The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates

deepsixteen

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
You might get some support for an increase in spending on defence, until you mention how this is to be paid for. It's difficult to justify spending more money on defence when the defence establishment waste so much of it.

Not really a very good point on the aid budget although popular with the Daily Mail, much of this is to support export and foreign policy objectives.

I have never suggested we build anything not up to the job, however I do feel numbers are reaching a critical level if the UK still wants to have a significant global role. I don't believe in building things we can't afford and just waste.

Do you really think this is all the politican's fault?

I would pay for it from the aid budget, I would explain that India a country with a space program that is building aircraft carriers could perhaps replace our aid money by doing without an aircraft carrier or two. I would also point out that defence spending in the UK sustains jobs produces tax revenue and as I stated and you ignored in your response I do think that procurement amongst other areas can be reformed to produce better value for money.

Perhaps an aid and foreign policy support funding “holiday” of a decade would make people appreciate our support a little more and help us to identify our true friends in the world at large. More ordinary people would agree with me on this than you.

As you know we do disagree on what a suitable spec for a warship going into harms way should be but further discussion on this subject would certainly be better suited to this forum than other recent posts. I agree that the present goverment is taking numbers Below critical levels.

Yes largely I do hold the politico’s responsible but as I think I’ve said before not all politicians live in Westminster some wear uniform. The Westminster ones have sort power and responsibility for the defence of this nation blaming civil servants and senior military figures is not acceptable they are responsible they sign off all decisions. I would prefer a root and branch reform of how decisions about the military are made.
 

weasel1962

New Member
Re:

Just looking at Tornado GR.1/1A stats during GW.

Total sorties: 1,671 (26.2% of total RAF sorties, 1.4% of total gulf war sorties)
Average sorties per day (0.9+)
Combat losses (official): 6 (4 at low altitude, 2 at medium altitude), 1 whilst carrying JP-233, 1 whilst carrying LGB, 4 whilst carrying 1000 lb bombs.
Combat losses %: 16.2% of total combat fixed wing losses (total: 37 combat fixed wing losses per osd website).
Non combat losses: 2+
Rate of combat loss + damage per sortie: 0.0076 (F-15E 0.0009, F-16 0.0006, highest of major strike aircraft) - see appendix 4 of GAO report.
Combat damages: 7
Munitions delivered: 497 guided, 1,346 unguided (lowest of major strike aircraft) - see appendix 4 of GAO report.
Ratio of guided to unguided: 1:3. (F-15E 1:8, F-16 1:242)
Total tonnage delivered: 1,090 tons (1.6% of total)
Tonnage per a/c per day: 0.38 tons (F-15E 2.71, F-16 1.93).

Sources:
Coastal Command History - Squadrons
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97134.pdf
Post • RAF Losses in 1991 Gulf War • The Register Forums
Coastal Command History - Squadrons
Fast Facts about Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

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Looking from the above, don't think its a question of LGB or low level.
 

Hambo

New Member
I went much further than that, I said the RAF continued to pursue tactics of low level attack despite clear evidence from US losses in Vietnam that this was likely to result in high level causalities. This near obsession within the RAF leadership led to higher training losses compared to similar Tornado operators in the decade up to GW1. Actually the development of JP223 is probably one of the best pieces of evidence of the folly of this approach, flying level along a defended runway....charge of the light brigade or what (and thats not to decry the brave men of the light brigade)?

Although the RAF denied it was US pressure at the time (what more evidence do you need) there was a clear shift in tactics with the arrival of the Buccaneers which could target standoff munitions. And they haven’t returned to it since and did move to stand off solutions aftward?

I doubt had the airfields been left the Iraqi air force could have shot down 7 allied aircraft in the air.

However this is a RN threat so let’s get back on subject.
Oh dear, its just too easy.

So 1805, "evidence of the folly of this approach"?, By that you mean in a way that is taking a dig at the RAF, as if somehow the RAF are inept and incapable of learning the lessons of Vietnam.

Take a look at the link below 1805 and tell me what you see.

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8YuFCtKoHCs"]YouTube - Harrier First Strike on Port Stanley 1982[/nomedia]

You see RN Harriers, in early daylight, flying ultra low in the face of radar guided AAA, Roland and Tigercat batteries and small arms over Stanley.

Why was the RN command incapable of learning the lessons of Vietnam 1805? Oh if only you had told them! Are you going to have a pop at the RN over their losses to ground fire?

Actually the above video highlights that the runway wasnt knocked out and shows why a direct low level run was the only way of doing the job, with such a weapon as JP223. It possibly contributed to its development, who knows? I dont think the coallition were concerned with the iraqi airforce shooting down numerous allied fighters should they get airborne, they were more concerned that Iraqi aircraft would dash low level towards cities and troop concentrations with several thousand litres of nerve agent and other WMD's that Saddam actually did have then (unlike GW2) so there was an urgency to close the runways, so the Tornado mission was of crucial importance and not a "folly" or embarrassment.

Finally Im not convinced the US abandoned low level after vietnam or even during it. For this I would point to the F111A missions towards the end of the war, at night , at low and medium level. Then the adoption of the B1, a low level bomber and of course the hundreds of A10's that were deployed to europe to fly charge of the light brigade style at the soviet tank armies at scarily low altitudes.
 

rip

New Member
I went much further than that, I said the RAF continued to pursue tactics of low level attack despite clear evidence from US losses in Vietnam that this was likely to result in high level causalities. This near obsession within the RAF leadership led to higher training losses compared to similar Tornado operators in the decade up to GW1. Actually the development of JP223 is probably one of the best pieces of evidence of the folly of this approach, flying level along a defended runway....charge of the light brigade or what (and thats not to decry the brave men of the light brigade)?

Although the RAF denied it was US pressure at the time (what more evidence do you need) there was a clear shift in tactics with the arrival of the Buccaneers which could target standoff munitions. And they haven’t returned to it since and did move to stand off solutions aftward?

I doubt had the airfields been left the Iraqi air force could have shot down 7 allied aircraft in the air.

However this is a RN threat so let’s get back on subject.
I am not taking a dig at anybody nor am I trying to disrespect the brave men who flew those dangerous missions at heavily defended air fields but I am very confused about some of the previous comments so would somebody please clear up some historical facts for me. If my memory serves me corectly, as I remember it from years ago, did not the British have a specially British designed and deployed munition, made specifically for the role of knocking out runways? A special munition that no one else had in their inventory. And was it for this very reason they and no other got the very tuff job of trying to take them out and thus they tock the hard hits? If I am wrong please correct me. I don’t understand your arguments.
 

Hambo

New Member
I am not taking a dig at anybody nor am I trying to disrespect the brave men who flew those dangerous missions at heavily defended air fields but I am very confused about some of the previous comments so would somebody please clear up some historical facts for me. If my memory serves me corectly, as I remember it from years ago, did not the British have a specially British designed and deployed munition, made specifically for the role of knocking out runways? A special munition that no one else had in their inventory. And was it for this very reason they and no other got the very tuff job of trying to take them out and thus they tock the hard hits? If I am wrong please correct me. I don’t understand your arguments.
Hello, you would probably need one of the defence professionals on here to give a definative answer, but my amateur crack at it would be as follows.

During the cold war , the Nato forces in europe, had the Warsaw pac attacked would have faced a massive onslaught and the land forces would have fought a retreat to various choke points and bottle necks. The RAF germany and all the other NATO airforces would have supported the ground forces and faced a numerically superior force, and loses would have been phenomenal, with the spectre of a nuclear exchange and escalation being the unthinkable consequence. The airforces had to find a way to ground or destroy as much soviet airpower as possible, blow up bridges, supply lines, tank formations etc. Destroying runways was obviously of critical importance.

Soviet anti aircraft technology, if lacking the technical edge over western systems made up for it in sheer numbers, multi layered systems in huge numbers, much of it mobile enough to advance with the armies, the SAM umbrella being a particularly tough nut. Now in Vietnam , the north used soviet systems and inflicted heavy casualties on US forces, the US forces in turn spending a massive amount of resources to counter it, jamming, hard kill (anti radar missiles) and a combination of flying through it with countermeasures or under it at low level, where aircraft are at risk from old fashioned triple-A.
The USA has far more resources that anyone else and so the approach of the US may not be one for other mere mortals. The UK can not, or could not afford enough electronic warfare aircraft or offensive assets to base its strategy on nullifying an air defence network and operating at altitudes other than low level. Low level obviously means you avoid detection until the last minute. There would be two ways to take out an airfield. Gain air superiority over the fighters, jam the radars or kill the radars with missiles, then fly safely over the AAA and put a precision weapon on the runway to ground all air ops, now that takes a lot of aircraft, far more than the RAF could achieve in germany, where they faced literally hundreds of warpac airfields and dispersal sites. So the RAF solution was a weapon the JP233, which required the tornado to fly down the length of the runway , the cannisters spewing out sub munitions to break up the tarmac and delayed fused mines to stop repairs, the aim to ground as many warpac aircraft for as long as possible so NATO ground and air forces could operate unhindered. I believe the germans developed a similar system for their tornados and the french a rocket called durandell that fired downwards into the tarmac.
So the gulf war was fought with 1970 and 1980s technlogy on the whole, meaning technology aimed at defeating soviet cold war tactics and technology. The Iraqi air defence network was probably less dense than the soviet one, but based on its philosophy.

The context of the gulf war was one where saddam had used chemical weapons, had means to deliver them, had threatened to use them and it was believed he would use them. He also had many many airfields. The target list was vast and the real fear of what Saddam might do, meant that a lot of targets needed hitting and quickly.
The hindsight argument is that the RAF didn't really need to practice low level runway denial, that somehow it was a futile effort of flawed tactics. But in 1991, The RAF had a suitable weapon, it had a key role in the planning phase of war and had practiced for decades against soviet built weaponry. Maybe the US could have taken out all the airfields without UK help? But at the time the RAF stepped up and took on a particularly tough job and lost men.

Penny pinching politicians and vested interests have reduced much of the debate around defence in the UK to petty arguments between services, Unfortunately some with an axe to grind against the RAF such as Sharkey Ward have seen fit to apply hindsight to a 20 year old war and decry the efforts of a lot of courageous men. If the bile was aimed at the politicians all three services might get a better deal.

Any way thats my potted history, feel free to correct any errors
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
You are thinking of the JP233 (UK and Saudi-Arabia) which can be described as big box under the fuselage which spits out a huge number of anti-airfield-submunitions.
In order to employ it properly a Tornado has to make a straight run over the target runway, which naturally is a dangerous task over a defended airfield.

Such a weapon is very effective even more so than other munitions like Durandal.

The German and Italian Tornados had a similar system, the MW-1 which works like the JP223 but can also be loaded with other submunition for example against enemy mech forces. But German Tornados didn't participate in ODS and I am not sure if the Italians used the MW-1 on their combat missions.
 

1805

New Member
A simple question 1805, provide any direct quote from any member of the military involved in GW1 or evidence that any senior member of the coalition thought the RAF low level tornado missions became an embarrassment ? Explain why exactly you conclude that the RAFs performance became and embarrassment? Had you said something along the lines that the RAF command could have done better or the tactics were flawed because of a,b or c then fair enough but you didnt.
Well didn't you quote Sharky Ward yourself, and anyway I don't need a quote from the RAF. Don't you read posts I have said "RAF command could have done better or the tactics were flawed because of a,b or c then fair enough but you didnt" a,b & c being learning from Vietnam additional evidence change of behaviour. You evidence RAF says they change hand nothing to do with significant losses in pointless raids on empty airfields (didn't the Iraqi airforce do a runner to Iran?). Additionally the fact the RAF post GW1 moved to more stand off munitions. You really do believe anything the RAF say....

I would be delighted to discuss the merrits of an independent air force till the cows come home (one of the greatest military mistakes this country has ever made) but it is a RN threats so can we get back on subject.
 

weasel1962

New Member
Re:

Just wanted to highlight that only 1 in 6 losses during GW was attributed to Tornado carrying the JP-233, though there were a fair number of critiques during that time. Its irrelevant today cos I think the JP-233 was abandoned with the accession to the mine treaty.

One more GR-4 lost due to onboard fire.
UK MoD confirms both crew members safe after Tornado ejection-27/01/2011-London-Flightglobal.com

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The big news in recent days is the push back against the MRA-4 cancellation.

Scrapping Nimrod Planes 'Puts Britain At Risk' - Defense News

Loss of Nimrods 'puts special forces at risk' - Telegraph

Previously nimrod, now 4 billion pounds of nothing. Disagree with the chiefs. Its the failure to work with accountants rather than accountants dictating budgets thats driving budgets today. 36 billion pounds of unfunded requirements hightlight the incompetence. The illusion of unlimited funds is over.
 

RubiconNZ

The Wanderer
To divert on a bit of a different thread,
Wikipedia states hence the question, the Bay Class LSD/ASLS can be fitted with a hangar, is this possible? Would this be a full Hangar or the annex type? I suppose it would not it be wrong to assume that this would reduce landing space on the deck.

Thanks in advance.
 

1805

New Member
To divert on a bit of a different thread,
Wikipedia states hence the question, the Bay Class LSD/ASLS can be fitted with a hangar, is this possible? Would this be a full Hangar or the annex type? I suppose it would not it be wrong to assume that this would reduce landing space on the deck.

Thanks in advance.
It looks quite big, I don't see why a more permanent structure could not be added if required.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It looks quite big, I don't see why a more permanent structure could not be added if required.
centre of gravity issue
resultant reallocation of bunkerage and storage issues
resultant ballast issue
resultant handling issue
resultant accreditation issue

there are a couple of real maritime engineers on here, so I would imagine that they will step in and offer their 2c's worth

just the above are non trivial issues
 

1805

New Member
centre of gravity issue
resultant reallocation of bunkerage and storage issues
resultant ballast issue
resultant handling issue
resultant accreditation issue

there are a couple of real maritime engineers on here, so I would imagine that they will step in and offer their 2c's worth

just the above are non trivial issues
Yes I agree and there would have to be a real need. It would probably impact some of its core role. That said it can't be impossible plenty of ships have had more radical rebuilds, whether its desireable or not is down to its new owners.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Yes I agree and there would have to be a real need. It would probably impact some of its core role. That said it can't be impossible plenty of ships have had more radical rebuilds, whether its desireable or not is down to its new owners.
there has to be an engineering advantage, there has to be a mission imperative and it has to be cost effective.

eg the amount of energy that a hangar generates when it acts like a sail (and they do start to cause handling issues because its like adding a great big slab/sail to the superstructure) can be enormous.

all of that impacts on hull life, hull stability, handling integrity etc.... its one of the legacy problems that all of the helo-deck cruisers had. adding a hanger caused more trouble than it was worth and thats why all those designs were short lived and never went to "version 2" or were developed as greenfields solutions.

its why the canadians use accordian hangars - the problem is you can't build accordians all the time.

its why there is an aversion to major superstructure changes. I can think of a number of major rebuilds where it was technically successful but the vessel was regarded overall as a lemon.
 

1805

New Member
there has to be an engineering advantage, there has to be a mission imperative and it has to be cost effective.

eg the amount of energy that a hangar generates when it acts like a sail (and they do start to cause handling issues because its like adding a great big slab/sail to the superstructure) can be enormous.

all of that impacts on hull life, hull stability, handling integrity etc.... its one of the legacy problems that all of the helo-deck cruisers had. adding a hanger caused more trouble than it was worth and thats why all those designs were short lived and never went to "version 2" or were developed as greenfields solutions.

its why the canadians use accordian hangars - the problem is you can't build accordians all the time.

its why there is an aversion to major superstructure changes. I can think of a number of major rebuilds where it was technically successful but the vessel was regarded overall as a lemon.
HMS Tiger being one of them:D
 

swerve

Super Moderator
... You evidence RAF says they change hand nothing to do with significant losses in pointless raids on empty airfields (didn't the Iraqi airforce do a runner to Iran?). Additionally the fact the RAF post GW1 moved to more stand off munitions. You really do believe anything the RAF say....
Of almost 1000 Iraqi air force aircraft before the war, 125 flew to Iran. That isn't 'the Iraqi airforce'. Twice that number were destroyed & over 100 damaged (including half of Iraq's combat aircraft), mostly in 'pointless' raids on 'empty' airfields.

I see you've adopted the Sharkey Ward approach to facts, i.e. ignore them & make up something.

As far as believing anything the RAF says - well, I wouldn't believe unsupported claims by senior officers, but I'm perfectly happy to accept the reports of the teams who investigated the losses of Tornados in Iraq. I note that they match the reports of surviving aircrews, unlike Sharkey Ward's disgusting libels. For Ward's stories to be true would require the complicity not only of all the RAF aircrew & investigators, but also all the mission planners & ground crew involved in the raids where aircraft were lost.

Now, back to the Royal Navy.
 

deepsixteen

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
centre of gravity issue
resultant reallocation of bunkerage and storage issues
resultant ballast issue
resultant handling issue
resultant accreditation issue

there are a couple of real maritime engineers on here, so I would imagine that they will step in and offer their 2c's worth

just the above are non trivial issues
Hi
I understand that the bay class are a derivative of the Dutch enforcer class design and as such could be fitted with facilities in the area forward of the aftermost crane. Weight should not be an issue as the ship is designed to carry a large number of ISSO containers in the area pretty mutch the size of a large hanger which suggests that the sail effect has been taken into consideration during the design of the vessel.

While not trivial to fit a hanger should be well within the tolerance of the vessel given the above and should be roughly comparable to the Rotterdam/Galicia which seem to cope with the other issues you mention.
 
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