Need for new battlefield/tactical nuclear weapons

[Quiller]

Well, given that the Minuteman missiles would have to go over the pole and Russia, yes that is a bad idea. But the SLBMs don’t, so there is your solution.

A major problem with limited range theater ballistic missiles is that there are an increasing number of systems out there that claim to be able to intercept them, like the S-400 and S-500. The faster ICBM is more difficult to intercept, and the larger throw weight allows for a greater number of countermeasures to be carried with a single warhead. They also would be launched from too far away for the launch to be detected by the target country and their defenses alerted.

The same political problem exists with SLBM's if we are talkingTrident. The deterrent is NOT directed at Russia. The deterrent is directed at Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Let's be clear and cut through the mud. These countries are not going to be able to field antiballistic missile batteries with any genuine competence any time soon. They would be decimated by theater ballistic missiles TBM's, if they existed in the region, in short order. it is a deterrent. Even if they HAD ABM assets, taking a chance they could stop a couple far outweighs the likely destruction.

The issue is these countries do not believe the US would respond with strategic ICBM's for a regional nuclear launch against regional enemies. The question is, if the US had TBM's positioned regionally, would that be a deterrent or not? Well I don't know... which is why I am asking.

 

[My2Cents]

The same political problem exists with SLBM's if we are talkingTrident. The deterrent is NOT directed at Russia.

Is there some technical reason that we are unaware of that Trident missiles cannot be aimed anywhere other than Russia?

The problem is not with the missile, it is with the flight path over the pole and Russia. Trident missiles should not pose a problem as long as they from the southern India Ocean for Iran, India, and Pakistan targets. North Korea is a bit trickier due to the proximity of China, but probably near Australia would be suitable launch location.

The deterrent is directed at Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Let's be clear and cut through the mud. These countries are not going to be able to field antiballistic missile batteries with any genuine competence any time soon.

Anyone of them could purchase Russian S-400 any day if not blocked by sanctions (Iran). The S-400 is supposed to be equivalent of Patriot system, but longer ranged. China supposedly has a similar system going into production, and no interest in abiding with sanctions. The S-500 system, when it hits the market, is supposed to have capabilities closer to the THAAD system, and be able to stop anything slower than an ICBM.

India is actively negotiating to purchase production capability for either the S-400 or the Israeli Arrow system. Pakistan has over 100 nukes, all aimed at India, so they are obviously highly motivated and hope to build a lot of them quick! When they do, Pakistan will probably follow suit.

They would be decimated by theater ballistic missiles TBM's, if they existed in the region, in short order. it is a deterrent. Even if they HAD ABM assets, taking a chance they could stop a couple far outweighs the likely destruction.

Given that these are mobile systems you are trying to kill, and are deploying camouflage and decoys, history has shown that will be extremely difficult. Still, if you are using nuclear TBM to kill the ABM system to clear the way for a nuclear TBM strike on your target, ...

The issue is these countries do not believe the US would respond with strategic ICBM's for a regional nuclear launch against regional enemies. The question is, if the US had TBM's positioned regionally, would that be a deterrent or not? Well I don't know... which is why I am asking.

I don’t see why those countries should believe that if they initiate a nuclear exchange that the ICBMs and SLBMs will not be deployed in response, it is established policy. The use of WMDs is not a military decision, but a political one. If US troops are nuked then whatever system can penetrate RIGHT NOW will be the one used. The politicians cannot afford to look ineffective (political suicide) by waiting for a slow neutralization of the defenses to clear the way, especially if there is the possibility of further use by the other side.

And then there is another political question – Which countries are you going to base the TBMs in? There are not any US nuclear weapons currently based outside the US except possibly a couple not yet removed from NATO bases in Europe. Which new countries to you envision accepting US controlled nuclear weapons being stationed on their territory?

 

[Quiller]

i believe a secondary problem with using North American based ICBMs or SLBMs is the Russian reaction to a launch event. They spend a lot of time watching US bases and shadowing our SLBM's and would likely detect a launch, which they might regad as a strategic threat against them. That, by the way, is one of the arguments some have posed against using ICBM's or SLBM's with conventinal warheads for use in the Prompt Global Strike scenario.

I agree completely a nuclear launch is more a political than a military choice, more than ever today. Thinking back to the "cold war" the idea of US fielding theater nuclear weapons in Europe was probably based on the notion -- somewhat silly I guess -- that if the Soviet Union deployed their SRBM's and MRBM's as part of an attack on Europe (and Europe only) that the US would be able to avoid putting the homeland at risk by responding with SRBM's or IRBM's (such as Thor and Jupiter missiles) from within Europe, Great Braitain, and Turkey. (Some Jupiters were stationed in Turkey at the time.) And it occurs to me the idea of a "controlled theater nuclear battle" is pretty ridiculous. Had such an event actually occurred, no doubt strategic ICBM's would have been in the air in prettty short order anyway.

Your final question is the big one really. Where would such missiles be based? Well okay, most incisive point yet.

 

[USAF77]

Yes. I think we do.

 

[Landis]

i believe a secondary problem with using North American based ICBMs or SLBMs is the Russian reaction to a launch event. They spend a lot of time watching US bases and shadowing our SLBM's and would likely detect a launch, which they might regad as a strategic threat against them. That, by the way, is one of the arguments some have posed against using ICBM's or SLBM's with conventinal warheads for use in the Prompt Global Strike scenario.

I agree completely a nuclear launch is more a political than a military choice, more than ever today. Thinking back to the "cold war" the idea of US fielding theater nuclear weapons in Europe was probably based on the notion -- somewhat silly I guess -- that if the Soviet Union deployed their SRBM's and MRBM's as part of an attack on Europe (and Europe only) that the US would be able to avoid putting the homeland at risk by responding with SRBM's or IRBM's (such as Thor and Jupiter missiles) from within Europe, Great Braitain, and Turkey. (Some Jupiters were stationed in Turkey at the time.) And it occurs to me the idea of a "controlled theater nuclear battle" is pretty ridiculous. Had such an event actually occurred, no doubt strategic ICBM's would have been in the air in prettty short order anyway.

Your final question is the big one really. Where would such missiles be based? Well okay, most incisive point yet.

While I don't doubt it matters where they land, does it really matter where they are launched from? Certainly in yield, there is little to distinguish the tactical -vs- the Strategic nuclear weapon, although granted there are/were a lot more of the smaller tactical -vs-larger tactical.

As I understand it (being a 7 star armchair general), the draw down in the size of the European based US tactical nuclear weapon stockpile from a high of around 7500 in the 1970s, to less than 3000 by the end of the Cold War was not so much fewer targets in eastern europe but moving the weapons out of Soviet tactical and regional nuclear weapon range and putting them on cruise missile subs and ships as well as just more longer ranged strategic weapons targeting. This allowed those Warsaw targets to be covered regardless of the advance of the Warsaw army across Germany, as well as the success of a first strike on NATO weapons depots.

 

[Quiller]

Well that might have been an underlying strategic idea... moving the nukes out of Europe and Turkey to subs and such to help keep them out of harm's way.

However the official drawdown of Thors from Europe and Jupiter missiles from Turkey was to "sweeten" the demand of a withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

 

[My2Cents]

However the official drawdown of Thors from Europe and Jupiter missiles from Turkey was to "sweeten" the demand of a withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

A very nice sweetener since they were obsolete already and due to be removed within 2 years anyway.

 

[Quiller]

A very nice sweetener since they were obsolete already and due to be removed within 2 years anyway.

Exactly the point. Many internatonal events are policy theater. The appearance to the world was either 1) the US forced the Soviet missiles out of Cuba or 2) there was some sort of quid-pro-quo negotiation for face saving. I realize this may be a simplistic version of what transpired, but it was nonetheless part of the global game.

 

[Quiller]

I think the final consensus is the use of a nuclear weapon by a foreign state against Israel or US/British military assets in the Middle East region is still effetively deterred by the existing US strategic nuclear arsenal at this point.

Whether or not US retaliation would in fact occur under various scenarios remains the province of the policy of whatever administration is in Washington D.C. at the moment.

I thank everyone for their insightful comments... and I imagine this threat can be abandoned.

 

[USAF77]

As I understand it (being a 7 star armchair general), the draw down in the size of the European based US tactical nuclear weapon stockpile from a high of around 7500 in the 1970s, to less than 3000 by the end of the Cold War was not so much fewer targets in eastern Europe but moving the weapons out of Soviet tactical and regional nuclear weapon range and putting them on cruise missile subs and ships as well as just more longer ranged strategic weapons targeting. This allowed those Warsaw targets to be covered regardless of the advance of the Warsaw army across Germany, as well as the success of a first strike on NATO weapons depots.

Actually "fewer targets" was exactly one of the two reasons. The Eastern Euro Warsaw pact targets simply stopped being targets and NATO gained far more flexibility with the Loss of forward basing by the Soviet in occupied countries. The 2nd being less nukes on hair trigger less chance of accidental nuclear war.

We didnt as much "Draw Down on theater nukes as much as upgrade them. Pershing-ll and GLCMs were far more effective deterrants and brought the Soviets to the bargaining table on Intermediate range nukes. They were even more so a staement of NATO solidarity that would have been far less strong has we only deployed them on USN platforms. The GLCM's/SLCMs, armed with the W-80, prettified the Soviets because the USN/NATO was able to launch so many of them and from so many platforms. Their RCS, low ALT attack profile, and accuracy again brought concessions when we unilaterally removed them from USN platforms. As far as I know the warheads are still being stored and would still be an effective deterrent if deployed.

So, new theater nukes worked back in the '80s to eventually make the world safer. Why wouldnt they now? An ICBM, a Trident-ll, is just to expensive, to powerful, and to important to waste on a limited retaliatory strike against an emerging WMD power. We cant retaliate against a Scud loaded with nerve gas, or a low yield/one stage device with a $30,000,000 SLBM with 6 450 KT H-Bombs loaded in its Bus, capable of wiping out numerous population centers. Let alone the fact that the launching of which, whether ICBMs or SLBMs, will make the Russians, Chinese, and our own Allies, awfully nervous.

We need to redeploy a limited amount of SLCMs with variable W-80s as a short term measure and develop a stand off weapon with a variable warhead, that we can deliver from F-35 size platforms. Add to that a bunker busting variant. The world has changed and the Russians and Chinese arent the main worry anymore. Thank you.

 

[My2Cents]

So, new theater nukes worked back in the '80s to eventually make the world safer. Why wouldnt they now? An ICBM, a Trident-ll, is just to expensive, to powerful, and to important to waste on a limited retaliatory strike against an emerging WMD power. We cant retaliate against a Scud loaded with nerve gas, or a low yield/one stage device with a $30,000,000 SLBM with 6 450 KT H-Bombs loaded in its Bus, capable of wiping out numerous population centers. Let alone the fact that the launching of which, whether ICBMs or SLBMs, will make the Russians, Chinese, and our own Allies, awfully nervous.

Actually, when you through in the research costs to design a new theatre ballistic missile or update an old design and build a new assembly line, you are already budgeted for several billion dollars. If a dozen Trident II are worth only $360 million, that is cheap by comparison.

 

[USAF77]

Actually, when you through in the research costs to design a new theatre ballistic missile or update an old design and build a new assembly line, you are already budgeted for several billion dollars. If a dozen Trident II are worth only $360 million, that is cheap by comparison.

I did not refer to

"design a new theater ballistic missile or update an old design and build a new assembly line"

in fact I said I was against the use of land based weapons for such a scenario. We both got rid of our IRBMs and its hard to figure how building new ones would make us more secure. And where would we base them anyways? Who would take them?

We already have a stand off weapon such as the JASSM-ER, or shortly will have it operational. We already have the war heads for it. Even a new warhead design would be cheaper then sending in 1 Billion $$ bombers to drop a gravity bomb.

I just think we have ignored the likely hood of this type of scenario long enough. As each year goes by it becomes more likely an emerging nuclear/WMD rouge state will either use, or threaten the use, of a limited strike weapon. NK sending an ICBM our way is an easy one to figure out but what if a Scud loaded with Sarin, or a small nuke, is aimed toward a Gulf naval base where the USN is stationed?

We need options for a more flexible response. But we could probably both agree that public support would be like a Lead Balloon hitting.

 

[Landis]

...We need options for a more flexible response. But we could probably both agree that public support would be like a Lead Balloon hitting.

And this is ridiculous. We are being paralyzed by (what some think is) public opinion? I bet most Americans expect us to maintain the leading edge of technology. We need to maintain a deterrent. That means keeping up with the advances in technology, defenses like the Russian 'Double Digit' SAMs specifically and other related.

Non-stealth old technology 30 year old cruise missiles that can be shot down with the latest defensive technology, and 30+ year old gravity bombs, even if dropped from expensive stealth platforms, seems inadequate to me.

Given strategic nuclear parity via treaty with Russia, our allies SHOULD be concerned given the massive and relatively superior technology Russia has with their tactical/regional nuclear weapons.

 

[USAF77]

100% agreement and well said.

I think, strangely, that most Americans think the '91 agreement covered all theater weapons and all thats left on either side are a small number of gravity bombs between us. The truth is the Soviets have a very large stockpile of theater nukes. The '91 agreement, if I recall right, only covered arty shells, IRBM warheads, and nuclear mines to be destroyed. There was no verification agreement and we were/are taking each other at their words. We have about 500 and they have 10X that number. Even worse, We really dont know how many of theirs they have destroyed. Even worse then that ; They have continued producing new designs.

Worse then all that they have continued with a policy of using the threat of these small yield weapons to intimidate former Soviet pact states to bend to their policies. Again the poor Poles are left wondering if the West would risk a nuclear escalation in the face of a Soviet attack.

But even the Russians aren't my main concern. My main concern are rouge states and terrorist groups assisted by such states. The biggest being Iran. But many others have very large chem/Bio stockpiles. Now we have to worry about Syria and what will happen if that regime falls ; They have a very large weaponized chem/Bio component.

And we in the West have out heads in the sand. By putting ourselves in the position of being afraid to even say "tactical nuke" we are in effect making a bad situation even worse. We've already lost much talent in our special weapons Industrial base and kickstarting new programs would be very expensive. We simply have to have more flexible options available until this world comes to its senses. A new arms race has already been started, we just havnt taken the necessary steps to protect ourselves from it.

And in an election year what are the chances of the topic being discussed. We had a hard enough time putting Pershing-lls and GLCMs into Europe during the height of The Cold War so what are the chances now of a new restructuring of NATOs "special" deterrent? I spent four years around Doomsday on trip wire back in the '70s and '80s. Frankly I think The World was safer then. At the least there were only two players, NATO and The Warsaw Pact.
Thank you.

And this is ridiculous. We are being paralyzed by (what some think is) public opinion? I bet most Americans expect us to maintain the leading edge of technology. We need to maintain a deterrent. That means keeping up with the advances in technology, defenses like the Russian 'Double Digit' SAMs specifically and other related.

Non-stealth old technology 30 year old cruise missiles that can be shot down with the latest defensive technology, and 30+ year old gravity bombs, even if dropped from expensive stealth platforms, seems inadequate to me.

Given strategic nuclear parity via treaty with Russia, our allies SHOULD be concerned given the massive and relatively superior technology Russia has with their tactical/regional nuclear weapons.

 

[Wise one]

Nukes are nukes

Most of the repliers are getting too tied up in technical matters,icbms or slbms etc. If an american ally is nuked by a regional foe, a North Korea, or an Iran, most Americans, who dont know one delivery system from another, will demand that the aggressor be obliterated asap. They couldn't care how you do it, as long as you do it!

 

[Kilo 2-3]

Most of the repliers are getting too tied up in technical matters,icbms or slbms etc. If an american ally is nuked by a regional foe, a North Korea, or an Iran, most Americans, who dont know one delivery system from another, will demand that the aggressor be obliterated asap. They couldn't care how you do it, as long as you do it!

Except they do...

Retaliation via conventional invasion carries with it massive humans and political risks. Invading the DPRK wouldn't be pretty, cheap or easy to sell to a post-Iraq public.

Conventional bombing runs the risk of being ineffective, plus it carries with it potential political embarrassment (downed pilots, collateral damage, etc.)

Using nuclear weapons wouldn't go over particularly well with the international community or millions of US citizens. Consider the guilt and second-guessing that has accompanied the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings. Iranian or North Korean children with horrific radiation burns don't make for good press...

 

[USAF77]

Most of the repliers are getting too tied up in technical matters,icbms or slbms etc. If an american ally is nuked by a regional foe, a North Korea, or an Iran, most Americans, who dont know one delivery system from another, will demand that the aggressor be obliterated asap. They couldn't care how you do it, as long as you do it!

Im afraid your wrong. Firstly America and her allies will expect a balanced response to such an attack. They take out an air base with a low yield nuke ; We do the same so they know we mean business. Annihilating an entire city of millions of civies, whose only crime was to be born in a country ran by a tyrant, is not a reasonable response.

Secondly that "client state" is a "client" of a country with far more capabilities then "it" has. And "it" may decide to push a button too, and then off we go.There are just to many escalation scenarios for the good ole American "make them all glow" response.

Then theres the worst scenario. What if the current American, I should just say USAF, tactical response finds itself not credible. Say a good defense against B2s and ALCMs evolves? What then? Then the Western Leaders may find themselves choosing between risking all out nuclear war, and being Damned by history, and doing nothing. And what elected "Pol" wants to be "Damned by History"?

And you just know that our enemies must see our static special weapons programs as a weakness.

 

[kato]

Annihilating an entire city of millions of civies, whose only crime was to be born in a country ran by a tyrant, is not a reasonable response

That's how it works though. Quite seriously, if you don't respond to a nuclear strike by glassing your enemy you'd be a laughing stock among the nuclear powers.

 

[My2Cents]

Im afraid your wrong. Firstly America and her allies will expect a balanced response to such an attack. They take out an air base with a low yield nuke ; We do the same so they know we mean business. Annihilating an entire city of millions of civies, whose only crime was to be born in a country ran by a tyrant, is not a reasonable response.

Secondly that "client state" is a "client" of a country with far more capabilities then "it" has. And "it" may decide to push a button too, and then off we go.There are just to many escalation scenarios for the good ole American "make them all glow" response.

Then theres the worst scenario. What if the current American, I should just say USAF, tactical response finds itself not credible. Say a good defense against B2s and ALCMs evolves? What then? Then the Western Leaders may find themselves choosing between risking all out nuclear war, and being Damned by history, and doing nothing. And what elected "Pol" wants to be "Damned by History"?

Pardon me, but what part of M.A.D. don't you understand?
:coffee

 

[USAF77]

I never said to not respond. Please read. I said we have to respond in a measured manner and have to do so to show our resolve. We cant take out an entire city cause one airbase was hit by a Sarin tipped Scud or a low yield weapon. Unlike a potential rouge state enemy we have Allies to answer to and public opinion to consider. We also dont want the situation to spin out of control into a complete catastrophe.

I suspect such an attack would not only bring a measured response in kind but also a very large conventional response.

That's how it works though. Quite seriously, if you don't respond to a nuclear strike by glassing your enemy you'd be a laughing stock among the nuclear powers.

Pardon me, but what part of M.A.D. don't you understand?

I understand all of it, especially since I was part of it. Im not talking about an exchange between the US and a power like Russia or even China. Theres nothing "mutual" about an exchange with a rouge state because we are far more powerful and can deliver a strategic response far above and beyond what they are capable of. Im just arguing for the tools to assure such an exchange is limited.

I dont like the term MAD anymore cause I dont want America and our allies to be part of the "mutual". The idea is to limit an exchange, while still achieving our goals and showing our resolve.To do so we need flexibility in our deterrent, weapons-wise, in order to have legitimacy in our deterrent in the real world. Our nuclear deterrent is still a Cold War relic and doesnt reflect todays and tomorrows reality.