Indo Pacific strategy

[Ananda]

Jakarta has received an official request from Moscow, seeking permission for Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) aircraft to be based at a facility in Indonesia's easternmost province.

What they ask from what I heard in here is not to 'base' VKS aircraft, however to have permission on regular stop over in Biak AB. What Russian ask is access for stop over just like US or Australian aircraft done from time to time. They have done it on case by case permission, and they ask for more regular stop over permission.

Indonesia law still not allowed any permanent base in Indonesia soil for foreign military. Even Singapore who wants to have training ground for their Airforce in Riau (like arrangement they have with Australia, France and US), can only use the facility base on periodic short term training case and not permanent/long term arrangement.

 

[downunderblue]

What they ask from what I heard in here is not to 'base' VKS aircraft, however to have permission on regular stop over in Biak AB. What Russian ask is access for stop over just like US or Australian aircraft done from time to time. They have done it on case by case permission, and they ask for more regular stop over permission.

Indonesia law still not allowed any permanent base in Indonesia soil for foreign military.

Let's see what comes out, as following your logic they wouldn't need additional permission if all they are asking is a repeat of the 2017 use case.

I honestly can't see why Indonesia would want to get involved.

 

[Ananda]

if all they are asking is a repeat of the 2017 use case.

Previous case was time to time incidental permission. They ask for more regular stop over permission, but not permanent base. The talk is not in that area. Too much internal politics getting the problem on basing permanent foreign military in Indonesia soil.

It is not first time Jane's blow up something out of proportion.

 

[Ananda]

Indonesia dismisses report Russia seeking to base aircraft in country as ‘simply not true’, Australia says

Australian defence minister Richard Marles says he has spoken to Indonesian counterpart about report Moscow filed official request over military aircraft

www.theguardian.com

Aussie defense minister call his counterpart for clarification. Indonesia Defense Minister denied that report. This talk on Russian asking Indonesia for permission to station VKS, is not even being talk by serious mainstream media in here. Shown from Indonesian side it is very unlikely happening.

Personally since this is report come out during Australian campaign, could it be more some try to stirring up issue on campaign trail ? More plausible then becoming issue in Indonesia.

Kemenhan Bantah Pangkalan TNI AU di Papua Akan Digunakan Militer Rusia

Kemenhan menyebut, isu bahwa penggunaan Lanud Manuhua untuk pesawat militer Rusia tidak benar.

nasional.kompas.com

Indonesian media tone is dismissing, even bit perplexed how this can be considered serious plausibility.

 

[spoz]

Been denied by Indonesia; who almost certainly would not give permission anyway. Looks like the whole story is a phurphy.

 

[downunderblue]

Indonesia dismisses report Russia seeking to base aircraft in country as ‘simply not true’, Australia says

Australian defence minister Richard Marles says he has spoken to Indonesian counterpart about report Moscow filed official request over military aircraft

www.theguardian.com

Aussie defense minister call his counterpart for clarification. Indonesia Defense Minister denied that report. This talk on Russian asking Indonesia for permission to station VKS, is not even being talk by serious mainstream media in here. Shown from Indonesian side it is very unlikely happening.

Personally since this is report come out during Australian campaign, could it be more some try to stirring up issue on campaign trail ? More plausible then becoming issue in Indonesia.

Kemenhan Bantah Pangkalan TNI AU di Papua Akan Digunakan Militer Rusia

Kemenhan menyebut, isu bahwa penggunaan Lanud Manuhua untuk pesawat militer Rusia tidak benar.

nasional.kompas.com

Indonesian media tone is dismissing, even bit perplexed how this can be considered serious plausibility.

IMHO I don't think Janes made it up at all. A request like that causes waves and confusion as to what to do about it. It's alleged the initial request was voiced between Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Sergei Shoigu on 25FEB25. For reference, Sjamsoeddin then accompanied Shoigu to see Prabowo later that day. I'm sure both Sjamsoeddin and Prabowo were gracious and uncommital, stating something like 'that [and the bag of cash or Sukhoi offer etc] is an incredible opportunity spruning regional cooperation and development, however we need some time to confer with colleagues and review the legal and political restraints etc, however graciously we'll get back to you in due course ...' etc.

I assume both Sjamsoeddin and Prabowo, and their staffs briefed a lot of people about the request. The longer it went on the more likely it 'internally' dispersed. The wider it 'internally' dispersed however, the greater the opportunity it was elicited, disclosed or collected to external parties.

Always look at the end result. Indonesia was never going to approve it but potentially needed an trigger (or excuse) to say 'sorry Russia, yes we value you and love your proposal for cheap Sukhoi's, but we were put on the spot and had to say no. Sorry, but let's maybe try again later ...'.

The source of the leak to Janes may be anyone/ from anywhere, but I don't doubt the leak was accurate. The author of the report is @ridzwan_rahmat, who is a Singapore based writer for Janes. To use this as an example, does anyone seriously doubt that Singapore itself lacks the relationships or ability to collect such information, nor the interest to leak it to a media source to ensure Indonesia says 'no'?

As for the Australian angle, yes we're in an election but the Government gains nothing from leaking it now, nor would the opposition likely have awareness of the event in the first place (nor really capitalised on it). If AU is relevant here, it's in the timing of the leak effectively forcing Marles to initiate the call with Sjamsoeddin, getting a denial and thus putting the whole sorry mess to bed.

The thing is, this is how statecraft and tradecraft works. To deny the accuracy of the source ignores what likely has occurred. Indonesia wants nothing of the request but needs a way to reject it, and someone like Singapore is the perfect agent to affect a leak resulting in a clarified 'no' and move back to the 'status quo'.

As to the final result, yes there will be no basing nor will Russia likely come back asking again. It reinforces that ASEAN ('in general'- ignoring PH, Cambodia or Myanmar) want to remain unaligned and nor forced to choose sides.

 

[downunderblue]

Been denied by Indonesia; who almost certainly would not give permission anyway. Looks like the whole story is a phurphy.

You mean 'beer'?

 

[Ananda]

Looks like the whole story is a phurphy.

I have suspicion on whose giving the leaks or more precise 'rumours' to Jane's. There're bunch of Western Defense items Salesman and Brokers with internal connection to MinDef circles. Those bunch now have bit 'grudges' to Prabowo's administration as they seems to give preference for Turkiye and Russian products for some projects. One of them (Frenchie Salesman) talk on his social media channels (that somehow got quite significant following), on this matter. Try to connect this with Su-35 lobby team.

Clearly part of negative perception building toward rival teams.

 

[downunderblue]

Congress SASC & HASC Posture Hearings on IndoPacific with Paparo

On 10APR25, Admiral Samuel J. Paparo Jr. (Paparo), Commander of US INDOPACOM testified before the Senate Armed Service committee. The video testimony is available here, along with a transcript located here.

I watched his testimony in parts but was particularly interested in his commentary with Senator Cotton regarding the impact of a war over Taiwan & expressed need to improve counter-C5ISR capabilities.

Senator Cotton quoted Naval War College Professor Ian Easton saying a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could cause a "21st century version of the Great Depression" and investor Ken Griffin stating it would be "an immediate Great Depression". Cotton asked Paparo "Why is it that Taiwan is different? Why is Taiwan such a hot flashpoint? Why could it lead not only to a catastrophic war but also a global Great Depression?".

In response, Paparo outlined the potential economic consequences of a conflict in the Western Pacific over Taiwan. He stated that such a conflict could result in a 25% GDP contraction in Asia, with a knock-on effect of a 10 to 12 % GDP reduction in the US, a with unemployment spiking 7 to 10 points above base, & likely 500,000 excess deaths of despair above base.

Paparo noted that in the longer term, the brittleness of the US network of alliances & partnerships could lead some states to submit to the PRC's exploitation, impacting the US strategic centre of gravity. He also raised the concern of nuclear proliferation among treaty allies in the event of such instability.

When Senator Cotton asked what he needed most to deter conflict with China, Paparo identified "counter-C5ISR capabilities in cyber, space, counterspace, to ensure that the US can see, understand, decide, act, assess, learn faster than the PRC can, to enhance our ability to blind, to deceive, & to destroy the adversary's ability to see & sense"

To counter the PRC's command, control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, & targeting complex, "we must be dominant in space & across the information environment, leveraging capabilities to counter the PRC's command, control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, & targeting complex". He further elaborated that this would enable the US to "gain a non-linear advantage over potential adversaries".

I also noted his comment per AUKUS & Submarine Rotational Force West at HMAS Stirling.

“AUKUS is going to confer a generational advantage on both countries, but I cherish the advantage it confers on the US of America. So I will say, first of all, the ability to operate out of Stirling, in Submarine Rotational Force West in Stirling, gives the American submarine force an Indian Ocean port. It gives us the ability to range the Indian Ocean without limitation in the Straits of Malacca, the Lombok or the Sunda Strait. It is a straight shot to the South China Sea, closer & faster than Hawaii; San Diego; Bangor, Maine”.

 

[downunderblue]

With the use of AI, I have summarised some of Admiral Samuel J. Paparo Jr. (Paparo) key (not political) points into themes:

Challenges in the Indo-Pacific & the Threat of China:

• He described a confluence of challenges in the Indo-Pacific, a region covering half the Earth's surface & housing half the operational joint force.
• He specifically pointed to China's unprecedented aggression & military modernization as a serious threat to the US homeland, allies, & partners.
• He noted the deepening cooperation among China, Russia, & North Korea.
• While stating that USINDOPACOM deters challenges, he cautioned that this margin is eroding, yet affirmed that the Joint Force remains confident, resolute, & determined to prevail.
• Regarding China's air power, he stated they have a large order of battle of fighters & bombers, a faster production rate of fighters, & advanced long-range air-to-air missiles. He gives them "high marks" in their ability to deny U.S. air superiority in the first island chain. He clarified that air supremacy would likely not be enjoyed by either side & that his job is to contest air superiority.
• He assessed that China is outproducing the US in air, missile, maritime, & space capability & accelerating these developments. While confident in current deterrence, he stated that the trajectory must change & emphasized the importance of the Pacific Deterrent Initiative.
• He confirmed that countering actions by Communist China consumes his duties, involving constant analysis & physical movement to anticipate & pace their actions regarding Taiwan & the South China Sea.
• He identified significant gaps in sealift, tanker fleet, & cargo lift as risks to the theatre logistics network, underscoring that sustainment is critical & materiel deficiencies cannot be overcome by AI.
• He described the amphibious fleet as indispensable but under-resourced & not ready enough.
• He highlighted China's active & untruthful information operations & underscored the importance of delivering truthful information & countering misinformation for maintaining the strength of alliances.
• He identified the threat of PRC attacks on digital infrastructure, particularly undersea internet cables, as part of grey zone operations aimed at weakening the information enterprise.

Deterrence & Required Capabilities:

• He emphasized the need to be dominant in space & across the information environment to counter the PRC's command, control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, & targeting complex.
• He stressed the need for additional sustained investment in long-range survivable fires, integrated air & missile defence, & force sustainment, with an emphasis on autonomy & AI-driven systems.
• He emphasized that deterrence must be backed up by the real capability to fight & win.
• He identified counter-C5ISR capabilities in cyber, space, & counterspace, along with the ability to effect long-range fires & effects, & critical infrastructure as most needed to deter conflict with China.
• He confirmed that some of the $11 billion in unfunded priorities relate to deterrence regarding Taiwan, warning that not addressing this funding gap would continue the trajectory of an eroded capability to prevail & would embolden the PRC.
• He is a strong advocate for SLCM-N at the soonest possibility to fill a critical vulnerability to impose doubt on adversaries, stating 2034 is too late for its deployment.
• He stated that the Army's long-range hypersonic weapon will aid in deterring China by shortening the adversary's kill chain & emphasized the critical nature of speed in modern warfare. He views the Navy deploying its own hypersonic weapon as a significant step-level change.

Importance of Allies & Partners:

• Paparo echoed the sentiment that the key "asymmetric advantage" of the US is its network of allies & partners.
• He stated that allies & partners have an outsized effect & are the strategic centre of gravity for the US. Access, basing, & overflight with allies enable expanded manoeuvre, & more partners lessen the burden across various domains.

Taiwan as a Critical Flashpoint:

• He agreed that Taiwan remains the most dangerous flashpoint in the competition with China.
• He explained why Taiwan is a critical flashpoint due to the potential for a significant GDP contraction in Asia & the impact on the network of alliances, stressing the vital interest for the US.
• Paparo emphasised that the key is to prevent a war over Taiwan from happening in the first place.

North Korea:

• Regarding a potential reduction of US military presence in Korean, Paparo stated that inherently it would reduce our ability to prevail in conflict. The probability of invasion increases with the loss of US forces on the Korean Peninsula
• He believes there would be a risk that a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would involve China & would need to be conducted carefully.
• He assessed that Kim Jong Un expects concessions from Russia for his support in Ukraine, including modernization of air defences, submarine technology, ballistic missile submarine assistance, propulsion help, & potentially help with re-entry vehicles for their nuclear program.
• He assessed that if the US withdrew support from Taiwan, it would incentivise Japan & South Korea to develop independent capabilities, including the possibility of nuclear weapons.

Logistics & Sustainment:

• Paparo strongly urged for the ability to surge replacements & conduct battle damage maintenance of naval auxiliary vessels within the region, highlighting the criticality of quantities of logistics vessels & 'gray tails'. While supporting allied sustainment, he expressed a preference for US capability.
• He affirmed the C-130's indispensable role for lift capability & highlighted it as a key priority for INDOPACOM. He also welcomed the potential of dual-use, uncrewed airlift capabilities.
• He highlighted the potential for deeper maintenance & leveraging shipbuilding capabilities of allies like South Korea & Japan to address logistical challenges.

Strategic Locations:

• Paparo stated that the US should reopen ADAC (Adak) & enhance operations from Erickson in Alaska due to its strategic importance in the North Pacific for gaining time & distance on potential adversaries & enhancing maritime patrol reconnaissance. He committed to working with NORTHCOM on the ADAC report & confirmed ADAC's role in the Northern Edge exercise.

Nuclear Deterrence:

• He affirmed that nuclear weapons are useful every day due to their deterrent effect & confirmed the US doctrine of not ruling out a first strike.

Special Operations Forces (SOF):

• He stated that he is currently underinvested in SOF & that more SOF would provide early leverage & deterrent capability.

Russia-China-North Korea Cooperation:

• Paparo described the growing closeness & transactional symbiosis between Russia, China, & North Korea, including their increasing ability to operate together.

AUKUS:

• He emphasised that AUKUS will confer a generational advantage on both Australia & the US, providing a crucial Indian Ocean port for US submarines & Australian contributions to the defence industrial base.

Submarine Capabilities:

• Paparo strongly agreed that the US has an overmatch in submarine attack force.
• He acknowledged that adding a tactical nuclear capability to Virginia-class submarines would have a cost on conventional torpedo capacity. He noted the very high threshold for employing such weapons & expressed a preference for not losing platform availability for refitting. He believes security requirements can be managed based on past experience.
• Paparo strongly agreed on the need for more & more available submarines & for investment in the submarine industrial base.

Aircraft Carriers:

• Paparo described aircraft carriers as mobile, defendable airfields that are uniquely threatening to the PRC due to their significant firepower, expressing confidence in their protection.

Undersea Warfare:

• He acknowledged the PRC's growing anti-submarine warfare capabilities but affirmed the US's generational lead in undersea warfare, highlighting its critical importance. He noted the potential impact of quantum computing on submarine vulnerability.

---------

May I say what an incredible tool AI is.

Submitted for information or assessment (particularly for people like me who are keenly watching how the world is changing before our eyes). OUT

 

[Redshift]

Previous case was time to time incidental permission. They ask for more regular stop over permission, but not permanent base. The talk is not in that area. Too much internal politics getting the problem on basing permanent foreign military in Indonesia soil.

It is not first time Jane's blow up something out of proportion.

Stopover implies on the way from somewhere to somewhere else, where would be the onward destination from Indonesia?