NATO Missile Shield
- Thread starter gazzzwp
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I'm sure they have ironed out the launching problems by now. My question was have we actually seen them hit anything? What theatre have they been tested in? Interesting.
Good article from Airpower AU on the S400 system tech specs. Assumes PK of .7-.9.
Almaz-Antey 40R6 / S-400 Triumf / SA-21 SAM System / ?????????? ???????? ???????? ???????? 40?6 / ?-400 '??????'
Almaz-Antey 40R6 / S-400 Triumf / SA-21 SAM System / ?????????? ???????? ???????? ???????? 40?6 / ?-400 '??????'
Air Power Australia is not considered a reliable source. They've proven, over and over again, that they have an agenda, and will actively push nonsense backed with primitive understanding of the concepts being discussed.
I wouldn't be giving the Snnn series "boogey man status" over and above qualified professional respect.
its a bit of a stretch to go into some kind of defensive hand wringing - especially when the russians are nowhere near the systems integration and integrated levels of the US - and to some extent nowhere near the systems level of capability of the Israelis. Thats not meant to trivialise the threat - but some perspective is needed
Would you consider the technical analysis done by Dr. Karlo Kopp on russian radar sets as unreliable as well?
I don't really follow russian radar developments (as my interest in more on western sets), but in reading his analysis I haven't seen any glaring technical inconsistencies wrt general radar engineering (meaning nothing that would be inconsistent w/ what you'ld find in generic radar textbooks by Merrill Skolnik for example).
Or do you mean he is just exaggerating the performance parameters of the russian sets in his analysis?
His credibility is questionable when one considers that at one stage he was being promoted as one of australias (if not an international) expert on russian radar, weapons systems - this is from someone who as far as I am aware never worked in the areas that I know deal with and analyse russian systems and who are directly involved in countering them. ie they have been operational crows with experience on historical and contemp systems. He has also never worked with people who I know have been peronsally involved in analysing russian systems and some of whom have designed and/or worked with in depth systems
If none of that self promoting dribble had been trotted out in the past he might incur some respect.
At the international level one of my US colleagues had direct responsibility for understanding the russian systems and hardware threat for a number of countries - he was scathing in some of the claims made.
Others on here may want to contribute their own examples of where his claims of expertise fall a tad short - especially as he's never had access to the material behind those systems which means he's restricted to extrapolation of OSINT material - because if he had access to relevant data then he wouldn't speak about in the open anyway as material which is privileged can't and wouldn't be disclosed in public environments.
Does he know a lot? for sure, but his integrity has been tarnished by some claims and self promoting positions socialised in the past.
To be fair, he has been very quiet in recent times, so maybe some self recognition about some of the prev self serving statements has sunk in.
Thanks @swerve and @gf0012aust.
Kopp has published graphs of rcs vs. range performance for russian sets (presumably based on analysis of his sources*), would you then say these graphs are suspect?
(*He has written that the marketing efforts of the russian manufacturers have resulted in technical info on these systems appearing in the public domain, w/c I assume is his source for the extrapolations in his graphs)
Kopp has published graphs of rcs vs. range performance for russian sets (presumably based on analysis of his sources*), would you then say these graphs are suspect?
(*He has written that the marketing efforts of the russian manufacturers have resulted in technical info on these systems appearing in the public domain, w/c I assume is his source for the extrapolations in his graphs)
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
In short, yes. Basically the only open-source information which is likely to be reliably accurate, is for systems which have been retired/out of service for some time.
The open-sourced data for a number of pieces of kit are likely to bear some resemblance to the actual performance data, at least for low order items. Things like EW and ISR kit however, are likely to be a bit off. Same goes for submarine performance.
So the various graphs APA have come up with, from open-sourced data, are basically worthless. The numbers are basically all going to be off, the direction of which and degree are in question. One of the other issues is that the data APA has presented, tends to be presented as though it is empirical data, when it is more accurately could be described as estimated guesses, based off published data sets in the public domain. The end result often seems to be of roughly the same value as a WAG.
Thanks, I'll keep the feedback in mind when going through Kopp's analysis.
Just read a mostlymissiledefense.com article on the implications of the under development SM-3 block 2A BMD interceptor (https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/06/30/strategic-capabilities-of-sm-3-block-iia-interceptors-june-30-2016/). Once fielded, this 2A variant is also scheduled for deployment to Aegis Ashore sites (starting w/ the Poland site in 2018) as part of phase 3 of the EPAA (ref: CRS 05/26/16 report "Navy Aegis BMD Program").
Unlike the block 1A and 1B version of the SM-3 missile, the 2A variant will have a burnout velocity around 45-60% greater than the assumed 3-3.5 km/s velocity of the 1A/1B (ref: CRS 04/19/11 "Navy Aegis BMD Program" report, and FAS "2011 Missile Defense Report": http://fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf). This higher burnout velocity is presumed to give the 2A variant a coverage of around 2400-2500 km per the FAS report.
As for the interception target profile, the mostlymissiledefense.com article posted the following image taken from a 2007 MDA BMD briefing:
In the image the 2A missile is credited w/ the ability to intercept ICBM targets during part of the ascent (post-boost) phase, as well as part of the descent (prior to re-entry) phase.
Given this intercept profile capability, together w/ the range coverage data in the FAS BMD report, it would seem Russia's concern could be that, once equipped w/ the 2A interceptor, the Aegis Ashore sites pose a threat to the value of their strategic nuclear arsenal's deterrence capability (both the FAS report and the mostlymissiledefense.com article posit this as well with regards to interception during the descent phase).
In a similar manner in which Aegis BMD ships (pre-positioned near the US) equipped w/ 2A missiles can be used to intercept ICBMs during the descent phase (prior to re-entry), the Aegis Ashore sites (in Poland/Romania) w/ 2A interceptors can be used to intercept ICBMs in the ascent (post-boost) phase. In both cases, the deterrence value of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal decreases as a result of the BMD coverage provided.
As for the supposed "offensive weapon" threat the sites pose, the voice-over translation for Putin in the video of the RT news article (https://www.rt.com/news/344642-putin-visit-greece-tsipras/) actually doesn't even use the word "offensive", all the voice-over translation says is "rockets of x range". It's also interesting to note that the range of "2400 km" for the rocket stated in the video coincides quite well w/ the FAS report's estimation of the range coverage for the 2A interceptor.
Unlike the block 1A and 1B version of the SM-3 missile, the 2A variant will have a burnout velocity around 45-60% greater than the assumed 3-3.5 km/s velocity of the 1A/1B (ref: CRS 04/19/11 "Navy Aegis BMD Program" report, and FAS "2011 Missile Defense Report": http://fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf). This higher burnout velocity is presumed to give the 2A variant a coverage of around 2400-2500 km per the FAS report.
As for the interception target profile, the mostlymissiledefense.com article posted the following image taken from a 2007 MDA BMD briefing:
In the image the 2A missile is credited w/ the ability to intercept ICBM targets during part of the ascent (post-boost) phase, as well as part of the descent (prior to re-entry) phase.
Given this intercept profile capability, together w/ the range coverage data in the FAS BMD report, it would seem Russia's concern could be that, once equipped w/ the 2A interceptor, the Aegis Ashore sites pose a threat to the value of their strategic nuclear arsenal's deterrence capability (both the FAS report and the mostlymissiledefense.com article posit this as well with regards to interception during the descent phase).
In a similar manner in which Aegis BMD ships (pre-positioned near the US) equipped w/ 2A missiles can be used to intercept ICBMs during the descent phase (prior to re-entry), the Aegis Ashore sites (in Poland/Romania) w/ 2A interceptors can be used to intercept ICBMs in the ascent (post-boost) phase. In both cases, the deterrence value of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal decreases as a result of the BMD coverage provided.
As for the supposed "offensive weapon" threat the sites pose, the voice-over translation for Putin in the video of the RT news article (https://www.rt.com/news/344642-putin-visit-greece-tsipras/) actually doesn't even use the word "offensive", all the voice-over translation says is "rockets of x range". It's also interesting to note that the range of "2400 km" for the rocket stated in the video coincides quite well w/ the FAS report's estimation of the range coverage for the 2A interceptor.
gazzzwp
Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #74
According to RT today one of Russia's main concerns is that the system has the capability to hit satellites. I never realised this.
This certainly is a crucial factor. Does anyone have further information to support this please?
https://www.rt.com/news/362323-us-shield-europe-china/
This certainly is a crucial factor. Does anyone have further information to support this please?
https://www.rt.com/news/362323-us-shield-europe-china/
With months of preparation, a modified SM3 missile was used to shoot down a failed US satellite (USA-193) in early 2008, in what was called Operation Burnt Frost. The satellite had been launched into a low earth orbit & the orbit was decaying. An Aegis-equipped ship sailed to a carefully calculated interception point in the Pacific, taking days to get there.
Looks rather limited as an anti-satellite weapon, doesn't it?
Looks rather limited as an anti-satellite weapon, doesn't it?
maybe the russians are concerned of the upcoming block 2A variant of sm3 (as opposed to the modified block 1A used in burnt frost)... fwiw, here's a short 2011 paper from FAS on sm3 anti-sat/ASAT capabilities in regards to the altitude reachable based on burnout velocities of the different sm3 blocks: http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default...documents/nwgs/2011-winter-anti-satellite.pdf
God damn RT is at it again. The real concern that Russian HQ recently expressed was that the ABM system would be able to strike ICBMs in their boost phase. However, if they were actually worried about that, they'd be trying to move ICBM units further east. And they don't seem to be doing that.
^fwiw, the intercept point for a SM-3 block-2A would actually be in the target ballistic missile's ascent phase (ie. post-boost phase/after booster burnout velocity is reached) during the period the target BM is coasting prior to apogee as shown by the MDA images in the mostlymissiledefense article cited previously (and the 2011 FAS report linked in the same article)...
the missile-based boost phase interceptor was supposed to be the KEI/kinetic energy interceptor (ref: Kinetic Energy Interceptor), but as of this jan-2016 MDA update by Syring (https://www.csis.org/events/ballistic-missile-defense-system-update-1) boost phase intercepts is now planned to be accomplished by airborne lasers rather than missile-based systems...
the missile-based boost phase interceptor was supposed to be the KEI/kinetic energy interceptor (ref: Kinetic Energy Interceptor), but as of this jan-2016 MDA update by Syring (https://www.csis.org/events/ballistic-missile-defense-system-update-1) boost phase intercepts is now planned to be accomplished by airborne lasers rather than missile-based systems...
gazzzwp
Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #79
Airborne lasers? I know that the US has successfully tested these at sea for shooting down drones and will now be fitted to warships. I thought they had abandoned the idea of airborne interception? If done by planes then surely that would involve permanent scrambling of fleets of planes? If by satellite then I thought that technology was decades away?
^the original ABL (airborne laser) was based on a chemical laser and had a weight to power output ratio of ~55 kg/kW, currently (as can be seen in the presentation by Syring in the link in the previous post) the MDA focus is on diode pumped alkali (DPAL) and fiber combined laser (FCL) systems with a stated weight-to-power ratio goal of 2 kg/KW to make it feasible for airborne use at sufficient standoff range (as compared to the original ABL testbed)...
the MDA goal is to mount the DPALS or FCL system on a UAV for high-altitude (~65 Kft), long endurance (multi-day) loiter time, at standoff ranges to provide the boost phase intercepts...
more details can be seen in the slides presented in the Syring video presentation, also a development timeline can be found at mostlymissiledefense here: https://mostlymissiledefense.com/20...for-laser-boost-phase-defense-august-26-2016/
the MDA goal is to mount the DPALS or FCL system on a UAV for high-altitude (~65 Kft), long endurance (multi-day) loiter time, at standoff ranges to provide the boost phase intercepts...
more details can be seen in the slides presented in the Syring video presentation, also a development timeline can be found at mostlymissiledefense here: https://mostlymissiledefense.com/20...for-laser-boost-phase-defense-august-26-2016/