Propagation of stealth technology and what this means for the US

Kilo 2-3

New Member
There is a big risk new passive radars in the future will be the end of stealth as we know it today...then there will be hard to justify the extra maintenance these platoforms requires....
The ability to counter or at least the degrade, the advantage of stealth is still a bit embroynic. But there are LO concepts and operational aircraft out there today.

We have to distinguish between "ifs" and "nows." The present is certainly more certain than the future.

Will someone one day find a way to beat stealth? Probably? But then someone will come up with a way to defeat that measure with a countermeasure , and then that will get countered, and so on and so forth. The two technologies are going to continually be improving in an effort to check each other, but I honestly think stealth is going to have the lead over AD tech for the next few years.
 

Pyongyang

Banned Member
The ability to counter or at least the degrade, the advantage of stealth is still a bit embroynic. But there are LO concepts and operational aircraft out there today.

We have to distinguish between "ifs" and "nows." The present is certainly more certain than the future.

Will someone one day find a way to beat stealth? Probably? But then someone will come up with a way to defeat that measure with a countermeasure , and then that will get countered, and so on and so forth. The two technologies are going to continually be improving in an effort to check each other, but I honestly think stealth is going to have the lead over AD tech for the next few years.
I am convinced that in a 5 year period there will be reasonably priced ways to detect and track relatively up to date stealth objects. The Thales HA-100 was able to track the Scalp cruise missile quite easy in Norway a couple of years ago. Now obviously it is hard to say if the Storm shadow is what you would describe as a stealth object, or if we can even start to compare it to some of the most recent American stealth projects.

The Thor-m1 system has apparently the ability to detect and engage objects with an rcs of 0.1 square meters and above at somewhat short ranges. And the Swedes at one time did some research and found a rather cheap way to protect themselves against stealth planes and missiles.
So yes, sometime in the future we will be looking at other ways to disguise the fighter jets, atleast we can find comfort in the fact that it’s not our job to wash the stealth materials eleven times a day…
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I don't think that's accurate. As radars evolve so will ways to reduce radar detection. I think there will always be ways to reduce their RCS.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
I am convinced that in a 5 year period there will be reasonably priced ways to detect and track relatively up to date stealth objects. The Thales HA-100 was able to track the Scalp cruise missile quite easy in Norway a couple of years ago. Now obviously it is hard to say if the Storm shadow is what you would describe as a stealth object, or if we can even start to compare it to some of the most recent American stealth projects.

The Thor-m1 system has apparently the ability to detect and engage objects with an rcs of 0.1 square meters and above at somewhat short ranges. And the Swedes at one time did some research and found a rather cheap way to protect themselves against stealth planes and missiles.
So yes, sometime in the future we will be looking at other ways to disguise the fighter jets, atleast we can find comfort in the fact that it’s not our job to wash the stealth materials eleven times a day…
Once again I'd ask the question, if reliable LO detection is that close to being available, how does one explain the fact that almost every combat aircraft and UCAV currently in development has LO features? Bearing in mind that the military has far more data than is available to you or I, and that they still consider LO features to not only be viable, but significant enough to build into everything from tactical fighters to UAVs to bombers - do you really think these efforts would be so comprehensive if the principles of RCS reduction (I assume this is what you mean by stealth) were so easy to overcome with detection systems?

And maybe you could elaborate on the Swedish efforts you mention? I'd be interested to hear about it.
 

Pyongyang

Banned Member
Once again I'd ask the question, if reliable LO detection is that close to being available, how does one explain the fact that almost every combat aircraft and UCAV currently in development has LO features? Bearing in mind that the military has far more data than is available to you or I, and that they still consider LO features to not only be viable, but significant enough to build into everything from tactical fighters to UAVs to bombers - do you really think these efforts would be so comprehensive if the principles of RCS reduction (I assume this is what you mean by stealth) were so easy to overcome with detection systems?

And maybe you could elaborate on the Swedish efforts you mention? I'd be interested to hear about it.
That’s really a bad argument, as not every third world country will have this “anti-stealth” capability, and clearly there will be certain need for them in the future. I also have a sneaking suspicion that some nations build these technology test platforms as a component of their anti-stealth effort as much as a forthcoming mass produced platform.

Regarding the Swedish system I found an old article:
Details of a formerly secret project to defend Swedish airspace against stealthy cruise missiles using a radical but inexpensive radar system were revealed at a conference in Oslo this week. The Associative Aperture Synthesis Radar (AASR) was approaching the hardware-test stage when it was cancelled in 2000 after eight years of work -- because there was no imminent cruise-missile threat any more. It has only recently been declassified and this was one of the first open, formal briefings on the project.

The AASR was designed to take advantage of the principle that a target's bistatic radar cross section -- where the radar receiver and transmitter are in different places -- may be affected minimally or not at all by stealth measures aimed at conventional radars. In particular, it exploits the "shadow" RCS behind the target, which depends entirely on the target's geometrical cross-section. The radar was also designed to operate in the UHF band where radar absorbent material (RAM) is less effective.
Radical and Cheap Anti-Stealth Radar
 

Kilo 2-3

New Member
That’s really a bad argument, as not every third world country will have this “anti-stealth” capability, and clearly there will be certain need for them in the future. I also have a sneaking suspicion that some nations build these technology test platforms as a component of their anti-stealth effort as much as a forthcoming mass produced platform.
With respect, Pyonyang, Bonza has a point that you are missing. If third world countries were the only ones without anti-LO radar tech, then why are so many militaries spending billions to develop stealth technology?

You're effectively saying that its worth developing highly expensive LO assets to go after "third world countries" that either a.) don't have any radar at all or b.) don't have an RCS-defeating radar?

If this does become the case, you'd be better off training heavily for the SEAD and EW/ECM missions, and keep using legacy-type airframes. But we don't see the Russians or the Americans dropping their stealth projects, screaming, and buying extra HARMs, do we?

Most developing nations don't have significant air forces, and unless they happen to have bought, stolen, or acquired ex-Soviet SAMs and radars after the fall of the USSR, they aren't going to have a really potent ground-based AD system. Spending billions on LO aircraft just so that you can be invisible to a third-world country's half-dozen Fan Songs makes no sense!

You have to also consider the fact that there is a such a thing as jamming. It isn't a silver bullet, but it makes life a lot harder for anybody using a radar. Even if for some reason counter-LO radars do become operational, the US is just going to sic its Growlers on it and keep rolling.

Regarding the article, it looks like a pretty very novel concept. But...I'll apply an old rule of thumb here "if anything sounds too good to be true....it probably is."

It sure sounds nice, but we have to know more we declare that stealth is dead.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
That’s really a bad argument, as not every third world country will have this “anti-stealth” capability, and clearly there will be certain need for them in the future. I also have a sneaking suspicion that some nations build these technology test platforms as a component of their anti-stealth effort as much as a forthcoming mass produced platform.
Why is it a bad argument? It's a valid question. I don't understand what the relevance of third world nations is to your explanation. Billions upon billions of dollars is spent in the pursuit of LO technology - whether it be RCS reducing treatments for a legacy fighter as is found on the Super Hornet, or a dedicated LO platform like F-35, or even technology demonstrators for UCAVs, like nEUROn or X-47b. If LO technology (and Feanor is right when he says LO technologies will advance just as detection technologies do) is that easy to trump, then the expenditure of that much money, across so many different nations, seems highly unlikely and thus must be explained.

Regarding the Swedish system I found an old article:

Radical and Cheap Anti-Stealth Radar
Thanks for the link. It does however seem that the approach hinges on a widely placed array of multiple sensors (900 nodes, as it mentions in the article) and requires an aircraft be between emitter and receiver in order to be detected, so I'm not sure whether this approach could be adapted to other radar systems. I take your point though that the work is significant, it's just a matter of whether the principle under which such a system would operate is applicable to general detection technology, and whether it, by its nature, requires a widespread sensor network in order to function and is situational in the sense that it requires LO aircraft to be within the sensor network in order to detect them.
 

Kilo 2-3

New Member
Thanks for the link. It does however seem that the approach hinges on a widely placed array of multiple sensors (900 nodes, as it mentions in the article) and requires an aircraft be between emitter and receiver in order to be detected, so I'm not sure whether this approach could be adapted to other radar systems. I take your point though that the work is significant, it's just a matter of whether the principle under which such a system would operate is applicable to general detection technology, and whether it, by its nature, requires a widespread sensor network in order to function and is situational in the sense that it requires LO aircraft to be within the sensor network in order to detect them.
Hmm...

If the network is a must then that means that lone ships wouldn't be able to really utilize this system. If a Navy wanted to us this, then they'd probably need airborne radar units, unmanned buoys or boats, or work out a multi-ship picket system. Seems a bit cumbersome which ever route you go.

And an area with poor lines of sight (mountains) might not be able to use this system either, unless you put the nodes on opposite peaks. Still, an aircraft could just fly down the valleys, below the nodes and limit its chances at being detected.

Nap of earth flight in more normal terrain might also affect the nodes' line of sight, reducing the effectiveness of the network.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Hmm...

If the network is a must then that means that lone ships wouldn't be able to really utilize this system. If a Navy wanted to us this, then they'd probably need airborne radar units, unmanned buoys or boats, or work out a multi-ship picket system. Seems a bit cumbersome which ever route you go.

And an area with poor lines of sight (mountains) might not be able to use this system either, unless you put the nodes on opposite peaks. Still, an aircraft could just fly down the valleys, below the nodes and limit its chances at being detected.

Nap of earth flight in more normal terrain might also affect the nodes' line of sight, reducing the effectiveness of the network.
I'd also add that if you wanted to use the system in naval applications it would require the targets to be within the bounds of the network for you to detect them, ie they've already penetrated your screen. If your opponent has a standoff capability you're probably in a bit of trouble...
 

Pyongyang

Banned Member
Again I have to say that your argument is bad. nEUROn project for starters, is a 400 million european project divided on six nations, which is far from spending “billions and billions” on demonstrators. It’s obviously important that these nations develop further experience on areas concerning stealth, but it is far from committing to a mass fabricated product, and spending billions on billions…you cannot be so arrogant and say that today, with the tempo within CPU advancement, and the massive rivalry in the defense industry that the F-35s passive and hard to maintain panels will keep her protected over her destined life span.

I have for a long time tried to retrieve information on the Super Green Pine L-Band AESA radar which is alleged to be able to track numerous stealth objects accurate at over 400 km. Sadly the operators of the system including the manufacturer failed to help me with information due to certain reasons.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Again I have to say that your argument is bad. nEUROn project for starters, is a 400 million european project divided on six nations, which is far from spending “billions and billions” on demonstrators. It’s obviously important that these nations develop further experience on areas concerning stealth, but it is far from committing to a mass fabricated product, and spending billions on billions…you cannot be so arrogant and say that today, with the tempo within CPU advancement, and the massive rivalry in the defense industry that the F-35s passive and hard to maintain panels will keep her protected over her destined life span.

I have for a long time tried to retrieve information on the Green Pine L-Band AESA radar which is alleged to be able to track numerous stealth objects accurate at over 400 km. Sadly the operators of the system including the manufacturer failed to help me with information due to certain reasons.
Sorry, perhaps I wasn't clear. When I referred to "billions and billions" I was referring to the total amount spent on LO developments around the globe, not just nEUROn - that's why I referenced three other platforms as examples in addition. They are just that, examples. That you'd pick nEUROn out of the bunch to pick apart costs when you were also given the example of the F-35 is odd - maybe you could check out the program costs of that particular aircraft instead.

Where exactly did I say the "F-35s passive and hard to maintain panels will keep her protected over her destined life span."? I'm curious as you seem to be inferring this is my belief and that it makes me arrogant. For starters I never said that, and if you think that signature management on LO aircraft is a) limited to "passive and hard to maintain panels" and b) is not going to change for the next thirty years, you're quite seriously mistaken.

But F-35 aside (the platform itself has very little to do with my point), what I asked was for an explanation as to why so much money is spent on LO technology when a comprehensive counter (and that in itself is a dicey proposition considering the changing nature of LO) is so close to fruition?

You keep telling me my argument is bad, but all I'm doing is asking a question - if a counter to LO aircraft is so affordable and achievable, why are we seeing global development of LO technologies? When pressed on this question, you ask me if I'm arrogant and then bring up the lifespan of the F-35, when more relevant is your own prediction, that so called "anti stealth" technology could be achieved within five years.

I only brought the aircraft up as an example of the money spent in LO developments. What I'm asking has to do with the practicality and applicability of the sensor systems you are describing. It's not arrogant to want an answer, it's logical.
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
It's not good enough just to be able to detect a stealthy target under a limited set of conditions, like the examples given here. They all have limitations, i.e. only detects low flying objects, between LOS of nodes, need a lot of in situ calibration, susceptibility to jamming, etc.

Which is why they're tested against cruise missiles - providing information of minimal tactical significance - it's the long range/early warning/battle management domains that stealth dominates.

Btw, the yanks have their own passive sensing systems as well, so they're not unfamiliar with the tech.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
In other words all you have is suppositions and guesswork, as well as a number of unproven conceptual solutions to the issue of dealing with LO platforms. The LO platforms themselves however have been around for decades, have been extremely successful for decades, and are continuing to evolve, as well as spread to other countries. Pardon me, if i don't but the blanket charge that LO platforms are useless.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I am convinced that in a 5 year period there will be reasonably priced ways to detect and track relatively up to date stealth objects. The Thales HA-100 was able to track the Scalp cruise missile quite easy in Norway a couple of years ago. Now obviously it is hard to say if the Storm shadow is what you would describe as a stealth object, or if we can even start to compare it to some of the most recent American stealth projects.

The Thor-m1 system has apparently the ability to detect and engage objects with an rcs of 0.1 square meters and above at somewhat short ranges. And the Swedes at one time did some research and found a rather cheap way to protect themselves against stealth planes and missiles.
So yes, sometime in the future we will be looking at other ways to disguise the fighter jets, atleast we can find comfort in the fact that it’s not our job to wash the stealth materials eleven times a day…
You seem to not be understanding something, and might find it worthwhile to do some searchs, paying particular attention to what posters like GF0012-Aust have to say regarding stealth/LO/VLO/sig management.

The above stealth/LO/VLO/sig management is not some "thing" which can then be overcome by some other 'thing' which can be developed and employed. It more a concept of development and employment, at times it can be achieved, at other times, it cannot. The objective (for those achieving LO, etc al.) is for a side have insufficient time to react to the actions of the other.
How it can or might be achieved (and by the same token efforts to achieve it countered) are situational and therefore vary.

Looking at historical examples like the A-12/SR-17 Blackbird, this objective was achieved by a combination of high altitude, high speed and (comparatively) small RCS for aircraft/radars of the time. While the aircraft could indeed be detected, by the time that had occurred, it was too late for an intercepting aircraft to be vectored in due to the high speed of the Blackbird, etc. Eventually it was replaced because other methods were developed to carry out ferret missions over the USSR.

If one looks are the the Blackbird, one can see that its features operating in concert, along with the correctdoctrine and operational employment, took advantage of limitations in the Command & Control systems available to the USSR during that period of time when it ran ferret missions over the USSR.

In time, some (if not all) of those exploited weaknesses within the Soviet and later Russian IADS were covered or corrected to not be an exploitable weakness, at least in the same fashion. Hence there was further development in sig management, to allow the US to exploit new (or smaller) weaknesses within the updated IADS with a 2nd generation of 'stealth' aircraft, namely the F-117 and B-2. As the sensor capabilities of potentially hostile nations have improved, alongside maintenance difficulties of earlier LO aircraft, a newer still 3rd generation of LO aircraft has been developed.

For the future, there will be continuing improvements in both detection capability as well as detection evasion. At least up to the limits allowed by physics anyway. The situation is not static, as one capability improves, there will be develop efforts made at negating that improvement.

There may well be some sensor development which comes out in the near term which can negatively impact the sig management work done on the F-22 and F-35, but then future LO developments would likely cancel out the sensor improvements.

Incidentally, the technology which allows improvement in LO/sig management is also the same technology used to improve detection capabilities. This means that the LO work done on aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 is likely to be at least somewhat difficult to counter effectively.

Having read the article that was linked to on the AASR, there were a few rather glaring omissions as to the limitations of such a system, or for that matter any sort of bistatic radar array. That is namely the underlying C4 systems which need to be in place and operational for such a system to function.

Keeping things at a very simple level, the following equipment is needed for such a system to function: A transmitter, a receiver, a data processing/display unit, and datalinks between the data processing unit and both the transmitter and receiver. It is also worth noting that all these pieces of equipment are single points of failure for the entire system, meaning that all components need to be working together properly for the entire system to function, if any one (or more) component fails, the entire system ceases to function.

In the case of the ~900 node AASR, there would likely only have been one, or perhaps just a few data processing facilities, as transmission and reception data from multiple nodes would likely have been required in order to detect a LO target, though potentially as few as two separate pairs of transmission and reception nodes could be used. This then opens up some interesting ideas on how such a system could be overcome.

The infrastructure required to create, setup and then maintain operation of such a network of nodes would dictate that the existence of such a system would be known (hard to hide the existence or function of the transmitters...) Therefore, the system itself would be subject to attack at various points upon commencement of, or perhaps even immediately prior to, hostilities. Given the system also has the significant weakness of being incapable of detecting targets that are not between different nodes, the nodes, datalink trunks and perhaps even the processing centers could be subject to attacks launched by forces in very low or very high altitudes, or even by forces positioned outside of the grid. All that needs to start happening is for some of the nodes to be attacked via ARM and/or AGM to begin reducing the coverage area of the network. Done in the appropriate sequence which is entirely dependent of disperal of the network, gaps or corridors can be created where there is no coverage, in time, the entire network can be negated by neutralizing the processing centres, the datalinks, etc. In point of fact, if one looks at the tactics the USAF currently uses when doing an IADS rollback, one can see that is what currently happens. The situation is of course always a somewhat different since the circumstances are never the same, but the tactics and techniques already exist to overcome such a sensor network.

-Cheers
 

Kilo 2-3

New Member
Todjaeger, thank you for shedding light on the doctrinal aspects of this issue. You bring up an excellent set of points.
 

Pyongyang

Banned Member
Todjaeger, first I have to say that I have an undeniable “skepticism” towards GFs knowledge, as he more often than not seems to be somewhat favorable when it comes to Australian radar systems, and repeatedly close his eyes to other arguments whilst frequently make use of personal attacks as a debate approach. This is not something you would be expecting from an important person who works with comparable systems by means of a more methodical approach then me for instance.

I’ve never in my life seen personal attacks when discussing defense advancement at both domestic and international roundtable seminars, even when rather radical concepts has been produced. Then again it is vital that I reveal that there might be a possibility we are talking about two different personas using the same name. So if I am mistaken, my apologies.

The above stealth/LO/VLO/sig management is not some "thing" which can then be overcome by some other 'thing' which can be developed and employed. It more a concept of development and employment, at times it can be achieved, at other times, it cannot. The objective (for those achieving LO, etc al.) is for a side have insufficient time to react to the actions of the other.
How it can or might be achieved (and by the same token efforts to achieve it countered) are situational and therefore vary.
I agree.

There may well be some sensor development which comes out in the near term which can negatively impact the sig management work done on the F-22 and F-35, but then future LO developments would likely cancel out the sensor improvements. Incidentally, the technology which allows improvement in LO/sig management is also the same technology used to improve detection capabilities. This means that the LO work done on aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 is likely to be at least somewhat difficult to counter effectively.
I would really like to see some justification for these claims, as when it comes to the passive element it can be quite costly and impractical if these basic design features are to be modernized every decade. I am in no doubt Lockheed-Martin would welcome the extra business, but it would take away the main selling point of the F-35. If the plane has to rely on more active elements like the more cheap alternatives, let’s say new F-16s, Rafales and Gripens, buying and maintaining the somewhat expensive F-35 can progress into a rather bad gamble.

From the historic aspect, this is the first time we have L-Band radars that can target stealth missiles with an accuracy of less than 4 meters at over 400 km, not to mention the new passive radars. And these radars are getting more powerful, while the F-35 has to rely mainly on its passive design and materials to differentiate from other much more affordable platforms.

Having read the article that was linked to on the AASR, there were a few rather glaring omissions as to the limitations of such a system
Please keep in mind that the system were modern ten years ago.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Todjaeger, first I have to say that I have an undeniable “skepticism” towards GFs knowledge, as he more often than not seems to be somewhat favorable when it comes to Australian radar systems, and repeatedly close his eyes to other arguments whilst frequently make use of personal attacks as a debate approach. This is not something you would be expecting from an important person who works with comparable systems by means of a more methodical approach then me for instance.

I’ve never in my life seen personal attacks when discussing defense advancement at both domestic and international roundtable seminars, even when rather radical concepts has been produced. Then again it is vital that I reveal that there might be a possibility we are talking about two different personas using the same name. So if I am mistaken, my apologies.



I agree.



I would really like to see some justification for these claims, as when it comes to the passive element it can be quite costly and impractical if these basic design features are to be modernized every decade. I am in no doubt Lockheed-Martin would welcome the extra business, but it would take away the main selling point of the F-35. If the plane has to rely on more active elements like the more cheap alternatives, let’s say new F-16s, Rafales and Gripens, buying and maintaining the somewhat expensive F-35 can progress into a rather bad gamble.

From the historic aspect, this is the first time we have L-Band radars that can target stealth missiles with an accuracy of less than 4 meters at over 400 km, not to mention the new passive radars. And these radars are getting more powerful, while the F-35 has to rely mainly on its passive design and materials to differentiate from other much more affordable platforms.



Please keep in mind that the system were modern ten years ago.
RE:GF, there is one specific person I was referring to, which is why I refered to him using the entire 'handle'. As for the development of Australian radar systems, in certain areas, Australia is known to have radar/ew capabilities which are unavailable elsewhere in the world. While the exact capabilities are of course not in the public domain, if one spends the time and effort looking to see who is buying what and spending money where, one can deduce a fair amount of what is going on behind the scenes. For instance, there is an Australian company called CEA which makes radar and comm systems, they have a scalable phased radar array currently available called CEA-FAR. They have a newer generation phased array in development known as Auspar. The has US contributed funding to CEA so that they can continue to develop systems. Why would the US do that? I can think of several reasons myself, but I would be interested to hear why you think the US would do something like this.

As for future developments of LO capabilities, I was referring to them (and the detection capabilities) in a generational sense. If a Gen-N platform can be detected with a Gen-O sensor, then a Gen-O platform would likely be developed to negate the detection improvements in the Gen-O sensor. This would in turn likely trigger sensor development leading to a Gen-P sensor, and so on.

Incidentally, the ability to detect/track a 4 sq. m. target at 400 km does not indicate any real competence or capability in detecting/tracking 3rd Gen LO aircraft at useful distances. Depending on the figures used, an aircraft like the F-22 has an RCS of ~0.02 sq. m. Assuming the L-band radar you referred to does not have a geometric or exponential growth in detection capability as an object moves closer, a target that has an RCS of ~0.02 sq. m. would be at WVR distances before the radar could detect the target in question.

As for the AASR bistatic radar being a plan from a decade ago, I am aware of that. However, the limitations in the deployment and operational use of a bistatic radar has not changed. Such a system has inherent weaknesses which are known and exploitable. A decade has not (and will not...) change that.

-Cheers
 

locutus

New Member
History

I asked GF a little more than two years ago what happens if a counter to stealth technology is found. The following is his answer and I think this helps to reinforce what Todjaeger was saying.

http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/s...detecting-us-stealth-plane-2972-4/#post121884

Short answer - no.
Long answer - continue on reading.

I think there are a couple of things that need to be determined first.
The most obvious is the definition of "stealth". Stealth is currently a buzzword typically thrown around in debate, and usually (and most commonly) with reference to platforms like the F-22 and JSF.

I guess at a personal level I get a bit irritated at that view as it dumbs down a very complex subject into a packaged "retail" type answer.

The whole basis of stealth is one of "low observability". very few people in industry use the term "stealth" as it's incorrect - it leads to follow on arguments by the more enthusiastic but less technically astute to also mumble about "invisibility" - when its clearly not.

So, LO platforms have been around for a while and need to be considered in the construct of an ability of a sensor system to correctly identify and respond defensively. The history of LO aerial management is important to look at as it shows why LO adapts and evolves and why it’s a moving feast that can't be pigeonholed as an obsolescent capability. I.e. it’s evolved over the last 90 years and will continue to evolve.

So, if I give a really brief history of Stealth concepts based around LO requirements, then it would be as follows:

E.g. the first stealth aircraft was in 1912 - it was a Taube biplane that had clear cellophane type skin named Emaillit to make it transparent vis a vis it's "bulk". LO was regarded as a visibility issue.

The second stealth aircraft was in 1913, (it was a monoplane) - the Germans decided to take it one step further and decided to retain the cellophane surface but to also paint the frame the same colour as the sky, i.e. blue/grey.

The third iteration of this was when the Germans fielded modified Fokker E111's in 1916; Emaillit was replaced with "Cellon". They then tried the same tech on a variety of different aircraft including an albatross, aviatik, rumpler and even a few bombers (VGO-1 and an R-1) so, as can be seen nice idea in principle, but ignored the fact that the engine, fuel tank and pilot were sitting up in the air for everyone to see.

But it did show lateral thinking. LO was regarded as an extension of the previous management of visibility issue. Both concepts failed as the cellophane material actually behaved like a reflector, and the pilots spent most of their time "snow blind" due to reflections. On top of that, Cellon was a material developed for the automobile industry and was applied by soaking it in water, and then stretching it over the airframe. The problem here was that when it rained, the Cellon started to expand, and thus become loose. Not exactly the best thing for an aircraft skin to do...

The next LO aircraft (in relation to enemy sensor systems being able to identify it and respond) was when the British used to run what was called "ferret missions" into the Soviet Union in the late 1940's and 1950's. The British used modified EE Canberra’s. When the Soviets developed more persistently competent missiles, radar systems and procedures to intercept, the west coast hi-speed low level ferret missions were reduced and eventually stopped. LO was regarded as low level and high speed as the Soviets did not have radar systems that could deal with low level hi speed entry, and their method of controlling gave the advantage to the ingressing aircraft. At one point the English also went high altitude as the lightened Canberras couldn't be intercepted by the Soviets (this changed once decent SAMs were bought into play). The Canberra btw was used as initially the RAF were badging USAF B-45 Tornados (which were flying lemons)

As a legacy of the success and superiority of the EE Canberra’s, the US then developed their own solution which emerged as the U2 and family. The U2 was considered LO due to a number of reasons, primarily the fact that for a short window of time the Soviets were unable to reach out and touch it. This changed with the arrival of the SA-2.

So the absolute advantage of high altitude to escape SAMs changed the LO requirement immediately. The requirement for LO management then turned to high speed high altitude aircraft.

The first purpose built LO aircraft was the A-12. It was considered LO as the Soviets could not and did not have any system capable of intercepting it. Even though it was "hot" and radar visible, the Soviets had no system capable of catching it - even when they volleyed intercepts. The LO management was high speed, high altitude where the enemy had no meaningful and managed capability to intercept even though the aircraft traffic was identified (not the plane though).

The follow on to the A-12 was the RS/SR-71 Blackbird. What's significant about the RS/SR-71 was that it was the bigger cousin to the A-12. What's even more significant was that it was a much harder beast to see and intercept. The fundamental reason was that not only was it finished in signature managing technologies, but when they discovered the impact of chine’s around the nose cone area, they were able to reduce its frontal aspect radar emitting footprint by 90%. The LO management was high speed, high altitude, onboard Elint and shape management.

At the same time that the SR-71 was in play, the US had also started to use unmanned aircraft for subsonic, low altitude recce. Again, the environment they were used in gave the US advantages. Although they lost a number of platforms, it was regarded as a success as it acted as the development vehicle for UAV's, RAM management, signature management, and it involved the enemy reacting to the threat and thus providing USAF escorting aircraft with harvesting opportunities. The Firebees/Lightning bugs were used in various guises, not just low level, so they were an adaptive platform.

The LO management was subsonic, low, medium, high altitude, surface management (they actually used RAM "blankets") and in some cases, the use of escorting aircraft as emission benefactors (such as Wild Weasels). They also developed Elint versions of these platforms (147TE). The final product development would have been a low footprint high altitude model to be used over China referred to as the 154.

The next series of LO aircraft basically were from the "Senior xxxx", "Have xxxx" and "Tacit xxxx" series of platforms. These were completely different in their LO management, and this was due to a number of reasons. One was the final comprehension of some study done by Bahret (US, and radar cross sections), Wright (US and RAM development)

The real breakthrough though was due to some Lockheed staff (Schroeder and Overholser). They came up with the concept of faceting. The original equations for faceting were done by a Scotsman named Maxwell.

These were then modified by a German electromagnetic expert named Sommerfield who developed signature management equations for simple shapes. This was followed up by some discoveries by a Russian named Ufmitsev who came up with an approach that could be applied to more complex shapes such as discs. The Russian is often touted as being the key to the development of "Stealth" - he is not, but he is one individual along a long line of others who contributed to the comprehension of LO management in its infancy.

What bought Maxwell, Sommerfield and Ufmitsev's calculations and mathematical assumptions to fruition were the improvements made in Computing. Schroder and Overholser were able to marry all of the previous work into a computer model and then made their own breakthroughs.

I'll ignore current LO trends as otherwise response this will turn into a book.....

So, why the long winded history lesson? Well, that’s because "Stealth" or more correctly LO platforms are a moving feast, a moving technological development where the capability evolves against the response. What was regarded as "Stealthy" even 25 years ago is now obsolete and replaced with new technology concepts.

It's a mistake to look at Stealth as a single technology entity - it’s not, and that why when you get people stating that bi-static radar, or OTHR or sympathetically merged commercial solutions such as mobile phone towers hooked into the sensor grid make it redundant, then they ignore the fact that the technology is not static. It ignores things such as the fact that sensor systems find it very hard to discriminate between nature and manufacture, e.g. there is a reason why the west chose subsonic cruise missiles over supersonics - and it’s tied into the history of stealth/LO development. The classic example of that is HALSOL (as a concept)

e.g., the F-22 can literally be LO managed due to its design.
Something simple like sensor arrays along the wings are able to be upgraded or improved via software. The F-22 will continue to have a role as the capability to identify it and commit to it is "not easy". The plane is not "invincible" and it’s not "invisible" - but it’s not meant to be - it’s meant to be able to be used as part of a package to exploit a weakness in the defenders grid so that other assets can bring their own "additional" sympathetic violence or electronic "wedge" to bear.

The danger is that some amateurs (and I don't mean that to be disrespectful and am making a sweeping statement out of convenience to clarify positions) only consider single platforms, they don't understand, comprehend or appreciate that response is about packages and systems. It’s also why this forum doesn't allow "this vs. that" threads as it just dumbs down the debate to a meaningless cycle of "mines bigger than yours"

As an observation, IMO the next LO platform in real terms will be hypersonics, as it is the next leap forward where existing sensor systems struggle to cope with intercepting it in time. It will then adapt to MIRVed responses on top of that hypersonic vehicle, and it will include (as the Russians have hinted at) controlled flight MIRV's. I would think that controlled flight MIRV's would have a degree of AI rather than just the Yakhont type "pop-up" "pop down" characteristics.

In a weapons management sense, miniaturisation of the prev weapons into carriers such as the F-22 make it even more relevant, when you consider that the F-22 will operate as part of a package with Compass and Rivet support, Prowler/Growler, an ability to hook into ForceNET etc etc... You can start to understand that LO participation in future wars is here to stay.

There will always be evolving counter solutions to any effective capability, but LO has been in play now for over 95 years, and we're already onto 6th and 7th generation solutions at the UAV level


Btw, I haven't even touched on LO management for ships and subs - and that’s a topic in its own right a well.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Locutus, thanks for locating that prior post by GF. It does illustrate much of the development work done over the past century to manage an opponent's detection capability re: aircraft.

A few things though, I usually refer to the situation asf who has the smarter mouse/better mouse trap, but it functions the same conceptually. As one side makes a breakthrough, the opposing side the developes a solution to counter the breakthrough. This ends up often coming down to economic limits applied to development due to funding availability.

The Soviet Union & Russia being a good example of this when doing a before/after look. Russia has been able to make progress particularly in the last few years as funding for R&D has again become available, but still a time gap of two decades where the US/allies have been developing systems while Russia was largely not. This comes on top of the differences in systems and development between the East and West at the end of the Cold War as well.

The other area in which I disagree somewhat is ignoring the night activities of Bomber Command and the Luftwaffe during WWII. The nighttime bombing raids both sides conducted could be though of as managing (to a degree) the ability of ones enemies to detect and respond to the raids. Certainly there was AAA and spot/flood lights used to detect and engage the incoming bombers, but both sides were also spurred to develop dedicated night fighters which could engage the enemy aircraft. Then again, this is just my opinion of an example.

Lastly, this post does illustrate why some people get a bit dismissive when people or articles make claims of ''anti-stealth' developments or capabilities. Such claims tend to gloss over, not understand or completely ignore that LO is not about specific platforms or technologies, but methods of a systemic response which are dependent on ones system capabilities and the weaknesses of the opposing system.

-Cheers
 

ewen55

New Member
When it comes to the newer stealthy assets, we dont have much info to go on for a discussion. When it comes to older assets (f 117 for example), then it seems that the advantage lies not in the fact that you cant be detected (you can) or that you cant be tracked (you can), but rather the only time these have occurred and the plane has been targeted and taken out was over serbia. If we look at this ample we see that the point is more that to do this, you need to know a certain section of sky to look at, what you are looking for, roughly when, and so forth. This was accomplished by having observers watching the aircraft take off and calling to inform the sam batteries, and the aircraft apparently did not change their routes. Thus stealth is no cloak to make you invisible or invulnerable, but means that the overwhelming majority of the time you go undetected. The enemy will not know the where, when etc typically. The enemy also cannot search the entire sky for stealth assets. That is the real point of stealth. One thing that is not often covered in the discussions of this is the amount of work that has to be diverted into searching for stealth( the given example, intelligence focus, having batteries focus on attempting to get a stealth asset, etc). One wonders what proportion of stealth flights were detected, but lets remember that the serbians had people watching airfields and calling in the info, yet only one f 117 went down...

The shoot down of the stealth had a more propaganda value to it...what if these assets had been dedicated to intercepting non stealth aircraft? any way you look at it other than propaganda or psychological, this would seem to be the more important military option (in terms of bombs prevented from being dropped, serb assets saved, enemy's cost of attacking you, protection of a greater part of ones military infrastructure,etc). I still wonder what the effect would have been if the serbs did not dedicate those efforts to getting down as many aircraft as possible, rather than one high propaganda value plane.

The other side to this is that it might have caused a major rethink in the attackers plans..consider the low intelligence on serb assets lost. nato, i have read, estimated 300 serb tanks destroyed, then after the war adjusted this estimate to 14...including destroyed by a militia.

just my thoughts...
A Pratt & Whitney engineer I do business with told me that the Russians had a good time looking over the Serbian downed F-117. That doesn't mean they will be able to copy it in the near future, as their aircraft people are really backward in most areas other than air frame construction and titanium usage. Russian experiments in carbon fiber and carbon-carbon construction have been an ongoing disaster, and when they do use it they buy American pre-preg bought through French middlemen. But it might help them with their Di-Pole radar set-ups.

One advantage the Serbians had is new Russian software, originally stolen from Israel, that allows long wave (early warning) radar to act more like short wave (targeting) radar. A lot of the information coming back was being wasted.

That, combined with knowing when the Americans launched from Italy (humorously, their informants were Albanian gangsters), and knowing which choke points in the mountains the U.S. was most likely to use, made it possible to down one F-117 and cause flight operations to be cancelled for three days, until alternate routes could be mapped.

The Di-Pole radar set-ups work with or without stealth aircraft. Two units are timed to send a signal to each other, and record any interruption in the transmission. Anything passing through the specific line-of-sight between the emitter and receptor is spotted, wether reflective or not. It's expensive, vulnerable to attack, and not at all mobile, but it can be used to close well travelled choke points, leaving other units to cover less likely areas of transit.

Another possible threat to stealth in mountainous country with well known choke points is the quite good "instant on" targeting radars the Russians have developed for their mobile AA missle launchers. At fairly close engagement ranges the high frequency targeting radar can do a decent job of detection, especially if placed in a "look down" position. The disadvantage is of course that they only cover a very small area, and if packed in tightly enough to provide complete coverage they are easy pickings for AGM-88's followed by AGM-154's. The new E model of the -88 is especially wicked, with it's smarter software and it's stealthed up nose and leading edges on it's wings.

The primary advantage retained by stealth aircraft is not that they can't be spotted. The can be. But they are much closer when they are, and that much more dangerous.
 
Top