The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Latest update from Def Mon. UKR have not yet started slowing down it seems:
"Changed Novodmytrivka, Velyka Oleksandrivka and Mala Oleksandrivka to liberated based on video/photos. "

"Petropavlivka liberated based on photo evidence. I consider the surrounding settlements liberated too. "

I wonder if it's a coincidence that again he draws the "25 km artillery range" in the shape of two huge testicles, coincidently connected to something that looks like a large.... oh well.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Defence forces around the world would be learning an incredible amount at the moment and I think there will be massive changes to things like force structures, procurement priorities and defense tech design and development in the very near future, based on learnings from Ukraine.
1. The ones that might admit to learning a lot from Ukraine are ones that neglected defense for a very long time, e.g Germany which now has to spend over $108 billion just to restore some capabilities, on top of a larger annual budget.
  • Those that took their defense seriously, are mostly talking about how the war confirms many of their CONOPS.
  • In a recent IDF conference, they talked about how valuable armor is to the maneuvering force and how the Ukraine war validates the decision made almost 20 years ago to re-invest in preparations vs a near-peer enemy.
We've never had a super power like Russia engage in a full scale war against a Western Country with the population resources of someone like Ukraine, and fought logistically (by proxy) with most of the other western major military powers with a suite of the most advanced weaponry available.
2. Did we not? Much of modern warfare history is how superpowers get bogged down in less-than-developed countries.
  • Sure, at least most people were caught by surprise when Russia's offensive was stalled, then repelled, and reversed.
  • But what wisdom value do we get from this, that we didn't get in, say, Vietnam? Or the Yom Kippur War (happy anniversary!)?
If we knew most of the lessons regarding Ukraine (I will use Australia as an example), I doubt Aus would be waiting on the delivery of our first land based mobile rocket launcher platform. HIMARS has been one of the major factors in turning the tide of this war in the last month and Ukraine hasn't even deployed ATACMS to the battlefield yet. They are arguably the single most valuable bit of kit Ukraine are deploying at the moment based on their operational effectiveness so far. Even though the nature of the Ukraine War and Australia's land based Army and their requirements and scope of involvement are completely different, I'm predicting Aus makes a much greater further investment in more HIMARS launchers in the near future following the effectiveness of HIMARS in defending a land invasion against a supposedly greater military force (Ring any bells?)
3. Ukraine is a huge military force with equipment from the 70's-80's, with efficiency of the 60's-70's (Soviet tech lagged behind western), an unbalanced force structure inherited from the Soviet Union that is further unbalanced by lack of proportional air power. Of course when you give it a modern, western piece of equipment, it's going to stand out. Especially if it's the shooting or flying kind that can be easily shown to the masses.

4. Are HIMARS and MLRS important? Yes. But in a modern, balanced force, they take a back seat and are seen as only one asset out of dozens.

5. Had Ukraine had a more modern armed force with western tech to begin with, it's likely we wouldn't have heard much about HIMARS.

Ukraine will be known as the war of the drone and autonomous platforms .
6. That was said about the 1982 Lebanon War when drones were used to bait Syrian SAMs. It was also said about Iraq and Afghanistan where drones took over the majority of sorties from manned aircraft, in the regular recon and strike missions.

7. We've had "drone wars" many decades before the Ukraine war, with far more extensive use of drones than Ukraine and Russia are capable of together.

8. And the supposedly new light drones and loitering munitions, well they existed since at least the late 80's.

It very much might be a turning point in world history regarding the the importance of armor. Whilst it will always remain a key pillar of any land force, it's never been as vulnerable in it's history as in this war.
9. Wasn't that said when AT rifles were invented? Or AT mines? Or HEAT weapons? Or the ATGM? Or the NLOS missiles?

10. Again, unicorn vs museum pieces. Ukraine employs some modern munitions, like Javelins from the 90's to early 2000's vs MBTs at least 2-3 decades older. That's a huge time gap.
There are, however, thousands of MBTs in the west that wouldn't be budged by a Javelin/NLAW.

11. Here's a good mantra about life expectancy of the tank:

"The death of the tank will be preceded by the death of the attack helicopter, which isn't going anywhere."​
- Israel Tal.​

It very much changes theories regarding "nothing can beat simple boots on the ground", doctrine regarding modern defensive positions and retention rates of infantry in a truly modern battlefield. One of the biggest killing machines to date in the war has been a $1500 civilian fishing drone dropping bait bombs with rigged grenades, reaching formally impenetrable defensive positions in traditional combat doctrine, results previously only really achievable with air superiority and massive investment in high cost air platforms.
12. Again, a modern weapon brought to an environment dominated by equipment much older than most of this forum's residents.

13. Here's what happens when you try to employ said drones against a balanced 21st century force.

14. Yes, these drones cost several hundred dollars each. But guess what? So does the jammer needed to kill it.

I could keep going on and on regarding precision artillery, vulnerabilities in modern armor design not exposed to this extent in a modern war
15. I'm dying to hear this. What vulnerabilities?

16. And please, only ones that weren't identified before I was born.

the relative back seat the air force and navy's etc have played so far.
17. You mean the air force that started off small, became tiny, and only barely ascended to being small again? The one that cannot achieve air superiority so must fly low and with small loads?

18. The one that doesn't have GP precision guided munitions so must pick off single targets at a time at a great cost?

19. And do you also mean the navy that was more or less sunk at the beginning of the war?

20. I'm sorry if my tone appears hostile, it's hard to convey via text, but basically everything you said has been chewed through in every war I can remember.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 5: Learn from each other, please

1. The amount of Russian equipment Ukraine will seize in their advance, if they succeed in their push along the Dnipro river banks in Kherson, will be totally unprecedented.
(a) The Russians are running to stop being encircled. But its open country along the banks of the Dnipro river as the Ukrainian Army herd the trapped Russian Army to set up a defence line at the Nova Kakhovka dam and a second line at the Inhulets river.​
(b) Some Russians will fight but others will escape over the Nova Kakhovka dam (if the defences there fall), but most will retreat to Inhulets. There will be tons of trapped Russian equipment that cannot cross back to the other side of the Inhulets river. The Antonovsky bridge is destroyed. Once the Russians are trapped there, we could be looking at a mass surrender in Kherson. Russia will have to confront an unprecedented type of loss.​
(c) The Americans may be supplying Ukraine with weapons but the Russians seem to be trying to match American efforts at the Inhulets River. We can see this from a mile off.​

Defence forces around the world would be learning an incredible amount at the moment and I think there will be massive changes to things like force structures, procurement priorities and defense tech design and development in the very near future, based on learnings from Ukraine.
2. You may be misinformed — procurement priorities in a logical planning process in countries like Finland, Korea or Isreal would not be affected. IMHO, some Australian politicians and think tanks, like ASPI, are in the business of destroying your country’s needed military capabilities by refusing at times to act on recommendations (or making timely investments), to enable an Australian armoured brigade to fight a near-peer enemy. Australia is a force contributor, in coalition with the Americans in war. You are a country that can’t fight by itself in a near peer war without America.

3. Australian politics has ensured that your country’s army is an unbalanced force. As a balanced force of 70,000 troops, Singapore’s 3rd Division, 6th Division and 9th Divisions are operating HIMARS since 2009 —in May 2022, 13 years later, Australia finally requests for 20 M142 HIMARS. The level of armour we have in a Singapore Armoured Brigade (SAB) or a motorised Singapore Infantry Brigade (SIB) is viewed by many as overmatch for our notional enemy. See the video below for the varied types and the ecology of armour, on street display for a city fight, for a SAB and a SIB.
(a) In Ukraine, Bushmasters are pushed to the front in such a way that it can end up facing a column of Russian BMP-2 / BMP-3 IFVs, BTR-70s / BTR-80s and Russian tanks — don’t learn the wrong lesson from the war in Ukraine. The M113 AS4 in Australian Army service will eventually be replaced in coming years by the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) capability being delivered under Project LAND 400 Phase 3. M113s are APCs, not IFVs. Doctrine for their use is different. Bet you don’t know that.​
(b) Modern balanced forces are in a rush retire all M113s because the tech used for protection is so badly dated — it is no longer threat relevant. In the Planning-Readiness-Execute-Assess (PREA) cycle, a war is part of the feedback loops. In the current PREA loop, planners notice that Ukrainian troops are dying because the belly armour of the M113s suck so bad. But guess what? It’s design as an APC is much better than a technical or a Soviet era BMP-2 IFV or BTR-70 / BTR-80.​
(c) Like a MRAP, the Bushmaster is a protected mobility vehicle, it can’t fight a Russian BMP-3 IFV. And MRAPs are a South African invention — the Casspir infantry mobility vehicle was developed for the South African Defence Force in the 1980s, IIRC. But guess what? MRAPs can’t fight IFVs with 30mm cannons. There is no need to write a ton of bullsh!t, if you don’t know or understand the difference (between MRAPs/PMVs, APCs & IFVs) because I can assure you that like me, @Big_Zucchini, knows how these are to be employed in war.​
(d) The US in this tranche is shipping 200 MaxxPro MRAPs because Ukrainian troops in Soviet era APCs, BTR-3s and M113s are dying from anti-tank mines. Thus far, Russia did not or could not execute combined arms operations in Ukraine — therefore, we need to be careful about drawing the wrong warfare lessons from it.​

4. With a population of 25.8 million, the entire Australian Army of 60,330 is comprised of 2 divisions — do you know how small that is for a country of this size? No one preparing for a near peer fight (eg. Poland, US, Korea & India) are training at brigade level — they are training at division level, in two sided-exercises, while concurrently trying to sort out the logistics of moving divisions to fight concurrently in Corp sectors or to echelon divisions, to exploit the engagement of a division with the enemy forces by pushing another division into a fight.

(a) The Australian Army is so tiny, it can’t deploy even a single division — your current goal is to have the resources to deploy a brigade as a course of action (COA) to a regional security contingency. Thankfully, with 2 LHDs, a LPD and a fleet of C-17s, the RAN and RAAF combined are almost there. If a contingency occurs in Korea, your country will just be a minor force contributor.​
(b) In Korea with a population of 51.3 million, the ROK Army of 464,000 comprises of 9 corps, (36 divisions), plan to fight at Corps and above. The Australian Army does not have Corp Commander because you don’t have the forces. Speaking of Korea, in the Battle of Maryang San, “3 RAR used 900,000 rounds of small arms, 5,000 grenades and 7,000 mortar rounds during the five-day battle.” I can tell you that Australian does not have the logistics means to ship this amount of ammo, per battalion, to a remote island for it’s sole division.​
(c) Keep in mind that the PLA methodically assembles capabilities and tactics under its concept of systems warfare, which targets perceived vulnerabilities of expected Japanese/American forces and plans. As a situation moves toward conflict, the PLA shifts to the “readiness” phase, in which it postures specific units and tailors COAs for expected operations.​

5. In FPDA, Australia is the leader but it is the SAF that provides mass, if a true peer war contingency occurs.
(a) In a true sh!t hit the fan peer enemy contingent, it will take Australia 12 to 18 months to ramp up its force structure, to its max. war fighting size of 2 divisions. In the meanwhile, our conscripts in 3 divisions will have to hold the line for FPDA forces for 3 to 6 months, while screaming for help from anyone, including Uncle SAM.​
(b) For Singapore, the SAF does not fight as a Corp because we don’t want to resource it, at this time. The need does not arise for Singapore to fight above the division level. The SAF’s division (with its SAB as its armoured punch and 2 SIBs to deliver infantry), is a force for overmatch in our threat matrix and we don’t want to appear to be capable of fighting a ‘peer’ enemy of America — naming a competitor as an enemy is a sure way to make one.​
 
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TScott

Member
1. The ones that might admit to learning a lot from Ukraine are ones that neglected defense for a very long time, e.g Germany which now has to spend over $108 billion just to restore some capabilities, on top of a larger annual budget.
  • Those that took their defense seriously, are mostly talking about how the war confirms many of their CONOPS.
  • In a recent IDF conference, they talked about how valuable armor is to the maneuvering force and how the Ukraine war validates the decision made almost 20 years ago to re-invest in preparations vs a near-peer enemy.

2. Did we not? Much of modern warfare history is how superpowers get bogged down in less-than-developed countries.
  • Sure, at least most people were caught by surprise when Russia's offensive was stalled, then repelled, and reversed.
  • But what wisdom value do we get from this, that we didn't get in, say, Vietnam? Or the Yom Kippur War (happy anniversary!)?
3. Ukraine is a huge military force with equipment from the 70's-80's, with efficiency of the 60's-70's (Soviet tech lagged behind western), an unbalanced force structure inherited from the Soviet Union that is further unbalanced by lack of proportional air power. Of course when you give it a modern, western piece of equipment, it's going to stand out. Especially if it's the shooting or flying kind that can be easily shown to the masses.

4. Are HIMARS and MLRS important? Yes. But in a modern, balanced force, they take a back seat and are seen as only one asset out of dozens.

5. Had Ukraine had a more modern armed force with western tech to begin with, it's likely we wouldn't have heard much about HIMARS.

6. That was said about the 1982 Lebanon War when drones were used to bait Syrian SAMs. It was also said about Iraq and Afghanistan where drones took over the majority of sorties from manned aircraft, in the regular recon and strike missions.

7. We've had "drone wars" many decades before the Ukraine war, with far more extensive use of drones than Ukraine and Russia are capable of together.

8. And the supposedly new light drones and loitering munitions, well they existed since at least the late 80's.

9. Wasn't that said when AT rifles were invented? Or AT mines? Or HEAT weapons? Or the ATGM? Or the NLOS missiles?

10. Again, unicorn vs museum pieces. Ukraine employs some modern munitions, like Javelins from the 90's to early 2000's vs MBTs at least 2-3 decades older. That's a huge time gap.
There are, however, thousands of MBTs in the west that wouldn't be budged by a Javelin/NLAW.

11. Here's a good mantra about life expectancy of the tank:

"The death of the tank will be preceded by the death of the attack helicopter, which isn't going anywhere."​
- Israel Tal.
12. Again, a modern weapon brought to an environment dominated by equipment much older than most of this forum's residents.

13. Here's what happens when you try to employ said drones against a balanced 21st century force.

14. Yes, these drones cost several hundred dollars each. But guess what? So does the jammer needed to kill it.

15. I'm dying to hear this. What vulnerabilities?

16. And please, only ones that weren't identified before I was born.

17. You mean the air force that started off small, became tiny, and only barely ascended to being small again? The one that cannot achieve air superiority so must fly low and with small loads?

18. The one that doesn't have GP precision guided munitions so must pick off single targets at a time at a great cost?

19. And do you also mean the navy that was more or less sunk at the beginning of the war?

20. I'm sorry if my tone appears hostile, it's hard to convey via text, but basically everything you said has been chewed through in every war I can remember.
I can address most points later, but I will say something simply:

I never claimed that these were the first instances of this technology occurring, I was trying to convey this is the first instance of their incorporation in a near peer to peer conflict.

Comparing a Ukraine force supplied by the major western powers in direct conflict with one of the historically largest military powers of the last 150 years to that of conflicts in Yemen and Syria, the differences are surely obvious?

The tank and airplane saw action in WWI and subsequent conflicts, but it doesn't mean it's use in WW2 completely changed ongoing military doctrine to this very day.
 
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koxinga

Well-Known Member
1. Not all Ukrainian males below the age of 18 were fleeing Ukraine
2. Many refugees have actually returned. Despite ongoing war and lack of access to care, many refugees return to Ukraine (who.int)
@Vivendi I am not sure why you are triggered. Did I imply that all Ukrainians below 18 were fleeing?

1. I stated a fact (males between 18 - 60 were required to stay) and I qualified in my second paragraph that there were those below 18 either stayed or left. (e.g same as your point that not all left) Let's also be clear, there is no shame in leaving, since below 18 would largely include children that are not meant to be combatants.

2. Many = (>4 million) have returned. But based on the data of people that left in the first months, the majority of them were women and children (depending on which sources, between 85% - 90%). I am not able to find any more granular demographic data but suffice to say, out of the remaining 10% - 15%, the number of males who are turning 18 in the last 6 months would not be a significant number.

The children are the future of Ukraine. They will be needed to rebuild the country. Conscriping 18 year olds would be an act of desperation much like the Russians are doing now.

 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
2. You may be misinformed — procurement priorities in a logical planning process in countries like Finland, Korea or Isreal would not be affected. IMHO, some Australian politicians and think tanks, like ASPI, are in the business of destroying your country’s needed military capabilities by refusing at times to act on recommendations (or making timely investments), to enable an Australian armoured brigade to fight a near-peer enemy. Australia is a force contributor, in coalition with the Americans in war. You are a country that can’t fight by itself in a near peer war without America.
@OPSSG and that is how democracy works, you leave it to incompetent politicians, blocs and interest groups and hope that the stars are aligned so that at least during one or two terms, you have enough sensible politicians to undo the damage.

I see no point in comparing how Singapore works versus other countries, since Singapore is run by largely "sensible" politicians with long governance runways, affording them the luxury work with professional public servants to concieve well thought out plans without answering to interest groups, lobbyists and the opposition.
 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Ukraine cancels autumn conscription and postpones demobilization: Zelensky cancels autumn conscription, postpones demobilization (kyivindependent.com)

What are the implications of this? There have been a lot of speculations regarding both RU and UKR losses. We know that RU has started a huge mobilization effort, probably to compensate for significant losses. If UKR had similar losses, would it make sense to cancel autumn conscription?
I suspect the training pipelines are already full. I doubt UKR can equip another wave of conscripts.

We have no way of proving it, but I would guess RU has taken more losses than UKR. UKR has been on the defensive most of the time, while RU is recruiting from prisons.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
1. The amount of Russian equipment Ukraine will seize in their advance, if they succeed in their push along the Dnipro river banks in Kherson, will be totally unprecedented.
I sure hope the UKR can keep this train rolling. If they could buffalo the RU near Kherson into surrendering, that might be a morale blow big enough to rock the RU army.

I do feel sorry for the Oryx team, who would have to review all the captured equipment data. Those guys need a break from the Izyum rout !
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
A look at Russian command and control... Russian generals in the field. The 21st century? I haven't heard...


EDIT; If anyone is wondering, Russia spent quite a bit of time and money developing a unified command and control system called Sozvezdie, a variant of the system was exported to India, various component parts were tested in the Russian military, and reportedly kits had started to arrive in line units pre-war but right now we're seeing Russian leadership at crucial junctions with drastically inadequate tools for coordinating the war effort. This comes as Russia is increasingly facing overwhelming Ukrainian forces and good coordination and comms are more important then ever.

On an interesting side note the VDV accepted their own command and control system called Andromeda-D into service, and took delivery of it in larger quantities then the land forces, while also being smaller themselves. This likely accounts for some of their better performance. By all reports it was a less ambitious but therefore easier to implement system.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates. Part 1.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
October 4, 10:00 pm ET

Full article
: Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.

  • Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization is having more significant short-term impacts on the Russian domestic context than on the war in Ukraine, catalyzing fractures in the information space that confuse and undermine Putin’s narratives.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains in northern Kherson Oblast on October 4, beginning to collapse the sparsely-manned Russian lines in that area.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to make gains in eastern Kharkiv Oblast west of Svatove on October 4, pushing past the Oskil River and increasingly threatening Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyiapole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 4.
  • Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 4.
  • The Kremlin effectively ordered local Russian administrations and non-Ministry of Defense institutions to fund a significant part of the mobilization effort from local budgets.
  • Russian security officials are attempting to maintain their domestic security apparatus as Putin’s partial mobilization drains the Russian security sector to generate additional forces to fight in Ukraine.


Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4.
Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway, forcing Russian forces to retreat to the south toward Kherson City. Ukrainian forces also continued to push south along the Dnipro River and the T0403 highway, severing two Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Kherson Oblast and forcing Russians south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border toward the Beryslav area. Ukrainian military officials noted that the Ukrainian interdiction campaign is crippling Russian attempts to transfer additional ammunition, reserves, mobilized men, and means of defense to frontline positions.[1] Ukrainian forces also continued to advance east of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that battles are ongoing near the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[2]
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
I was trying to convey this is the first instance of their incorporation in a near pear to pear conflict.
Indeed but ultimately a lot of what we're seeing now isn't new or totally surprising irrespective of the fact that it's happening in a peer to per conflict unlike in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Nargano Karabakh and the Donbas. If you want to point out that this is the first peer to peer conflict in which we're seeing many things unfold then yes but ultimately many of these things aren't really surprising or unexpected.

Comparing a Ukraine force supplied by the major western powers in direct conflict with one of the historically largest military powers of the last 150 years to that of conflicts in Yemen and Syria, the differences are surely obvious?
The similarities with regards to many things [the need for effective C3; for AD to be integrated; for UASs to be operated as part of recce/strike packages; for sufficient amounts of ammo to be available; for armour to be operated as part of combined arms teams; for MLRSs to need effective targeting in order to be effective; etc, also surely obvious.

doesn't mean it's use in WW2 completely changed ongoing military doctrine to this very day.
Maybe not ''completely changed'' but it still has a large bearing and influences things till today.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates. October 4, 10:00 pm ET. Part 2.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization is having more significant short-term impacts on the Russian domestic context than on the war in Ukraine, interacting with Russian battlefield failures to exacerbate fractures in the information space that confuse and undermine Putin’s narratives. Ukrainian sources have rightly observed that the partial mobilization is not a major threat in the short term because the Ukrainian counteroffensive is moving faster than the mobilization can generate effects.[3] Ukrainian Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov even stated that mobilization in Russia is a “gift” to Ukraine because the Kremlin is finding itself in a “dead end,” caught between its failures and its determination to hold what it has seized.[4] The controversies surrounding the poorly executed partial mobilization, coupled with significant Russian defeats in Kharkiv Oblast and around Lyman, have intensified infighting between pro-Putin Russian nationalist factions and are creating new fractures among voices who speak to Putin’s core constituencies.[5]

Putin is visibly failing at balancing the competing demands of the Russian nationalists who have become increasingly combative since mobilization began despite sharing Putin’s general war aims and goals in Ukraine. ISW has identified three main factions in the current Russian nationalist information space: Russian milbloggers and war correspondents, former Russian or proxy officers and veterans, and some of the Russian siloviki—people with meaningful power bases and forces of their own. Putin needs to retain the support of all three of these factions. Milbloggers present Putin’s vision to a pro-war audience in both Russia and the proxy republics. The veteran community is helping organize and support force generation campaigns.[6] The siloviki are providing combat power on the battlefield. Putin needs all three factions to sustain his war effort, but the failures in Ukraine combined with the chaotic partial mobilization are seemingly disrupting the radical nationalist community in Russia. Putin is currently trying to appease this community by featuring some milbloggers on state-owned television, allowing siloviki to generate their own forces and continue offensive operations around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, and placating veterans by ordering mobilization and engaging the general public in the war effort as they have long demanded.

Russian failures around Lyman galvanized strong and direct criticism of the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Alexander Lapin, who supposedly commanded the Lyman grouping, as ISW has previously reported.[7] This criticism originated from the siloviki group, spearheaded by Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kadyrov and Prigozhin represent an emerging voice within the regime’s fighting forces that is attacking the more traditional and conventional approach to the war pursued by Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu and the uniformed military command. The chaotic execution of Putin’s mobilization order followed by the collapse of the Lyman pocket ignited tensions between the more vocal and radical Kadyrov-Prigozhin camp, who attacked the MoD and the uniformed military for their poor handling of the war.[8] Putin now finds himself in a dilemma. He cannot risk alienating the Kadyrov-Prigozhin camp, as he desperately needs Kadyrov’s Chechen forces and Prigozhin’s Wagner Group mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[9] Nor can he disenfranchise the MoD establishment, which provides the overwhelming majority of Russian military power in Ukraine and the institutional underpinnings needed to carry out the mobilization order and continue the war.

The Kadyrov-Prigozhin incident sparked a rift between the siloviki and the milbloggers, with the milbloggers defending Lapin. Milbloggers are criticizing Kadyrov’s attack on Lapin, claiming that it stems from competition between Lapin and Kadyrov-Prigozhin.[10] The Kremlin did not punish Kadyrov or Prigozhin for their direct attacks on Lapin and the Defense Ministry but has instead deflected blame for the Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast onto the Western Military District (WMD). Kremlin-affiliated outlets have even interviewed milbloggers who have painted Lapin as a hero for saving the stranded WMD units in Lyman, likely in an effort to divert responsibility for the Russian defeat there onto recently fired WMD Commander Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlev.[11] Milbloggers, who had frequently complimented Kadyrov or Prigozhin before this incident, are now more skeptical of the siloviki community, attacking it for being too self-interested.

Fractures are emerging within the Russian milblogger community itself, moreover. Milbloggers have begun increasingly questioning each other's military credentials and rights to offer recommendations for the Russian Armed Forces.[12] One milblogger complained that commentators without appropriate military experience have been improperly criticizing current military commanders and should be focusing on simply portraying the situation on the frontlines without editorializing.[13] These critiques have been largely aimed at the milblogger discourse following the Russian defeat in Lyman and the Kadyrov-Prigozhin incident.[14] These attacks on some milbloggers’ credentials have drawn responses from milbloggers who have met with Putin himself and are being featured on Kremlin-controlled television channels, who now declare that they are the ones who have shown the true shortcomings of the Russian forces to Putin so that he can address them.[15]

The veterans’ community is dissatisfied with the execution of Putin’s mobilization. ISW reported in May that an independent Russian veterans’ organization, the All-Russian Officers Assembly, published an open letter calling on Putin to declare war on Ukraine, announce partial mobilization, and form new war-time administrations to execute the mobilization order.[16] Those new administrations would likely have improved or supplanted the military commissariats that have been mishandling the current partial mobilization. The Assembly also encouraged Putin to recognize that Russia is fighting NATO in Ukraine, not Ukrainians, long before this narrative gained prominence in the Kremlin’s justifications for its defeat in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman. This elder nationalist military community has long been warning Putin of the limitations of his forces, problems in the Russian military-industrial complex, and the failings of the Russian mobilization system. Putin has refused to order general mobilization or declare war against Ukraine, and the partial mobilization has likely been executed as poorly as those who had recommended fixing the mobilization system had feared. Former Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District Andrey Gurulev stated that the Russian military command must disclose its inability to mobilize 300,000 combat-ready reservists and broaden the mobilization criteria if Russia is to have any hope of regaining the initiative in this war.[17] Gurulev even expressed his support for Kadyrov’s and Prigozhin’s attack on Lapin, highlighting the growing fractiousness of the nationalist information space.

The fragmentation of the Russian nationalist information space could have significant domestic impacts and could even affect the stability of Putin’s regime. Putin will be unable to meet the mutually exclusive demands of various groups. Kadyrov and Prigozhin are pushing for a change in the way Russia fights the war to one more suited to their unconventional modes of mobilizing personnel and fighting. The veterans have been pushing for a more traditional overhaul of the Russian higher military command and MoD and for putting Russia on a conventional war footing and the Russian MoD. Russian milbloggers are currently defending the Kremlin’s selection of uniformed commanders while continuing to attack the MoD and making a variety of extreme demands and recommendations of their own—all the while reporting on Russia’s frontline failings in detail even as the MoD tries to silence them. Putin cannot afford to lose the support of any of these groups, nor can satisfy them all as the war wears on and Russian troops continue to sustain losses. The shocks of the Kharkiv and Lyman defeats, energized by the partial mobilization and its poor management, have exposed these deepening fissures within Putin’s core constituencies to the view of all Russians. They could even begin to seed the notion that Putin is not fully in control of his own base. The ramifications of such a development for his regime are hard to predict.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 5: Learn from each other, please

6. The difficulties Russia has had in the conflict with Ukraine has proven that the West, if and when NATO is committed fully in conventional capability, it will have few if any issues with defeating the Russian Army in Ukraine. The West in its PREA loop have chosen to arm Ukraine but not to fight because of the risk of nuclear escalation (in the likely event of Russian defeat), if NATO troops are directly involved.

We've never had a super power like Russia engage in a full scale war against a Western Country with the population resources of someone like Ukraine, and fought logistically (by proxy) with most of the other western major military powers with a suite of the most advanced weaponry available.
7. Everyone is not seeing the same thing because of prior experience — read more on the PREA loop. Learn from each other, in this forum please. Their point of view, informed by experience and planning (for their army force structure) is valid too.

A look at Russian command and control... Russian generals in the field. The 21st century? I haven't heard...
8. @Feanor, spot on. Where is the so called unified C2 system ‘Sozvezdie’ (a variant of the system was exported to India), for Russia?

9. In contrast, earlier pictures released by Ukraine, of their command post’s C4ISR system, make Ukraine look advanced in comparison.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
Footage of a Ukrainian T-72 conducting indirect fire on Russian positions km away. An aircraft - which I assume is Russian - is later heard in the video.

 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I can address most points later, but I will say something simply:

I never claimed that these were the first instances of this technology occurring, I was trying to convey this is the first instance of their incorporation in a near pear to pear conflict.

Comparing a Ukraine force supplied by the major western powers in direct conflict with one of the historically largest military powers of the last 150 years to that of conflicts in Yemen and Syria, the differences are surely obvious?

The tank and airplane saw action in WWI and subsequent conflicts, but it doesn't mean it's use in WW2 completely changed ongoing military doctrine to this very day.
Neither was I talking about them occuring. Rather, about them being used.
  • For many, the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict in 2020 was the dawn of drone warfare. It wasn't.
My examples were the 1982 WAR between Israel and Syria, which at the time were near peers to one another, and many years of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Q1: Can you give an example of a weapon system that was used in combat, for the first time, in Ukraine?
  • Because drones, loitering munitions, MLRS, are not examples of that.
Now, let's switch back to tanks.

Q2: Can you identify one vulnerability tanks have that was observed for the first time in Ukraine and which doesn't already have a solution deployed?
 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
@OPSSG and that is how democracy works, you leave it to incompetent politicians, blocs and interest groups and hope that the stars are aligned so that at least during one or two terms, you have enough sensible politicians to undo the damage.

I see no point in comparing how Singapore works versus other countries, since Singapore is run by largely "sensible" politicians with long governance runways, affording them the luxury work with professional public servants to concieve well thought out plans without answering to interest groups, lobbyists and the opposition.
I agree Singapore seems to be a well-run country, including the defence. However, I do not completely agree that democratic countries cannot produce decent long-term defence plans and implement them. Examples include: Finland (the prime example IMHO), Israel, South Korea, Greece, and to some extent the UK, France. The counterargument to my examples could be "well those are all 'special cases'" however my counter-counter argument would be "well so is Singapore".

There are plenty of examples of nondemocratic countries that have poor defences. Also, several examples of nondemocratic countries having relatively "poor defence" compared to the resources they have invested, e.g., Saudia Arabia and several other ME countries -- after the last 7 months, I would also put Russia in the category of nondemocratic countries having invested substantially in their armed forces and with rather poor ROI...
 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
The children are the future of Ukraine. They will be needed to rebuild the country. Conscriping 18 year olds would be an act of desperation much like the Russians are doing now.
Indeed, and that was my point -- Ukraine is not as desperate as Russia. It seems we are in agreement on this point. Apologies for not communicating more clearly what I meant.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Well, I was responding to @OPSSG repeated trumpet blowing of how great is Singapore's defence planning. We can agree that democracies and non democracies can screw up defence planning, which means that political systems are hardly a good measure.

UK is shitshow as far as defence planning is concerned. Successive SDSR have basically decimated their capabilities. And if Germany is any measure to go by...

@koxinga There is no call for you to disrespect OPSSG. FYI he actually knows what he's talking about and FYI Singaporean defence planning is good. So pull your head in and behave.

Ngatimozart.
 
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Morgo

Well-Known Member
I never claimed that these were the first instances of this technology occurring, I was trying to convey this is the first instance of their incorporation in a near peer to peer conflict.
I think comparing peer to peer conflict to the current situation is like comparing apples with oranges.

I’d like to see the discussion return to a more fruitful track.

Sorry I couldn’t help myself. I’ll see myself out.

EDIT: The mods have corrected TScott’s typos, and my awful puns. How disappointing.
 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
According to Forbes Russia, 700,000 Russians have left Russia since mobilization was announced September 21; 200,000 went to Kazakhstan. Россию после 21 сентября покинули около 700 000 граждан

If confirmed, this is much more than what I expected. If true, it's odd that Russian authorities have not been more effective in halting the exodus. Perhaps bribes at the border could partly explain this? In any case, such a mass exodus is clearly not helpful to the Russian economy, and Russian society.
 
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