Argentine mirage 2000 purchase

Big-E – Assuming the UK has at least one fighting company with associated kit located in already sighted and dug-in positions, the Argentineans would require at least a battalion strength to shift them from the beachhead supported by air and/or sea bombardment. A new network of roads was built to allow for rapid movement to likely landing points.

The UK already has 105mm artillery in-situ coupled with the fact the UK military annually conducts reforger exercises to deploy reinforcements within 24-hours (C-17).

The islands early warning radar will pick up any vessel or aircraft approaching the island, so the chance of the Tornados being caught ‘napping’ is pretty slim. This fact, coupled with rapier and star-streak means the dug in troops will have pretty decent air-defense coverage.

Question – how are the Argentineans going to get a battalion plus support (basically a battle-group) to the island undetected? How will they mitigate the threat represented by 105mm, Javelin, 81mm Mortars, Rapier, Star-streak et al?

Also I have no doubt the next time the Argies start paying silly buggers the UK will use its submarine based land attack missiles to hammer the Argentinean airbases along the coast. And I have no doubt the Nimrods will be retrofitted to carry storm-shadow, which should bring a few more surprises to the party .

The Tornadoes would be overun in a matter of seconds just by sheer numbers. 4 isn't enough to fly CAP for the island much less cover the airspace for RAF Mt. Pleasant. Given the loss of air superiority I think the outcome of an invasion by IMARA would overun one company in minutes. I'm sure they would put up a galliant stand but it would be like the Alamo. If the Argies can deliever a suprise attack it would be theirs. If the UK wanted it back they would have to conduct a heavier operation than they did in the previous campaign and they really don't have the capability to sustain that tempo.

In hindsigt I wonder if the large garrison and its associated costs were the best way to go post Falklands War? Sharkey Ward, the Sea Harrier commander made the point in his book that if the Argentinians captured the airfield we would struggle to recapture the islands, although a fan of big carriers due to his earlier carrier flying from them, I would agree with his great experence and judgement.

Rather than build a big runway, a handful of harriers could have been based there, later upgraded to Harrier 11+ standard. Post Falklands I thought and hoped that the bloody lesson would have made the MOD realise that a big carrier would have deterred it in the first place, yet 25 years on, the tories had 15 years to put it right and labour have had ten. We still have three (one now in reserve) small carriers.

Any idea on the cost of a 50-60 thousand tonne carrier at mid 1980's prices? Could we have purchased one second hand from the US. Has the cummulative cost of the garrison over 25 years been bigger than the costs of building 3 larger carriers and perhaps an F18 purchase in the late 1980's. I wish we had gone down that route, the RN would have been much more powerfull and two ready carriers with a decent sized airgroup of F18's would have deterred argentina and guaranteed a win in future rather than the "close run thing" in 1982. e would have also bought more punch to GW1, GW2, Bosnia etc.

Hindsight eh?

That said Tornado is being replaced with Typhoon this year so the chances of even an upgraded argentinian airforce is slimmer.

Big-E said:

If the Argies can take out RAF Mt. Pleasant they would be sitting pretty from an air superiority standpoint if they upgrade their fighter fleet. The only support the UK could bring would have to be naval based. If they sit around and wait for the CVF and her JSFs they won't ever stand a chance of a military solution. Argentina only needs to get something that can carry BVR and dart out of an AMRAAM ranged engagement... speed would be of the essence. It wouldn't take much to blast past RAF Mt. Pleasant's 4 Tornadoes in a suprise raid. It wouldn't take much to actually overpower the garrison either. If they do make a military attempt it would have to be soon. The RN has never been as weak as it is today.

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You should understand the importance of fuel.

Argentina does not, at present, have the ability to launch the sort of attack you describe. In 1982, with a larger air force, the Argentineans were unable to launch concentrated strikes because of very limited AAR capability. They haven't increased it. In fact, it may have decreased. Argentinean air strikes, as in 1982, would have to come in dribs & drabs.

Taking out Mt. Pleasant would be difficult for them. They couldn't, for example, emulate the 1982 Vulcan raids, because the distance & their shortage of AAR means they can't drop that many bombs in one strike. They also lack PGMs which would enable them to do serious damage with a few bombs.

"The Tornadoes would be overun in a matter of seconds just by sheer numbers". Oh dear. What numbers? Count their operational fighters, note how many of them can actually reach the Falklands unrefuelled & get home again, & how many they can refuel. Their fighters have only WVR missiles, & their radars are easily outranged by the F3s. We don't need CAP: we can sit on the ground & take off on warning. They can't sneak up: have to come in from one direction, over the sea. Any Argentinean aircraft that survive the Amraams would still be outranged by Asraam, & would lack fuel for evasive action. That hasn't changed since 1982. Their supersonic jets can't use afterburners unless the pilots plan to swim home.

Argentina has no - repeat no - amphibious assault ships. That's a deterioration from 1982. Any assault force would be infantry only, disembarking over the side into beachable boats, until they captured a wharf which they could unload vehicles onto, i.e. Stanley. Stanley can't easily be taken by surprise, due to its geography (look a map, or Google Earth), so running a freighter in & trying to grab a wharf by a coup de main would be incredibly risky. Most likely outcome would be the loss of the whole force.

You say "Argentina only needs to get something that can carry BVR and dart out of an AMRAAM ranged engagement... speed would be of the essence. It wouldn't take much to blast past RAF Mt. Pleasant's 4 Tornadoes in a suprise raid" - but by the time they could get anything like that in service, there'll be Typhoons at Mt. Pleasant acording to the current schedule, & we can react to any upgrading of their capabilities faster than they can upgrade them. We can wreck their airbases within range of the islands from under the sea, leaving them with no aircraft at all over the Falklands. We couldn't do that in 1982.

I don't think you appreciate just how weak & ill-equipped the Argentinean air force & navy are nowadays.

I agree the Argentinian air force could only send a few isolated jets to run strike missions so far out. Besides, they would still be using rockets and dumb bombs. Their A4s can launch Maverick but how many do they really have ?

They totally lack BVR missiles and such a capability can't be obtained overnight. Even if they got those Mirage 2000s, would they just operate Matra 530 semi-active ? Even with Mica, range is below that of Amraam C/D (never mind Meteor).

cheers

contedicavour said:

I agree the Argentinian air force could only send a few isolated jets to run strike missions so far out. Besides, they would still be using rockets and dumb bombs. Their A4s can launch Maverick but how many do they really have ?

They totally lack BVR missiles and such a capability can't be obtained overnight. Even if they got those Mirage 2000s, would they just operate Matra 530 semi-active ? Even with Mica, range is below that of Amraam C/D (never mind Meteor).

cheers

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Agreed. The F-3's might not be the most maneuvrable jet in the world, but it has a BIG radar and fully data-linked AMRAAM's, plus ASRAAM WVR's, which puts it WAY ahead of anything the Argentinians have.

I have no doubt the RAF can reinforce their flight at Mt Pleasant relatively quickly (probably within days) and even "just" a Squadron of F-3's is a force that likely possesses more combat capability than the entire air component of the taskforce sent in 1982, let alone the GR-9/GR-9A's that would be sent down in a hurry as well...

The fact that it will be manned by Typhoons within a few short years, simply excerbates the problems for the Argentines, unless they massively upgrade their airforce within the same time period.

However, having read somewhat of their economy and the state of their military, I personally think RAF will be flying Typhoon Tranche 2's from Mt Pleasant before the Argentines even have a jet capable of seriously challenging the F-3's, in-service...

I'm not saying this to denigrate the Argentines, it's just my feelings, based on my readings of the state of their military. I doubt whether they will have ANYTHING more capable than what they had in 1982 in the next 10 years...

In any re-run of the Falklands War, how big a role could the RAF's E-3's play? Is there enough AAR capacity to allow an Ascension based Sentry to operate more or less continuously over the task force?

The state of UK AEW has improved massively since 1982, the E-3's and the Sea King AEW's would give the sort of situational awareness that Admiral Woodward would probably have given his right arm for! It would also be harder for the COAN SuE's to carry out the missions they did in 82 as they would be detected almost as soon as they took off.

Turk said:

if I were Argentanian I choose other warplanes apart from france because France gave the codes to the England why Argentina choose frnace ?

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Dave H said:

Turk,

Im not sure what you are getting at?

Are you referring to the actual war in 1982 and the exocet matter? France is a European ally of the UK. The UK asked France not to supply the next order of Exocet during the conflict. This left the Argentinians with 5 exocets rather than the 14 on order. France obliged because she is our close neighbour, part of the EU and a "sort" of NATO member. (The Cold War was also on at that time, it wasnt in the interests of European defence against the WARPAC for the RN to be down south too long getting sunk by exocets).

Argentina scoured the world for exocets and the Brtish Spy network went to work stopping them.

Just because France stopped selling exocet is no reason that 25 years later Argentina wouldnt buy their weapons. Thats just the way the arms trade works. The Argentinians used many UK weapons such as Type 42/Seadart, Tigercat SAM. The British army trained a lot of Argentinian troops prior to hostilities.

The US gave us the 9L sidewinder, access to satellite reconaissance and other military asssitance as well as political support in 1982. That hasnt prevented the US from helping the Argentines since.

Argentina will buy weapons that it needs in context of its position, its relations with neighbours and what it can afford.

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I've quoted both of you to show where I'm going with this comment....


In 1982 France was indeed about to ship more Exocet missiles to Argentina. The war kicked off & France, being both a UN & EU community member complied with the rules about shipment of weapons to countries involved in wars.

However, from comments made on various documentaries shown in the UK since the 20th Anniversary, it's become apparent that France played a slightly different game of poker.

Yes, France did capitulate in not sending the additional missiles, but they also made a point of not passing any other information to the UK regarding how many missiles where in circulation, or deatils of countries who they'ed sold parts/spares to, who were allies of the Argentine Junta.

This action meant that the UK had to scower the globe, trying to buy up all the parts/spares & actual missiles they could. :nutkick

With the 25th Anniversary just passed, UK TV made a point of doing some special reports from Argentina, to see how things are viewed by the countries people.

Public opinion is still 110% behind the idea that the "Isla Malvinas" are Argentine soverign territory, as all Gov't. issued maps still display.

However, over the last 10-15 years there has been a series mutual agreements between the islanders & the Argentines, specifically regarding fishing rights & tourisim access. The prospect that the islands also sit on "a reasonably sized oil reserve", may also be another factor in the discussions.

Over 30,000 tourists visit the islands every year, as it's a great place to see whales & other large sea life, as well as the penguins!!
(Also, ask some of the ex-servicemen who had the great task of going round after every aircraft take-off, to pick the little blighters up, as they fall over backwards watching the planes & can't get up again !!)

These series of reports also made it clear the the public while still claiming ownership, would be totally against an armed retake of the islands, due to the prospect of a similar or greater loss of life than that in 1982.

It would seem to be logical that any decision will be reached through diplomacy, & will be long & drawn out, to the benefit of all concerned.

As a final comment, Argentina IMHO, would be left out in the cold by her neighbours if she attempted such an action again. Countries like Chile, who have just accepted the 2nd of 3 ex RN Type-23 frigates from the UK into service with their own navy, know only too well that "special relationships" with European countries & the US have unwritten strings attached.

Systems Adict

Systems Adict said:

As a final comment, Argentina IMHO, would be left out in the cold by her neighbours if she attempted such an action again. Countries like Chile, who have just accepted the 2nd of 3 ex RN Type-23 frigates from the UK into service with their own navy, know only too well that "special relationships" with European countries & the US have unwritten strings attached.

Systems Adict

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Well, Latin America is more and more split between the moderates (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru) and the left wing populists allied with Chavez (including Argentina...). If the Argentinians turned up the noise on the Falklands, expect support (words but also money and potentially equipment) from Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and of course Cuba. Not enough in military terms, but from a diplomatic point of view enough not to isolate Argentina...

Anyway, back to topic: I have found no recent news of Mirage 2000 transfers to Latin America other than the known batch of unmodernized jets for Brazil.

cheers

I have noticed Argentina becoming buddy buddy with Hugo Chavez. Would Venezuela add a dynamic the UK couldn't contend with if suprise was on the Latin American side given their arms purchases.

Big-E said:

I have noticed Argentina becoming buddy buddy with Hugo Chavez. Would Venezuela add a dynamic the UK couldn't contend with if suprise was on the Latin American side given their arms purchases.

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They'd have to deploy their Sukhois to Patagonia. Have to deploy all the people & equipment needed to unfamiliar bases, which have never handled that type before. Difficult to do it surreptitiously, & if we knew it was happening we could reinforce. We can deploy Tornados (& soon, Typhoons) to Mount Pleasant in about the time it takes to fly there. Everything's set up for them.

Venezuela has some LSTs, which would be very useful in an invasion, but it would be extremely difficult to get any degree of surprise with them.

Is there an EF squadron scheduled to operate from RAF Mt. Pleasant in the future?

Big-E said:

Is there an EF squadron scheduled to operate from RAF Mt. Pleasant in the future?

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Just a flight, not a squadron, but yes, and soon. Maybe next year.

swerve said:

They'd have to deploy their Sukhois to Patagonia. Have to deploy all the people & equipment needed to unfamiliar bases, which have never handled that type before. Difficult to do it surreptitiously, & if we knew it was happening we could reinforce. We can deploy Tornados (& soon, Typhoons) to Mount Pleasant in about the time it takes to fly there. Everything's set up for them.

Venezuela has some LSTs, which would be very useful in an invasion, but it would be extremely difficult to get any degree of surprise with them.

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... and the Flankers would have to overfly Brazil which isn't aligned with such outlandish manoeuvres... Though in theory half a dozen Flankers with AA-12 could be a serious issue, and the Venezuelan South Korean-built LSTs could arrive unexpectedly in front of Port Stanley.

cheers

Falklands Garrison`

The RAF four Tornado's detached to the Falklands are maintained to a very high standard by only the best aircraft mechanics. Two fighters are kept on a +5/24-hour QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) and often perform practice interceptions of the RAF's jet transport aircraft flights to the Island.

Other permanent aircraft assets assigned to the Falklands are one jet air tanker, one C-130J (STOL version), two CH-47 Chinooks, and four SeaKing helicopters. Two of the latter are for all-weather SAR one on +15 min by day and the other on a 45 to 60-min night availability.

The two Chinooks are used primarly for supporting remote radar sights sling loading fuel bladders and other equipment and supplies.

If I remember right the RAF's single C-130 flys out to the permanent Royal Marine detachment on South Georgia about once a month to paradrop supplies into the small harbor there which are picked up by RIB's, due to lack of airfield.

"Cornerstone of the air defence of the Falklands is the FLADGE (Falkland Islands Air Defence Ground Environment). This has three main radar sites situated strategically around the islands on high ground, one on East Falkland and two on West Falkland. In addition to the obvious task of tracking aircraft within the control zone and providing early warning of aircraft further out, the radars are also capable to perform maritime surveillance to the sea. One acts as the CRC (Command and Reporting Centre.

SHORAD (short range air defence) is handled by an RAF Regiment's Rapior unit, known as RRS (Resident Rapier Squadron). Although easily relocatable, the Rapiers are usually deployed around the MPA area to protect the main garrison, airfield and deep-sea anchorage at Mate Harbour. With the unrestricted airspace around the Falklands, the Rapier units can perform live firings over the sea. Similarly, the Navy can also undertake high-seas gunnery with live ammunition. The Army has the Orion live-firing range on East Falkland, which became the final resting place for many of the wrecked aircraft from the war.

Accommodation for the four Tornado F.Mk'3 is provided amid the sizeable shelter complex, and in common with most alert operations the two mission-ready fighters are housed in shelters with taxiways leading straight on to the end of the runway. The shelters - known as 'houseys' - are not hardened, but are surrounded by large earth revetments for protection. In addition to the QRA building (Quick Reaction Alert), the flight has a well-equipped engineering/operations facility in the shelter area. The QRA facility offers some comfort for the on-duty crews: a kitchen, bedrooms and a recreational area are provided. A key feature of the facility is obviously the communications system which links the building to the CRC, the tower and other operations and command centres.

A scramble begins with the notification from the CRC and siren sounding in the QRA facility. The crews run to their aircraft, using a tunnel through the earthworks to rapidly access the 'housey'. The fighters are maintained with full fuel and a standarfd missile load of Sky Flash (now Aim-120) and four AM-9L Sidewinder AAM's, with the cannon also armed. External fuel tanks are virtually never used during Falkland Island operations apart from during aircraft changeovers. Umbilicals are connected to the aircraft to provide immediate ground power, and the crew will start one engine to begin the launch sequence. Aligning the inertial navigation system takes the longest time to accomplish, but once up and running the aircraft can quickly taxi the few yards to the runway. The 'housey' has opening doors at the rear as well as the front, allowing internal engine starts and the use of sizeable amounts of power when leaving shelter without damaging it.

Crews are drawn from all of the UK-based F.Mk 3 squadrons, and are posted to Mount Pleasant for five weeks. The flight is usually manned by five crews with a squadron leader as OC. The length of a QRA alert for each crew is 24-hours, one crew being replaced at 8.00 in the morning and the other at 7.30 in the evening. Daytime training flights are undertaken regularly (including the QRA jets), and a full practice scramble is usually unleashed on the unsuspecting crews once a month. The Tornado's are drawn from the UK fighter pool, but usually are basic standard aircraft.

One VC-10 jet air-refueling tanker is assigned to supoort the Tornando on a 24-hour QRA.

A single C-130J is tasked with various duties. Primary amoung them is that of MRR (Maritime Radar Reconnaissance). The priroity is to the patrol the ENA (Exercise Notification Area) - 50 miles out from the coast, in which the operations of military aircraft must be notified to the other side. Although instances of military forces operating within these limits are rare, the framework exists to build confidence in each side's military operations in the area.) every two days to locate and track military shipping activity. The Hercules is augmented in the maritime role by land-based radars and by military vessels. Every six months a Nimrod detachment is sent to the Falklands to conduct MRR sorties across the area.

In the load-dumping role the Hercules is used for a supply run to South Georgia every six weeks. There is no airfield, and the principal settlement, Grytviken, nestles under steep cliffs in the Cumberland East Bay. This requires the Hercules to air-drop the supplies into the harbour. The process is more difficult than might be imagined, for the Hercules has to perform a 180-degree turn to avoid the cliffs. Several drop runs are made on each visit, the Royal Marine party on South Georgia rescuing the supplies by boat."

Source -
WORLD AIR POWER JOURNAL
Volume 29
Pages 34-47

contedicavour said:

... and the Flankers would have to overfly Brazil which isn't aligned with such outlandish manoeuvres... Though in theory half a dozen Flankers with AA-12 could be a serious issue, and the Venezuelan South Korean-built LSTs could arrive unexpectedly in front of Port Stanley.

cheers

Click to expand...

Would getting Venezuelan aircraft from there to Patagonia really be a problem???

Big-E said:

Would getting Venezuelan aircraft from there to Patagonia really be a problem???

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I don't think so. But doing it with any degree of surprise (which was what you originally posited) would be damned near impossible. They'd either have to ask for, & get, permission to overfly Brasil, which would not support any adventurism & would have no reason nor desire to keep Venezuelan & Argentinean secrets, or they'd have to go a long & sneaky way round, either loaded onto a ship or ships & unloaded surreptitiously in Argentina or flying through countries which might agree to co-operate (Peru & Bolivia?). And the last option would be hard to keep quiet, especially as any failed attempt to hush-up the presence of Sukhois would ring alarm bells in many places.

Just unusual activity at one of the Patagonian bases would ring alarms in London, & they're conveniently situated near the main towns on the coast, so hard to hide much.

swerve said:

I don't think so. But doing it with any degree of surprise (which was what you originally posited) would be damned near impossible. They'd either have to ask for, & get, permission to overfly Brasil, which would not support any adventurism & would have no reason nor desire to keep Venezuelan & Argentinean secrets, or they'd have to go a long & sneaky way round, either loaded onto a ship or ships & unloaded surreptitiously in Argentina or flying through countries which might agree to co-operate (Peru & Bolivia?). And the last option would be hard to keep quiet, especially as any failed attempt to hush-up the presence of Sukhois would ring alarm bells in many places.

Just unusual activity at one of the Patagonian bases would ring alarms in London, & they're conveniently situated near the main towns on the coast, so hard to hide much.

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Brazil has signficantly improved its ability to track aircrafts over the Amazon with Erieye AEW and is able to intercept Venezuelan Flankers by the time they come close to Brasilia after leaving the Amazon. Modernized F5E/F with Derby BVR AAMs and soon Mirage 2000s C/Ds with ?? BVR (Matra 530D or may be even Mica) would probably be wiped out by Flankers with AA-12, but Chavez would never dare attack the biggest Latin American country since it would push it into an alliance with the US.

cheers

PS : the other route through Peru is also very unlikely since Peru is in the anti-Chavez camp with its current government and also has some viable assets including Mirage 2000s.

Some petinent excepts from this superb article from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

http://www.coha.org/2008/12/honor-s...y-of-argentina’s-tattered-armed-forces-today/

Honour, Shame and Duty: The Reality of Argentina's Tattered Armed Forces Today

The Economic Meltdown and the Military Today
In 2001, the Argentine economy effectively imploded due to the collapse of the Argentine peso. The Argentine military proved incapable of surviving the negative aftershocks of a then broken policy of defending the peso at all costs. Since then, the military’s annual budget sank becoming a fraction of what it was in the past. Salaries were cut throughout the ranks. The size of the armed forces not only had to be reduced, but in many cases equipment had to be sold on the black market in order for military units to meet their daily expenses. According to Military Technology, the current strength of the Argentine military is about 68,000 troops.

In a May 2007 op-ed to the conservative Argentine daily La Nacion, former Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena declared that the average age of the country’s military hardware is thirty years. He reported that the army was operating at 30% of its supposed strength, due to its limited ability to house and feed its troops, as well as to maintain its equipment and weaponry. The former official gave other examples, such as that out of 31 military transport aircraft in inventory, only four were currently operational. Although the Argentine navy is considered new in comparison to those found in other countries across the continent, it remains one of the less potent in terms of its inherent military capacity.

Assessing the Country’s Military
With a reduced budget, the Argentine military continues without a sense of direction or mission. In May 2006, then-President Nestor Kirchner declared his intention to reform the Argentine armed forces during a ceremony marking the army’s 196th anniversary. He stated that “we are preparing a process of review, restructuring and holistic modernization of the national defense system.” Similarly, in June 2008, current Defense Minister Nilda Garre discussed the re-organization of the country’s naval policy. She is on record as saying that “naval policy should adequately interconnect the need to have an efficient war squadron, sustainable economic development, protection of the marine environment, promotion of the ship-building industry, and the consolidation of an international system based on multilateralism and the respect for the norms of international law.”

There is certainly a necessity to modernize the Argentine military, particularly as Argentina’s military equipment has not been comprehensively renovated in years, possibly jeopardizing the integrity of the weaponry and whoever utilizes it. For example, in August 2005, a Hughes 39 helicopter operated by the Argentine military crashed in Cordova province, killing all four passengers. On April 2007, the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irizar caught fire in the South Atlantic. [and is still inactive]

But times could be slowly changing for the Argentine military as a rehabilitation process is slowly underway. In October 2007, Defense Minster Garre announced plans for additional funding for the armed forces, including funding to upgrade the Santa Cruz (TR-1700)-class submarine. A November 10, 2008 report in Mercopress news agency announced that Buenos Aires had refurbished its UH-3H Sea King helicopters. The article goes on to say that “Argentine defence sources admit that some new model will have to be acquired to replace the ageing Sea King in a near future, since they are technologically behind and spares are increasingly difficult to obtain.”

This past October 2008, the Argentine Defense Ministry announced the successful test of two medium-range Aspide missiles (Italian in origin) that had been modified in Argentina’s Centro de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de las Fuerzas Armadas (Scientific and Technical Research Center of the Armed Forces). The goal of the project is to produce missiles that will intercept possible air attacks.

As previously noted, Argentina has carried out relatively few military purchases from foreign suppliers. In 2006 there were rumors circulating that Argentina would buy military hardware from Russia (at the time news about Venezuela’s multi billion-dollar purchases from Russia were still fresh); however, the story failed to materialize. Such rumors resurfaced again in early November 2008, when a report in the ITAR-TASS Russian state news agency quoted the director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Mikhail Dmitriyev, as saying that there is a growing trend of military technical cooperation between Russia and Argentina. The article mentions concrete plans for cooperation, including radar stations and a “helicopter programme, including supplies and setting up of centers for servicing helicopter hardware, possibly, not only in Argentina but also at a regional scale.”

The Argentine military is also salvaging homegrown equipment and do-it-yourself “garage” projects in order to prolong the life of its current aging hardware. So far, this process has had mixed success. In November 2007, the Argentine military presented its first self-fabricated helicopter. The CH-14 is a tandem two-seater (one crew member forward and the other aft) for surveillance and light attack. It is unclear if any foreign military establishments were interested enough to place tenders to buy them. During the presentation of the aircraft, General Roberto Bendini exalted the “courage” of the military aviators in various missions assigned to them, especially those carried out during the Malvinas War. In early November 2008, according to reports, the Argentine Defense Ministry decided to cancel “Project Patagon,” due to high costs. The goal of this initiative was to manufacture forty hybrid tanks, using out-of-service tank turrets and combining them with recently-acquired Austrian parts. The total price tag for the project was to be $23.4 million.

Almost at the same time, Argentine Defense Vice Minister, Germán Montenegro, declared that “the Argentine armed forces are prepared, qualified and trained to work in any scenario to militarily protect the country.” It is unclear if the Argentine official knew of the doomed Project Patagon, which exemplifies how cash-strapped the country’s military currently happens to be.

A new training facility for junior naval officers opened at the Puerto Belgrano naval base in 2006. Nestor Kirchner attended the ceremony and gave a speech in which he told junior officers that “you must now look ahead to the future and not to the past.”

In spite of the economy’s still present tempest, military exercises continue. In early November 2008, the Argentine military carried out exercises in the province of Corrientes, very close to the border with Paraguay. Paraguayan officials complained that their Argentine counterparts had failed to properly inform them of the commencement of these operations.

The Legacy of the Military Period and the Falklands/Malvinas War
In 2004 then-Defense Minister Jose Pampuro declared that the military would not be used for domestic security. The declaration came about due to persistent, if unsubstantiated rumors that the Colombian leftist rebel movement, FARC had “infiltrated” Argentine labor and political organizations. This was a prudent decision as such a deployment inevitably would have brought to mind odious memories from the military period when the civilian population was the target of choice of the Argentine military. A news report in October 2004 that was carried by the partially state-owned Argentine Telam news agency quotes Pampuro as saying “the Argentine government has clearly and emphatically refused to involve the armed forces in matters related to internal security.” The truth of the matter is that it remains somewhat unclear what exactly is the contemporary function of the Argentine military. Especially after the 2001 economic meltdown, Argentine military units have been tasked with a variety of relatively low-scale projects, like taking a minor role as white helmets in the UN mission to Haiti, Cyprus and environmental protection projects in Antarctica.

What continues to make headlines in Buenos Aires is the periodic arrests of now-retired military junta-era officials who are accused of human rights abuses. Interestingly, in 2007, Defense Minister Garre, a veteran leftist politician and critic of the 1970s’ military government, mandated that designated Argentine troops would take specially-arranged educational classes on human rights. At the time, an AP report mentioned that some 600 army, navy and air force troops would take a three-month, civilian-taught course, “the role of the state in a democratic society, conflict resolution and justice.”

A July 2008 report carried by Agence France Presse quotes Cristina de Kirchner’s interest in a greater Argentine military role in Antarctica. The article notes that “although Antarctica is protected under a 1959 treaty allowing only scientific research, moves are being made by Argentina, Australia, Britain, China, France, New Zealand and Norway to boost their presence there and lay claim to territorial waters that could yield oil.” Indeed, without any other obvious raison d’etre for them to be stationed on mainland Argentina, Fernandez de Kirchner is considering sending her troops to Antarctica to keep them usefully occupied.

The Kirchners and the Military
The relationship between the presidencies of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina de Kirchner with the Argentine military has been cool at best. In general, the Kirchners have done little, if anything at all, to shield suspect military officials from having to stand trial due to the abuses that occurred in the country under their leadership. For example, in 2004, then-President Nestor Kirchner took the bold move of ordering an investigation regarding accusations that the armed forces had operated training sessions on torture techniques during the early 1980s. Nestor Kirchner revealed himself as supporting the overturn of amnesty laws, which had previously protected junta-era military officers from being prosecuted for their atrocities.

In November 2007, Nestor Kirchner and hundreds of human rights activists gathered in Buenos Aires’ Memorial Park. During the gathering, he unveiled a memorial to the victims of the country’s “Dirty War.” The former president told his audience that the “monument is a great feat as it shows that the collective memory of the victims is alive in the world.”

The Falklands catastrophe continues to be a sensitive issue for the nation, and Nestor Kirchner was known to have strained relations with his military while president, especially after he declared that the attack on the Falklands had been a “cowardly” act. He uttered his words during a ceremony in 2006 marking the 24th anniversary of the Argentine attack on the British-held islands. He added that the invasion was an attempt for the junta led by General Leopoldo Galtieri to divert attention from the worsening economic situation of the country by waving the bloody flag of patriotism. “To save itself, the dictatorship planned and executed a war while lying about its intentions,” the Argentine leader added.

In a showcase moment for the Argentine military’s heated disdain for the Kirchner administration, a May 2006 AP report explained that four Argentine military officials were placed in detention for 20 days because of security lapses that allowed heckling by protesters during a public address by Kirchner. During the speech, he was quoted as saying, “I want to make it clear, as president of the nation, that I am not afraid of you,” Kirchner said. “We want an army that is completely separate from state terror,” the then-head of state added. Cristina de Kirchner tried to improve her relationship with the military on her own, uttering pro-Argentine populist statements about the Falklands conflict and Argentina’s rightful ownership of the islands. In April 2008 the Argentine daily El Clarin reported that Fernandez de Kirchner had declared that Buenos Aires’ claim to the island will not end. She also defined the London-controlled archipelago as a “colony in the 21st century.”

A positive sign in contemporary Argentine civil-military relations is that the Argentine armed forces do not appear to have any marked interest in taking advantage of the country’s present hard economic times by trying to exercise any control over the government, much less rustling their saber as a prelude to launching a new crusade to reclaim the Falkland islands or a domineering place in Argentine domestic society.

Heading South?
The Argentine military is at a crossroads in terms of defining its identity and determining its raison d’etre. Unfortunately for the armed forces, a lack of public interest in its status induces the military to look south, to raise the visibility and vigor of its claim to a section of Antarctica.

Yet for the decades ahead, the Argentine military will continue to be viewed through the prism of its actions during the monstrous 1976-1983 period of military rule and the 1982 Falklands War, when it turned its guns and unleashed its power against the nation rather than a bona fide enemy.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez

Big-E said:

The Tornadoes would be overun in a matter of seconds just by sheer numbers. 4 isn't enough to fly CAP for the island much less cover the airspace for RAF Mt. Pleasant. Given the loss of air superiority I think the outcome of an invasion by IMARA would overun one company in minutes. I'm sure they would put up a galliant stand but it would be like the Alamo. If the Argies can deliever a suprise attack it would be theirs. If the UK wanted it back they would have to conduct a heavier operation than they did in the previous campaign and they really don't have the capability to sustain that tempo.

Click to expand...

Actually I'll have to differ on that. 4 Tornadoes (appropriately named Faith, Hope, Charity, and Desperation(!) may not be impressive in number but the question is whether they are sufficient to defend the islands. A measured approach which is politically and economically justifiable is preferable to simply opting for a nice round number.

The Falkands' F3s, Chile's F16s, and Venezuela's Sukhois are the only 'decent' fighters in the whole of the continent.

The F3's, supported by a very impressive radar network, Rapier units at high readiness, and the <24hr reforger ability are more than sufficient to fend off Argentina's 8-or-so airworthy A-4ARs.