John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Long term, Ukraine needs Western support to continue and Russia can count on Chinese support as well as their own larger MIC. Without significant long range missiles to lay some hurt on Russia, Ukraine will be in trouble.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
This railway is in Poland. That is unprecedented.Poland seems to be outraged by this terrorist attack and will bring these terrorists to justice.
Explosion on Polish railway was ‘unprecedented act of sabotage,’ says PM – Europe live
Donald Tusk says ‘worst fears confirmed’ over damage on route used to ferry aid deliveries to Ukrainewww.theguardian.com
(Nordstream was a singularity in the space-time continuum). I love the "unprecedented" part.
The Nordstream sabotage was in international waters. Also, the Russian state owned >50% of the stock in the pipeline, & was at war with Ukraine. Poland is not at war with anyone. And the pipeline was not being used, & a non-Russian alternative was due to open next day. It didn't damage anyone economically at the time, though it could potentially have been damaging if the war had ended quickly.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #13,183
I think even with some long range missiles Ukraine will be in trouble. There's little evidence that long range strikes have a big influence on the course of the war.
It isn't though. We've had vague accusations of Russia being behind explosions at western military industrial facilities, and behind drones spotted near an airport. Now we have vague accusations of railway sabotage. If we believe these accusations then Russia has been active in EU countries for a while. If we don't, then this is hardly anything.
Of course Ukraine would rather have then not have. But operating technology requires support, maintenance, and in wartime repairs and replacements. Having a mix of different things is inconvenient but it gets worse when the mix is getting whittled down in all categories. And it's likely that for some types you simply won't get enough parts, and won't get any replacements. This applies to all kinds of equipment, including locomotives. The more types are in service, the more complex it is to keep all the types working. So even with a mix of western locomotives replacing Ukraine's own fleet, it's likely a mixed fleet will operate worse. And there's the matter of declining foreign support. If that support can be focused on military assets, that's one thing. But if it has to be stretched to energy infrastructure support, rail logistics support, economic support, and then also military aid...
Look like the loading of oil tankers has resumed. I admit it I bought they hype here and thought it was no simple thing to reload a tanker and would take weeks to rebuild the capacity at a port. Definitely should have read more up on what that process actually entails
newsukraine.rbc.ua
Russia's Novorossiysk resumes oil loadings after Ukraine strike hits key terminal - Reuters
Read more
rsemmes
Active Member
Not exactly confused but, the "perspective" is that Ukraine is in "a desperate wartime situation" and it could be even worse?
How much of that superiority is Russia (for political reasons) using? This looks like a kind of limited war, at least to me. Six/seven hundred thousand men, a 10:1 superiority?
rsemmes
Active Member
German hydrogenation plants in WW2 and the war on terminals during the Iran-Iraq War.Look like the loading of oil tankers has resumed. I admit it I bought they hype here and thought it was no simple thing to reload a tanker and would take weeks to rebuild the capacity at a port. Definitely should have read more up on what that process actually entails
Russia's Novorossiysk resumes oil loadings after Ukraine strike hits key terminal - Reuters
Read more
If Russia is prosecuting a limited war and bleeding casualties because of that, I don't see how that helps their political reasons. That is unless they care more about western opinions than their own peoples concerns, and I highly doubt that.
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- #13,189
Russia is definitely prosecuting a limited war. They're not conducting a mass mobilization, or converting their economy to full on war time footing. It's a much larger limited war then something like Syria or even Chechnya, but it's not total war. Keeping the war limited is a key part of Russia's strategy. They're keeping things quiet at home by minimizing the impacts of this war on the population and smoothing things over with piles of money when it does affect people.
Fair enough in those terms. However if they had of just gone full on at Ukraine I'm quite certain the war would have been over long ago. Russia would have suffered more casualties earlier on but less overall than by dragging it out as they have. Did Russia even try to get air superiority over Ukraine within the first year?
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- #13,191
There are many on the "ultrapatriotic" side in Russia that would agree with that sentiment. I'm not sure it was a real possibility. The thing is... it would have required a very different view of the situation in Ukraine. Russia clearly thought Ukraine in 2022 was the same as in 2014, and this wasn't true. The political space had been heavily sanitized, and there were almost no remaining pro-Russian figures in the Ukrainian government. In 2014 entire military units changed sides when Russia went into Crimea and rebels rose up in the Donbas. In 2022 there was a flood of volunteers enlisting. Russia certainly didn't understand this, and it took them until the fall of '22 to realize just how bad the mess was. That's when they did a partial mobilization, changed leadership, and sat down for a long war. And let's not forget how poorly the Russian public reacted to a partial mobilization. Russia has opted to leave the current mobilized personnel in uniform until the end of the war, or until they get medically separated (iirc they're also releasing from further service obligation those that become POWs and get exchanged back). They don't even want to do a fresh mobilization wave to replace that first wave, despite the fact that they're locked in for 3 years now, and it will likely be at least a couple more. Russia has quite the state apparatus. So I think in principle Russia could conduct a full size mobilization. But they would have to close down borders at least for military age men, and it would not be pretty. Russian society would not take it well, and it would come with major economic and political costs.
On an unrelated note, Russia currently seems to have reached throughput limits on personnel they can train and effectively field. In other words, they probably can't substantially increase their current recruitment rate without investing into fairly large scale new facilities for recruits. This is after 3 years past the mobilization. What did Russia's throughput for new recruits look like in the summer of '22?
They did during the initial push, and again in the fall. They failed both times. Arguably Russia currently has air superiority, just not air dominance. Ukraine retains enough SAMs and AAA to ambush Russian jets, and Russia hasn't demonstrated the ability to track down moving Ukrainian SAMs effectively. If they had hit Ukrainian GBAD as hard in 2022 as they tend to now, they probably could have accomplished it, but Russia's initial poor performance gave Ukraine time to learn, and Russia lost quite a few jets that first year because in 2022 they didn't have any substantial quantities of gliding bombs...
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- #13,193
Well, it's not a town, it's a village. It's a de-facto suburb of Orekhov, and Russia is making gains there. But the gains are small and costly. The reason it looks silly to me is that the distance from Velikaya Novoselka to Gulyaypole, and the distance from Gulyaypole to Orekhov are comparable. Orekhov is actually a bit closer. Meaning the eastern front rolling across Zaporozhye and southern Dnepropetrovsk regions will catch up to Orekhov some time in the next 6-12 months depending on how things go. At that point Orekhov will probably fall, as Russian troops will threaten it's supply lines well north of there. So why expend the manpower and materiel now for minimal gains if the entire defense system there will be compromised by Russia's upcoming offensive? And that's the other piece, Ukraine has a robust and effective defense line with a center in Orekhov. Russia can eventually blast their way through that, at a considerable cost. But it doesn't make any sense to attack in that direction. I wouldn't be surprised that there isn't good strategic coordination between the command (East MD) leading the push westward, and the command holding the section of the front line in Zaporozhye. It's possible there's something I'm missing here, but Russia has tried to take Malaya Tokmachka with these kinds of attacks many times now. Finally succeeding doesn't necessarily justify the expended resources or casualties. Not when the entire area will be irrelevant as a defense line in the future.
EDIT: It appears the Mirnograd pocket is collapsing. There were three main nodes in the pocket. The southern one was a series of fortified positions in the fields, connecting to the villages of Sukhoi Yar, and Lisovka. Ukrainian forces have pulled out from there. The second area was the southern part of Mirnograd (which is shaped kind of like an hourglass). The southern half of Mirnograd has either completely or almost completely fallen to Russia, with some Ukrainian presence in the fields west of it, but it's not likely to last. In the northern node, there are Russian penetrations from the north and east, with the center and western parts still being held by Ukrainian forces. This is the area closest to any potential breakout, it's also the biggest built-up area, making it potentially more defensible. So it makes sense for remaining Ukrainian forces to concentrate there. However it's pretty clear this indicates the fight is heading towards a conclusion. Additionally there isn't an exit corridor any more. There is still a grey area that neither side really control but the terrain is relatively open, and it's unlikely any large forces can exit. Small groups probably can, with losses.
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rsemmes
Active Member
My mistake.
I cannot see Suriyaki maps, I thought that what Kalibrated is (surprisingly still) showing was that advance. My post is actually showing that Russia has not advanced there since last Wednesday.
Kalibrated Ukraine Map - Google My Maps
Kalibrated Maps is developed by (https://x.com/squatsons) ). It was created with the aim of providing a publicly available but accurate control map of Ukraine. The map is updated based on confirmed information but it is still under development and may have some mistakes.
www.google.com
rsemmes
Active Member
The Guardian view on funding Ukraine’s resistance: a looming financial crisis in Kyiv must be averted | Editorial
Editorial: Whether by leveraging Russia’s frozen assets, or other means, the EU must deliver the cash necessary to withstand Putin’s war of attrition
www.theguardian.com
Ukraine should try to get the best possible peace agreement today, not tomorrow. It is going to be better this year, than next year.
"Ukraine will need more than €70bn in extra financial assistance next year to keep defending itself"
Just to keep playing, to keep itself "in the fight".
"...ability to negotiate an acceptable peace..."
That is, obviously, going to be a lot better than that of Istanbul.
"The International Monetary Fund, currently in negotiations with Kyiv over new loans reportedly worth about $8bn, has warned that its own decisions will depend on what the EU decides to come up with."
We will tell Zelenski how high to jump, that's all he can do. He is in another "beggar's round" in the EU, and getting "promises", of course.
Now, in what universe does Zelenski thinks he lives in?
(And not only him.)
Hoover
Member
You have to define the erm victory first. It will be a victory if the Ukraine didn´t have to surrender and stay an independent and souvereign state.First of all: There is no Ukrainian victory (this is theguardian, not Pravda), that is the reality.The Guardian view on funding Ukraine’s resistance: a looming financial crisis in Kyiv must be averted | Editorial
Editorial: Whether by leveraging Russia’s frozen assets, or other means, the EU must deliver the cash necessary to withstand Putin’s war of attrition
Ukraine should try to get the best possible peace agreement today, not tomorrow. It is going to be better this year, than next year.
"Ukraine will need more than €70bn in extra financial assistance next year to keep defending itself"
Just to keep playing, to keep itself "in the fight".
"...ability to negotiate an acceptable peace..."
That is, obviously, going to be a lot better than that of Istanbul.
"The International Monetary Fund, currently in negotiations with Kyiv over new loans reportedly worth about $8bn, has warned that its own decisions will depend on what the EU decides to come up with."
We will tell Zelenski how high to jump, that's all he can do. He is in another "beggar's round" in the EU, and getting "promises", of course.
Now, in what universe does Zelenski thinks he lives in?
(And not only him.)
I know that you have very pro Russian positions and you are not ready to accept that the Ukraine don´t want to become a Rusian puppet state.
Of course a state has the right and the dury to defend his nation. The question is, how long will/can the West support the Ukraine against the Russian aggressors.
Currently it is Putin who won´t negotiate beside a surrender of the Ukraine. And that is impossible for Zelenski, you know that.
If Putin accept a cease fire on the current contact zone, the fighting would end. It is very simple to critize Zelenski and demand his surrender.
rsemmes
Active Member
theguardian, not me, is not even talking about that (victory) possibility.
I have a very pro-reality position.
Surrender has never been mentioned. (By me, at least.)
Hitler, never surrendered. (Meaning, if Zelenski exiled himself, he can proudly say that he never surrendered. The last President of SVN did surrendered, instead of flying away.)
Side note: If planet Nibiru (not Putin) intervenes, Zelenski may take Sevastopol.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
What if that won’t happen? What if Ukraine stops existing altogether some years down the line because they have neither human nor other resources to sustain the existence of the state, the process that this very war has accelerated? What if now is as good as it gets?
I am curious, why do you think his position is “very pro-Russian”? What makes one’s position pro-one side or the other? To note, I don’t know if it really is pro-Russian or isn’t, but, as I stated previously, I don’t believe it has any relevance anyway.
Why does he have to accept it (or be ready to do so)? I don’t get it. There are a few things here. One is that one does not have to accept any position of any state, per se. Second, Ukraine is a broad term and what “it” wants or doesn’t is rather arguable (more on that below). Third, “Russian puppet state” is not the only or obvious outcome here.
Here it gets interesting. What is the “state” in this case that has the right? Sure, any “state” does have the right to defend its nation. What does that mean though? There are two components here: the state and the nation. Then there are the right, the duty, but there is also the action.
Over two thousand young Ukrainians have been leaving the country every single day to the EU (on average) since Zelensky lifted the ban on travel for those people. So what is being defended and for whom? The ten million or so pensioners who will die off within the next decade, give or take? What is the fight about and who are those on the frontline dying for on the daily baiss?
I personally think (convinced, for that matter), for example, that one has to be completely insane to commit to any tangible security guarantees that would include their own human personnel to fight for the existence of “independent” Ukraine. So what is next then?
What is surrendering of Ukraine? Is Putin currently demanding that? What is the alternative?
Ceasefire is not going to be accepted at this time - it was as clear when the proposal was made as it is now. The reasons have been discussed previously. If he did accept a ceasefire, why do you think the fighting would end? I don’t believe it would.
So is it Zelensky who has to surrender or Ukraine and what do they have to surrender in order to end the fighting, individually or combined (Zelensky and the state)?
GermanHerman
Active Member
I dont think you can make that statement that it didnt hurt economicly.
It was russia and not germany who stoppen the flow of gas so the claim that it didnt do economical damage needs proof that germany wasnt interested in potentialy resuming to buy russian gas.
Indeed germany in 2022 wasnt ready to abandon russian gas and tryed to reduce its dependence because of russias weaponization of gas rather then outright stopping it for economic reasons [1]. Germany was activly trying to restore russian deliverys during summer of 22 when russia paused deliveries for the first time under the guise of maintenance work [2].
In fact russia did use its dominance as gas exporter already in 2021 to pressure germany and the EU to open NS2 [3] and in 2022 this was very mich still the main aim and part of the german political debate [4].
Russia did use germanys dependence on its cheap gas to exert pressure, there was no active political will or plan to decisively break with russia in germany and other Europas nations demonstrated that it was and in fact still is possible to buy gas from russia [5]
As it stands the pivot from russian gas lead to enormous costs and all indications are that germany wanted and possibly could have mitigated the costs by reducing its commitment to Ukraine and securing cheap russian gas.
In that sense one has to assume that the bombing bears at least partial responsibility for the economic damages.
Import costs themselfs rose by 38 billion € in the first year after the bombing [6]
The gas price for the german economy increased six fold [7], the german industrial production shrank by 1.6% [8] and an study of the IdW claims a total economic damage of 90 to 125 billion € for 2022 in consequence of the war [9] with a follow up estimating a further 315 billion € in economic damages since then up to 2024 [10].
In conclusion I think you are partialy wrong and the bombing did in fact contribute to the econlmical costs.
[1] FAQ: Was ein Gas-Lieferstopp für Deutschland bedeuten könnte
[2] Nord Stream 1: Russland verzögert offenbar Turbinenlieferung für Gaspipeline
[3]Lässt Putin den EU-Gasmarkt gezielt austrocknen? – DW – 14.10.2021
[4] Energiekrise: Wolfgang Kubicki für Öffnung der Pipeline Nord Stream 2
[5] Redirect Notice
[6] Reuters
[7] https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/rest/items/item_28398_3/component/file_28572/content
[8] Production in December 2023: -1.6% on the previous month
[9] IW-Studie: Corona und Ukraine-Krieg kosten deutsche Wirtschaft 420 Mrd. Euro - WELT
[10] https://www.iwkoeln.de/en/studies/michael-groemling-the-economic-losses-in-germany-due-to-the-pandemic-and-the-war-in-ukraine.html
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