John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Agree totally although I would subtitle “Putin” in place of Russia.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread starter Feanor
- Start date
One problem with Gripen: supply. How many does Sweden have? I don't think there are many used ones going spare, & making more would take a long time.
I really, really, like the idea of Ukraine having a lot of Gripens operating from dispersed bases, but sadly, I can't see very many being available in a reasonable time. I suspect that secondhand F-16s would be easier to supply a useful number of.
I'm not sure how an early model Leopard A-4 would perform compared to the A-5 certainly Turkish A-4 Leopard tanks were destroyed in the Syrian fighting ,I understand that later models of the Leopard are being sent as well that are better protected but early model a-4s without any increased protection could be at risk
Battle of Al-Bab: The destruction of Turkish Leopard-2a4 tanks - GEOPOLITIKI
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #6,564
Sorry for the lack of updates lately. There have been a few changes over the past week. It appears Russia is stalled on the Svatovo axis. Ukrainian forces have failed to force their way towards Kremennaya. Around Artemovsk/Bakhmut Russian forces are making small gains, including the rail station Salt, and south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut they've taken Klescheevka and are threatening Krasnovo, the next tiny village in line. Around Avdeevka DNR forces have apparently finished clearing Vodyanoe. The village has been contested for about a month and Ukraine likely withdrew due to the positions being untenable rather then any significant Russian/rebel effort. In Mar'inka Russian forces have continued their advance slowly, street by street, and now appear to hold most of the town, though this is not 100%. Russia has also begun an assault on Ugledar. The recent push in Zaporozhye has apparently stalled though artillery exchanges continue and it's likely Russia will try again. On the Dnepr Ukraine has made two crossing attempts but both appear repulsed.
Russia and Ukraine disagree about where those borders are.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
With aircraft even more so than tanks, surely training of pilots and logistics/maintenance will be critical issues? The Ukraine air force ending up with a hodge-podge of different ex-Soviet and NATO fighter aircraft will only result in low sortie rates. This is not criticism of the qualities of the Grippen.
I would have thought that switching all UAK squadrons to one or two common types of NATO fighter, like F15 or F16, will be the most effective use of their resources. Also in most wars, trained pilots are more scarce than aircraft.
Likewise I can't help thinking that the sending of US Abrams tanks as well as presumably several hundred Leopard 2A4 and A6 tanks is a mixed blessing.
Poland already operates the Abrams (28 in hand) and has 250 Abrams on order, while holding 250 Leopard 2s. To me it seems blindingly obvious that the US Abrams should go to Poland (as an "early delivery" of those ordered), and Poland in return sends Ukraine a higher proportion of the Leopard 2s it has.
That way Poland transitions to an army only operating Abrams and Korean K2 tanks, while Ukraine has its current stock of ex-Soviet and captured ex-Russian tanks, moving to a growing proportion of Leopard 2s.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
My understanding is that the Leopard upgrades after 2A4 are modular and can be retrofitted. So you can upgrade a Leopard 2A4 to 2A6 in terms of armour protection. The ballistic wedge fitted on the front of the Leopard 2A6 turret is an addition to the original turret front. A lot of countries have upgraded Leopard 2s from 2A4 to 2A6 themselves, notably Sweden.
Replacing the original Leopard 2A4 44 calibre 120mm gun with the 55 calibre 120mm gun no the 2A7 would be more difficult I suspect.
KipPotapych
Active Member
I was going to reply, started looking for one particular article, couldn’t find it and thought I would look again later and then forgot of course. Apologies.
Don’t have anything to link to this one, really, but in my opinion, there is no coup coming within the foreseeable (and probably beyond) future. This point of view can also be supported by an observation that basically every article that talks about it comes to a conclusion that the regime change is impossible to achieve at this time and in the near (even mid-term) future. That also holds true even if Americans get involved attempting to create a “colour” revolution, according to pretty much every analyst whose articles I read on the subject. Like I said, sorry, I don’t have anything to link at this moment, so take it as my opinion and nothing more (though I am sure you and many others by this point read similar opinions by qualified and respected individuals in the field).
I wouldn’t be so sure on the second point either. Putin generally is not the kind of guy that moves pawns back and forth when his plans don’t work out. And here we are not talking about pawns even, but about rooks and bishops/knights. Keep in mind that Surovikin wasn’t purged, but remained as a deputy commander. Everything I see (and read) suggests to me that they are preparing for a possible (or, perhaps, unavoidable at this point?) escalation. I don’t know. I could be way off, who knows. Nothing to do but wait and see.
Another factor I would propose/consider here is that Putin still has an extremely strong support within the population of Russia. The idea of fighting the entire Western world, and ‘Mericans and NATO in particular, is easier to push now than ever. I mean I can see how, as I sated in my previous post, the thin line between supporting Ukraine and actually participating in the war is being erased or had already been erased (?). Even the top diplomats are confused on the subject (source):
Germany's Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock called for unity amongst Western allies in the midst of the debate over tank deliveries to Ukraine from Germany.
"We are fighting a war against Russia and not against each other," said Baerbock at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on Tuesday.
Of course, I read later (today) there was a clarification/correction that it is not what was meant (I don’t remember how they rephrased it and not really willing to look for it at the moment because not the point, really). You can imagine what Russians believe.
Gerasimov gave an interview to the Russian media outlet AiF (the outlet is garbage, but I do not believe it has any effect on what he said, here via Google translate):
Currently, under the leadership of the General Staff, a special military operation is being carried out in Ukraine. Modern Russia has never known such a level and intensity of fighting. Our country and its Armed Forces today are opposed by almost the entire collective West.
To stabilize the situation, protect new territories and carry out offensive operations, the General Staff needed to put in place plans for partial mobilization. There have been no such events since the Great Patriotic War.
So yeah, I don’t think coup is in the planning any time soon. I actually see a higher likelihood of a coup if Russia is actually starting to lose on the battlefield, giving up territory, including Crimea, “hard decision not being made”, etc -> some hardliners decide to take over and make those “hard decisions” going to nukes and whatever. But I also tend to think the decision would, perhaps, be made if the events start unfolding this way. It doesn’t necessarily have to be nukes to begin with, but…
I’ll wrap it up here on this point.
If you remember, after there was an explosion on the bridge to Crimea, Russia bombed Kiev (centre of the city, ‘next to’ the SBU building inclusive) for the first time since the early days of the war. The message was pretty clear, in my opinion.
It is not the same as the “little drone” attacks on Sevastopol and whatnot. And it seems that the Russians have set up proper defences to deal with that. An attempt to enter Crimea will be countered by a very strong push back, I have zero doubt in my mind. It would likely happen way before the Crimea is threatened too.
The article I mentioned in the beginning of this post I was looking for and couldn’t find was a very good one. Too bad I cannot recall the source, which was a good one too; wasn’t just an opinion, but a good summary of opinions of several knowledgeable individuals. It was from March or April of last year, which is probably why I am having hard times finding it. It was discussing the war, possible outcomes, but most importantly, for this discussion, the Russian leadership, people in and with power, possible Putin replacements, etc. The idea in this regard essentially was that even the most “liberal” and west-oriented politicians or those who may come into politics in the near future will never give up Crimea, not one of them. Even if they wanted to (and neither of them would), it would a losing proposition because Crimea is Russia, in hearts and minds, so to speak. Since I don’t have anything to link here, consider it my opinion (looking at you too, mods, lol). I’ll still try to find the article and if I do I’ll post the link, of course.
I might return to this later. Getting late here.
Cheers.
Pukovnik7
Member
I was thinking more of a post-war situation. For now, the best thing to do would be to keep Ukrainian fleet of Su-27s and MiG-29s up to force and up to date.
But if that is not possible, then it might be better to look at an aircraft with low logistical / maintenance issues.
Agreed about the tanks.
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,
Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State,
Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time,
Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces,
Confirm the following:
1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to
Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
2. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Entry into force: 5 December, 1994 by signature. volume-3007-I-52241.pdf (un.org)
Ukraine is paying a high price for believing in the commitments made by Russia in 1994 to respect the borders Ukraine had back then (and the commitments by the US and UK for that matter -- NATO should have punished Russia much harder as a reaction to the first invasion back in 2014).
The Gripen has US components in it (F404 engine in C/D variant & F414 in E variant) so the US can veto it's export to another country under its ITARS legislation.
Updates.
It's been reported that the Russians are building a UAV manufacturing facility for building Iranian UAVs.
"A site has been identified for a factory where Iranian specialists will help the Russian military to construct 'unmanned aerial vehicles', designed to paralyse Ukraine's energy infrastructure and overwhelm its air defence systems during the Spring, when newly trained troops are expected to launch a new push."
A former UK tank officer says that Russia is unable to undertake manoeuvre warfare because it doesn't have the capacity too.
A DW report on Russia's arsenal.
A case is being made for an Ukrainian arms manufacturing facility to be built in eastern Poland. It would be staffed and run by the Ukrainians. Being in Poland if Russia attacks the complex, it immediately means an attack on NATO.
This is quite interesting. It's a historical comparison between the Soviet Union's invasion of Finland in 1939 (inter War) and the current Russian invasion in Ukraine. There are some very interesting similarities, but also differences.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
That's too much grey line. Russian can argue that Poland 'host' belligerence facilities. Thus open for attack. This is also means NATO harbouring Ukrainian facilities.
There's difference even in legal term, on supplying Ukraine for war against Russia and harbouring Ukrainian facilities aim for war against Russia within NATO territory.
ISW Updates. Part 1 / 2.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
January 26, 9 pm ET
Full article:
www.understandingwar.org
The pdf can be downloaded here.
Main Points:
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces launched another massive series of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on January 26. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valery Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian forces launched 55 air- and sea-based missiles, including Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-47, and Kh-95 Kalibr and Kinzhal missiles at Ukraine from Tu-95, Su-35, and MiG-31K aircraft from the waters of the Black Sea.[1] Ukrainian air defense shot down 47 of the 55 missiles and all 24 Shahed 136 and 131 drones.[2] Several missiles struck critical infrastructure in Vinnytsia and Odesa oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov notably reported that Russian forces had 90 Iranian-made drones remaining as of January 7.[4] Russian forces have enough drones for only a few more large-scale strikes unless they have received or will soon receive a new shipment of drones from Iran. Russian Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on January 23 to expand bilateral cooperation efforts, conversations that may have included discussions on the provision of Iranian-made weapons systems to Russia.[5]
A recent altercation between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and former Russian officer Igor Girkin is exposing a new domain for competition among Russian nationalist groups for political influence in Russia. Girkin accused Prigozhin on January 25 of deliberately misconstruing his criticism of Prigozhin’s political aspirations and exploitation of the information space as an attack on Wagner forces fighting in Ukraine.[6] Girkin claimed that Wagner-affiliated outlet RiaFan’s interview with an unnamed Wagner commander who blamed Girkin for abandoning positions in Donbas in 2014 was an effort to anonymously discredit him.[7] Girkin also accused Prigozhin of continuing to commit Wagner forces to support operations in Syria and African countries instead of deploying his mercenaries to win the war in Ukraine.
Prigozhin replied that he does not have political ambitions and stated that his team attempted to bribe Girkin in an effort to silence his criticism of Wagner forces which could have led to the imprisonment of his fighters for illegal mercenary activity.[8] Prigozhin also made a point of exaggerating his authority by claiming that he cannot withdraw Wagner from Africa because he “made a promise to several presidents” that he will “defend them,” claimed that Wagner “de-facto” won the Syrian war, and noted that Wagner was kicked out of Donbas in 2015.[9] Prigozhin reiterated that he founded, controls, and sponsors Wagner and sarcastically invited Girkin to join one of Wagner’s assault units in occupied Luhansk Oblast, which Girkin stated he would do if Prigozhin sent him a serious invitation.[10] Prigozhin further demeaned Girkin by stating that Wagner does not send out invitations and stated that Girkin would not be effective on the frontlines because he is only interested in promoting himself for financial benefit.[11]
Prigozhin and Girkin – both critics of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s conduct of the war – are likely competing for influence and patronage among pro-war politicians disillusioned with the progress of the war. ISW assessed on October 4 that the Russian nationalists are split among three distinct groups that pursue different objectives while unilaterally criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD): Russian or proxy veterans, nationalists with their own private forces, and Russian milbloggers and war correspondents.[12] Girkin represents the veteran faction due to his connections with veteran organizations such as the All-Russian Officers Assembly, while Prigozhin is a self-proclaimed nationalist with access to a parallel military structure.[13] While both have avidly denied their political aspirations in Russia, they have continued to criticize the Russian MoD and the Kremlin in an effort to boost their prominence in Russian society against the backdrop of Russian military failures.[14] Prigozhin and Girkin are likely competing for favor with the same pro-war nationalist patronage networks within the Kremlin that are represented by outspoken nationalist politicians. Prigozhin, for example, is engaging members of the A Just Russia – For Truth Party and nationalist-leaning Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin to legalize Wagner mercenaries in Russia.[15] Girkin had broken with many officials with strong nationalist rhetoric like Volodin, however, and may be frustrated that he is unable to attain the same political power that he exerted in 2014 during the occupation of Crimea, and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[16]
Prigozhin’s attack on Girkin may benefit Putin, however. Prigozhin is very prominent in the Russian information space, and many milbloggers accused Girkin of lacking combat experience and cowardice in response to this exchange.[17] Prigozhin may have attempted to undermine Girkin to gain influence in the nationalist space while simultaneously but not necessarily intentionally discrediting one of the most prominent Putin critics.
Prigozhin is likely attempting to maximize his influence to avoid Girkin’s fate. The Kremlin had seemingly rid itself of Girkin after his militants retreated from Slovyansk and following his involvement in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July 2014.[18] Girkin was removed from the position of Minister of Defense of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) in August 2014 and has not resurrected his influence within the Kremlin since then. Prigozhin, however, is trying to build a support base within the Kremlin and in Russian society to solidify his presence in Russian domestic affairs even as Wagner struggles on the battlefield.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued his campaign against critical and opposition voices by cracking down on several major opposition media outlets while continuing to platform highly critical Russian milbloggers. Putin signed a law on January 25 designating several major Russian language media and investigative outlets, including Meduza, Important Stories, Bellingcat, The Bell, and The Insider as undesirable organizations within Russia, outlawing the publication, distribution, or financial support of the organizations and their publications.[19] The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office claimed that the activities of Meduza and other outlets threaten the “foundations of the constitutional order and security” of Russia.[20] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin had notably called for the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to censor Meduza in July 2022, claiming that the outlet deliberately spread false information to split Russian society.[21] Putin has failed, however, to rein in highly critical Russian nationalist milbloggers who have long criticized and undermined the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Kremlin, and even Putin himself, as ISW has previously reported.[22] Putin likely hopes to cultivate a group of loyal milbloggers to undermine other rising opponents, such as Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov.[23]
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
January 26, 9 pm ET
Full article:
Institute for the Study of War
Russian forces launched another massive series of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on January 26. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valery Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian forces launched 55 air- and sea-based missiles, including Kh-101, Kh-555,
The pdf can be downloaded here.
Main Points:
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces launched another massive series of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on January 26. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valery Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian forces launched 55 air- and sea-based missiles, including Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-47, and Kh-95 Kalibr and Kinzhal missiles at Ukraine from Tu-95, Su-35, and MiG-31K aircraft from the waters of the Black Sea.[1] Ukrainian air defense shot down 47 of the 55 missiles and all 24 Shahed 136 and 131 drones.[2] Several missiles struck critical infrastructure in Vinnytsia and Odesa oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov notably reported that Russian forces had 90 Iranian-made drones remaining as of January 7.[4] Russian forces have enough drones for only a few more large-scale strikes unless they have received or will soon receive a new shipment of drones from Iran. Russian Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on January 23 to expand bilateral cooperation efforts, conversations that may have included discussions on the provision of Iranian-made weapons systems to Russia.[5]
A recent altercation between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and former Russian officer Igor Girkin is exposing a new domain for competition among Russian nationalist groups for political influence in Russia. Girkin accused Prigozhin on January 25 of deliberately misconstruing his criticism of Prigozhin’s political aspirations and exploitation of the information space as an attack on Wagner forces fighting in Ukraine.[6] Girkin claimed that Wagner-affiliated outlet RiaFan’s interview with an unnamed Wagner commander who blamed Girkin for abandoning positions in Donbas in 2014 was an effort to anonymously discredit him.[7] Girkin also accused Prigozhin of continuing to commit Wagner forces to support operations in Syria and African countries instead of deploying his mercenaries to win the war in Ukraine.
Prigozhin replied that he does not have political ambitions and stated that his team attempted to bribe Girkin in an effort to silence his criticism of Wagner forces which could have led to the imprisonment of his fighters for illegal mercenary activity.[8] Prigozhin also made a point of exaggerating his authority by claiming that he cannot withdraw Wagner from Africa because he “made a promise to several presidents” that he will “defend them,” claimed that Wagner “de-facto” won the Syrian war, and noted that Wagner was kicked out of Donbas in 2015.[9] Prigozhin reiterated that he founded, controls, and sponsors Wagner and sarcastically invited Girkin to join one of Wagner’s assault units in occupied Luhansk Oblast, which Girkin stated he would do if Prigozhin sent him a serious invitation.[10] Prigozhin further demeaned Girkin by stating that Wagner does not send out invitations and stated that Girkin would not be effective on the frontlines because he is only interested in promoting himself for financial benefit.[11]
Prigozhin and Girkin – both critics of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s conduct of the war – are likely competing for influence and patronage among pro-war politicians disillusioned with the progress of the war. ISW assessed on October 4 that the Russian nationalists are split among three distinct groups that pursue different objectives while unilaterally criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD): Russian or proxy veterans, nationalists with their own private forces, and Russian milbloggers and war correspondents.[12] Girkin represents the veteran faction due to his connections with veteran organizations such as the All-Russian Officers Assembly, while Prigozhin is a self-proclaimed nationalist with access to a parallel military structure.[13] While both have avidly denied their political aspirations in Russia, they have continued to criticize the Russian MoD and the Kremlin in an effort to boost their prominence in Russian society against the backdrop of Russian military failures.[14] Prigozhin and Girkin are likely competing for favor with the same pro-war nationalist patronage networks within the Kremlin that are represented by outspoken nationalist politicians. Prigozhin, for example, is engaging members of the A Just Russia – For Truth Party and nationalist-leaning Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin to legalize Wagner mercenaries in Russia.[15] Girkin had broken with many officials with strong nationalist rhetoric like Volodin, however, and may be frustrated that he is unable to attain the same political power that he exerted in 2014 during the occupation of Crimea, and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[16]
Prigozhin’s attack on Girkin may benefit Putin, however. Prigozhin is very prominent in the Russian information space, and many milbloggers accused Girkin of lacking combat experience and cowardice in response to this exchange.[17] Prigozhin may have attempted to undermine Girkin to gain influence in the nationalist space while simultaneously but not necessarily intentionally discrediting one of the most prominent Putin critics.
Prigozhin is likely attempting to maximize his influence to avoid Girkin’s fate. The Kremlin had seemingly rid itself of Girkin after his militants retreated from Slovyansk and following his involvement in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July 2014.[18] Girkin was removed from the position of Minister of Defense of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) in August 2014 and has not resurrected his influence within the Kremlin since then. Prigozhin, however, is trying to build a support base within the Kremlin and in Russian society to solidify his presence in Russian domestic affairs even as Wagner struggles on the battlefield.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued his campaign against critical and opposition voices by cracking down on several major opposition media outlets while continuing to platform highly critical Russian milbloggers. Putin signed a law on January 25 designating several major Russian language media and investigative outlets, including Meduza, Important Stories, Bellingcat, The Bell, and The Insider as undesirable organizations within Russia, outlawing the publication, distribution, or financial support of the organizations and their publications.[19] The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office claimed that the activities of Meduza and other outlets threaten the “foundations of the constitutional order and security” of Russia.[20] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin had notably called for the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to censor Meduza in July 2022, claiming that the outlet deliberately spread false information to split Russian society.[21] Putin has failed, however, to rein in highly critical Russian nationalist milbloggers who have long criticized and undermined the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Kremlin, and even Putin himself, as ISW has previously reported.[22] Putin likely hopes to cultivate a group of loyal milbloggers to undermine other rising opponents, such as Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov.[23]
ISW Updates. Part 2 / 2.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
January 26, 9 pm ET
The United States Treasury Department announced new sanctions targeting the Wagner Group’s global support network, likely in response to the Wagner Group’s renewed efforts to support its operations outside of Ukraine. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 16 entities that support the Wagner Group’s military operations as sanctioned entities including a Russian-based technology firm, a Chinese-based satellite imagery company, a Central African Republic security company controlled by the Wagner Group, a United Arab Emirates-based aviation firm, and several Russian nationals.[24] OFAC redesignated the Wagner Group as a significant transnational criminal organization and cited its role in Russian operations in Ukraine and its involvement in serious criminal activity in the Central African Republic and Mali.[25] The announcement of secondary sanctions on specified entities outside of Russia and the focus on the Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel suggests that the US Treasury Department is in part trying to constrain the Wagner Group’s likely renewed focus on conducting operations outside of Ukraine. The Wagner Group has likely renewed efforts to increase security capacity building and counterterrorism roles in African countries, roles that the Wagner Group had focused heavily on before committing serious resources to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[26]
Key Takeaways
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
January 26, 9 pm ET
The United States Treasury Department announced new sanctions targeting the Wagner Group’s global support network, likely in response to the Wagner Group’s renewed efforts to support its operations outside of Ukraine. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 16 entities that support the Wagner Group’s military operations as sanctioned entities including a Russian-based technology firm, a Chinese-based satellite imagery company, a Central African Republic security company controlled by the Wagner Group, a United Arab Emirates-based aviation firm, and several Russian nationals.[24] OFAC redesignated the Wagner Group as a significant transnational criminal organization and cited its role in Russian operations in Ukraine and its involvement in serious criminal activity in the Central African Republic and Mali.[25] The announcement of secondary sanctions on specified entities outside of Russia and the focus on the Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel suggests that the US Treasury Department is in part trying to constrain the Wagner Group’s likely renewed focus on conducting operations outside of Ukraine. The Wagner Group has likely renewed efforts to increase security capacity building and counterterrorism roles in African countries, roles that the Wagner Group had focused heavily on before committing serious resources to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[26]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces launched another massive series of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on January 26.
- A recent altercation between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and former Russian officer Igor Girkin is exposing a new domain for competition among Russian nationalist groups for political influence in Russia against the backdrop of Russian military failures in Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continued his campaign against critical and opposition voices by cracking down on several major opposition media outlets.
- The United States Treasury Department announced new sanctions targeting the Wagner Group’s global support network, likely in response to the Wagner Group’s renewed efforts to reinvigorate its operations outside of Ukraine.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces relaunched counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, on the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in the Vuhledar area.
- Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are not conducting offensive operations at the size or scale necessary for a full-scale offensive.
- Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to conduct limited and localized ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Wagner Group likely experienced significant losses in attritional offensive operations in eastern Ukraine over the past few months.
- Russian occupation officials are reportedly continuing to “nationalize” property and close places of worship belonging to the Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Christian communities in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in an effort to establish the Kremlin-affiliated Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox Church as the dominant faith in the region.
Maybe but Russia would still be attack NATO territory and that's something that will cause a war between Russia and NATO. The Russian army would be annihilated by NATO in a strictly conventional war. The NATO forces would go through the Russian forces like a hot knife through butter because, short of nuclear weapons, current Russian forces, capabilities, and leadership have nothing to stop them. Yes they would give NATO a bloody nose, but that's about it. The Russians have only themselves to blame because of poor leadership and rampant corruption. The Soviet forces would have been a totally different story.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
I guess it is depends on how the progress on this war later on, toward Russian build up. Anyway my concern not just on Russian and NATO. However how this going to be interpreted by others.
This can open the 'pandora' box on International Legal cause of differentiating between Support - Supply and Harbouring one parties belligerence. I do suspect US will be extremely careful on this ones. It can bite US back on other region concerning harbouring belligerence parties toward US interest.
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
True, and the Russians, in the face of catastrophic defeat, will then initiate use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and get NATO's right back at them.
There's no favourable outcome for any attack on NATO territory, so I don't believe that NATO will give Russia the impression that they are backed into a corner by hosting Ukrainian arms manufacturers.
Of course this is why I think it's important that NATO does supply Ukraine the capability to strike at Russia.
There is of course some extensive repair facilities set up in Poland to repair the various N.A.T.O weapon systems damaged in the fighting before being sent back to Ukraine Russia has ignored this as a "belligerent facility "
Who repairs Ukraine's Western weapons? – DW – 09/26/2022
In eastern Poland, the creation of a center for the repair of equipment of Ukraine is being considered - Militarnyi
Who repairs Ukraine's Western weapons? – DW – 09/26/2022
In eastern Poland, the creation of a center for the repair of equipment of Ukraine is being considered - Militarnyi
Ananda
The Bunker Group
But not a facility own and run by Ukrainian. Not basically Ukrainian MIC. Russian clearly going to attack any Ukrainian MIC. If this is NATO facilities that repair NATO assets, which then find its way to be donate to Ukraine on the war effort, it is basically still NATO facilities.
It is very different with Ukrainian own MIC build to support the war, and hosted on NATO territory. It is legal term, but can be completely different meaning, not only between NATO and Russia, but also to potentially other regions International order interpretation.
One of the results of this war will be the destruction of large amounts of Soviet era military equipment that dated back fifty years held by several former Warsaw Pact countries , some of these now in N.A.T.O will likely be more selective to their future sources of replacement and certainly what may be considered battle proven
Ukraine weapon switcheroos are flushing Soviet arms out of Europe (defensenews.com)
Ukraine weapon switcheroos are flushing Soviet arms out of Europe (defensenews.com)
Can you supply precedent for this please