China-India border dispute.

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Indeed.

Pakistan & China disagreed about the border until 1962, when China agreed to discuss the dispute - after Pakistan voted in favour of th PRC getting China's UN seat. They signed an agreement in 1963 which divided the disputed area, China getting most of it. Some people in Pakistan call it a cession by China, saying Pakistan (& before that the rulers of Kashmir) had never disputed China's sovereignty over the land it agreed was Chinese, & it was just a question of delimiting the border. Pakistan has had Chinese support since then.

The border in question is between Kashmir (Gilgit & Baltistan) & Sinkiang.
Thanks.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2: Update on LAC Fiasco

1. An Indian Army patrol that was attacked by the PLA with nail-studded rods on 16 June 2020 has suffered 20 deaths and 76 injured in the clash with China in the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The good news is that 4 of the critically injured soldiers are out of danger.

2. As an external observer, I see the Delhi’s response as limited and lacking in resolve. That being the case, Beijing will use the standard Leninist tactic of 'probe with a bayonet – If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.' IMHO, only when the Delhi, as the weaker and less prepared party, steel up their resolve, will this probing process by Beijing stop. Having steel in their resolve does not mean going to war. It also does not mean a short term deployment of more Indian troops to the LAC (which is temporary in nature) or the knee jerk burning of Chinese flags. IMHO, having steel in their resolve may mean:
(i) investing in even more roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them to the border fast enough to pre-empt any Chinese counter deployment;​
(ii) speeding up the retirement of antiquated MiG-21s and acquiring modern fighters as replacement and investing in better IFF systems (to prevent friendly fire) — to routinely protect and defend Indian airspace;​
(iii) improving ISR capability through the acquisition and deployment of 3 new squadrons of advanced UAVs to patrol the LAC along with the necessary improvements made to 3 to 4 airbases near the LAC to house additional fighter squadrons with hardened aircraft shelters; and​
(iv) providing better support to troops on the LAC by having 12 to 24 hour notice to move, QRFs (to be housed/stationed at various staging points along the LAC), properly supported with adequate numbers of CH-47F Chinooks with IFF systems (to conduct a company sized troop lift of men and their organic helicopter-lift vehicles, in 1 wave, for each of these QRF battalions) and a flight of AH-64E Apaches to protect the troop lift. The Bronco would be the ideal low ground pressure vehicle in this role for the QRF battalions.​
3. On the one hand, following the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers along the LAC, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said “peace-loving” India was capable of giving a fitting reply if provoked.

They are more or less joined at the hip with Pakistan highly dependent upon the PRC economically and more so as each day passes.
4. On the other hand, actions of China and Pakistan, to raise tensions with India at their respective LACs are coordinated. This will present the Indian Army with a dilemma to split their focus.

5. "On 16 June 2020, in the late evening hours, Pakistan initiated unprovoked ceasefire violation along the LOC in Naugam Sector by firing mortars and other weapons," the defence spokesman was quoted as saying by news agency PTI. He said Indian Army strongly retaliated to Pakistan's unprovoked firing.

6. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said the extremely violent incident on Monday night “will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship” between the two neighbours. Both accused troops of the other side for violating the understanding reached by their respective senior commanders on June 6 but agreed to "cool down" tensions on the ground "as soon as possible" and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border area. Jaishankar also said the Chinese side reneged on the June 6 agreement on de-escalation and disengagement along the LAC when it sought to erect a structure in the Galwan valley “on the Indian side of the LAC... While this became a source of dispute, the Chinese side took pre-meditated and planned action that was directly responsible for the resulting violence and casualties.”

7. The Indian Army’s Mountain Strike Corps has been hit by lack of funds and the ITBP’s requirements for all-weather border posts at Pangong long been delayed. Most importantly, while Report(s) of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence highlighting depressing delays – 68% of Indian Army equipment is classified as ‘vintage.’ Further, the PLA is prepared consolidate their gains on the ground and Chinese diplomats are prepared to handle Indian protests by diplomatic channels. What strong message did India send?

8. As a journalist and former solider, Ajai Shukla, is speaking truth to power against the lies of his country’s politicians. The PLA(AF) flies some 2,000 combat aircraft – more than thrice the size of the IAF. The 1962 Sino-Indian war was fought entirely between land troops, with neither side using its air force or navy against each other. But in a military face-off today, the PLA(AF), will operate in numbers from the ten-odd air bases in Tibet. To degrade the IAF, the PLA would very likely begin the war with cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Indian air bases in Tezpur, Bagdogra and Hashimara, using missiles from the PLA’s Second Artillery. This might be preceded, or accompanied, by a carefully directed cyber attack to disable the IAF’s surveillance network, satellite communications and command and control systems. His 2012 article, “Don’t fight 1962 all over again”, contains key insights of reforms needed.

(i) He said that: “Indian Army needs to rethink its strategy, relying on local partnership as in the 1950s, rather than on an overwhelming presence that could start being resented...​
(ii) This must involve a three-fold action plan:​
Firstly, recruit at least twenty territorial army battalions from local tribes, which will defend their homeland fiercely against the Chinese, rather than relying on regular army battalions....​
Secondly, rather than committing the bulk of our regular army battalions into defensive deployments aimed at stopping the Chinese at the border, reorganise these formations into offensive strike groups that are geared, trained and equipped to retaliate against any Chinese incursion with counter-incursions into Tibet...​
Thirdly, create the infrastructure of roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them​
(iii) In his view, “it is foolish to adopt an entirely defensive deployment, and that too focused almost exclusively on the areas in which the Chinese attacked in 1962 (as if to say that the Chinese would just dust out the old plans and re-implement those, instead of coming up with an entirely new plan). Instead of trying to unilaterally fight the 1962 war all over again, [India] should let [the PLA] come in, defeat them in-depth, and simultaneously launch ripostes in pre-decided sectors with pre-prepared, pre-rehearsed and properly supported strike groups.”​
(iv) He has also given talks on the 1962 War, that India lost, to ensure lessons learnt are retained.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2: A lose-lose outcome

9. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have built public support in large part on hyper nationalism and a promise of future greatness. This often translates into jingoism and aggressive rhetoric, particularly when playing to a domestic audience. Such an approach was evidenced in Chinese coverage of the PLA maneuvers in the Himalayas. Equally, despite Delhi's announcement Saturday of easing tensions, leading Indian government figures struck an aggressive tone with Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah telling a rally of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that "any intrusion into the the borders of India will be punished."


10. India will now impose costs on China whenever it tries its favourite salami-slicing tactics in a bid to incrementally grab territory, a move that marks a decisive change in India's long-standing border management policy to largely maintain “peace and tranquility” along the Line of Actual Control, said top official sources. The “days of walk-in options for the PLA are over” said the sources, even as Indian armed forces went on their highest state of alert along the 3,488-km LAC as well as the eastern seaboard after the bloody skirmish in the Galwan Valley.

11. China has in the last three decades, transformed its military, and is prepared to use the same to pursue its policy. It has enforced a status quo with respect to border infrastructure on its own terms. In the meanwhile, the clueless Indian ministry of defence is belatedly re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of carrying firearms in the forward areas, given that PLA has flouted the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013 BDCA) and 4 other agreements, including the 1996 CBM on the LAC Agreement — these agreements lay down norms to exercise restraint in use of weapons during confrontations. But that is for border policing in normal times and not during military operations. The agreement does not lay down any restrictions on carriage of weapons. Moreover, when the lives of soldiers is threatened, the commander on the spot can use all weapons at his disposal, including artillery fire. The decision to not carry weapons was deliberate and a wrong one taken by the military hierarchy.

12. Despite the potential for clashes at the LAC, five major Sino-Indian agreements have – until now – largely kept the peace. The first of these, the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), signed in September 1993, is the “mother agreement.” It was supplemented with the 1996 confidence-building measures (CBM) on the LAC agreement; a 2005 standard operating procedures for patrols that come into contact agreement; a 2012 agreement that sets out processes for consultation and co-operation; and, most recently, the 2013 BDCA. Both Beijing and New Delhi realise that a mutually delineated LAC would end the uncertainty that causes troop clashes. The 1996 agreement explicitly notes the need for a “common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India–China border areas”. It states that the two sides “agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible”. However, China stonewalls the exchange of LAC maps, keeping alive the window for clashes.

13. In the standoff between India’s 14 Corps led by Lt General Harinder Singh and the Xinjiang Military Command, Major General Lin Liu, we see a fiasco unfolding at multiple levels for both Beijing and Delhi.
On the one hand, the PLA and the CCP have a PR fiasco for initiating the attack and killing Indian soldiers with nail-studded rods. The PLA is shown as engaging in thuggery, not soldiering —destroying PLA’s hard earned international reputation, as military professionals, by its strong participation in numerous UN peacekeeping operations and its evacuation of 35,860 Chinese nationals stranded in riot-torn Libya were rescued in a huge air, sea and land operation in Feb and Mar 2011. This thuggish mindset is like the Johnson South Reef Skirmish that took place on 14 March 1988, where the PLA(N) was perfectly willing to gun down Vietnamese troops attempted to erect the Vietnamese flag on the reef.​
On the other, the Indian BJP government suffered from a credibility gap given its hyper nationalist language usage, obvious spin control with lies and actual actions — where it is ONLY re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of not carrying firearms. There is also a gap the Indian ability to conduct timely ISR to support its unarmed troops under attack. And I am not even sure if they have a QRF for timely rescue of the injured. The BJP government should have given powers to the the Indian Armed Forces to make emergency procurements to stock up its war reserves, months ago (and not just after 20 had died). If that had been authorised months ago, it would have signalled real resolve.​

14. IMO, like China’s propaganda mouth pieces, BJP’s jingoistic rhetoric also does not allow critical engagement in any sphere. It projects anything critical of the BJP ruling party as anti-national. The reality is that it is the BJP that decided to procure only 36 Dassault Rafale in a Euro €7.87 billion contract (and failing to order a 2nd tranche of 36 more). Likewise the previous government failed to conclude the MRCA tender for 126 fighters and only ordered 11 C-17s by moving too slowly before the line closed (when they had a requirement for 16). In the 2011 C-17 contract, for 10 aircraft, was worth US$4.7 billion, India had an option to purchase 6 more C-17s over its order of ten. However, a lack of funds ensured that the follow-on order was not processed.

15. From China’s arms procurement perspective, India does not have a competent arms procurement process —India’s ruling party and its opposition can never find a bipartisan path forward to spend on defence. Even now, with Indian soldiers dead and injured the politicians are more or less engaging in political stunts to blame each other rather than finding a fix to their problems in defence. Correctly understood, it has a ministry of defeat, instead. The Indian defence ministry also took years to sign the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the US, despite years of buying American weapons. Without COMCASA, the Americans had to strip out equipment on aircraft sold to India, including crucial comms equipment for the Indian P-8Is.

16. The real art of public policy is not treating security and prosperity as strict alternatives but finding ways that get the most for both. PLA’s June 2020 hostile action to gain some inconsequential land along the LAC has resulted China destroying the trust created by prior border agreements and creating another enemy, when they could have kept India in the neutral camp.

(i) China’s self defeating approach extends to the Nov 2016 HK Terrex episode, where Chinese intelligence caused HK to detain Singapore’s armoured vehicles being shipped back from Taiwan — earning the distrust of another ‘neutral,’ who has now entered the F-35B club in Asia, along with Japan. Singapore's recent purchase of the F-35B fighter jets is part of the vital and longstanding relationship shared between the two countries, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Mr Rene Clarke Cooper, said on 10 Feb 2020. Speaking to global media, Mr Cooper also said that “the US-Singapore partnership is one very clear tangible example of the United States' commitment to a very free and open Indo-Pacific for all states in the region," he added. The US government has approved the sale of up to 12 F-35Bs to Singapore, the first sale to a country in South-east Asia.​

(ii) Many in the Indo-Pacific are hedging with the rise of China. With Trump’s unpredictability, there is strong incentive for Japan, Indonesia and Australia, as G20 members, to grow closer bilateral defence and economic ties. On the diplomatic front, the 6 Dec 2019 joint statement from the Australia–Indonesia foreign and defense ministers’ meeting expressed “serious concerns” about developments in the South China Sea. The rare united statement is a starting point for more discussions on how both countries could work together on strengthening sovereignty.​
(iii) In Southeast Asia, there is no “one-size-fits-all” narrative regarding China. While many countries are increasing ties with China to hedge against declining US influence, the survey also underscored how power dynamics in Southeast Asia are about much more than just the US and China. Japan and India, are also viewed as major players, with Indonesia holding significant influence in its own right.​
(iv) China’s unnecessary turn to hostility with its neutral neighbours has increased hedging behaviour in Asia, resulting in the trilateral naval exercise involving India, Singapore and Thailand in Sep 2019 that includes HTMS Kraburi and RSS Tenacious, from Thailand and Singapore. The Indian Navy was represented by INS Ranvir, INS Kora, and INS Sukanya along with a P8I MPA.​
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Wrong analysis of alternatives does not help solve the border problem

1. The importance of this crisis is clear. China has taken by force small pieces of territory that India perceives as its own. In doing so, China crossed two important Indian red lines: seizing territory and killing Indian soldiers. Do modern conquests typically involve large, valuable areas or smaller areas whose worth one must squint to discern? And what can be done in response? Answering these questions exposes the surprising normalcy of what has happened in Ladakh. To my mind and most western security analysis, deterrence “is the use of a threat (explicit or not) by one party in an attempt to convince another party not to upset status quo” (Quackenbush, 2010: 60). More specifically, deterrence is the persuasion of an aggressor that the cost and/or risk of a given course of action he might take outweighs its benefits (George & Smoke, 1974: 11). Where the preference is not to fight.

2. In common with the Chinese mindset, deterrence for the Indians is a mutual relationship that involves communication and signaling and assumes that states in competition or conflict make decisions in accordance with rational cost-benefit calculations that can be manipulated (Mazarr & Goodby, 2011).

3. But the key difference is China’s willingness to fight, as a next step, to communicate to the Indians in the language of deterrence by shedding blood. That is why I worry a lot when I see an Indian reporter say:
“...China clearly wants more. India faces the choice of moving towards becoming a vassal state or purposefully safeguarding its sovereignty and self-respect. True, China is several times more powerful and wealthy than India, and a military confrontation would incur a heavy cost. However... Sovereignty has a price and sometimes that price has to be paid.”​
4. I believe that the CCP’s strategy must be understood correctly — as the fait accompli. Each fait accompli is a calculated gamble and the CCP bet that it could take small areas in Ladakh without provoking India to start a wider war. So far, that bet has played out in Beijing’s favor, but the crisis is not over. I suspect that China’s motive is to establish deterrence against India by a limited border skirmish and the Indian politicians must be prepared to suffer deaths to draw a line and after that happens, to seek a path to peace. The choice is not about becoming a vassal state or sovereignty. The choice for India is to be sovereign but to pay for such unpreparedness in blood. That is to engage in war planning but execute with clear stop lines.

5. China’s encroachments in Ladakh share the most baffling quality of conquest in recent decades: risking military conflict for such a small territorial payoff. Only when the Indians are in a position to make such a payment, can they get China to withdraw to their side in a manner that minimises the amount of bloodshed for this border dispute.

6. It is my suspicion that India is headed to a path of a limited war with China. Peaceful coexistence and restoration of Sino-Indian relations after a limited war would not be possible without wisdom and pragmatism by the leaders on both sides.
 

tonnyc

Active Member
I want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.

For Pakistan to pick a fight with India, even if India is distracted by a conflict with China, is a major risk. India may decide to concede some land to China and then turning around to crush Pakistan for good. China may call Pakistan batie, but this relationship fundamentally is based on realpolitik and realpolitik can easily see China deciding that they've gotten what they want and let Pakistan to fend themselves, calling for "peace in the region" and offering mediation but not lifting a single finger in terms of military assistance. After all, despite sharing a border, China can't easily use those mountain passes to invade India. The logistics are tough. On the other hand, the Indian-Pakistani border is wide open.

Pakistan knows this, or at least their higher ups do. So rather than an all out support for China in a Chinese-Indian conflict, I expect a more measured and cautious reaction.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.

For Pakistan to pick a fight with India, even if India is distracted by a conflict with China, is a major risk. India may decide to concede some land to China and then turning around to crush Pakistan for good. China may call Pakistan batie, but this relationship fundamentally is based on realpolitik and realpolitik can easily see China deciding that they've gotten what they want and let Pakistan to fend themselves, calling for "peace in the region" and offering mediation but not lifting a single finger in terms of military assistance. After all, despite sharing a border, China can't easily use those mountain passes to invade India. The logistics are tough. On the other hand, the Indian-Pakistani border is wide open.

Pakistan knows this, or at least their higher ups do. So rather than an all out support for China in a Chinese-Indian conflict, I expect a more measured and cautious reaction.
Yep, but China also regard the Pakistani ports as quite important for their access to the Indian Ocean. One could almost classify them as strategic Chinese assets in that sense. So I wouldn't necessarily dismiss the idea of China not militarily supporting Pakistan against India.
 

tonnyc

Active Member
Yep, but China also regard the Pakistani ports as quite important for their access to the Indian Ocean. One could almost classify them as strategic Chinese assets in that sense. So I wouldn't necessarily dismiss the idea of China not militarily supporting Pakistan against India.
Yes, but that's two different scenarios there. If India attacks Pakistan, China will help Pakistan because it is in their strategic interest to do so. But if China and India got into a dispute, well, what's in it for Pakistan? A long standoff between India and China sapping Indian strength may be more beneficial to Pakistan strategically.
 

Ananda

Well-Known Member
want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.
True, but I think the scenario being talk about here for Pakistan involvement based on scenarios on China by passing Malaca Strait and used land transport through Central Asia and Sea Lane toward Pakistan ports to transport oil imports to China Interior.

The safety on that routes can be compromise by India, but for Indian to compromise that route will means they have to pacified Pakistan first.
India can pacified Pakistan, there's no doubt in there. However to do that, they have to commit most of their forces.
As India pretext to pacified Pakistan in this scenario is for compromising Chinese routes, then China will come to equation. India simply can't afford to take both Pakistan and India in same time.

Thus if we back to topic of SCS, with China road and belt policies to open trade routes through Central Asia and Pakistan Ports, China in my opinion already open another safe route that basically quite safe from other potential opposition except US.

But I agree there's no guarantee that Pakistan will involve conflict with India only on China benefits and vice versa. They will involve only if India try to compromise China's routes in their territory or the ones that India has to reach over their territory.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
The situation around the Chinese-Indian border is heating up, it seems that there has been shot for the first time since 1975.

What is the source of tension?
The root cause lies in unresolved border disputes. Sharing a border of more than 3,440km (2,100 miles), the two countries have overlapping territorial claims.

Their armies come face to face at many points because the border is poorly demarcated. Rivers, lakes and snowcaps mean the line separating soldiers can shift and they often come close to confrontation.

Source: India-China border dispute explained in 400 words


 

cdxbow

Active Member
Ironically, Hugh White, the 'strategist' in March 2020 - Why India isn't going to save Australia from China's power | East Asia Forum wrote this:

"The stronger India becomes, the stronger Beijing’s incentives to avoid a direct strategic contest in New Delhi’s backyard which it cannot win.
What gains could China expect from continuing to provoke India in this way as India’s power grows? It is unwise to assume that China will do us all a favour by making such an elementary strategic mistake."


Well, the fact is the PRC did and Hugh was wrong!

Six months is a very long time in politics.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Ironically, Hugh White, the 'strategist' in March 2020 - Why India isn't going to save Australia from China's power | East Asia Forum wrote this:

"The stronger India becomes, the stronger Beijing’s incentives to avoid a direct strategic contest in New Delhi’s backyard which it cannot win.
What gains could China expect from continuing to provoke India in this way as India’s power grows? It is unwise to assume that China will do us all a favour by making such an elementary strategic mistake."


Well, the fact is the PRC did and Hugh was wrong!

Six months is a very long time in politics.
And...it wouldn’t be the first time that the redoubtable Mr White has been wrong!
 

Vivendi

Member
I would tend to place more accuracy in the Indian version of events because the PRC have been known to be highly economical with the truth, even on a good day. They are the ones ratcheting up the tension and creating the problems.
Although I agree to your assessment of the PRC, I suggest we should be skeptical to both sides' claims. As we all know the first victim in a conflict like this is truth. There have been several examples of India not being entirely truthful. For example, last year India claimed to have shot down a Pakistani F-16...
This was later denied:

In other news, it seems some progress has been made on the diplomatic front:

India and China to 'quickly disengage' from border

It's too early to tell if things will really calm down, but this looks like a good start to me.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Although I agree to your assessment of the PRC, I suggest we should be skeptical to both sides' claims. As we all know the first victim in a conflict like this is truth. There have been several examples of India not being entirely truthful. For example, last year India claimed to have shot down a Pakistani F-16...
This was later denied:

In other news, it seems some progress has been made on the diplomatic front:

India and China to 'quickly disengage' from border

It's too early to tell if things will really calm down, but this looks like a good start to me.
Maybe they're trying to de-escalate, but Chinese troops were spotted carrying bladed weapons (glaives) likely in preparation for other non-shooting confrontations.


And China appears to be upgrading airfields likely to be used in a potential Indo-Chinese conflict over mountains.


Maybe it's the proverbial "you get more with a kind word and a gun then just a kind word". Or maybe the diplomacy is a smoke screen. Maybe it's even both, they're ready for a diplomatic solution if they can get what they want, but are ready to continue the conflict if they can't. I don't know, I'm having a hard time seeing what exactly China hopes to gain, if they are the ones behind this escalation.
 

Vivendi

Member
Could this be a partial explanation for why things have escalated between India and China?
On Aug. 5, Modi’s government altered India’s relationship with Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi removed the special status Kashmir had long enjoyed, split it into two federally controlled territories, imprisoned all pro-India Kashmiri politicians, and imposed a very harsh physical and internet lockdown in the region.

At the time, these moves were seen by his supporters as a political masterstroke. Asserting de jure control over Kashmir had long been a central tenet of his party (the Bharatiya Janata Party) and Modi — months after re-election — had delivered. In the eyes of domestic and international critics, however, New Delhi’s new Kashmir policy was, at best, a short-sighted mistake and, at worst, a gross miscarriage of justice unbecoming of a secular democracy. Relations between India and Pakistan had already plummeted after the two countries were involved in a limited military skirmish following the Indian airstrikes in Balakot to avenge the Pulwama suicide bombing incident in February 2019. However, the decision on Kashmir in August opened up a new set of challenges for India with Pakistan and, more surprisingly, with China.

China’s Anger

As soon as India bifurcated the erstwhile state into two federally controlled territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, the latter bordering Tibet, China clearly signaled its disapproval. China’s foreign ministry said, “We urge India to exercise prudence in its words and deeds concerning the boundary question, strictly abide by relevant agreements concluded between the two sides and avoid taking move that further complicate the boundary question.”

The strident Chinese statement took Indian officials by surprise. On Aug. 5, Modi’s right-hand man and India’s Home Minister Amit Shah had thundered in parliament about taking back Aksai Chin — another territory claimed by New Delhi and Beijing — at any cost. However, the prime minister had to suddenly rush his foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, to Beijing to placate the Chinese government. The ploy didn’t work. Wang Xianfeng, press officer at the Chinese mission in Islamabad, tweeted an article — which he later deleted — that stated that Foreign Minister Wang Yi had conveyed to Jaishankar that “India’s moves challenged China’s sovereign rights and interests and violated the agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas between the two countries.”
I am no expert but to my layman eyes this analyst seems to have many good points regarding the dynamics between Pakistan, India and China, and the dangerous situation that India currently finds itself in, with the risk of ending up in a "two and half front" war, at a time with a weak economy, weak air force, and little ammunition.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I don't think so. IMHO it's more argy bargy on both the Chinese and Indian sides. Both countries have leaders who are nationalistic and seeking to take any advantage where possible. The Pakistan ISI will be playing one side off against the other in order to get what they can of the situation. It will what will be to the ISI's advantage and not necessarily Pakistan's. A Chinese - Pakistan war against India wouldn't necessarily be in China and / or Pakistan's favour because of international reaction. It could drag in third parties on India's side and what might've been a limited war, all of a sudden escalates into something that neither party wants. There is also the nuclear weapons dimension, in that if India feels sufficiently threatened on the battlefield it could / would resort to using its nuclear arsenal. That's a whole new Pandora's box and don't forget all three of the aforementioned nations are nuclear armed.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Wrong analysis of alternatives does not help solve the border problem - Part 2
7. In relation to the Sino-India Border dispute, Ajai Shukla’s consistency and honesty in reporting over these months deserve appreciation — Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said in Parliament: “I want to inform this august House, and through it the entire nation, that we are prepared for all outcomes to ensure that India's sovereignty is maintained.”

8. Recounting the crisis, Rajnath said that, since April, it became apparent that the PLA was on the Eastern Ladakh border in larger numbers and with extra armaments. In early May, the PLA began interdicting India’s traditional patrolling patterns in the Galwan Valley. China also attempted LAC transgressions at several other places, including Kongka La, Gogra and the north bank of the Pangong Lake.

9. Avoiding any mention of Chinese occupation of Indian-claimed territory, Rajnath said: “Our troops observed these attempts and took counter measures.” “We have informed China through diplomatic and military channels that such activities constitute a unilateral attempt to change the status quo, which is on no account acceptable to India,” he added.

10. Referring to the clash of June 15, in which 20 Indian soldiers died, the defence minister cloaked the actual events in nationalist rhetoric.” But Rajnath’s problems aren’t just limited to the Sino-Indian border, as Pakistan has stepped up its rate of cross border incidents. The 2.5 front challenge, with nuclear-armed neighbours, has become a grim reality for the Indians.
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
Maybe they're trying to de-escalate, but Chinese troops were spotted carrying bladed weapons (glaives) likely in preparation for other non-shooting confrontations.

Pole arms! How very mediaeval.

You don't carry weapons like that unless you're a military re-enactor, a ceremonial guard - or planning to kill people.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
So, china has strengthened its border troops with the Type 928D assault boats, which are 'heavily inspired' by the Swedish CB90 assault boats.

 
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