@Feanor, can you explain more on the use and employment of loitering munitions in this conflict?
Is loitering munitions use effective in this Nagorniy Karabakh conflict or over rated (when compared to a hellfire or spike launched from a long endurance UAV)? Esp. the hit on an Armenian UAZ van, that is claimed to belong to the Armenian Ministry of Emergency Situations.
I just don’t really understand its tactical use. If you can enlighten me, it would be great.
What I saw in the last flare-up was that the Azeris used them very effectively to knock out dug in Amernian T-72s. Their other operations were significant less effective. And I think once the initial surprise wore off, the Armenians recovered well. However the Armenians had no immediate counter to the use of top-attack munitions against their armor, be it Spike missiles, or loitering munitions. Given the complex terrain, and the dug in positions (this conflict has gone on for a very long time) top attack munitions make a lot of sense, and are new to the conflict. They are also very expensive, making it easier for Azerbaijan to get their hands on them then Armenia.
As for long endurance UAVs, Armenia has an air defense grid, and has some EW systems. Larger UAVs spending a long time over the battlefield would be more vulnerable, as they are larger and fly higher. Though in this last fight it looks like even smaller UAVs were taken out quite regularly. It's important to note that since the 2016 fight Armenia has gotten Tor-2MKM systems, a wheeled version of the Tor-M2, which has proven itself to be capable of dealing with small UAVs in Syria, and new EW, including the Infauna, and the Avtobaza systems. So I suspect that the use of loitering munitions (and top attack munitions) by Azerbaijan in 2016, which came as a surprise to Armenia, and was very effective, was far less effective this time around. Interestingly enough, there are some countering claims about the UAZ van being either a comms or a command vehicle for the Armenian military.
Armenia deploying their own top-attack munitions, loitering or otherwise, would represent a parallel move, a sort of symbolic (and possibly actual) restoration of the status quo. It's important to note that in neither case did Azerbaijan achieve any lasting success, despite their significant advantage in technology and resources. But in 2016 the top attack munitions were the most successful tactical component of the Azeri push, and likely the reason they gained ground at all, against dug in mech infantry and armor, in difficult terrain.
The final bit of relevance is that Russia has made a habit of, sometimes covertly and sometimes openly, testing their new gear in various combat zones against lesser opponents. They tested new systems, carefully, in Ukraine in '14-'15, and quite openly in Syria (though not announcing it until after, and even then not always). If Armenia has indeed used "special" UAVs to destroy Azeri tanks, there is a good chance we are talking about Russian systems (Russia did give Armenia that credit line) and possibly Russian loitering munitions, possibly being evaluated before deciding to procure them domestically. Possibly, though, something more sophisticated like the Orion, or the Forpost-M (a Russo-Israeli Searcher upgrade with some ground attack capability).
