wagah and Gawandi.
The attack of 4 Punjab was led by C Coy under Major Mohammad Abdul Rashid. They left their positions at 2200 hours. The movement had perforce to be slow as the enemy positions were behind water-logged area. The deeper portions of the Sem lake were waist-deep but they waded through it under heavy small arms and mortar fire and by 2230 hours the enemy had evacuated pakka village also. Five prisoners were taken. The major portion of the enemy had disappeared in the dark. 4 Punjab had only 4 ORs wounded.
One could not expect the Indians not to retaliate. They started shelling our positions early next morning, 7 September and continued this economic method of retaliation throughout the day. Pakistani positions had no overhead cover but fortunately there were no direct hits. As night approached the intensity of enemy shelling increased. The patrols reported enemy concentrations near Gurmukh Khera. AT 2000 hours, a battalion of Indian 14 Punjab Regiment composed of Sikhs, put in an attack on A Company of 4 Punjab. This company behaved in an extremely cool and calm manner. It showed very high quality of fire control. The Sikhs were allowed to come right up to the middle of the company position . The Indians saw the villages ablaze as a result of their shelling and were happy to have reached the objective without any opposition. In their joy they sent up their success signals. The very light showed them up as nothing else could have done and they received well aimed rifle and LMG firm from very close quarters. This sudden volley of small arms fire in the middle of rejoicing, produced the shock effect, which in other circumstances , thousands of artillery shells could not have done. The Indian commanders , were shouting orders on vain:
Take positions
Charge
Hamala Karo
Jai Hind
All these calls were of no avail. The men could think of nothing except their safety. They ran back as they had seldom run before. The Indians reinforced this sector by 67 Indian Infantry brigade but did not venture to attack our positions until after the cease-fire. 1 Baluch was planning its further attack on 15 September when it was pulled out of this sector. 4 Punjab was relieved by 22 Punjab, a newly raised battalion, mainly composed of retired soldiers.
105 Infantry Brigade, in spite of its numerical inferiority, kept up pressure on the Indians and was able to reduce a number of small posts one by one. By the time cease-fire was agreed, this brigade had at least 30 Indian villages under its control and had succeeded in capturing over 150 square miles of Indian territory. The Indians tried hard on 25 September to recapture the territory, they had lost but had to sit quiet after the unpleasant experience of 3/0 Gurkhas, who apart from heavy casualties in dead and wounded, lost 5 tanks and 2 officers, 4 JCOs and 45 ORs as prisoners, during only one night of operations. The Indian brigadier came forward the next morning and requested for stopping the battle which he himself had started. His request was agreed to as he promised not to attack again.
yasin_khan
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #5
The Eternal City, Data Ki Nagri
The threat of Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India had come true. India had chosen and found the time and place of attack on Pakistan. In the time old Chanakian style the rulers of India had launched a full scale attack on Pakistan without either declaring war or giving an ultimatum. The secrecy with which preparations for the invasion of Pakistan were made was so great that the object of the forward movements was kept hidden even from the invading army until the last moment. The men had been told that they were going on a route march. Indian High Command was afraid of leakage of information and possibility of a few last minute desertions. The men were however, ordered to put on their best uniforms as there would be a ceremonial march at the end of the route march. The author of the Police Action in Hyderabad, general Chaudhuri C-in-C Indian Army, was hopeful of another lucky break. He had his first during the invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948, which India declared as it was just a Police Action. Lieut. General Kaul speaking of the command qualities of Indian C-in-C says,
"The largest tank formation he commanded was a division with which he never fought in any battle but only against ill armed and irregular razakars (volunteers) in a Police Action in Hyderabad." (Kaul op. Cit., P 447)
He, therefore, had decided to march through the streets of Lahore in new uniforms. His advisers were confident that the mighty white elephant at his disposal would, through its sheer momentum, carry him towards Lahore Gymkhana by the same evening. The next few days were to be used in mopping up operations. He was impetuous enough to advice his senior commanders to keep their mess kits and medals handy and to issue invitations to senior civil officials to join him at a cocktail party at the famous Lahore Gymkhana the same evening.
The military Governor of Lahore had been nominated and administrative services earmarked. The police force, to enforce law and order of the type that India had practiced during the days of partition, aided by Jan Sangh mobs, was to follow the army. After all, the world at large was to be told, after a fair accompli, that it was no more than a Police Action.
The Indian High Command was confident of the unawareness of Pakistan to such an extent that they chose the assembly areas of their forward troops a few hundred yards from Pakistan border. Move to the assembly areas started at 10 p.m. on September 5, 1965 and by a little after midnight the mighty Indian Army was poised for the march into the dreamland which would, not only allay the land hunger of their rulers, but would also remove the hunger and starvation brought on to the land of Bharat by her warlords. The acquisition of Pakistan was also to be the first step towards the fulfillment of the dream of Greater India which the Indian demigods had hoped would stretch from Indonesia to the Dardanelles. The steel steeds of India started fuming and puffing from soon after midnight.
The checking and cross checking of formation and unit positions on the start lines was complete by 3 a.m. on September 6. The Zero hour was drawing near and with it was increasing the anxiety of the Indian commanders. They felt, as all commanders in their position should e able to feel, that their troops, who by now had been told the purpose of their presence on the border of Pakistan were a little jumpy and not as elated as the occasion demanded. This eventuality must have been foreseen. A good doze of Rum was administered to the men a few minutes before the order for advance was given.
At 3:30 a.m., 4 a.m. Indian standard time, the green light went up all along the front and the Indian Army rolled into Pakistan. The capture of Lahore being on the cards for the first day's events, the press was told to publish its fall without any mental reservations. The Operation Order of 25 Indian Infantry Division for the attack on Pakistan had said, "The defenses of Lahore have not been prepared and are not manned."
It is to the credit of the West Pakistan Rangers that they forced the enemy to deploy at the very outset and fight for every inch of Pakistan territory. They were neither trained nor equipped to fight a first rate enemy but they did. Unknown to the Indians the Rangers were expecting them. General headquarters Pakistan Army had issued a signal to the Army and HQ West Pakistan rangers on the evening of September 4, that an Indian attack appeared imminent and although efforts were to be made to avoid an escalation of fighting yet the defensive positions were to be occupied. The D. G. Rangers, Brigadier Khuda Dad Khan had issued an order on September 5th to be prepared to meet an Indian invasion. The Rangers, however, could not be everywhere and the Indian Army was able to roll on towards Lahore until they suddenly hit the forward positions of Pakistan Army in the early hours of the morning. Instead of surprising Pakistan Army there, Indians were themselves surprised. They had been allowed to march into Pakistan without much hindrance.
They were sure that fighting against Ranger Posts, which were nowhere in larger strength than a section and armed with rifles only had been localized and even if they had sent back information of Indian invasion it would not be possible for the garrison in Lahore and elsewhere to get ready, collect arms and ammunition and come out of their cantonments before the Indians were inside the town of Lahore itself.
The Indians were banking on the acute effect of such a severe blow to Pakistan. They probably felt that with the fall of Lahore the whole of Pakistan would be at their feet. They approached the BRB canal without much concern but their concentration and the resultant disorganization was beyond description when they suddenly came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire. By now it was first light. Figures could be been seen to have halted, flattered and fall down. Others came forward but met the same fate. The Indian advance had ended. A halt had been called. Not by those who held the initiative, superior strength and unlimited resources in men and equipment but by those who were fewer in numbers and could not boast of similar resources. They were few but they had faith in Allah.
The Indian commander, opposite Lahore had 2 Infantry Divisions and one Independent Brigade under him. He was so confident of the powerful force under his command being invincible that like a school child of eight learning arithmetic, he divided the figure of 2 by 2 which was the number of axis that he wished to advance on. The answer was 1, so he allotted one Division to each axis, Wagah and Burki and sat back. The Independent Infantry brigade could be kept in hand as reserve. The simple exercise in arithmetic was to continue down to battalion and company levels. His distribution of the Corps Artillery was very just and fair, giving equal number of the batteries and guns to each Infantry Division strictly according to the arithmetical formulae. It was so simple and yet people used to tell him that it needed brains to formulate a plan for attack.
The Pakistani commander opposing him was not so fortunate. Major General Mohammad Sarfraz Khan had in all seven infantry battalions and a front of 89,000 yards to defend.
He could not do the simple arithmetic exercise and sit back. He considered the likely axis and having allotted sectors to brigades kept a little reserve in hand. 103 Infantry Brigade was given the right sector, from including Hudiara Drain to exclusive of Railway line Lahore - Wagah. The left sector stretching upto Ravi was given to 114 Infantry Brigade. 22 Infantry Brigade with only four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one Squadron was kept as the striking force. The positions had been occupied after midnight on the night 5/6 September. Although it had earlier been planned to lay a mine field in front of BRB canal, there was no time to do so.
GOC 10 Infantry Division had placed a small screen of a platoon, on the main Wagah axis from R&S battalion under Major Arif Jan. This small force cost the Indians heavily. Major Arif allowed the Indian to come close and then opened fire at short range. In view of the inadequate light this was the only course open to him. This platoon not only held up the Indian advance along the main Wagah road but inflicted very heavy casualties on them. The Indians, however, on their flanks had managed to by pass them. Rather than surrender they put up a gallant fight. Major Arif and his small band of men will for ever be remembered as a force which fought to the last man and last round. No one left his post. Not one of them was taken prisoner. They all achieved the highest distinction that man can get.
The battalion astride the Lahore-Wagah road was 3rd Battalion of the Baluch regiment. A little after first light they saw the Indians advancing astride the road. In front of the advancing Indians were a large number of refugees, men, women and children, hurrying across as if driven by a pack of blood thirsty fiends. The Baluchis could not engage the enemy until the refugees had crossed the bridge. It was risky but they could not shoot their own people. The stout resistance put up by the small R&S section under Major Arif had upset the entire schedule of 54 Indian Infantry Brigade allotted to this sector.
The Indian commander had three approaches to this position and he had allotted a battalion to each one of these. 13 battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment, on the left of Indian flank was, as a result the first to gain contact with Pakistani defenders. This happened at 0600 hours opposite Jallo railway station. Heavy toll of the Indians were taken by the company in this position supported by its own artillery. In fact the artillery fire was so accurate that the enemy fell back never to venture forward again.
The next to approach the defensive position in this sector was 15 battalion of the Dogra Regiment, following the main Wagah axis. They reached the killing ground supported by tanks at 0645 hours and having lost two of its tanks in the first few minutes called it a day. The company of 3 Baluch in this part of the sector had the moral support of many senior officers being with them. The battalion commander Lt. Col. Tajammul Hussain Malik and the brigade commander , Brig. Aftab Ahmed Khan who with the Engineer officer Lt. Col. Suleman Khan and the gunner Lt. Col. Imdad Ali Khan were all present in their midst. They were watching the Indian advance from the road bridge at Batapur. It may not have been strictly according to the customs of service, but the presence of these senior officers on the main axis made a great deal of difference. They were in a position to see the situation all the time rather than get it at intervals.
The threat of Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India had come true. India had chosen and found the time and place of attack on Pakistan. In the time old Chanakian style the rulers of India had launched a full scale attack on Pakistan without either declaring war or giving an ultimatum. The secrecy with which preparations for the invasion of Pakistan were made was so great that the object of the forward movements was kept hidden even from the invading army until the last moment. The men had been told that they were going on a route march. Indian High Command was afraid of leakage of information and possibility of a few last minute desertions. The men were however, ordered to put on their best uniforms as there would be a ceremonial march at the end of the route march. The author of the Police Action in Hyderabad, general Chaudhuri C-in-C Indian Army, was hopeful of another lucky break. He had his first during the invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948, which India declared as it was just a Police Action. Lieut. General Kaul speaking of the command qualities of Indian C-in-C says,
"The largest tank formation he commanded was a division with which he never fought in any battle but only against ill armed and irregular razakars (volunteers) in a Police Action in Hyderabad." (Kaul op. Cit., P 447)
He, therefore, had decided to march through the streets of Lahore in new uniforms. His advisers were confident that the mighty white elephant at his disposal would, through its sheer momentum, carry him towards Lahore Gymkhana by the same evening. The next few days were to be used in mopping up operations. He was impetuous enough to advice his senior commanders to keep their mess kits and medals handy and to issue invitations to senior civil officials to join him at a cocktail party at the famous Lahore Gymkhana the same evening.
The military Governor of Lahore had been nominated and administrative services earmarked. The police force, to enforce law and order of the type that India had practiced during the days of partition, aided by Jan Sangh mobs, was to follow the army. After all, the world at large was to be told, after a fair accompli, that it was no more than a Police Action.
The Indian High Command was confident of the unawareness of Pakistan to such an extent that they chose the assembly areas of their forward troops a few hundred yards from Pakistan border. Move to the assembly areas started at 10 p.m. on September 5, 1965 and by a little after midnight the mighty Indian Army was poised for the march into the dreamland which would, not only allay the land hunger of their rulers, but would also remove the hunger and starvation brought on to the land of Bharat by her warlords. The acquisition of Pakistan was also to be the first step towards the fulfillment of the dream of Greater India which the Indian demigods had hoped would stretch from Indonesia to the Dardanelles. The steel steeds of India started fuming and puffing from soon after midnight.
The checking and cross checking of formation and unit positions on the start lines was complete by 3 a.m. on September 6. The Zero hour was drawing near and with it was increasing the anxiety of the Indian commanders. They felt, as all commanders in their position should e able to feel, that their troops, who by now had been told the purpose of their presence on the border of Pakistan were a little jumpy and not as elated as the occasion demanded. This eventuality must have been foreseen. A good doze of Rum was administered to the men a few minutes before the order for advance was given.
At 3:30 a.m., 4 a.m. Indian standard time, the green light went up all along the front and the Indian Army rolled into Pakistan. The capture of Lahore being on the cards for the first day's events, the press was told to publish its fall without any mental reservations. The Operation Order of 25 Indian Infantry Division for the attack on Pakistan had said, "The defenses of Lahore have not been prepared and are not manned."
It is to the credit of the West Pakistan Rangers that they forced the enemy to deploy at the very outset and fight for every inch of Pakistan territory. They were neither trained nor equipped to fight a first rate enemy but they did. Unknown to the Indians the Rangers were expecting them. General headquarters Pakistan Army had issued a signal to the Army and HQ West Pakistan rangers on the evening of September 4, that an Indian attack appeared imminent and although efforts were to be made to avoid an escalation of fighting yet the defensive positions were to be occupied. The D. G. Rangers, Brigadier Khuda Dad Khan had issued an order on September 5th to be prepared to meet an Indian invasion. The Rangers, however, could not be everywhere and the Indian Army was able to roll on towards Lahore until they suddenly hit the forward positions of Pakistan Army in the early hours of the morning. Instead of surprising Pakistan Army there, Indians were themselves surprised. They had been allowed to march into Pakistan without much hindrance.
They were sure that fighting against Ranger Posts, which were nowhere in larger strength than a section and armed with rifles only had been localized and even if they had sent back information of Indian invasion it would not be possible for the garrison in Lahore and elsewhere to get ready, collect arms and ammunition and come out of their cantonments before the Indians were inside the town of Lahore itself.
The Indians were banking on the acute effect of such a severe blow to Pakistan. They probably felt that with the fall of Lahore the whole of Pakistan would be at their feet. They approached the BRB canal without much concern but their concentration and the resultant disorganization was beyond description when they suddenly came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire. By now it was first light. Figures could be been seen to have halted, flattered and fall down. Others came forward but met the same fate. The Indian advance had ended. A halt had been called. Not by those who held the initiative, superior strength and unlimited resources in men and equipment but by those who were fewer in numbers and could not boast of similar resources. They were few but they had faith in Allah.
The Indian commander, opposite Lahore had 2 Infantry Divisions and one Independent Brigade under him. He was so confident of the powerful force under his command being invincible that like a school child of eight learning arithmetic, he divided the figure of 2 by 2 which was the number of axis that he wished to advance on. The answer was 1, so he allotted one Division to each axis, Wagah and Burki and sat back. The Independent Infantry brigade could be kept in hand as reserve. The simple exercise in arithmetic was to continue down to battalion and company levels. His distribution of the Corps Artillery was very just and fair, giving equal number of the batteries and guns to each Infantry Division strictly according to the arithmetical formulae. It was so simple and yet people used to tell him that it needed brains to formulate a plan for attack.
The Pakistani commander opposing him was not so fortunate. Major General Mohammad Sarfraz Khan had in all seven infantry battalions and a front of 89,000 yards to defend.
He could not do the simple arithmetic exercise and sit back. He considered the likely axis and having allotted sectors to brigades kept a little reserve in hand. 103 Infantry Brigade was given the right sector, from including Hudiara Drain to exclusive of Railway line Lahore - Wagah. The left sector stretching upto Ravi was given to 114 Infantry Brigade. 22 Infantry Brigade with only four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one Squadron was kept as the striking force. The positions had been occupied after midnight on the night 5/6 September. Although it had earlier been planned to lay a mine field in front of BRB canal, there was no time to do so.
GOC 10 Infantry Division had placed a small screen of a platoon, on the main Wagah axis from R&S battalion under Major Arif Jan. This small force cost the Indians heavily. Major Arif allowed the Indian to come close and then opened fire at short range. In view of the inadequate light this was the only course open to him. This platoon not only held up the Indian advance along the main Wagah road but inflicted very heavy casualties on them. The Indians, however, on their flanks had managed to by pass them. Rather than surrender they put up a gallant fight. Major Arif and his small band of men will for ever be remembered as a force which fought to the last man and last round. No one left his post. Not one of them was taken prisoner. They all achieved the highest distinction that man can get.
The battalion astride the Lahore-Wagah road was 3rd Battalion of the Baluch regiment. A little after first light they saw the Indians advancing astride the road. In front of the advancing Indians were a large number of refugees, men, women and children, hurrying across as if driven by a pack of blood thirsty fiends. The Baluchis could not engage the enemy until the refugees had crossed the bridge. It was risky but they could not shoot their own people. The stout resistance put up by the small R&S section under Major Arif had upset the entire schedule of 54 Indian Infantry Brigade allotted to this sector.
The Indian commander had three approaches to this position and he had allotted a battalion to each one of these. 13 battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment, on the left of Indian flank was, as a result the first to gain contact with Pakistani defenders. This happened at 0600 hours opposite Jallo railway station. Heavy toll of the Indians were taken by the company in this position supported by its own artillery. In fact the artillery fire was so accurate that the enemy fell back never to venture forward again.
The next to approach the defensive position in this sector was 15 battalion of the Dogra Regiment, following the main Wagah axis. They reached the killing ground supported by tanks at 0645 hours and having lost two of its tanks in the first few minutes called it a day. The company of 3 Baluch in this part of the sector had the moral support of many senior officers being with them. The battalion commander Lt. Col. Tajammul Hussain Malik and the brigade commander , Brig. Aftab Ahmed Khan who with the Engineer officer Lt. Col. Suleman Khan and the gunner Lt. Col. Imdad Ali Khan were all present in their midst. They were watching the Indian advance from the road bridge at Batapur. It may not have been strictly according to the customs of service, but the presence of these senior officers on the main axis made a great deal of difference. They were in a position to see the situation all the time rather than get it at intervals.
yasin_khan
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #6
The Hour of Trial
The information regarding the Indian invasion took some time to reach Rawalpindi. The field commanders wanted to be certain that it was full scale invasion and not a few stray border incidents, before they informed the General Headquarters. The President, however, came to know of it through the Air Force channels earlier than the C-in-C of the army and rang him up to find out the exact situation. The C-in-C knew of the formations having moved forward and was quite confident that no amount of Indian pressure would be able to bend, much less break, the line of defense formed by the devoted sons of Pakistan, Threat of an Indian invasion was not new. It had existed from the very inception of Pakistan. Those who had expected to return and capture Pakistan within six months, after the two separated, had made known their intentions on many occasions. Pakistan was, therefore, prepared and vigilant.
It was after 5 a.m. by the time the Chief of General Staff, Major General Malik Sher Bahadur informed the C-in-C General Mohammad Musa that India had invaded Pakistan. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur, who was reputed for his coolness had been informed as soon as the commanders in the field were satisfied that the Indians had crossed the International Border and it was a full scale invasion and not a mere border incident . Having received the exact positions from all sectors, the Chief of General Staff apprised C-in-C in the meantime, as has been mentioned earlier, had been informed by the President and had the time to discuss the problem with him. One can visualize Maj. Gen. Sher Bahadur stroking his steel Grey mustache and smiling to himself on the folly that India had committed. He was confident that the officers and men of Pakistan Army would acquit themselves in a superb manner. His thoughts, however, were towards the mind of the enemy.
Director of Military Intelligence, Brig. Irshad Ahmed gave the debriefing in the Operations Room to C-in-C and others as he had anticipated Indian attacks on Lahore and Sialkot. There had been no information from Sialkot regarding any large scale Indian advance except at Jassar. The C-in-C and CGS were both of the opinion that Jassar was being used as a diversionary movement only. It was not yet clear but it appeared that the previous forecast of General Headquarters that India was likely launch Indian Armoured Division from Samba against Chawinda as the focal point still held good. As a result of this forecast the Staff College, Quetta had carried out Defense Exercises with regard to that area and most of the commanders and their staff were acquainted with the whole of the area and the likely tactics that the Indians would employ. The C-in-C and the General Staff having already apprised the field commanders of the plan could not do much except to watch the course of events and by keeping abreast of the developments remain one move ahead of the enemy all the time. As time passed and there was no sign of 1 Indian Armoured Division having been launched the feeling in the Operations Room became crystallized that the place chosen for the deployment of Indian armour was the Sialkot front. It was reasonable too. The terrain in front of Lahore was not as good as in Sialkot sector. There was a more weighty reason in favor of using armour in Sialkot. As explained earlier the political objective decided upon by the Indian Government was the complete annihilation of Pakistan which resulted in the formulation of the Military objective as the occupation of Pakistan territory and not the destruction of the armed forces of Pakistan. If General Chaudhuri who has been hailed by Indian writers as one of the greatest military commanders of Asia today, knew his subject, he would put his armour where it had a clear run for miles in front of it. Lahore rested with its back on river Ravi, clearly a tank obstacle and a bottleneck. On the other hand, a trust from Chawinda meant a clear run up to Wazirabad without any formidable obstacle except the canal for which enough brigade material had been arranged. If, by a diversionary attack against Jassar and Sialkot city they could entice away the defending force of the two flanks, it would give them a clear run up to Wazirabad without fighting a battle.
The Indian C-in-C acted exactly as the Pakistani General Staff had anticipated. He had decided to launch his armour from Samba on the firm plain of Sialkot and make a dash for the bridge of Chenab at Wazirabad. As will be seen later this decision cost him heavily. It was a bold plan but, as elsewhere, the action did not match the boldness of the plan. The bania in him, coupled probably with the interference from the politicians prompted and in a way forced him to over insure on less important fronts, there by making the plan not as effective as it would otherwise have been. If the Indian C-in-C had kept in front of him the objective to destroy the armed forces of Pakistan irrespective of the fact whether large tracts of our territory had been captured or not while doing so and without counting the number of places at which Pakistan was being attacked he would have been absolved of all blame for the failure of his army. As things stand today. The count on the first day, in addition to Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, regarding which the Indian radio was jubilant in every communiqué it gave out, was seven fronts. These seven fronts were Sialkot, Jassar, Wagha, Burki, Kem Karan, Kasur and Sulaimanki. The large number of fronts opened by General Chaudhuri did not upset the plans of General Mohammad Musa and his staff. They had catered for them. If General Chaudhuri had brought about dispersion with a view to dissipating the meager resources of men and material at the disposal of Pakistan then he was mistaken. As a leading foreign correspondent had said,
"These two fronts were intended to be diversional attacks to scatter Pakistan's smaller army over a wider front and weaken the defenses around Lahore. Man for man, unit for unit, it is probably safer to say that Pakistan Army is at higher standard of training than the Indians." (BBC 1410 hours, 10 September 1965)
Simultaneously with forcing Pakistan Army's general staff to spread out over a front of 1600 miles he was doing the same for himself. Lieut. General Kaul has commented on this aspect when he says,
"He (Indian C-in-C) was not justified in taking …. Offensive over two extensive an area, which prevented him from concentrating sufficient forces any where." (Kaul op. Cit., P.478)
If he had kept inferior froces at most of these points and contained superior Pakistani Forces, in order to get the requisite superiority at the decisive place then his decision to open so many fronts would have been militarily justified. As it became clear to the Pakistani General Staff on the very first day that the enemy had attacked on all fronts with a superiority ranging from 3:1 to 4.5:1 they were satisfied that they will not be forced to make major moves from one front to another except possibly in one or two cases.
The odds against Pakistan Army on various fronts on the first day of war, the 6th of September, 1965, in terms of Infantry battalions were as follows:
Pakistan India
Tithwal Pak 1 3
Uri Sector AK 2 8
Haji Pir Pass 2 Pak 20
Punch Sector 3 AK
Akhnoor 6 18
Sialkot Jammu axis 2 9
Chowinda 4 24
Jassar 2 3
Wagah 7 (including 2 in res.) 17
Burki 2 7
Kem Karan 5 (6 Sep.) 13
Hussainiwala-Kasur 7 4
Sulaimanki 2 4
Sind 2 8
The story of how the commanders and men met this challenge on various fronts will unfold itself in the following pages. A mention, however, must be made of the manner in which the common man on the street and the administration stood the test in their "Hour of Trial". The Armed Forces are from the amongst the nation. It was only natural that the nation which produced men of unbeatable spirit must possess courage and determination of the highest order.
Unmindful of the Indian numerical and material superiority, the Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, issued order of the day with confidence in his army and faith in Allah. He was not wrong when he said, "Officers and men of Pakistan Army, this is the Hour of Trial and Glory".
He gave details of the areas where the Indians had invaded and continuing he said, "Our gallant troops defending these areas have stopped the enemy's advance and inflicted heavy casualties on their invaders. Within hours of the start of the fighting our forces have stabilized the situation and are in complete control of it………."
The information regarding the Indian invasion took some time to reach Rawalpindi. The field commanders wanted to be certain that it was full scale invasion and not a few stray border incidents, before they informed the General Headquarters. The President, however, came to know of it through the Air Force channels earlier than the C-in-C of the army and rang him up to find out the exact situation. The C-in-C knew of the formations having moved forward and was quite confident that no amount of Indian pressure would be able to bend, much less break, the line of defense formed by the devoted sons of Pakistan, Threat of an Indian invasion was not new. It had existed from the very inception of Pakistan. Those who had expected to return and capture Pakistan within six months, after the two separated, had made known their intentions on many occasions. Pakistan was, therefore, prepared and vigilant.
It was after 5 a.m. by the time the Chief of General Staff, Major General Malik Sher Bahadur informed the C-in-C General Mohammad Musa that India had invaded Pakistan. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur, who was reputed for his coolness had been informed as soon as the commanders in the field were satisfied that the Indians had crossed the International Border and it was a full scale invasion and not a mere border incident . Having received the exact positions from all sectors, the Chief of General Staff apprised C-in-C in the meantime, as has been mentioned earlier, had been informed by the President and had the time to discuss the problem with him. One can visualize Maj. Gen. Sher Bahadur stroking his steel Grey mustache and smiling to himself on the folly that India had committed. He was confident that the officers and men of Pakistan Army would acquit themselves in a superb manner. His thoughts, however, were towards the mind of the enemy.
Director of Military Intelligence, Brig. Irshad Ahmed gave the debriefing in the Operations Room to C-in-C and others as he had anticipated Indian attacks on Lahore and Sialkot. There had been no information from Sialkot regarding any large scale Indian advance except at Jassar. The C-in-C and CGS were both of the opinion that Jassar was being used as a diversionary movement only. It was not yet clear but it appeared that the previous forecast of General Headquarters that India was likely launch Indian Armoured Division from Samba against Chawinda as the focal point still held good. As a result of this forecast the Staff College, Quetta had carried out Defense Exercises with regard to that area and most of the commanders and their staff were acquainted with the whole of the area and the likely tactics that the Indians would employ. The C-in-C and the General Staff having already apprised the field commanders of the plan could not do much except to watch the course of events and by keeping abreast of the developments remain one move ahead of the enemy all the time. As time passed and there was no sign of 1 Indian Armoured Division having been launched the feeling in the Operations Room became crystallized that the place chosen for the deployment of Indian armour was the Sialkot front. It was reasonable too. The terrain in front of Lahore was not as good as in Sialkot sector. There was a more weighty reason in favor of using armour in Sialkot. As explained earlier the political objective decided upon by the Indian Government was the complete annihilation of Pakistan which resulted in the formulation of the Military objective as the occupation of Pakistan territory and not the destruction of the armed forces of Pakistan. If General Chaudhuri who has been hailed by Indian writers as one of the greatest military commanders of Asia today, knew his subject, he would put his armour where it had a clear run for miles in front of it. Lahore rested with its back on river Ravi, clearly a tank obstacle and a bottleneck. On the other hand, a trust from Chawinda meant a clear run up to Wazirabad without any formidable obstacle except the canal for which enough brigade material had been arranged. If, by a diversionary attack against Jassar and Sialkot city they could entice away the defending force of the two flanks, it would give them a clear run up to Wazirabad without fighting a battle.
The Indian C-in-C acted exactly as the Pakistani General Staff had anticipated. He had decided to launch his armour from Samba on the firm plain of Sialkot and make a dash for the bridge of Chenab at Wazirabad. As will be seen later this decision cost him heavily. It was a bold plan but, as elsewhere, the action did not match the boldness of the plan. The bania in him, coupled probably with the interference from the politicians prompted and in a way forced him to over insure on less important fronts, there by making the plan not as effective as it would otherwise have been. If the Indian C-in-C had kept in front of him the objective to destroy the armed forces of Pakistan irrespective of the fact whether large tracts of our territory had been captured or not while doing so and without counting the number of places at which Pakistan was being attacked he would have been absolved of all blame for the failure of his army. As things stand today. The count on the first day, in addition to Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, regarding which the Indian radio was jubilant in every communiqué it gave out, was seven fronts. These seven fronts were Sialkot, Jassar, Wagha, Burki, Kem Karan, Kasur and Sulaimanki. The large number of fronts opened by General Chaudhuri did not upset the plans of General Mohammad Musa and his staff. They had catered for them. If General Chaudhuri had brought about dispersion with a view to dissipating the meager resources of men and material at the disposal of Pakistan then he was mistaken. As a leading foreign correspondent had said,
"These two fronts were intended to be diversional attacks to scatter Pakistan's smaller army over a wider front and weaken the defenses around Lahore. Man for man, unit for unit, it is probably safer to say that Pakistan Army is at higher standard of training than the Indians." (BBC 1410 hours, 10 September 1965)
Simultaneously with forcing Pakistan Army's general staff to spread out over a front of 1600 miles he was doing the same for himself. Lieut. General Kaul has commented on this aspect when he says,
"He (Indian C-in-C) was not justified in taking …. Offensive over two extensive an area, which prevented him from concentrating sufficient forces any where." (Kaul op. Cit., P.478)
If he had kept inferior froces at most of these points and contained superior Pakistani Forces, in order to get the requisite superiority at the decisive place then his decision to open so many fronts would have been militarily justified. As it became clear to the Pakistani General Staff on the very first day that the enemy had attacked on all fronts with a superiority ranging from 3:1 to 4.5:1 they were satisfied that they will not be forced to make major moves from one front to another except possibly in one or two cases.
The odds against Pakistan Army on various fronts on the first day of war, the 6th of September, 1965, in terms of Infantry battalions were as follows:
Pakistan India
Tithwal Pak 1 3
Uri Sector AK 2 8
Haji Pir Pass 2 Pak 20
Punch Sector 3 AK
Akhnoor 6 18
Sialkot Jammu axis 2 9
Chowinda 4 24
Jassar 2 3
Wagah 7 (including 2 in res.) 17
Burki 2 7
Kem Karan 5 (6 Sep.) 13
Hussainiwala-Kasur 7 4
Sulaimanki 2 4
Sind 2 8
The story of how the commanders and men met this challenge on various fronts will unfold itself in the following pages. A mention, however, must be made of the manner in which the common man on the street and the administration stood the test in their "Hour of Trial". The Armed Forces are from the amongst the nation. It was only natural that the nation which produced men of unbeatable spirit must possess courage and determination of the highest order.
Unmindful of the Indian numerical and material superiority, the Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, issued order of the day with confidence in his army and faith in Allah. He was not wrong when he said, "Officers and men of Pakistan Army, this is the Hour of Trial and Glory".
He gave details of the areas where the Indians had invaded and continuing he said, "Our gallant troops defending these areas have stopped the enemy's advance and inflicted heavy casualties on their invaders. Within hours of the start of the fighting our forces have stabilized the situation and are in complete control of it………."
yasin_khan
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #7
The Indian Elephant comes to a Grinding halt at Chawinda
Sialkot sector had always been upper most in the minds of Pakistan. Across it, lays the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which in addition to the outright injustice of the case and India usurping it forcefully, it posed a direct threat to the innermost areas of Pakistan. Any threat based on Kashmir would come at right angles to the threat from India itself there by weakening defenses facing India and could not be anything but a source of great anxiety to Pakistan. As far as India was concerned, Kashmir was ideally suited as a jumping ground to attack Pakistan. The military build up during the last few years under the assumed threat from China had given India a good excuse, if she needed one, to build up the strength in Kashmir to unusually large six divisions. Indian infantry brigades in Kashmir have the habit of having up to seven infantry battalions as a measure of solace and over insurance.
Pakistan could not afford to keep more than one medium size infantry division in this sector. 15 Infantry Division containing 7 Infantry Battalion only was placed in Sialkot. Its armour compliment consisted of 25 cavalry and two tank delivery units. The division was commanded by Brig. Sardar Mohammad Ismail Khan.
The Indian garrison opposite to this small force was 26 Indian Division with four oversize brigades and two armoured regiments. It had been anticipated that the enemy could launch a three pronged attack from the following directions; Dera Baba Nanak, Samba and Jammu. The areas of responsibility of the brigades of 15 Infantry Division were as a result as follows:
· 101 Infantry Brigade (2 battalions) astride Sialkot Jammu Road under the command of Brig. S. M. Hussain
· 104 Infantry Brigade (One infantry battalion only) Area Uggoki as Divisional Strike Force
· 24 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions plus one Armoured Regiment) Area Chawinda under the command of Brig. Malik Abdul Ali Khan
· 115 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions) Area: Jassar under the command of Brig. Muzzafaruddin
6 Armoured Division commanded by Maj. General Abrar Hussain, which in fact was no more than an Armoured Brigade, was placed in Daska area to be used as required. It had under it, two Armoured Regiments and one Infantry Battalion. The Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF with proportionate supporting arms and services.
The Indian build up in early September opposite 15 Division was substantial. The Indians had brought in three infantry divisions including one oversize mountain division and their crack 1 Indian Armoured Division. The details of these were to be known as fighting developed. The Indian plan in this sector unfolded itself gradually and was most unrealistic. It had neither taken the capabilities of the Indian soldiers into account not had been fair in assessing the fighting qualities of Pakistan Army. It smelt of Hyderabad Police Station. General Chaudhuri had decided to attack with one strong division at Suchetgarh and a brigade at Jassar. He knew the strength of both 15 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division and expected the armoured division with its armoured regiments to be equally divided between the two garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot. The attack having been launched on 6 September would in the opinion of Indian C-in-C, draw the whole Pakistan Army in this sector of these two corner points. When Pakistan garrison was fully sucked into these two extreme corners and was committed completely the main attack from Samba would roll down the plains lead by Indian Armoured Division. According to General Chaudhuri there would be nothing to stop this mighty force, not even a section of infantry. The garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot would be too committed to extricate themselves and even if they tried to fall back to interfere in the main attack they would be only following the Indian divisions and would never be permitted to re-establish any worthwhile defensive line. General Chaudhuri's optimism was really infectious. It permeated down to the brigade commanders' level but no further. The lower levels have to be more realistic. They are too far near the ground and they are the ones who have to capture ground and hold it or give it away. To them higher planning and lines across the map mean little. When it came to that level the situation looked different but more of that later.
As planned by India, the first place that took the brunt of Indian attack in this sector was Jassar. 3 Punjab was holding the brigade and a part of it was across it, in the little Pakistani enclave across the river Ravi. The Indians started shelling at 0315 hours, a quarter of an hour earlier than they crossed the border in other places. An hour later the attack came in, led by one infantry battalion and the Indians succeeded in securing foothold in the enclave. 3 Punjab put in a counter attack at 1000 hours on 6 September and had thrown back the Indians by 1200 hours. Simultaneously 4 FF cleared the Indian enclave on West bank of the river. There does not appear to have been much resistance to this action. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of Indians to defend their position on the right bank of Ravi was a clear indication that the Indian attack against Jassar was merely a feint. If they had meant to invade Pakistan from this direction in earnest, it would have been easier for them to build up across the river, by making use of the enclave as initial brigade head.
The artillery compliments of 15 Infantry Division, which had earlier helped 10 Infantry Brigade, in Chhamb and Jurian also returned during night 6/7 September and the position, became more reassuring.
The Indians were to continue giving the impression that the attack on Jassar was in real earnest. Between 0300 and 0630 hours on 7 September, but put in three attacks supported by massive artillery support and tanks. They succeeded in capturing the far end of the bridge eventually. The bridge as a result was blown up at 0800 hours the same day. The troops on the far end were ordered to swim to home side as it was not considered advisable to leave a few unsupported companies across the river. The Indians throughout the day, continued to try to enlarge their gains along the bridge but all their attempts were foiled.
26 Indian Division advancing along the main Sialkot-Jammu road did not make any headway on 6 and 7 September.
14 Indian Infantry Division rolled down across the wide stretch Charwah-Bajra Garhi on the night of 7/8 September. The attack started at 2330 hours. 3 FF fought delaying action and gradually fell back to the main defensive line around Phillorah. 3 FF was holding area Gadgor and adjoining villages. Although vastly outnumbered the battalion stood the most intense shelling and kept to its positions. A few platoon localities exchanged hands once but were immediately recaptured. The fight for every inch of the territory had started. It was like a cyclone. Waves clashing with waves and creating an uproar in the dark but few Pakistani soldiers stood steadfast. Attack after attack was coming and yet the thin line stood firm like a wall of steel.
The unit was ordered to fall back to Chawinda early in the morning on 8 September. By then, they were in danger of being cut off. They did so at first light. By the morning of 8 September the enemy with elements of 1 Indian Armoured Division had captured Maharajke, Charwa, Chobara, Gadgor and Phillorah villages.
The advance of 26 Indian Division along the main road to Sialkot had also been checked and the enemy was hardly able to throw back the screens pushed forward by 19 Punjab and 13 FF on the main road Sialkot-Jammu.
6 Armoured Division, commanded by Major General Abrar Hussain was now moved forward and given the responsibility of stopping the main enemy advance opposite Chawinda in conjunction with 24 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik already in position. The brigade had under it, 2 Punjab, 3 FF and 25 cavalry. In fact, what it amounted to was that an infantry and an armoured brigade, were defending against this very strong Indian offensive.
8 September gives the image of a series of hammer blows on a small size but ultra strong anvil. Each blow produces blinding flashes. It is the test of strength and quality of metal between the anvil and the hammer. After a little it starts becoming evident that the hammer blows have started losing their vigor and frequency and the metal of the hammer started cracking.
The Indians had occupied Phillorah during the earlt hours of the morning but the appearance of 24 Infantry Brigade opposite them in the morning, in an offensive mood, made them fall back. Bajrah and Garhi had four enemy tanks. The moment one was hit by Pakistani armour, 25 cavalry, the other three disappeared. The enemy was gradually pushed out of Chobara also by 24 Infantry Brigade and 25 Cavalry.
On the morning of 9 September, 10 Infantry Brigade commanded by brigadier Azmat Hayat Khan also joined in and had taken up positions along side 24 Infantry Brigade.
9 September again was a busy day. The enemy tried to edge towards our left and making use of a road Maharajke-Sialkot and road Bajra-Garhi-Sialkot to put in a right hook.
This move was foiled immediately it became apparent and the enemy withdrew in haste. The enemy operation order had laid down the main axis as Ramgarh, Chobara and Phillorah. One Centurian regiment was to push through along it while the other, a Sherman regiment was to be on the right. This regiment appears to have attempted the right hook but could not sustain it. The other Centurian regiment plus a squadron was to be on the enemy left in area Daigi. 4 Horse had been kept by the Indians in reserve.
The enemy put in a counter-attack on Chobara with an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion. This was successfully beaten back. The enemy had used his air on a number of occasions but the Pakistan Air Force had every time appeared on the scene and chased them away, before they could contribute much to the battle.
15 Infantry Division headquarters itself were attacked by enemy aircraft on the morning of 10 September but there were no casualties. The GOC Major General Tikka Khan who had taken the command from brigadier Sardar Mohammad Ismail, had organized tank hunting parties who were successful in destroying a number of tanks during the night of 9/10 September. This put a stop on the night movement of Indian tanks opposite Sialkot.
On 10 September, the Indians subjected the Jassar positions to very heavy shelling but did not try to advance forward. They seemed to have been given large quantities of artillery ammunition merely to expend while sitting at a distance from Pakistani troops.
The Indians, opposite 24 Infantry Brigade, in the area of Gadgor tried to make a flanking move from the left but failed to make any headway.
A great deal of enemy movement was observed during 10 September behind the enemy lines. It was evident the regrouping and reallocation of tasks was being undertaken by the Indians. The original plan had failed. They hoped to succeed with the changed plan if ……….. But, they were soon to know that the "ifs" do not turn out to be in favor of mighty hordes all the time.
Sialkot and Jassar received their share of shelling again on 11 September. Enemy tried to advance along the main axis but failed. Khaira village fell to the Indians but was counter attacked and retaken. Shelling by the Indians along their main axis of advance was very intense. It lasted from 0200 to 0800 hours. The Indians also used air which, however failed to do any damage. At 1100 hours, the main enemy attack, mainly armour came against Gador and Phillorah. 11 Cavalry Guides and 25 Cavalry took the brunt and stopped the enemy. It was a magnificent battle; tank against tank reminded of the armour battles of Second World War. There was determination on both sides, in fact it was a test of stamina and determination. There were fairly heavy casualties on both sides.
The only gain to the Indians that day was the Phillorah village. This also lost because the Indians were pushing across thousand of refugees from the villages occupied by them on the first day. To have advanced under the cover of refugees was the most unsoldierly act on the part of Indians but then there it was and not much could be done about it. For three days they had kept them confined without food and water and now on 11 September they had used them as human shield. Pundit Kautilya had come to their aid but even this guile was short lived. It could not be repeated day after day. There were no more left to be used after the 11th. PAF brought about successful air strikes that day, against Chobara and Charwa.
A certain amount of regrouping and reallocation of areas was carried out on 11 September by Pakistan also. 1 Armoured Division less 5 Armoured Brigade had also arrived in the area and could be used as and when found necessary. The attack against Phillorah had cost Indians heavy losses. 25 Cavalry had been successfully engaging the enemy armour throughout this period. They had been able to account for 29 tanks against a loss of only 4 of their own. As a result of the re-organization our own locations were as follows on 12 September.
Chawinda Area 24 Infantry Brigade2 Punjab3 FF14 Baluch25 Cavalry
Badiana Area 10 Infantry BrigadeGuides Cavalry plus Squadron 11 Cavalry22 cavalry less one Squadron
Pasrur Area 14 (P) Brigade11 Cavalry less one Squadron9 FF
Sialkot Area 15 Infantry Division101 Infantry Brigade2 Baluch19 Punjab104 Infantry Brigade9 Baluch20 Lancers less one squadron
Jassar Area No Change
Khairi and Chak Phulra posts and high ground in the vicinity were captured on the morning of 12 September in Sialkot Sector.
Sialkot sector had always been upper most in the minds of Pakistan. Across it, lays the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which in addition to the outright injustice of the case and India usurping it forcefully, it posed a direct threat to the innermost areas of Pakistan. Any threat based on Kashmir would come at right angles to the threat from India itself there by weakening defenses facing India and could not be anything but a source of great anxiety to Pakistan. As far as India was concerned, Kashmir was ideally suited as a jumping ground to attack Pakistan. The military build up during the last few years under the assumed threat from China had given India a good excuse, if she needed one, to build up the strength in Kashmir to unusually large six divisions. Indian infantry brigades in Kashmir have the habit of having up to seven infantry battalions as a measure of solace and over insurance.
Pakistan could not afford to keep more than one medium size infantry division in this sector. 15 Infantry Division containing 7 Infantry Battalion only was placed in Sialkot. Its armour compliment consisted of 25 cavalry and two tank delivery units. The division was commanded by Brig. Sardar Mohammad Ismail Khan.
The Indian garrison opposite to this small force was 26 Indian Division with four oversize brigades and two armoured regiments. It had been anticipated that the enemy could launch a three pronged attack from the following directions; Dera Baba Nanak, Samba and Jammu. The areas of responsibility of the brigades of 15 Infantry Division were as a result as follows:
· 101 Infantry Brigade (2 battalions) astride Sialkot Jammu Road under the command of Brig. S. M. Hussain
· 104 Infantry Brigade (One infantry battalion only) Area Uggoki as Divisional Strike Force
· 24 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions plus one Armoured Regiment) Area Chawinda under the command of Brig. Malik Abdul Ali Khan
· 115 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions) Area: Jassar under the command of Brig. Muzzafaruddin
6 Armoured Division commanded by Maj. General Abrar Hussain, which in fact was no more than an Armoured Brigade, was placed in Daska area to be used as required. It had under it, two Armoured Regiments and one Infantry Battalion. The Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF with proportionate supporting arms and services.
The Indian build up in early September opposite 15 Division was substantial. The Indians had brought in three infantry divisions including one oversize mountain division and their crack 1 Indian Armoured Division. The details of these were to be known as fighting developed. The Indian plan in this sector unfolded itself gradually and was most unrealistic. It had neither taken the capabilities of the Indian soldiers into account not had been fair in assessing the fighting qualities of Pakistan Army. It smelt of Hyderabad Police Station. General Chaudhuri had decided to attack with one strong division at Suchetgarh and a brigade at Jassar. He knew the strength of both 15 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division and expected the armoured division with its armoured regiments to be equally divided between the two garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot. The attack having been launched on 6 September would in the opinion of Indian C-in-C, draw the whole Pakistan Army in this sector of these two corner points. When Pakistan garrison was fully sucked into these two extreme corners and was committed completely the main attack from Samba would roll down the plains lead by Indian Armoured Division. According to General Chaudhuri there would be nothing to stop this mighty force, not even a section of infantry. The garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot would be too committed to extricate themselves and even if they tried to fall back to interfere in the main attack they would be only following the Indian divisions and would never be permitted to re-establish any worthwhile defensive line. General Chaudhuri's optimism was really infectious. It permeated down to the brigade commanders' level but no further. The lower levels have to be more realistic. They are too far near the ground and they are the ones who have to capture ground and hold it or give it away. To them higher planning and lines across the map mean little. When it came to that level the situation looked different but more of that later.
As planned by India, the first place that took the brunt of Indian attack in this sector was Jassar. 3 Punjab was holding the brigade and a part of it was across it, in the little Pakistani enclave across the river Ravi. The Indians started shelling at 0315 hours, a quarter of an hour earlier than they crossed the border in other places. An hour later the attack came in, led by one infantry battalion and the Indians succeeded in securing foothold in the enclave. 3 Punjab put in a counter attack at 1000 hours on 6 September and had thrown back the Indians by 1200 hours. Simultaneously 4 FF cleared the Indian enclave on West bank of the river. There does not appear to have been much resistance to this action. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of Indians to defend their position on the right bank of Ravi was a clear indication that the Indian attack against Jassar was merely a feint. If they had meant to invade Pakistan from this direction in earnest, it would have been easier for them to build up across the river, by making use of the enclave as initial brigade head.
The artillery compliments of 15 Infantry Division, which had earlier helped 10 Infantry Brigade, in Chhamb and Jurian also returned during night 6/7 September and the position, became more reassuring.
The Indians were to continue giving the impression that the attack on Jassar was in real earnest. Between 0300 and 0630 hours on 7 September, but put in three attacks supported by massive artillery support and tanks. They succeeded in capturing the far end of the bridge eventually. The bridge as a result was blown up at 0800 hours the same day. The troops on the far end were ordered to swim to home side as it was not considered advisable to leave a few unsupported companies across the river. The Indians throughout the day, continued to try to enlarge their gains along the bridge but all their attempts were foiled.
26 Indian Division advancing along the main Sialkot-Jammu road did not make any headway on 6 and 7 September.
14 Indian Infantry Division rolled down across the wide stretch Charwah-Bajra Garhi on the night of 7/8 September. The attack started at 2330 hours. 3 FF fought delaying action and gradually fell back to the main defensive line around Phillorah. 3 FF was holding area Gadgor and adjoining villages. Although vastly outnumbered the battalion stood the most intense shelling and kept to its positions. A few platoon localities exchanged hands once but were immediately recaptured. The fight for every inch of the territory had started. It was like a cyclone. Waves clashing with waves and creating an uproar in the dark but few Pakistani soldiers stood steadfast. Attack after attack was coming and yet the thin line stood firm like a wall of steel.
The unit was ordered to fall back to Chawinda early in the morning on 8 September. By then, they were in danger of being cut off. They did so at first light. By the morning of 8 September the enemy with elements of 1 Indian Armoured Division had captured Maharajke, Charwa, Chobara, Gadgor and Phillorah villages.
The advance of 26 Indian Division along the main road to Sialkot had also been checked and the enemy was hardly able to throw back the screens pushed forward by 19 Punjab and 13 FF on the main road Sialkot-Jammu.
6 Armoured Division, commanded by Major General Abrar Hussain was now moved forward and given the responsibility of stopping the main enemy advance opposite Chawinda in conjunction with 24 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik already in position. The brigade had under it, 2 Punjab, 3 FF and 25 cavalry. In fact, what it amounted to was that an infantry and an armoured brigade, were defending against this very strong Indian offensive.
8 September gives the image of a series of hammer blows on a small size but ultra strong anvil. Each blow produces blinding flashes. It is the test of strength and quality of metal between the anvil and the hammer. After a little it starts becoming evident that the hammer blows have started losing their vigor and frequency and the metal of the hammer started cracking.
The Indians had occupied Phillorah during the earlt hours of the morning but the appearance of 24 Infantry Brigade opposite them in the morning, in an offensive mood, made them fall back. Bajrah and Garhi had four enemy tanks. The moment one was hit by Pakistani armour, 25 cavalry, the other three disappeared. The enemy was gradually pushed out of Chobara also by 24 Infantry Brigade and 25 Cavalry.
On the morning of 9 September, 10 Infantry Brigade commanded by brigadier Azmat Hayat Khan also joined in and had taken up positions along side 24 Infantry Brigade.
9 September again was a busy day. The enemy tried to edge towards our left and making use of a road Maharajke-Sialkot and road Bajra-Garhi-Sialkot to put in a right hook.
This move was foiled immediately it became apparent and the enemy withdrew in haste. The enemy operation order had laid down the main axis as Ramgarh, Chobara and Phillorah. One Centurian regiment was to push through along it while the other, a Sherman regiment was to be on the right. This regiment appears to have attempted the right hook but could not sustain it. The other Centurian regiment plus a squadron was to be on the enemy left in area Daigi. 4 Horse had been kept by the Indians in reserve.
The enemy put in a counter-attack on Chobara with an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion. This was successfully beaten back. The enemy had used his air on a number of occasions but the Pakistan Air Force had every time appeared on the scene and chased them away, before they could contribute much to the battle.
15 Infantry Division headquarters itself were attacked by enemy aircraft on the morning of 10 September but there were no casualties. The GOC Major General Tikka Khan who had taken the command from brigadier Sardar Mohammad Ismail, had organized tank hunting parties who were successful in destroying a number of tanks during the night of 9/10 September. This put a stop on the night movement of Indian tanks opposite Sialkot.
On 10 September, the Indians subjected the Jassar positions to very heavy shelling but did not try to advance forward. They seemed to have been given large quantities of artillery ammunition merely to expend while sitting at a distance from Pakistani troops.
The Indians, opposite 24 Infantry Brigade, in the area of Gadgor tried to make a flanking move from the left but failed to make any headway.
A great deal of enemy movement was observed during 10 September behind the enemy lines. It was evident the regrouping and reallocation of tasks was being undertaken by the Indians. The original plan had failed. They hoped to succeed with the changed plan if ……….. But, they were soon to know that the "ifs" do not turn out to be in favor of mighty hordes all the time.
Sialkot and Jassar received their share of shelling again on 11 September. Enemy tried to advance along the main axis but failed. Khaira village fell to the Indians but was counter attacked and retaken. Shelling by the Indians along their main axis of advance was very intense. It lasted from 0200 to 0800 hours. The Indians also used air which, however failed to do any damage. At 1100 hours, the main enemy attack, mainly armour came against Gador and Phillorah. 11 Cavalry Guides and 25 Cavalry took the brunt and stopped the enemy. It was a magnificent battle; tank against tank reminded of the armour battles of Second World War. There was determination on both sides, in fact it was a test of stamina and determination. There were fairly heavy casualties on both sides.
The only gain to the Indians that day was the Phillorah village. This also lost because the Indians were pushing across thousand of refugees from the villages occupied by them on the first day. To have advanced under the cover of refugees was the most unsoldierly act on the part of Indians but then there it was and not much could be done about it. For three days they had kept them confined without food and water and now on 11 September they had used them as human shield. Pundit Kautilya had come to their aid but even this guile was short lived. It could not be repeated day after day. There were no more left to be used after the 11th. PAF brought about successful air strikes that day, against Chobara and Charwa.
A certain amount of regrouping and reallocation of areas was carried out on 11 September by Pakistan also. 1 Armoured Division less 5 Armoured Brigade had also arrived in the area and could be used as and when found necessary. The attack against Phillorah had cost Indians heavy losses. 25 Cavalry had been successfully engaging the enemy armour throughout this period. They had been able to account for 29 tanks against a loss of only 4 of their own. As a result of the re-organization our own locations were as follows on 12 September.
Chawinda Area 24 Infantry Brigade2 Punjab3 FF14 Baluch25 Cavalry
Badiana Area 10 Infantry BrigadeGuides Cavalry plus Squadron 11 Cavalry22 cavalry less one Squadron
Pasrur Area 14 (P) Brigade11 Cavalry less one Squadron9 FF
Sialkot Area 15 Infantry Division101 Infantry Brigade2 Baluch19 Punjab104 Infantry Brigade9 Baluch20 Lancers less one squadron
Jassar Area No Change
Khairi and Chak Phulra posts and high ground in the vicinity were captured on the morning of 12 September in Sialkot Sector.
yasin_khan
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #8
The Second Round In Kashmir
The debacle in Kutch disappointed the Indian Warlords. They had great hopes on this seemingly innocent border incident. It did not escalate as expected. The visits of reverted pundits like Shastri, the Prime Minister, and Chavan, the Defence Minister did not succeed in infusing life into the demoralized Indian soldier. Commanders like Major Karnail Singh believed that they were doomed to be taken prisoners whenever and wherever they went to war. A high powered conference was called. All the brass and all the excellencies attended. The adversaries were in the lobbies but near enough to influence decisions. After a little mud slinging between the politicians and the soldiers the conference settled down to sober deliberations. The blame for that defeat was thrown on the Pakistanis. They had not played the game expected of them as a small weak neighbor. They should have agreed to loose but instead they had stood up and had managed to attack with superior forces at the desired time and place whenever they decided to adopt offensive defense.
The decision arrived at by this high powered conference was to try again. The mighty Indian white elephant, its army, was to be geared into motion once again but this time it was considered best to roll it down the hills of Kashmir. As soon as it had gained momentum it was to be supplemented by an energetic push from all directions and across all fronts. It must be noted here that the principle of diversifying the points of attack had not yet been given up. In the plan to initiate the move from Kashmir the beginning was to be made once again from disputed territory. A certain amount of ingenuity and the dovetailing of political and military strategy was to be in greater prominence than in the case of Rann of Kutch. The Indians realized that Pakistan had relied too long on the promises of UNO. The question of Kashmir and Pak-Bharat problems had become in the meantime a matter of the so called global strategy of big powers. As a result Kashmiris had become so frustrated that since 1964 any aggressive move by India in Kashmir had brought about retaliation by AK Forces. Chaknot and other places had shown the changed attitude of the government of Azad Kashmir. The Indian shrewd mind was quick to come to conclusion. If Indian heightened her aggressive attitude in Kashmir through increased breaches of Cease Fire Agreement and raids into territory controlled by Azad Kashmir were stepped up, it was more than likely, in fact certain, as the Indian Prime Minister put it to the meeting-that Pakistan and the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir would reply in the same coin-1. It was even possible, said the pupil of Chanakya smilingly, that Pakistan may join hands with the revolutionaries in the valley and other parts of held Kashmir who would certainly rise if in addition to the use of agents provocateurs, the control was relaxed a little. If this happened, as he was mistakenly certain it would happen, then the next step for India was to march into Pakistan from all directions. "After all, all roads lead to Islamabad. What fun could you not have, General". The reply was very military like, "Yes Sir. You know the brave jawans of the Sena2 are itching to march westwards at your command". With a "Well done" and "I have faith in you and your brave jawans. Give them all my Ashir Bad3", and the meeting ended.
As a last reminded the Prime Minister turning to Mr. Nanda the Home Minister, had said, "Are the plans regarding dispatch of Jan Sangh volunteers complete". When the Home Minister nodded with "Yes" in an undertone, the Prime Minister smiled and left the room. The plan, they all thought was so simple that it could not fail to achieve the desired result. The Army of Occupation in Indian held Kashmir was ordered to set up raids across the Cease Fire Line and the puppet Government of Srinagar was instructed to provide agents provocateurs who could light the fuse and blow up the smoldering heap of explosives, that Kashmir had become. The security troops had to be moved nearer to the FDLs in any case. The relaxing of control, the presence of agents provocateurs and increased persecutions were expected to create conditions which, the Indians thought, would force Pakistan to listen to Kashmiri leaders' requests of marching into Indian held Kashmir.
The record of Indians in Kashmir was fairly black even before this eventful decision but immediately after this meeting the activities across the Cease Fire Line were stepped up out of all proprtions. The cease fire violations are reported to the U.N. observers by Pakistan during the past had been as follows:
1962 538
1963 283
1964 1464
They now produced a different picture in 1965.
January 189
February 224
March 325
April 335
May 438
June 480
With the figures of raids across CFL mounting up week after week it was only natural for India to expect Pakistan to retaliate. It can be said that the dovetailing of political with military strategy by India had succeeded to the extent that it drew out the Kashmiris exactly as the Indian Pandits had anticipated. They, however, had miscalculated the results in more than one manner, and particularly the action which they thought Pakistan would take. The error of judgement referred to by Lieut. General Kaul, in his book, cost the Indians heavily4.
The first mistake which the Indians made was that they had not weighed up the Kashmir situation inside the Indian held Kashmir itself. The repression which had been planned to be simultaneous with increased activities across CFL and to precede the final push had reached a crescendo by the time the level of junior executives was reached. These officials had been supported by thousands of armed Jan Sanghis imported from India after intensive training and careful screening. The plan boomeranged as a result. Persecutions and cruelty have a limit in every case. Even the most willing sufferer will not be able to bear patiently beyond a certain point. The same happened in Kashmir as it had happened in 1930. A countrywide tumult arose, a lot more than the Indians had expected. That part of the Indian Army which had been hitherto utilized for local protection and to frighten the Kashmiris was not there to stifle the voices. The troops had been moved forward to carry out raids through the FDLs into Azad Kashmir (AK) territory. The absence of these troops helped the revolutionaries to organize better that the Indian authorities felt they would be able to do.
The second miscalculation was regarding the exact reaction of Pakistan. Indian commanders had visualized that with the threat of AK, Pakistan High Command would move at least two divisions into AK to thicken up the defenses in addition to retaliation. This would have weakened the defenses in Lahore and Sialkot. Nothing of the sort happened. No units, much less formations were moved into AK. The Azad Kashmir leaders had been pressing Pakistan Government that if Pakistan was not in a position to act, the kashmiris should be left free, but so far Pakistan had been able to hold them back.
The debacle in Kutch disappointed the Indian Warlords. They had great hopes on this seemingly innocent border incident. It did not escalate as expected. The visits of reverted pundits like Shastri, the Prime Minister, and Chavan, the Defence Minister did not succeed in infusing life into the demoralized Indian soldier. Commanders like Major Karnail Singh believed that they were doomed to be taken prisoners whenever and wherever they went to war. A high powered conference was called. All the brass and all the excellencies attended. The adversaries were in the lobbies but near enough to influence decisions. After a little mud slinging between the politicians and the soldiers the conference settled down to sober deliberations. The blame for that defeat was thrown on the Pakistanis. They had not played the game expected of them as a small weak neighbor. They should have agreed to loose but instead they had stood up and had managed to attack with superior forces at the desired time and place whenever they decided to adopt offensive defense.
The decision arrived at by this high powered conference was to try again. The mighty Indian white elephant, its army, was to be geared into motion once again but this time it was considered best to roll it down the hills of Kashmir. As soon as it had gained momentum it was to be supplemented by an energetic push from all directions and across all fronts. It must be noted here that the principle of diversifying the points of attack had not yet been given up. In the plan to initiate the move from Kashmir the beginning was to be made once again from disputed territory. A certain amount of ingenuity and the dovetailing of political and military strategy was to be in greater prominence than in the case of Rann of Kutch. The Indians realized that Pakistan had relied too long on the promises of UNO. The question of Kashmir and Pak-Bharat problems had become in the meantime a matter of the so called global strategy of big powers. As a result Kashmiris had become so frustrated that since 1964 any aggressive move by India in Kashmir had brought about retaliation by AK Forces. Chaknot and other places had shown the changed attitude of the government of Azad Kashmir. The Indian shrewd mind was quick to come to conclusion. If Indian heightened her aggressive attitude in Kashmir through increased breaches of Cease Fire Agreement and raids into territory controlled by Azad Kashmir were stepped up, it was more than likely, in fact certain, as the Indian Prime Minister put it to the meeting-that Pakistan and the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir would reply in the same coin-1. It was even possible, said the pupil of Chanakya smilingly, that Pakistan may join hands with the revolutionaries in the valley and other parts of held Kashmir who would certainly rise if in addition to the use of agents provocateurs, the control was relaxed a little. If this happened, as he was mistakenly certain it would happen, then the next step for India was to march into Pakistan from all directions. "After all, all roads lead to Islamabad. What fun could you not have, General". The reply was very military like, "Yes Sir. You know the brave jawans of the Sena2 are itching to march westwards at your command". With a "Well done" and "I have faith in you and your brave jawans. Give them all my Ashir Bad3", and the meeting ended.
As a last reminded the Prime Minister turning to Mr. Nanda the Home Minister, had said, "Are the plans regarding dispatch of Jan Sangh volunteers complete". When the Home Minister nodded with "Yes" in an undertone, the Prime Minister smiled and left the room. The plan, they all thought was so simple that it could not fail to achieve the desired result. The Army of Occupation in Indian held Kashmir was ordered to set up raids across the Cease Fire Line and the puppet Government of Srinagar was instructed to provide agents provocateurs who could light the fuse and blow up the smoldering heap of explosives, that Kashmir had become. The security troops had to be moved nearer to the FDLs in any case. The relaxing of control, the presence of agents provocateurs and increased persecutions were expected to create conditions which, the Indians thought, would force Pakistan to listen to Kashmiri leaders' requests of marching into Indian held Kashmir.
The record of Indians in Kashmir was fairly black even before this eventful decision but immediately after this meeting the activities across the Cease Fire Line were stepped up out of all proprtions. The cease fire violations are reported to the U.N. observers by Pakistan during the past had been as follows:
1962 538
1963 283
1964 1464
They now produced a different picture in 1965.
January 189
February 224
March 325
April 335
May 438
June 480
With the figures of raids across CFL mounting up week after week it was only natural for India to expect Pakistan to retaliate. It can be said that the dovetailing of political with military strategy by India had succeeded to the extent that it drew out the Kashmiris exactly as the Indian Pandits had anticipated. They, however, had miscalculated the results in more than one manner, and particularly the action which they thought Pakistan would take. The error of judgement referred to by Lieut. General Kaul, in his book, cost the Indians heavily4.
The first mistake which the Indians made was that they had not weighed up the Kashmir situation inside the Indian held Kashmir itself. The repression which had been planned to be simultaneous with increased activities across CFL and to precede the final push had reached a crescendo by the time the level of junior executives was reached. These officials had been supported by thousands of armed Jan Sanghis imported from India after intensive training and careful screening. The plan boomeranged as a result. Persecutions and cruelty have a limit in every case. Even the most willing sufferer will not be able to bear patiently beyond a certain point. The same happened in Kashmir as it had happened in 1930. A countrywide tumult arose, a lot more than the Indians had expected. That part of the Indian Army which had been hitherto utilized for local protection and to frighten the Kashmiris was not there to stifle the voices. The troops had been moved forward to carry out raids through the FDLs into Azad Kashmir (AK) territory. The absence of these troops helped the revolutionaries to organize better that the Indian authorities felt they would be able to do.
The second miscalculation was regarding the exact reaction of Pakistan. Indian commanders had visualized that with the threat of AK, Pakistan High Command would move at least two divisions into AK to thicken up the defenses in addition to retaliation. This would have weakened the defenses in Lahore and Sialkot. Nothing of the sort happened. No units, much less formations were moved into AK. The Azad Kashmir leaders had been pressing Pakistan Government that if Pakistan was not in a position to act, the kashmiris should be left free, but so far Pakistan had been able to hold them back.
yasin_khan
New Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #9
The shifting sands of Rajputana
Sind was the second front opened boastfully by India, when a company of Indus Rangers in Darda village was attacked by an Indian battalion and two squadrons of armor. The rangers halted the advance for over three hours but, being outnumbered and not having any A/Tk weapons, had to withdraw. The Indians occupied the village with all the fanfare that All India radio and the Indians press could make. The idea was clear. The move fitted into the Indian strategic plan. As the BBC announced,
"Indian troops are meeting no resistance and have captured the town of Gadro, six miles over the border. They are now said to be advancing on another town called Khokhrapar, 15 miles further on. This new front is in desert country as a route towards Pakistan's most important cities - Hyderabad and beyond that Karachi, which is 200 miles from the frontier. And with a new assault, fighting is now going between the two countries in five sectors spread along some 850 miles of border. This extending of line will help India, which has far more infantry divisions to deploy along it than Pakistan."
The real object of India is opening a large number of fronts and trying to grab as much territory as possible, has been explained earlier, but as elsewhere, her troops were not destined to succeed in their efforts. The march of Khokhrapar remained as to many other places, only a narrow mark on the maps in Army headquarters India. It was never allowed to materialized. In pursuance of instructions from Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, 51 Infantry Brigade, (2 Infantry battalions, 18 Punjab and 8 FF) had moved from Karachi on 5 September and were getting into their battle locations when the Indian invasion came.
Commander 51 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier (later Brigadier General) K. M. Azhar Khan, asked permission to undertake offensive operations instead of waiting of the Indians to attack Khokhrapar. GHQ were reluctant to let this brigade disappear into the vastness of Rajputana desert but permitted the undertaking of limited offensive. The town and railway station of Monabhao was nearest Indian target. It lay six miles inside Indian territory and was being used by them, as railhead for the desert campaign in this area. A battalion of Mahratta Regiment and three companies of RAC held it.
The pre-attack shelling was undertaken on the evening of 9 September by mortar batteries. There was no great deal of ammunition to be used by the Indians needed even less to evacuate their positions. Only 17 rounds fired. 18 Punjab put in an attack on 10 September but the Indians did not wait long enough to fire the mortar shells they had stacked near their mortars and fled. The Indians as usual denied the fall of Monabhao and did not admit until foreign correspondents had visited the place. The Indian casualties in this encounter could not have been very heavy and their running away cannot be explained except, that, their soldiers from the south of India had no sympathy with the war which was of Northern India's making.
The next place to fall on 13 September , to 51 Inf. Brigade was Panchilla, pronounced like Panchshila. The men, a company of 8 FF who captured this post had better luck. The Indians put up a better show. The result was that, one JCO and 33 ORs were captured in addition to a number of Indians killed. The quantities of Rum found among the rations left behind the Indians spoke well of the minute care given to proper logistic support of the army in this sector by the Indian High Command. D Company of 18 Punjab commanded by Major Mohammad Taj, put in well directed attack on Shakarbu Post on 15 September. The enemy was holding the post with one company and was entrenched. The Indians put up a fairly good fight but did not wait for the final charge. They left a number of dead and the trenches were found to be well stocked with ammunition, rations and rum.
Kharin Post was close by and as a movements of men and vehicles were observed it was decided to capture that post as well. The day still young, it was only 1500 hours, and the men were keen for another dash forward. They were not very fortunate. The Indians sensed the attack and when the company reached the enemy position, it found plenty of rations but no Indians. Theyhad left in a hurry.
The indians however came back and launched a counter-attack, supported by tanks at 1730 hours. The platoon commander of the forward most platoon, Subedar Mohammad Elias handled his platoon in a superb manner. The two leading tanks were destroyed by one round eachof RR which discouraged the others. The counter-attack gradually slackened and by 1945 hours the Indians started breaking contact and eventually retreated, having suffered fairly heavy casualties.
'A' Company 8 FF, commanded by Major Aqil dad, raised the enemy position in the area of Jaisandar on 17 September. The information must have been incomplete. It was thought that there was hardly an enemy infantry battalion at this place. It, however, turned out to be occupied by the entire 30 Indian Infantry Brigade, consisting of 3 Guards, 1 Garhwal and a Border Police battalion. The raid was a complete success. The outer cordon was broken through and two Indian companies badly mauled. This forced and Indians to put in a number of couter-attacks, on the position held by them, a little while ago. Indians suffered as a result very heavy casualtie47s. The company commander, although wounded earlier on, continued to exercise control, and withdraw his company after a good day's fight.
The next target was Roheri. By then the local Mujahids, Hurs Free men, had joined the ranks of pakistan Army as volunteers. An infantry patrol aided by Hurs raided this post. The Indians put up better resistance at this point but eventually evacuated it. Initially it was not meant to occupy Roheri, but as it appeared to be an ideal base for deep patrolling and raiding the Indian posts in the rear, it was occupied and made good use of until the end. The Hurs loved this sort of task. They are born fighters and an extremely disciplined body of men. They obeyed orders as if they had spent a lifetime in the army and were perfect sportsmen. They refrained from looting and burning or shooting after the enemy had turned its back. It was against their code of conductin battle. The country was also suited for deep raides. Rajputana, in thispart, is a vastdesert, full of sand dunes, dotted with occasional stretches of under growth nut, has very little water. It is fairly hard soil in places but mostly there are soft patches and M.T. movement is not easy. Troops used to long marches alone can operate in it. The indians do not seem to have chosen the ideal troops for this area. They had;
5 maharatta Light Infantry from Maharashtra: 30 Indian Inf. Bde.
3 Guards (a mixed unit)
1 Garhwal
6 RAC (a mixed unit)
7 RAC (a mixed unit with some locals)
4 Maharatta Light Inf. From Maharashtra: 85 Indian Inf. Bde
17 madras
13 Grenadiers (a mixed unit - Camel borne)
51 Infantry Brigade, had to undertake the major portion of its fighting after the cease-fire, when the Indians launched a major offensive all along this front to avenge their past defeats. It resulted in some severe battles but except adding to the number of their casualties the Indians did not achieve anything. They lost 5 officers, 3 JCOs and 50 ORs as prisoners in the battle of Sundra alone. 8 FF commanded by lt. Col. M. M. janjua despatched a company to defend it against the Indian attack by 4 Maharatta Light Infantry. They not only drove them back but also having inflicted heavy casualties, stopped them from coming forward again.
Desert Force
The Desert Force consisted of a few companies of West Pakistan Rangers and mujahids - the Hurs of Sind. They were allotted the Sector opposite the Indian State of Jaisalmir. Their task was to protect the LOC Lahore-Karachi in the area of Rohri and Khairpur and stop any aggressive move by India in this sector.
The indian forces opposite this small but determined band of men were Rajistan Armed Constabulary and units of Indian Army supported by light and medium artillery. They had also some of horse and camel cavalry units. The indians started the war in this sector on 8 September, this trying to coordinate their efforts wuth the attack into Sind against Gadro. Their attacks were not allowed to materalize and in fact they were pushed back.
Desert Force retaliated soon after and attacked tannot post. The lack of artillery support did not permit the attack to go in which was, therefore called off. The Sector however received reinforcement in the shape of 23 FF, a newly rasied battalion, from amongst the Army reservists, and a mortar battery. This made all the differences and the Desert Force was ready to go the offensive.
The main battle in the sector was was Sadhewala but this happened after the cease-fire . the Indians suffered heavy casualties in this actions and it stopped their inching forward movement which as elsewhere, they had started after the cease-fire agreement.
Sind was the second front opened boastfully by India, when a company of Indus Rangers in Darda village was attacked by an Indian battalion and two squadrons of armor. The rangers halted the advance for over three hours but, being outnumbered and not having any A/Tk weapons, had to withdraw. The Indians occupied the village with all the fanfare that All India radio and the Indians press could make. The idea was clear. The move fitted into the Indian strategic plan. As the BBC announced,
"Indian troops are meeting no resistance and have captured the town of Gadro, six miles over the border. They are now said to be advancing on another town called Khokhrapar, 15 miles further on. This new front is in desert country as a route towards Pakistan's most important cities - Hyderabad and beyond that Karachi, which is 200 miles from the frontier. And with a new assault, fighting is now going between the two countries in five sectors spread along some 850 miles of border. This extending of line will help India, which has far more infantry divisions to deploy along it than Pakistan."
The real object of India is opening a large number of fronts and trying to grab as much territory as possible, has been explained earlier, but as elsewhere, her troops were not destined to succeed in their efforts. The march of Khokhrapar remained as to many other places, only a narrow mark on the maps in Army headquarters India. It was never allowed to materialized. In pursuance of instructions from Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, 51 Infantry Brigade, (2 Infantry battalions, 18 Punjab and 8 FF) had moved from Karachi on 5 September and were getting into their battle locations when the Indian invasion came.
Commander 51 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier (later Brigadier General) K. M. Azhar Khan, asked permission to undertake offensive operations instead of waiting of the Indians to attack Khokhrapar. GHQ were reluctant to let this brigade disappear into the vastness of Rajputana desert but permitted the undertaking of limited offensive. The town and railway station of Monabhao was nearest Indian target. It lay six miles inside Indian territory and was being used by them, as railhead for the desert campaign in this area. A battalion of Mahratta Regiment and three companies of RAC held it.
The pre-attack shelling was undertaken on the evening of 9 September by mortar batteries. There was no great deal of ammunition to be used by the Indians needed even less to evacuate their positions. Only 17 rounds fired. 18 Punjab put in an attack on 10 September but the Indians did not wait long enough to fire the mortar shells they had stacked near their mortars and fled. The Indians as usual denied the fall of Monabhao and did not admit until foreign correspondents had visited the place. The Indian casualties in this encounter could not have been very heavy and their running away cannot be explained except, that, their soldiers from the south of India had no sympathy with the war which was of Northern India's making.
The next place to fall on 13 September , to 51 Inf. Brigade was Panchilla, pronounced like Panchshila. The men, a company of 8 FF who captured this post had better luck. The Indians put up a better show. The result was that, one JCO and 33 ORs were captured in addition to a number of Indians killed. The quantities of Rum found among the rations left behind the Indians spoke well of the minute care given to proper logistic support of the army in this sector by the Indian High Command. D Company of 18 Punjab commanded by Major Mohammad Taj, put in well directed attack on Shakarbu Post on 15 September. The enemy was holding the post with one company and was entrenched. The Indians put up a fairly good fight but did not wait for the final charge. They left a number of dead and the trenches were found to be well stocked with ammunition, rations and rum.
Kharin Post was close by and as a movements of men and vehicles were observed it was decided to capture that post as well. The day still young, it was only 1500 hours, and the men were keen for another dash forward. They were not very fortunate. The Indians sensed the attack and when the company reached the enemy position, it found plenty of rations but no Indians. Theyhad left in a hurry.
The indians however came back and launched a counter-attack, supported by tanks at 1730 hours. The platoon commander of the forward most platoon, Subedar Mohammad Elias handled his platoon in a superb manner. The two leading tanks were destroyed by one round eachof RR which discouraged the others. The counter-attack gradually slackened and by 1945 hours the Indians started breaking contact and eventually retreated, having suffered fairly heavy casualties.
'A' Company 8 FF, commanded by Major Aqil dad, raised the enemy position in the area of Jaisandar on 17 September. The information must have been incomplete. It was thought that there was hardly an enemy infantry battalion at this place. It, however, turned out to be occupied by the entire 30 Indian Infantry Brigade, consisting of 3 Guards, 1 Garhwal and a Border Police battalion. The raid was a complete success. The outer cordon was broken through and two Indian companies badly mauled. This forced and Indians to put in a number of couter-attacks, on the position held by them, a little while ago. Indians suffered as a result very heavy casualtie47s. The company commander, although wounded earlier on, continued to exercise control, and withdraw his company after a good day's fight.
The next target was Roheri. By then the local Mujahids, Hurs Free men, had joined the ranks of pakistan Army as volunteers. An infantry patrol aided by Hurs raided this post. The Indians put up better resistance at this point but eventually evacuated it. Initially it was not meant to occupy Roheri, but as it appeared to be an ideal base for deep patrolling and raiding the Indian posts in the rear, it was occupied and made good use of until the end. The Hurs loved this sort of task. They are born fighters and an extremely disciplined body of men. They obeyed orders as if they had spent a lifetime in the army and were perfect sportsmen. They refrained from looting and burning or shooting after the enemy had turned its back. It was against their code of conductin battle. The country was also suited for deep raides. Rajputana, in thispart, is a vastdesert, full of sand dunes, dotted with occasional stretches of under growth nut, has very little water. It is fairly hard soil in places but mostly there are soft patches and M.T. movement is not easy. Troops used to long marches alone can operate in it. The indians do not seem to have chosen the ideal troops for this area. They had;
5 maharatta Light Infantry from Maharashtra: 30 Indian Inf. Bde.
3 Guards (a mixed unit)
1 Garhwal
6 RAC (a mixed unit)
7 RAC (a mixed unit with some locals)
4 Maharatta Light Inf. From Maharashtra: 85 Indian Inf. Bde
17 madras
13 Grenadiers (a mixed unit - Camel borne)
51 Infantry Brigade, had to undertake the major portion of its fighting after the cease-fire, when the Indians launched a major offensive all along this front to avenge their past defeats. It resulted in some severe battles but except adding to the number of their casualties the Indians did not achieve anything. They lost 5 officers, 3 JCOs and 50 ORs as prisoners in the battle of Sundra alone. 8 FF commanded by lt. Col. M. M. janjua despatched a company to defend it against the Indian attack by 4 Maharatta Light Infantry. They not only drove them back but also having inflicted heavy casualties, stopped them from coming forward again.
Desert Force
The Desert Force consisted of a few companies of West Pakistan Rangers and mujahids - the Hurs of Sind. They were allotted the Sector opposite the Indian State of Jaisalmir. Their task was to protect the LOC Lahore-Karachi in the area of Rohri and Khairpur and stop any aggressive move by India in this sector.
The indian forces opposite this small but determined band of men were Rajistan Armed Constabulary and units of Indian Army supported by light and medium artillery. They had also some of horse and camel cavalry units. The indians started the war in this sector on 8 September, this trying to coordinate their efforts wuth the attack into Sind against Gadro. Their attacks were not allowed to materalize and in fact they were pushed back.
Desert Force retaliated soon after and attacked tannot post. The lack of artillery support did not permit the attack to go in which was, therefore called off. The Sector however received reinforcement in the shape of 23 FF, a newly rasied battalion, from amongst the Army reservists, and a mortar battery. This made all the differences and the Desert Force was ready to go the offensive.
The main battle in the sector was was Sadhewala but this happened after the cease-fire . the Indians suffered heavy casualties in this actions and it stopped their inching forward movement which as elsewhere, they had started after the cease-fire agreement.