Assessment TOP
The Azerbaijani Army has been suffering from over a decade of decline since its losses in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its role in the attempted coups of 1993-95. It proved unable to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh, in part as a result of the superior discipline, better training and more qualified leadership of the opposing Armenian forces, and continues to suffer from severe problems in training, equipping and motivating its soldiers. It is, however, a better-organised and more professional service than it was then. Despite these positive changes, the Army and the other services as well are still hampered by corruption in the ranks and a highly politicised officer corps; and it lacks a consistent and co-ordinated training programme for individual soldiers as well as small and larger units, who are especially lacking in combined arms/joint service training.
Among the enlisted ranks, corruption, hazing and the forced conscription of young men are all common practices and serve further to degrade the Army's operational effectiveness. The conscription process is reportedly fraught with corruption, with bribes guaranteeing deferments or exemptions, and a high level of non-compliance - possibly as much as 20 per cent in 2000. Reporting indicates that the conscription process is anything but universal and that both the quality and quantity of the conscripts continues to suffer. The Army is also plagued by poor living conditions, inadequate or irregular pay and an overall lack of decent equipment and supplies.
The destabilising effects of such poor conditions is reflected in incidents of abuse, desertion and mutiny, and an increasing level of injury and death among conscripts, all of which negatively affect morale and personnel readiness. Several high profile events in 2002 revealed the extent of these types of problems in the Army and the armed forces as a whole. Efforts have since been underway to improve living conditions within the army, with increased pay and bonuses, improvements in housing allowances and increased food rations.
The quality and readiness of much of the Army's equipment is also a problem, as a decade of poor maintenance and chronic shortages of spare parts means that many systems are non-operational, cannibalised for parts, or operating at less than optimal status. Moreover, much of the older generation equipment is in need of systems upgrades and modernisation, that is, communication packages, fire control and target acquisition systems, and so on. As a result, the readiness levels and operational capabilities vary significantly between units.
After more than a decade of relative neglect, the Army and the armed forces as a whole face a number of daunting challenges that they must overcome if they are to develop into a competent military force. Changes will not come overnight and they will not come without greater government support, both in economic and political terms. The Army has long been under-funded by a government that distrusted the potential opposition it presented and preferred to fund the security services. The cumulative impact of a decade of neglect and decline has made the solution to the structural problems in the army a very long and expensive process. In terms of rebuilding the army, the best solution lies in focusing on restructuring, refurbishment and modernisation efforts for a couple of brigades at a time. They cannot afford to swap out their equipment base, rather they must focus on salvaging as much of this equipment as is needed and upgrade it where possible.
The Army remains however a lower priority compared to both the Navy and the Air Force, which have both benefited from the country's ties with the US and NATO. American and NATO planners have seemed hesitant to direct any tangible support to the army for fear of granting a new offensive capability that could tempt Azerbaijan to restart hostilities with neighbouring Armenia. Thus, the Azerbaijani Army has begun to look beyond the US and NATO for potential partners, and increasingly looked towards Russia as provider for the army given its serious need for Soviet weapons and spare parts stocks. The army has also tried to leverage its traditional relationship with the Turkish Army, although the decline in close ties between Baku and Ankara has so far led to only disappointing results. Over the past three years, the army has therefore also looked to expanding its ties with Pakistan, Iran and other former Soviet states, such as Ukraine, Slovakia and even Belarus.
