Good post, these are some of the lessons learned from past conflicts, people tend to focus on the rear hull use for ground pounders due to lower level skirmishes that have been fought pretty much during Merkava introduction; Given a pure defensive posture this tank by far is the one I would rather be in versus some of the other models currently serving.
M1A3 Abrams Upgrade?
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Good post, these are some of the lessons learned from past conflicts, people tend to focus on the rear hull use for ground pounders due to lower level skirmishes that have been fought pretty much during Merkava introduction; Given a pure defensive posture this tank by far is the one I would rather be in versus some of the other models currently serving.
Some of the reasons Waylander for lack of newer specialized maingun projectiles has alot to do to other assets available for field commanders, also the new fighting concept that we were all hell bent on wasting billions of dollars on did not help. But given these facts we do have projects that we are working on, if unsuccessful then we know that we can procure technology advancements from another country which seems to be the norm as of late due to the global economic crisis.
Also being part of NATO and having compatible guns help also during times of possible war, in the event that we need say a projectile from Germany it would not be hard to add ballistic solution information to our fcs computers, they are designed for this type of situation.
I know that usually a US commander has more options available than commanders of other nations. But after years of high and low intensity fighting in Iraq including tanks one would have thought that the small summ needed for a new HE gets invested. From the comments I have read from tankers who served in Iraq I got the impression that they would have welcomed a decent HE to supplement the HEAT/MPAT rounds.
@3: That is a drastic understatement of the versatile Merkava design.
It would be better described as:
3a) Emergency shelter (as you said, but not only for knocked out vehicles but also for normal ground troops, especially in urban environment).
3b) Troop transport for up to 10 ground troops (It is a myth that this capability is a myth! This is an integral part of its design, not some nice side effect).
3c) Ambulance and medevac (The standard complement of a "tankbulance" is a medical team of 3, there is space for 2 to 3 stretchers and some nice medical equipment).
The troop transport is not a primary design capability, but the Merkava is used as a troop transport not only troop evac (eg in 2006 Lebanon).
I think it would be worth it for the US to go for a small number of Merkavas. They are considerably better suited for Urban environment and rough terrain, because those are the specific theatres they were designed for (eg the abrams is clearly designed to "face" the enemy, whereas the merkava puts much more emphasis on 360 or 270 defence for urban environment). Also the lower fuel consumption and especially the versatile rear area (troop transport, tankbulance, emergency evac aso).
There is a reason why Merkava addon developments slowly filter through to Abrams (eg Droid, Thor).
But in which situation has the Abrams suffered from any drawbacks of it's design compared to the Merkava? A M1A1 with TUSK is ok for urban environments. Even without these add-on it performed very good. Just have a look at the Thunder Runs and at Falluhja.
Mobility has never been a problem of the Abrams in recent conflicts.
The room in the back is nice to have but hardly decisive. Especially when one considers that the Abrams represent sunk costs and the US has Bradleys available.
A new Merkava Mk.IV costs a fortune to buy and operate in comparison (it would need a completely new log chain). Not to forget that the crew in the Abrams is still better protected in case of an ammo hit. The Blow Out panels offer more safety than the fireproof containers of the Merkava.
Mobility has never been a problem of the Abrams in recent conflicts.
The room in the back is nice to have but hardly decisive. Especially when one considers that the Abrams represent sunk costs and the US has Bradleys available.
A new Merkava Mk.IV costs a fortune to buy and operate in comparison (it would need a completely new log chain). Not to forget that the crew in the Abrams is still better protected in case of an ammo hit. The Blow Out panels offer more safety than the fireproof containers of the Merkava.
You are thinking of the Namer heavy IFV and the Tankbulance. They use the Merkava chassis, but are not Merkava tanks.
It would be like saying the M-48 Patton tank has an 8" gun, because they built the M-110 using the same chassis.
Yes we do need a good general purpose round, but when did DOD ever bother to field anything in a timely fashion, it took us how long to field our multi purpose heat round, this projectile was being talked about at Todd Hall back in the mid 80's and we finally got it fully fielded by the mid 90's.
The problem with finding drawbacks of a weapon system is, that the field is often narrowed down by perception. You could say that the Abrams has no problems with the terrain, just because it is not used in the terrain it would have problems in. Like no one with a normal car complains about its capabilities in rough terrain, since no one would use it in rough terrain from the beginning.
I m not saying that the Abrams is inferior to the Merkava per se, just in some specific environments like urban and Golan like terrain.
And the versatile Merkava rear compartment (and the mortar and so on) offer (in combination) a significant advantage, let alone the Droid system (but afaik that is also tested on abrams).
I agree with the sunk costs and especially the new logistic chain, however when only merkavas are deployed in a long term or small theatre (abrams only for the short time mass invasion), only the base logistics would be additional, and there would also be a positive impact on theatre logisitics (eg due to the lower fuel consumption). And the bradley offers hardly comparable protection, eg for command post/tankbulance/troop transport when compared to a merkava.
And given the overall spending of the US the costs for 100 merkava would hardly be a decisive argument.
No, not the Namer, a Merkava which temporarily trades ammo containers for troops (up to a maximum of 4 crew, 10 rounds ammo (afaik) and 10 additional ground troops) or a command post or air or uav control post or whatever fits in. And the Tankbulance is what it says, a Merkava III or IV (yes, with turret) where the rear compartment is permanently converted to be a medical station.
But your argumentation to buys some Merkavas is based on the idea that it has several advantages.
I get were you are coming from but saying that the Abrams has mobility disadvantages is just not proved by real world experiences. So far the Abrams has not shown any limitations.
That the Merkava IV might prove to be better for the Golan is unimportant as the Golan is not a major operational area for the US Army whereas the IDF has to plan accordingly to their terrain.
I highly doubt that the Merkava Mk.IV has a much better mobility compared to the Abrams if at all. The running gear of the Merkava might offer some advantages but I bet they are not decisive.
As for urban areas. Yes, the Merk IV seems to perform rather well in them but a M1A2SEP with TUSK II is not what I would call unsuited for the usual support role it is employed in.
I already mentioned the situations where Abrams without TUSK kits faired fairly well. I just can't see the decisive advantage a Merkava Mk.IV offers.
I might be tempted to count the versatility offered by the room in the back as such a decisive advantage but the US is currently accelerating the development of the GCV. This beast should be able to fill all the roles mentioned with very good protection, less trade-off and defenitely better ergonomics for the guys in the back. Till then the Bradley is ok.
It comes down to wether the additional costs (and a new supply chain, training and procurement costs for a MBT are not cheap) are worth the additional advantages a second MBT offers.
I say no. The Abrams is the iron fist of the US Army HBCTs. This is the main role it is going to fill. In this role the Merkava offers no advantages which are not negated by the advantages of the Abrams.
There will, like in Iraq, be situations were it is used in a support role for urban combat. Is this situation really worth the costs or isn't a TUSK like package in combination with the other available US Army assets good enough?
And add-on systems like the Droid cannot be an argument either as they can be fitted to any vehicle.
Don't get me wrong. I really like the Merkava Mk.IV and I think that alot of thought went into it. Some of it's unique design features are very good and I think they should be part of other new designs as well.
Nevertheless it is no wonder machine. A M1A2 SEP Abrams, Leopard IIA7, Challenger IIE or Leclerc T10/11 plays in the same league.
The advantages are IMO just not big enough to justify another MBT with basically the same characteristics.
I get were you are coming from but saying that the Abrams has mobility disadvantages is just not proved by real world experiences. So far the Abrams has not shown any limitations.
That the Merkava IV might prove to be better for the Golan is unimportant as the Golan is not a major operational area for the US Army whereas the IDF has to plan accordingly to their terrain.
I highly doubt that the Merkava Mk.IV has a much better mobility compared to the Abrams if at all. The running gear of the Merkava might offer some advantages but I bet they are not decisive.
As for urban areas. Yes, the Merk IV seems to perform rather well in them but a M1A2SEP with TUSK II is not what I would call unsuited for the usual support role it is employed in.
I already mentioned the situations where Abrams without TUSK kits faired fairly well. I just can't see the decisive advantage a Merkava Mk.IV offers.
I might be tempted to count the versatility offered by the room in the back as such a decisive advantage but the US is currently accelerating the development of the GCV. This beast should be able to fill all the roles mentioned with very good protection, less trade-off and defenitely better ergonomics for the guys in the back. Till then the Bradley is ok.
It comes down to wether the additional costs (and a new supply chain, training and procurement costs for a MBT are not cheap) are worth the additional advantages a second MBT offers.
I say no. The Abrams is the iron fist of the US Army HBCTs. This is the main role it is going to fill. In this role the Merkava offers no advantages which are not negated by the advantages of the Abrams.
There will, like in Iraq, be situations were it is used in a support role for urban combat. Is this situation really worth the costs or isn't a TUSK like package in combination with the other available US Army assets good enough?
And add-on systems like the Droid cannot be an argument either as they can be fitted to any vehicle.
Don't get me wrong. I really like the Merkava Mk.IV and I think that alot of thought went into it. Some of it's unique design features are very good and I think they should be part of other new designs as well.
Nevertheless it is no wonder machine. A M1A2 SEP Abrams, Leopard IIA7, Challenger IIE or Leclerc T10/11 plays in the same league.
The advantages are IMO just not big enough to justify another MBT with basically the same characteristics.
The lack of such a round was painfully evident in Korea in the early - mid 90s. 2nd ID had the last 2 regular army M1 IP Battalions, kept in service primarily because of the lack of an HE 120mm round. We carried 105mm APRES, HEP and WP rounds in our go-to-war load out (something like 4, 4, and 2). We finally converted to the M1A1 in 1995, and while it was nice to get shiny new tanks (with that new tank smell), we missed the flexibility the 105mm gave us (not to mention having 52 instead of 40 main gun rounds and a bigger coax box).
The M8 AGS was intended to fill the gap in the infantry support role (and leave the M1s to killin' other tanks).
I remember in 96-97 everyone in my BN was waiting for the chance to volunteer for Airborne school to try and get into the first AGS BN when it was stood up with the 82nd but we all know how that went..... thanks Mr. Clinton for ruining my dreams of being an Airborne Tanker
Adrian
At least the Army added the canister round to it's inventory. It seemed to work well in Iraq and A-stan (There with the Danes). IIRC the round was designed with Korea in mind, too.
But it just very limited. As you said Korea is a theater where a modern HE would be a huge gain in capabilities. The difference of putting a HEAT into the middle of an enemy platoon or letting an APAM airburst over the heads of the enemy is immense.
Large numbers of NK infantry coming into canister range is way too close for my taste...
But it just very limited. As you said Korea is a theater where a modern HE would be a huge gain in capabilities. The difference of putting a HEAT into the middle of an enemy platoon or letting an APAM airburst over the heads of the enemy is immense.
Large numbers of NK infantry coming into canister range is way too close for my taste...
I hear ya! I don't know why they went for a canister round instead of just scaling up the 105mm M494 APERS-T. It had something like 5000 8 grain flechettes and had a fuse which could be manually set from muzzle action (like a giant shotgun) out to something like 1200m (if I remember correctly).
The TC would lase the troop concentration and give the fire command "Gunner, APERS, Troops, 800m" and the loader would set the fuse before loading the round. That allowed you engage troops well outside of RPG range.
The 105mm howitzer version of the APERS round was used very effectively in Vietnam for base defense.
Given todays technology, I don't see why we can't field an electronically fused APERS round or an air bursting HE-FRAG round (or both....). Also, why not a thermobaric round?
good for caves, bunkers or buildings.Heck, If it wasn't for CNN we'd probably still have a WP rounds and flamethrower tanks. You want to ruin someones day, lob a 120mm WP round into their midst or spray a high pressure jet of napalm into their building.
My uncle was a mechanized infantry platoon leader in Vietnam with 25th ID and was cross attached to an M48 Tank Co. They had 2 M132 flame thrower tracks (M113 with flame turret) and 2 M163 PIVAD SP ADA attached to them, and they said that the combination of 90mm canister, napalm, and 20mm HEI at 3000 rpm worked wonders for breaking up ambushes and making the enemy realize that maybe they had better things to go do.
Adrian
Afaik the GCV is scheduled for 2019 for operational units. Thats quite some time ahead compared to a vehicle available today.
I guess you could mount some 120mm gun turret on it, but when will that be, 2025? (I d rather use a heavy dual mortar for LIC/MOUT, but thats not the topic).
My guess is, that M1 variations stay around for quite some time, as the US main tank force, until another empire rises and considerably pushes its tank tech.
So whats done in the meantime? I think the versatile Merkava concept is superior to the Abrams with regards to the wars the US is actually engaged in. I also think that the current types of conflicts will be theatres for the US for quite some time, especially if another empire rises militarily.
Therefore a small scale Merkava force would offer lots of first hand experience for a versatile, LIC specialized, tank, building on the experience of maybe the most experienced army fighting such conflicts for some time. Look at it more as a field experiment, rather than a second MBT force.
Btw that is from a military perspective, I m aware that it most likely wont happen for political reasons anyway.
EDIT: You could argue that the experiment is already conducted by Israel, but as history tells, some experiences have to be made directly and not only told about.
The lack of such a round was painfully evident in Korea in the early - mid 90s. 2nd ID had the last 2 regular army M1 IP Battalions, kept in service primarily because of the lack of an HE 120mm round. We carried 105mm APRES, HEP and WP rounds in our go-to-war load out (something like 4, 4, and 2). We finally converted to the M1A1 in 1995, and while it was nice to get shiny new tanks (with that new tank smell), we missed the flexibility the 105mm gave us (not to mention having 52 instead of 40 main gun rounds and a bigger coax box).
The M8 AGS was intended to fill the gap in the infantry support role (and leave the M1s to killin' other tanks).
I remember in 96-97 everyone in my BN was waiting for the chance to volunteer for Airborne school to try and get into the first AGS BN when it was stood up with the 82nd but we all know how that went..... thanks Mr. Clinton for ruining my dreams of being an Airborne Tanker
Adrian
We were not overly worried about NK tank capability but instead very concerned with what the Chinese had in the works thus the switch out to M256A1, plus we could not let the ROK become king daddy with their upgunned K1A1.
The sad thing about the AGS program was that about the time we were ready to start production it was found that the armor was already non capable of handling some of the newer armor defeating projectiles that was coming out of Russia and a few others, plus the cost of the vehicle was way too high, but still it was a neat vehicle. After this 82nd Airborne came really close to purchasing French AMX 10RC's as a gap filler until the plug was pulled on that also, rumor has it that the unit was insane with rage because they were told they would not get anything until additional research was conducted, and we know how that works when it comes to the Army purchasing anything new.
nfloorl:
I hear ya! I don't know why they went for a canister round instead of just scaling up the 105mm M494 APERS-T. It had something like 5000 8 grain flechettes and had a fuse which could be manually set from muzzle action (like a giant shotgun) out to something like 1200m (if I remember correctly).
The TC would lase the troop concentration and give the fire command "Gunner, APERS, Troops, 800m" and the loader would set the fuse before loading the round. That allowed you engage troops well outside of RPG range.
The 105mm howitzer version of the APERS round was used very effectively in Vietnam for base defense.
Given todays technology, I don't see why we can't field an electronically fused APERS round or an air bursting HE-FRAG round (or both....). Also, why not a thermobaric round?
Heck, If it wasn't for CNN we'd probably still have a WP rounds and flamethrower tanks. You want to ruin someones day, lob a 120mm WP round into their midst or spray a high pressure jet of napalm into their building.
My uncle was a mechanized infantry platoon leader in Vietnam with 25th ID and was cross attached to an M48 Tank Co. They had 2 M132 flame thrower tracks (M113 with flame turret) and 2 M163 PIVAD SP ADA attached to them, and they said that the combination of 90mm canister, napalm, and 20mm HEI at 3000 rpm worked wonders for breaking up ambushes and making the enemy realize that maybe they had better things to go do.
Adrian
Man the Lefty Cons would be screaming for your head just for you having the thought of using Willie Pete on troop concentrations, but what the hell would be the difference with the newer Thermoboric, if the Russians and a few others want to use them on a massive scale then we should have that option also.
Beehive was cool to watch, especially the yellow detonation marker.
@Locarnus
Well, the US fought in GW I+II with multiple HBCTs leading the way. These engagements were much bigger than what Israel fought in since more than 25 years. Not to talk of 9 years of constant assymetrical fighting. I would even go as far as saying that the US right now has more experience than the IDF.
The Lebanon affair demonstrated that the conventional warfare capabilities of the Israelis had deteriorated because of constant policing actions since the eighties.
During ODS and the conventional phase of OIF the heavy US forces performed brilliantly.
And when we have a look at the assymetrical conflicts the US was involved in the last 10 Years one won't find many problems with the Abrams as it is. The fighting in Iraq didn't led to the believe that the Abrams in conjunction with other assets is not up to the task. Quite the contrary, especially with the TUSK kits.
And in Afghanistan the US doesn't even use MBTs. But the experiences of the Danes and Canadians with the Leo indicate that the Abrams would perform well, too.
I just don't see the covincing arguments to use all the money for a vehicle which performs a little bit better in 5% of the normal situations but also performs less good in other 5%.
Does Israel procures some Abrams just in case they have to dash through the Sinai again?
Well, the US fought in GW I+II with multiple HBCTs leading the way. These engagements were much bigger than what Israel fought in since more than 25 years. Not to talk of 9 years of constant assymetrical fighting. I would even go as far as saying that the US right now has more experience than the IDF.
The Lebanon affair demonstrated that the conventional warfare capabilities of the Israelis had deteriorated because of constant policing actions since the eighties.
During ODS and the conventional phase of OIF the heavy US forces performed brilliantly.
And when we have a look at the assymetrical conflicts the US was involved in the last 10 Years one won't find many problems with the Abrams as it is. The fighting in Iraq didn't led to the believe that the Abrams in conjunction with other assets is not up to the task. Quite the contrary, especially with the TUSK kits.
And in Afghanistan the US doesn't even use MBTs. But the experiences of the Danes and Canadians with the Leo indicate that the Abrams would perform well, too.
I just don't see the covincing arguments to use all the money for a vehicle which performs a little bit better in 5% of the normal situations but also performs less good in other 5%.
Does Israel procures some Abrams just in case they have to dash through the Sinai again?
I understand your point. And i think the Abrams should remain the primary force for the invasion stage, since for that stage the 5% + or - applies. But I think in the occupation stage, that balance tips in favor of the Merkava. And I think it would tip even more for AStan occupation, with theatre supply restrictions and so on (where only small numbers would be deployed anyway, making an all Merkava force suitable).
I think you are approaching this too much from a european defence perspective. Add a capability only when the need arises.
I think the US approach is different. You will add capabilities anyway, its just a matter of how you spend the money. And with that in mind, a small scale, field experiment Merkava force seems imho to be one of the more useful things to spend money on. The results could be directly used for a distant future, next generation US MBT.
I think you are approaching this too much from a european defence perspective. Add a capability only when the need arises.
I think the US approach is different. You will add capabilities anyway, its just a matter of how you spend the money. And with that in mind, a small scale, field experiment Merkava force seems imho to be one of the more useful things to spend money on. The results could be directly used for a distant future, next generation US MBT.
I don't think it's a European perspective Waylander is taking, but a very practical one - what is the tangible benefit offered by the Merkava over an Abrams with TUSK kit? And secondly, is the improvement substantial enough that it justifies the large costs associated not only with procuring the tank, but adding the tank to the logistics chain? To say nothing of the tactical and operational changes necessary if you wanted to use the tank effectively in a way that's different to the Abrams - and if you don't want to change the way it's used, why do you need another tank to begin with? There's a LOT of time and money involved, and for how much benefit exactly? Don't you think it's a more prudent use of resources (especially considering the current economic climate) to put money into developing a next-generation capability, instead of simply buying a contemporary of the Abrams?
Bear in mind too, even if the Merkava offered a significant benefit over the Abrams in counterinsurgency (and I don't believe it does), that the US isn't necessarily chomping at the bit to get to the next occupation. Iraq is (hopefully) winding down, after all...
Bear in mind too, even if the Merkava offered a significant benefit over the Abrams in counterinsurgency (and I don't believe it does), that the US isn't necessarily chomping at the bit to get to the next occupation. Iraq is (hopefully) winding down, after all...
In layman's terms and the benefit of someone like Locarnus, yes.
gf0012-aust and I have previously discussed this point in other threads. We are of the view that the conduct of modern warfare requires a strong focus on logistics and without the necessary logistics, an army cannot:
(1) prosecute,
(2) project,
(3) promote,
(4) persist, and
(5) maintain a presence,
(the 5Ps, a concept often cited by gf0012-aust).
Let me try to explain this from another angle. The IDF has a particular and unique concept of operations. This is different from US concept of operations. Now if Locarnus can't understand or see the difference, any further elaboration will go over his head.
I would not be comfortable explaining it in this manner because it is not money alone that frames the discussion on force modernisation. The way to approach the issue is to understand that there is more than one way to skin a cat (ie. to achieve your military objectives). There is an American way of war and there is an Israeli way of war. Both ways share some similarities but at some core level, they will have important differences. It is these differences that gives each way of war a particular flavour. For example, the US Army is an expeditionary army at heart - they need to be shipped overseas for their war. OTOH, the IDF is not an expeditionary army and needs to defend their country's borders. The IDF has local concerns and has adapted uniquely to their local conditions and to a particular regional threat matrix. The Merkava's design is informed and framed by a particular set of design considerations to answer the 5Ps that is uniquely Israeli. The Israeli way of war is much, much more than a specific tank model - it's also a way of thinking (set within a particular set of national resource limitations).
As a Singaporean, I have family members who are Israeli trained tank commanders and with Israeli help, wrote parts of our initial tank doctrine, which the Israeli trainers had kindly customized for our specific local needs (and our local threat matrix). I would go so far as to characterise our way, as a doctrinal platypus
(we use German tanks, American fighters, Swedish submarines, locally made artillery and armoured fighting vehicles with Israeli, American and Australian technological inserts). We started off with a British regimental system that was improved with Israeli help, that is evolving towards greater interoperability with American and Australian forces - who are our preferred long term regional security partners. The way we have addressed the 5Ps is again different and unique to us and within our national resource limitations. I would go so far as to say that the American way of war would bankrupt our country (should we need to go to war). But yet, financial considerations is not the key limitation on our defence planners. The key limitation we have is time (or rather the lack of). We need time to be decisive and everything we do is geared towards 'speed', including but not limited to speed of mobilisation for 9% of Singapore's citizens for a come as you are war. Though come as you are is not a preferred mode of war for us.When the US Army takes lessons learnt from past IDF operations, there is a need to apply it to a specific area of operations and to American TO&E. And in each American area of operations, there are different considerations (political and military) that frame particular rules of engagement. IMHO, there is little value in Americans adopting the Merkava in limited quantities for a uber specialised role that can be taken care of by tactics. Continued improvements to the Abrams tank should be more than sufficient to meet present and future threats.
I hope you don't mind that I have put in my 2 cents worth....
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Ok...
main practical difference:
versatile rear compartment
difference enough to justify add costs:
maybe, I cant give it a certain no or a certain yes
but its not only the difference in the tanks capabilities, its also the experience with a more versatile tank concept (could be incorporated in some distant future new US MBT design!)
and what are the costs of eg 50 or 100 tanks?
@ OPSSG: Singapore operates a number of Leopard 2s. Do you have numbers for your spending on tanks?
tac and op changes:
well, thats the whole point in field testing something different, right?
you change how or with what you do something and then look at the results.
better to go for next generation capability:
what is the next generation? and when will there be a next gen US MBT?
the merkava offers increased mission flexibility, without significant drawbacks. that can be a part of the next generation, and thus maybe a good reason to gain some experience in this field.
about next occupation:
Well, AStan is still on and Iraq is also not finished.
So a major question is, what are the additional costs?
main practical difference:
versatile rear compartment
difference enough to justify add costs:
maybe, I cant give it a certain no or a certain yes
but its not only the difference in the tanks capabilities, its also the experience with a more versatile tank concept (could be incorporated in some distant future new US MBT design!)
and what are the costs of eg 50 or 100 tanks?
@ OPSSG: Singapore operates a number of Leopard 2s. Do you have numbers for your spending on tanks?
tac and op changes:
well, thats the whole point in field testing something different, right?
you change how or with what you do something and then look at the results.
better to go for next generation capability:
what is the next generation? and when will there be a next gen US MBT?
the merkava offers increased mission flexibility, without significant drawbacks. that can be a part of the next generation, and thus maybe a good reason to gain some experience in this field.
about next occupation:
Well, AStan is still on and Iraq is also not finished.
So a major question is, what are the additional costs?
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