A-10 The ground pounders friend

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
According to what I've seen thus far the A-10 will often deploy with this configuration:
Station 1) 1x AN/ALQ-131 Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) pod
2) 1x LAU-131/A rocket pod
3) 1x AGM-65
4) 3x GBU-38 JDAM
5) 1x GBU-16 Paveway II
6) Empty
7) 1x GBU-16 Paveway II
8) 3x GBU-38 JDAM
9) 1x AGM-65 Maverick
10) 1x AN/AAQ-28(V) LITENING Targeting Pod
11) 2x AIM-9 Sidewinder

This is the setup I have in the scene in my book that I described. I need confirmation on this. I should have stated this outright.
They don't just load up a bunch of ordnance and fly around waiting to hear calls of TIC...
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The aircraft in question were already in the air at the time of the engagement.
I acknowledge your point concerning timetables and I acknowledge that aircraft don't have their payloads magically glued to their pylons to fit the exact mission requirements of the troops in contact calling for support.

Define "heavies."
How would that compare to American air assets in the ROK?

I am considering theater and geological issues, if you think I'm missing something could you be more specific?

What do you mean by "driven by injecting names from a military glossary?"

I have a 5 Paragraph OPORD template sitting in front of me right now. I have used it in the past for this series of books. But, is the mission not clear? An ODA happened to be close by a downed pilot so they were rerouted and tasked with recovery when they stumbled in and made contact with a much larger PLA force.
Typically when flying a sortie of any kind, there needs to be a reason and a specific mission. The ordinance it carries will be determined by the reason it's in the air. Instead of rattling off munitions, why not tell us the scenario and let some of the knowledgeable members here tell you what a typical payload would look like for that kind of mission.

As was earlier pointed out, CAS missions frequently involve loitering in the area, waiting for the ground troops to call for CAS. Which means a smaller payload, to reduce fuel consumption. This, by the way, is why strategic bombers make such excellent CAS these days. They can stay in the air for ridiculous periods of time with a gigantic payload. This is also why helos and UAVs are good choices. Both tend to have decent loiter times, meaning they can provide presence, with CAS on demand, rather then the ground troops having to call for CAS, and then wait for it to arrive.
 

south

Well-Known Member
as a matter of fact it is quite common for a CAS platform to take off with a generic loadout, not knowing who they are going to support, especially when longer flight times are in place.

E.g all of the aircraft sitting ground alert for afghan were waiting for a call with generic loads, along with the heavies and most of the carrier missions, and most of the current MEAO missions are the same.

It is only for a pre-planned mission allocated that ordnance will (can be) tailored.

Btw does anyone have any open source facts showing the tonnage employed by different platforms in OEF/OIF? I often see the claim that the "overwhelming" majority was dropped by heavies but haven't seen anything to back it up.
 

south

Well-Known Member
The USAF says that B-1Bs dropped 40% of the total bomb load during the first 6 month of OEF and 46 % of all JDAMs with less than 1 % of the total sorties during OIF.

B-1B Lancer > U.S. Air Force > Fact Sheet Display

Puts the price of purchasing and operating versatile bombers into perspective...
Great - doesn't necessarily imply CAS though. E.g the first 6 months were likely deliberate strike/ AI. Without knowing the mission it is impossible to read in to those statistics.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Great - doesn't necessarily imply CAS though. E.g the first 6 months were likely deliberate strike/ AI. Without knowing the mission it is impossible to read in to those statistics.
I've only got unsubstantiated offline info from another group where a USAF colleague is a tac planner. He's regularly come back and said that from what he's seen its over 80% with rotaries then picking up most of the rest

it also depends on the ground mission as CAS and cover is preplanned and if they're not roaming far (like SF) then they tend to operate within the confines of interlocking arty and rotary. that by inference would seem to indicate that ground missions within a 40km radius would have first order CAS and coverage provided by arty and local rotary
 

south

Well-Known Member
I've only got unsubstantiated offline info from another group where a USAF colleague is a tac planner. He's regularly come back and said that from what he's seen its over 80% with rotaries then picking up most of the rest

it also depends on the ground mission as CAS and cover is preplanned and if they're not roaming far (like SF) then they tend to operate within the confines of interlocking arty and rotary. that by inference would seem to indicate that ground missions within a 40km radius would have first order CAS and coverage provided by arty and local rotary
A lot of CAS is not pre planned. The thing with SF is the S. If they have a mission coming up that with a known time and date that fits into the ATO then often they can get an air unit allocated and this get a tailored load. or they may have their own organic air support allocated at all times (rotary - they won't get fixed wing in that way). A regular army platoon going on a patrol is unlikely to have that pull.

Regardless of who you are however if I it is short notice, reactive cas like a call to a tic from ground alert, the guys on the ground have to take what they can get, both in terms of platform and weapons. How Afghanistan Distorted Close Air Support and Why it Matters

i don't doubt your colleague in what he said. I'd be surprised if it is still the same ratio the current fight, it's a different war.

The very thing that makes a heavy useful in situations (size, which then gives them great endurance and loadout and often superior comm) is also a compromise in that they requires significant airspace, they generally sit further from the target area with a longer run in to attack and greater egress time. There is also the fact that they don't work as a pair so are naturally disadvantaged when it comes to maintaining PID/tracking movers/searching for targets etc as they have 1/2 the number of pods.
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Sure, in Afghanistan over the course of a long TIC the JTAC on the ground could have seen a dutch F-16 getting replaced with a USAF A-10 getting again replaced by a RAF Harrier getting replaced by a USAF B-1B with some british and US Apaches mixed in for good measure and all with generic weapons loads.

From the reports and books I've seen it looks like that all fast movers often did't operate in pairs with a second pair of airborn eyes sometimes being provided by a UAV. And while a B-52 takes it's time to get around for a second strike or BDA a B-1 shouldn't be all that much slower than a fighterbomber doing it.

As for the usevof heavies in the early phase of OEF. There weren't that many static and worthwhile Taliban/AQ targets present in Afghanistan to begin with. So I think that much of the bombload delivered during OEF was called in by SFs attached to the northern alliance units or operating in their own as well as in support of the other units arriving later (Marines, Rangers,...).
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
as a matter of fact it is quite common for a CAS platform to take off with a generic loadout, not knowing who they are going to support, especially when longer flight times are in place.

E.g all of the aircraft sitting ground alert for afghan were waiting for a call with generic loads, along with the heavies and most of the carrier missions, and most of the current MEAO missions are the same.
Interesting. Could you elaborate on this? What did this generic loadout look like? Was the generic loadout based on previous planning on the types of support ground troops normally required in that theater?
 

south

Well-Known Member
Sure, in Afghanistan over the course of a long TIC the JTAC on the ground could have seen a dutch F-16 getting replaced with a USAF A-10 getting again replaced by a RAF Harrier getting replaced by a USAF B-1B with some british and US Apaches mixed in for good measure and all with generic weapons loads.

From the reports and books I've seen it looks like that all fast movers often did't operate in pairs with a second pair of airborn eyes sometimes being provided by a UAV. And while a B-52 takes it's time to get around for a second strike or BDA a B-1 shouldn't be all that much slower than a fighterbomber doing it.

As for the usevof heavies in the early phase of OEF. There weren't that many static and worthwhile Taliban/AQ targets present in Afghanistan to begin with. So I think that much of the bombload delivered during OEF was called in by SFs attached to the northern alliance units or operating in their own as well as in support of the other units arriving later (Marines, Rangers,...).
Waylander, wrt your para2: as I'm sure you know western fighter doctrine is for a mutually supporting pair. Operating solo would be the exception rather than the norm. Specific cases may be solo tanking ops with a single remaining overhead if the tanker is nearby, or perhaps operating in two discrete areas that are relatively close if the jtac has two areas of interest (note: unable to do that with a heavy). A UAV would not constitute a "wingman". Any CAS platform should be able to operate with UAV support.

If you would like to refer to The JP on close air support doctrine you can see some of the limitations (and strengths) I have detailed regarding heavy bombers in CAS.
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_09_3.pdf Page 164 of 361.

Wrt para 3: yep, I agree although without the figures it is impossible to say what percentage were deliberate strike/dynamic target/CAS. The fact that the USAF highlight the first 6 months is telling - likely it is before establishment of Kandahar and Bagram. Obviously this is a strength of the heavy in terms of range and persistence when few other platforms were getting into the AO, hence their high percentage.

If however the USAF were currently dropping a massive% of current CAS weapons from the B1/52 though they could easily be put the A10 argument to bed - obviously there would be little to no need need for a dedicated CAS platform if heavies were dropping such a high ratio. Why do the USAF not release figures to this effect?

Feanor - I can't speak to specifics, as I don't know off hand the standard loadouts as it undoubtedly would differ from platform to platform, and potentially even from sqn to sqn. However if you click the link in my previous post it details how the aircrew were unable to conduct the detailed planning and integration they would like as they would find themselves retasked so frequently. Note that is for planned sorties airborne. For aircraft sitting GCAS (ground alert) they obviously had very little idea what situation they would face so could not tailor their ordnance. I believe that early days Afghanistan RAF harriers flew with one aircraft having1x 1000lb freefall instantaneous fuze, 1x 1000lb air burst, the second having 1x1000lb LGB and rocket pods on the other wing. That is from a book that I have read however it was some time ago.

Long story short - my opinion - the bomber has a place, particularly if you are a long way away from anywhere, or need an absolutely ridiculous amount of bombs. i just think that to advertise them as 'more capable / better / superior' than a well coordinated pair of any fighters is a hard argument to justify, particularly if you have more difficult target sets (movers etc).
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I am curious as to whether the P-8 could be used in a similar, persistent CAS role, in permissive environments, to the B-1 / B-52? As it is planned to use the type as an over land ISR platform, as well as to incorporate the ability to launch and control MAD equipped ASW UAVs, is it really that much of a stretch that they could control, even deploy small CAS UCAVs, as well as be loaded out with various PGMs instead of their regular torpedo / missile warload?
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks for the PDF. I cannot make out that many disadvantages of bombers, particularly the B-1B, doing CAS in that document.

Flight times to the theater are high if one operates out of Diego Garcia but much lower in the middle east where they operate out of Quatar. They are not alert assets coming in right from the tarmac although from their Quatari base they are not much further away than other assets and in the case of the B-1B not much slower.

Reattack times of 5min are also not all that much considering BDA needs to be done while the dust settles and that they can service more targets in one run.

Informations about one ship CAS missions are for example to be found in the books Apache, Hellfire and Fire Strike 7/9, all of them covering Afghanistan and probably more prominent there due to the restrictions on number of assets in theater.

The USAF also releases numbers for the current conflict against the IS.

.

The picture is out of this article:
https://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2016/03/30/isis-kill-missions-1-5-conducted-drone/82389432/

And this article covers the B-1Bs in theater:
bombing-isis-cmdr-shares-lessons-6-months-airstrikes | DefenseNews

It shows that the pattern continues as in that the B-1Bs dropped most of the loadout with a small amount of sorties. The second article states that many of these missions were CAS missions.

What is telling is that the USAF rotated the A-10 out of theater and substituted it with normal multirole fighterbombers in theater while they also rotated the B-1Bs out but replaced them with B-52Hs.

Fighterbombers, UAVs and Bombers act in concert here, each bringing in some particular strengths with the bombers often not getting the recognition they deserve. But I fail to see the particular need for a plane like the A-10 in here.

I would even say that the air force got it right in that they think about putting 1-2 new birds into service for these kind of missions in a low/medium mix like Super Tucano/Scorpion. CLet such cheap platforms handle some of the burden while reducing pressure on the operational budget and flight hours of the high performance assets.

The A-10 IMHO is too expensive to operate for what it bribgs to the table as it is just as useless against any halfway serious air defense just like cheaper platforms.

@Volkodav
I think so. P-3s are already used for ISR due to their onbooard sensors and persistence and the french just recently upgraded some of their Atlantices for self designating and dropping PGMs. This is IMHO even more interesting for countries without bombers and the exhaustive UAV capability like the US.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Waylander, wrt your para2: as I'm sure you know western fighter doctrine is for a mutually supporting pair. Operating solo would be the exception rather than the norm. Specific cases may be solo tanking ops with a single remaining overhead if the tanker is nearby, or perhaps operating in two discrete areas that are relatively close if the jtac has two areas of interest (note: unable to do that with a heavy). A UAV would not constitute a "wingman". Any CAS platform should be able to operate with UAV support.
Russia/USSR had the same concept, operate in pairs. But as soon as they flew a few sorties in Syria, they scrapped it. Now they're regularly flying solo. Granted the airspace is fairly small, and there's no (in theory) hostile air threat. So it's probably more of an exception then the rule. Still they seem to be getting away with it so far. And of course they do only a little CAS with fixed wing.

Feanor - I can't speak to specifics, as I don't know off hand the standard loadouts as it undoubtedly would differ from platform to platform, and potentially even from sqn to sqn. However if you click the link in my previous post it details how the aircrew were unable to conduct the detailed planning and integration they would like as they would find themselves retasked so frequently. Note that is for planned sorties airborne. For aircraft sitting GCAS (ground alert) they obviously had very little idea what situation they would face so could not tailor their ordnance. I believe that early days Afghanistan RAF harriers flew with one aircraft having1x 1000lb freefall instantaneous fuze, 1x 1000lb air burst, the second having 1x1000lb LGB and rocket pods on the other wing. That is from a book that I have read however it was some time ago.
I did read the article, it was quite interesting, thanks for sharing. Personally I recall being taught the CAS 9-line, and told not to count on JTACs or dedicated personnel to be available for that sort of thing.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Waylander regarding limitations of bombers I will highlight some that you understand if you read between the lines:
- The simple fact there is a discrete section on planning for bomber operations highlights there have been issues in the past as their tactics are necessarily different and abnormal.
- where it talks about being able to observe the general target area but may require LSS, IR pointer or rover on turning inbound - they will likely lose PID of what they are looking for due to the fidelity of sensors at range (fighter pair has less issue)
-consideration to noise to maintain surprise...
-bombers traditionally employ on given coordinates ( if you do not have a bomb-on-coordinate attack they are probably out of their comfort zone.)
-CAS in urban environments... Positive ID will be more challenging (firstly because they are standing off further so the pod fidelity will be reduced even for trying to determine which building you are trying to find. It does not talk about urban canyons but there will be aspects where it is impossible for the bomber alone to track vehicles or people due obscuration.)....maximum use of LSS, IR pointer and VDL will be warranted (higher JTAC workload) ... In the absence of VDL talk on...may be extensive (they will struggle)...
- because of launch altitudes...standoff range may be longer...(note now you have to clear everyone below them out of the stack to miss the bomb(s) having a detrimental effect, whilst they track to their IP for run in - this will be for a longer duration than for a fighter at lower altitude). If you have a look at the diagram for their hold, and then attack phase they require huge chunks of airspace.
- post attack phase.. Reattack.... 5 minutes to 20 minutes (5 minutes is good drills, I would say exceptional as if you do the simple maths for how long it physically takes them to turn around)

I stand by the last paragraph in my previous post... Bombers are fine, even great, if you have bomb on coordinate CAS, a less challenging CAS stack, and less challenging (static) target sets. It is important to understand their limitations before we wax lyrical about pure tonnage though.

Regarding the books... I have read the apache and hellfire, I can't remember the bits you highlight. I'm not saying you are incorrect but suggest that written from an Apache driver pov there is probably no context as to why they were singles. It could be as simple as they were written out of the book by their ghost writer to keep the story flowing and not get bogged down in detail, or wingy was at the tanker, or wingy was 10miles away on a different freq prosecuting a different target but still providing mutual support.
 

Waylander

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Verified Defense Pro
An extra section for bombers just means they are different not better or worse.

The paper also states that they may require laser or other means of helping them to find the target which in itself is not different from other fast movers under certain circumstances although fighterbombers may more often go deeper in order to ger a better picture.

As for noise, the paper states that bombers are usually not audible outside of a 5nm bubble which is not all that much and I would rate the trails by high flying B-52s as more of a problem.

Where do you read about bombers being out of their comfort zone, when not doing a bomb on coordinates run?

Tracking in urban environments is tricky and a two ship package has it's advantages there but interestingly the B-1B article I posted mentions that they were mostly employed over difficult terrain. Not a sign for me that target discrimination is that much of a problem. They are doing this since close to 15 years now over the mountaineous terrain of A-stan and the urban centers of Iraq (and now Syria).

As for turn around times. I don't think it's about different drills. It's more about platforms. A B-52 turns like a whale while a B-1 is much closer to a fighterbomber.

And I never stated that they are the be all and end all of modern CAS. But their role expanded massively in the last 15 years with them becoming the backbone of sustained CAS efforts over multiple theaters of operations in concert with multirole fighterbombers and UAVs. That's what the numbers support.
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think the main issue with heavies as CAS was response time (not the time taken to get the platform into action, but usually they were dropping JDAM from a fair few miles out so it just physically took a while for the end effects to happen from weps release.


Can't recall where I read it, but JTACS are now getting the ability to see what the FLIR picture looks from the heavy end and actually see what they see which is nice.
 
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