I feel that the topic of this thread may drifted a bit from Peace4ever20's original post. From the original discussion of "How truly capable is the United States Navy?", the conversation shifted to interesting, and important, but non-the-less distinct topics of applicability of war-games to comparisons of actual capability and anti-submarine warfare.
However, there are a few substantial points that I believe have yet to be addressed as it relates to the true overall capability of the navy. I believe, and Peace4ever20, please correct me if I am wrong - I do not want to highjack your thread; but it would seem that a few additional issues would fit well into this discussion.
These revolve around 1) the ASuW warefare capability of the navy 2) the development and advancements within the US Navy, and those developments in relation to other navies and 3) The manifestations of the navy's lapses in capabilities or maintenance of certain aspects of its historic core competencies
My first concern is that the navy is effectively losing integral ASuW capability. At this point the majority of Burke's are Flight IIA, which are deployed without Harpoon launchers, the number of cruisers is being reduced (and with them the number of deployed Harpoon launchers), and the Perrys are firstly being withdrawn from service, and secondly have had their MK13s along with missile launching capability removed. The LCSs do not even have a credible SSM capability planned.
Granted the SM-2s have been used in an anti-surface capacity. However, my understanding is that this is not a tool that can be relied on to provide a primary ASuW capability. With their semi-active homing, the missiles lack over-the-horizon capability. Albeit, possibly, the IR mode may help here - but without an imaging IR capability or database of surface targets, I'm not sure how applicable this would be.
The navy does have the LRASM program running, however, they are focused on the subsonic version, not a leap-ahead technology. Meanwhile, both China and Russia possess, and continue to develop supersonic SSM. Moreover, there is already talk about a BraMos II which would be hypersonic.
Also, until the LRASM is available for fielding, we have at best 8 SSMs on our ships. Both China and Russia, are moving towards 16 on their primary surface assets. Also as more advanced missiles make their way onto FACs, the 2 CSSC-2 Scrubbrush/P-15 Termit missiles to 4 - 8 missiles of the C-702 or similar class. This can occur on FACs of even less than rival adversaries, such as Iran.
Another troubling situation arose with the 2006 surfacing of a Chinese Song class submarine inside of a Carrier Strike Group. The Group was on exercises, but not with the Chinese. This was not a scripted scenario. In fact, this is exactly what is not supposed to happen, and what all the training is supposed to prevent, happening at the will of the adversary.
Here again, we see the Navy giving ground in certain regards, to potential adversaries. As the Russians and Chinese are deploying newer boats with AIP and improved sound management, we are failing to advance. Our boat count is decreasing, and we have made certain concessions. For instance, the Virginia class was selected as a cheaper alternative to the Seawolf. Granted it has some better/newer technologies, such as a non-hull penetrating periscope, but those could be incorporated into the Seawolf. However, the Virgina cannot accommodate the weapons load of the Seawolf, and from my understanding is a bit slower.
Also, the Flight IIA Burke's do not have VDS and our next generation MPA lacks a MAD. Again, this would appear to be a retreat from the wide ranging, holistic, ASW approach that is required given today's advanced submarine threat..
We are faced with an environment where near peer adversaries are rapidly developing their capabilities, adding more weapons to their ships, and catching up to the West technologically. In this environment,our capabilities seem focused on the asymmetric and air threat. Our shipbased ASuW capability is obsolete and rapidly diminishing in the number of available launchers; we have discontinued the focus of our escorts on ASW as evidenced by the lack of VDS, and there are questions about whether we are using cutting edge sonar and submarine technology. Given this mismatch between our focus, rate of advancement, and capability and the threat environment, how truly capable is the United States Navy?