Will the Euro Big 3 follow US Path, or they will keep their strategic relationship with Turkey ?
Geography dictates the relationship of the Big 3 with Turkey. IMO all have different interests relative to each other. France will want to sell arms to Turkey, when the time is right. IMHO, Germany will not be willing to sell arms to Turkey going forward; and UK’s defence industry is too well integrated with that of the US to sell in the face of US objections.
However seems some in US (at least on my reading) want to push Turkey more...thinking that loosing Turkey alliance is something that can be accepted.
If Trump is not keen on NATO, how can he be keen on Turkey that is willing to slap him back? The harm that this US Trump Admin is doing with its global relationships should not be underestimated. There is no coherence to their plans that I can detect other than the slogan — America First (which is understandable, given the rise of the Tea Party group before Trump, from where he draws his base of support).
Question is, will the Big 3 Euro will think the same as some faction in US, or they go on opposite direction ? The example on Tempest or Airbus-Dassault project
The Big-3 will go in multiple directions and alignment of interests will become more difficult.
I used as barrometer on how the Big 3 Euro will react to Turkey if US relationship going down further.
...Will Big 3 Euro can navigate their relationship better than US? with strategic relationship with Turkey as part of the barrometer ?
Yes, hard to imagine Europe not being more informed about the ground truth in Turkey. But the 2nd wild card beyond the US is Turkey. Turkey is acting against its own self interests, consistently, for the last few years. According to Foreign Policy Magazine:
Turkey is even more dependent on the F-35 network, because its own aviation industry supplies a number of F-35 components. It would face major losses if the United States cut Turkey off for good. Whereas the Pentagon estimates that finding alternate domestic suppliers to replace Turkey will cause at most a few months’ delay, Turkish production lines will be unable to so easily adapt, putting at risk the $12 billion in component parts business Turkey expected. That figure may be a rounding error for the trillion-dollar F-35 program, but it is equivalent to eight years’ worth of all Turkish aerospace exports.
Erdogan will pay a high cost with his purchase of Russian weaponry. Training for Turkish F-35 pilots has stopped as the Pentagon prepares to expel Turkey from the joint strike fighter program, but Turkish students learning to maintain the F-35 at Eglin Air Force base will be able to complete their training. “The 33rd Fighter Wing is complying with the Secretary of Defense's memo of having all Turkish training completed by July 31st,” said Lt. Savannah Stephens, chief of public affairs for Eglin’s 33rd Fighter Wing. “We have no concerns about the current students finishing their training as everything they do here is on an FOUO [for official use only] or unclassified level and they only work with training devices.” All current jet mechanic students are scheduled to graduate on July 24 and 27, and the Turkish leadership team will leave on July 29, Stephens said. There are currently 42 Turkish pilots and maintainers training at Luke and Eglin. The July 31 deadline would allow 28 of them to complete their training, but the remainder would be sent home before their training naturally concluded.
You are too kind in your reply towards my nearly incoherent thoughts on this matter. I certainly know much less about Turkey than what I know about Asia.
This is a lot more complicated. I'm going to try to keep this away from politics as best as I can, given the subject matter.
Both of us always avoid going into politics and any discussion by me in DT, is always about providing a geopolitic context and an analysis of capability relative to threat perception.
The analogy of the Phillipines is not quite accurate. In 1991 the USSR had just collapsed and US power was expanding. The Soviet threat was gone, China was still weak, the strongest national militaries around the world were basically all US allies. This situation has gradually changed.
I think you misunderstood the reason for my reference. Power vacuums will result in a change in the status quo — Turkey’s decision to downgrade ties with US and NATO will permanently change the geopolitical context, regardless of whether the speed of change is fast or slow. This is something long term that most news articles don’t focus on.
I mentioned the example of the US pivot away from South East Asia in 1991 as a geopolitical construct or ground reality. Power abhors a vacuum. For the Philippines, the departure of US bases created a power vacuum in South East Asia and a rebalancing of interests within ASEAN and Asia that creates an external environment that is much more hostile to their ability to cope. I pity them but I also recognise that they cannot be helped, as they were active in making a conscious decision to do something short sighted that eventually caused much hardship to their own military — where they are no longer sovereign within their undisputed territory. In the latest example, their armed forces took 5 months to dislodge an insurgent group at the Marawi siege. They have no hope in a fight with anyone competent — Taiwanese ability to coerce them over the Guang Da Xing No. 28 shooting incident in 2013 is a telling example.
Additionally China is a whole lot stronger then before, the European NATO members aren't as nearly behind the US as they were in the past (look at their unwillingness to support US adventures in Iraq, and their lukewarm support in Syria). The US still has plenty of loyal allies, even outside of NATO, and still has a gigantic global network of bases, so of course the US can fundamentally do without its Turkish bases or even without Turkey as an ally. But it's not a good direction to move in. Losing the Phillipines in the early 90s is nowhere near as significant as losing Turkey in the 2020s.
And as for control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, it appears the Turks have already loosened restrictions on Russian subs transiting the straits. They're only supposed to leave for repairs, but they're being allowed to leave on Mediterranean deployments in addition. Everything comes with consequences.
Yes.
EDIT: Of course it goes without saying that Turkey itself will pay a hefty price for this course of action. However it appears that Erdogan is at least trying to convince everyone that he is willing to pay that price in the name of greater strategic independence. If things continue in this vein, losing the F-35 deal is only the first alarm bell. They've been actively trying to develop a domestic defense industry, and much of that could go out the window if they end up losing their ties to other NATO countries and other US allies. On the other hand some of those allies might not be willing to cut their lucrative dealings with Turkey even if the US requests it directly.
I can see your point of view. Thanks for the additional contextual clarity to help me understand your perspective.
