Middle East Defence & Security

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
If we're taking about the same insurgents here IS captured territory the size of England and the danger was real. Might not appear scary to you when viewed on a map in another country but let me assure you to ordinary Iraqis and to the Iranians who share a border with Iraq; it was extremely "scary"'
I'm talking as someone who had ISIS on 4 different borders. They're meant to look scary. That's part of the marketing, but when faced with an actual organized and well trained military, they crumble just like any other terrorist organization has. Their "massive gains" weren't due to some superior strategy (although they have introduced a few distinct tactics), but rather just many organizations that already held those territories jumped on the wagon and joined ISIS, thus automatically giving them control.

Russia has a huge amount of territory, but the bulk of actual Russia is in its European side (western), with the vast majority of the country very scarcely populated.

What should be measured is the portion of population of Syria and Iraq that they held. And frankly, it was never a threatening amount.
Any operation that would seek to weaken only ISIS and achieve no other goal, would not need such presence. Attack their sources of funding, attack their media, attack their lines of communication and attempt to assassinate leaders, and you've already done 90% of the job by just removing what little that made them "unique".

In the Sinai they tried to bomb Eilat. They were bombed a few times and never dared attempt such an attack again. In Syria they also refused to divert any resources to try to attack Israel. In Gaza and the West Bank they were easily crushed. The US committed very little relative to the perceived threat, and crushed them as well. What made the Iraqis and Syrians struggle against ISIS? The fact those many rebel groups, terrorists, and local gangs were now united under one roof, and that on a technological level, they were a match for them. Also, ISIS had institutional capacity for tactical innovation while the Syrians and Iraqis, with their well known incompetence, failed to adapt.

It hasn't always been a history of sheer incompetence and you put it. The Arabs also have a history of making the right security related decisions when they have to.It's great to apply or reach generalistic and simplistic statements driven perhaps by prejudices or other things but doesn't enable an accurate picture.
I'm not talking about history and the wars of several decades ago. I'm talking about what I'm seeing today, with how incapable they are of dealing with the simplest of tasks.

Most glaring example is Saudi Arabia. Its forces are being crushed in Yemen, its navy is practically nowhere to be found while Iran's efforts to supply Houthis with arms were uninterrupted, and while Iran's own assault on civilian shipping in the gulf, sometimes in the Arab sea ports themselves(!) went unanswered. On the strike on Aramco, Saudi Arabia didn't even respond!

As for Assad's betrayal of the Iranians if you understand or are aware of the dynamics at play and the history behind it you'll understand that any betrayal is unlikely.
That... is what I said.

Also the intention is not to "sway"' Syria away from Iran because that would be impossible but to perhaps lessen its influence and gain further leverage over Assad.
That's just another word for sway. What makes you think their attempts will be anything but futile in light of the diminishing power of the Arab nations and the increasing sense of Iranian victory in their cold war? Especially since every piece of Iran's foreign policies will now be dramatically boosted by the sanctions relief.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
I'm talking as someone who had ISIS on 4 different borders. They're meant to look scary.
Granted but they didn't enter the Galilee or cross over from the Sinai. After taking over a slice of Iraq comparable to the size of England and after overturning various towns and cities they did look very scary to the Iraqis... And to the Iranians; irrespective of the fact that IS was no match for any well trained military.

Syrians and Iraqis, with their well known incompetence, failed to adapt
Incorrect. In due course Syrian and Iraqi units did adapt and improve after going through a tough and expensive learning curve. There are a number of videos in which U.S. advisors are full of opraise praise for certain Iraqi units who largely fought alone after the U.S. military withdrawal some years earlier. If the Syrians and Iraqis were incapable of adapting as you claim IS would not have been defeated when it was; irrespective of assistance provided by the U.S, Russians and Iranians. We also have to note that IS itself was known for various innovative tactics and it's field leadership comprised numerous former Iraqi military people; a well known fact.

If you want to state that the Syrian and Iraqi military was largely ineffective and incompetent I'd fully agree but in due course certain units rapidly improved. Also despite their well documented history of under performing in various wars the Arabs also have a clear history of adapting and there are various examples. In your constant criticism of Arab military performance you make it sound as if they have never improved or lack the ability because of issues inherent in them; not true.

I recommend "Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness" [Pollack]. The author goes in great detail analysing Arab military performance and provides certain answers.

I'm not talking about history and the wars of several decades ago
I'm taking about what we're seeing today being a result of history and various dynamics still at play.

On the strike on Aramco, Saudi Arabia didn't even respond!.
True but not everyone is Israel who is able and will respond proportionately [of course] if even a 20 kilo rock is hurled across its border. The Saudis didn't respond because they feared further attacks which they could not prevent. For one note that their oil facilities were extremely vulnerable because their air defences were optimised for medium to high altitude threats; not swarms of micro UASs [which at that period hardly anyone had the experience of dealing with]. Not responding made them look weak, indicisive and other things but it is what it is; wasn't without good reason.

That... is what I said..
Gratified to hear it. Then you'll understand why an Assad betrayal of Iran is unlikely.

What makes you think their attempts will be anything but futile in light of the diminishing power of the Arab nations and the increasing sense of Iranian victory in their cold war?.
Did I say that? I merely said that talks are driven by realpoltik; the realisation by the Arabs that the longstanding policy of isolating and weakening Iran has failed and that an attempt is being made to improve and lower tensions. You're assuming talks will fail; I'm not assuming anything but I will point out that there is genuine desire by both sides because both sides see the need and both sides are making great efforts. In the past the Saudis or Emeratis would never have held such high level publicised talks with the Iranians.


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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Iran deal reportedly consists of 4 phases, would take full effect within 165 days.
The phases are mostly related to internal US politics, as this time Biden wishes to ratify the deal in Congress.
While I can't personally gauge just how pro or anti deal the Congress are, I know Obama declined to bring the JCPOA to Congress fearing it would be shot down.
Israel, as you know, would rather have no deal, seeking a military solution and maintaining full pressure.
In 2015 Israel's then-PM Netanyahu bypassed the White House and made a speech in Congress urging them to oppose the deal. It was an all-out PR war.
Current PM Lapid takes a different, more professional approach of talking directly to the White House, less with Congress and the press.
There are some rewards - the deal is slightly better for Israel than the 2015 JCPOA, and Biden speaks more openly about the military option.
Israel could have its way if Congress shoots down the deal.


Mossad chief to travel to Washington to try and reshape the deal in a last ditch effort.
The Mossad chief is the most vocal critic of the deal. He believes Mossad, and Israel itself, have the tools necessary to provide a military solution to the nuclear program. What's always missing is the green light.
The chief, Barnea, said the deal was "bad for Israel", and "based on lies".
He is only one of several Israeli officials that traveled to Washington regarding the deal. Just recently, Minister of Defense Benny Gantz made a visit.


Russia sends one of Syria's S-300 batteries back to Russia.
The move can be interpreted in more than one way, but a popular take was simply Russia's inability to properly defend Crimea while this battery was rusting away in Syria.
Its inability to shoot down Israeli munitions and aircraft meant it was useless to Russia and Syria there, and if the intention was to use merely the radar to gather intelligence, Russia would have simply sent radars only, and it wouldn't raise an eyebrow.


In odd chronological proximity to the S-300 being withdrawn, the SSRC site which the S-300 battery previously protected, was attacked. The damage to the facility is so extensive, local residents reported secondary explosions for hours. Some say the area was burning for 2 hours, some say 6, some say 24 hours. Regardless, the scale is exceptional, and Syrian aerial firefighting units fought the forest fires that resulted from the strike.
SOHR - a one man organization considered to be not so credible, claimed over 1,000 missiles have been destroyed there. Some claim multiple thousands.
But anyone who understands how such things work, will understand it's difficult to quantify such things when using specific labels like 'missile' and 'destroyed'.
The observed damage at least tells us a significant amount of munitions had been destroyed. Satellite imagery shows rather un-dramatic damage, which points to the objects being located deep underground.
Israel does have a wide range of bunker busting munitions, but some articles oddly referenced low flight in the context of the strikes in the area, and one article referenced special munitions.
One possibility is air-launched ballistic missiles like the Rampage or ROCKS.
SSRC's primary work is in integration of systems on long range rockets and SRBMs. These include guidance systems for Hezbollah and SAA, and they are responsible for Syria's chemical weapons development and manufacturing as well. It has many branches, but these are its two primary ones - guidance kits integration and chemical weapons.



Perhaps related to Russia's S-300 withdrawal, looming Iran deal, and the exceptional strike in Masyaf, Assad requests Iran not to attack Israel from its territory.
As a result, we've seen Iran repeatedly targeting the US in Syria and Iraq.
How smart is that in the long term? Or short term? I don't know. But it seems to backfire at least for now, as the US responds to these attacks disproportionately.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Iran keeps demanding cessation of IAEA investigations into clandestine nuclear sites as a condition to nuclear deal. US says no. Previously US officials indicated the talks were nearing completion, i.e signing deal soon. Not sure if US believes Iran will drop this, or was unaware of Iran's view on the subject.

Russia reportedly asks Iran to leave certain Syrian sites for fear of repeated targeting. Russia has taken particular interest in the Syrian air ports, so I assume it refers to said air ports, in which Iran has significant presence. Iranian Ma'an air is a hybrid civilian-military airline using commercial flights to transport military hardware, and thus flies very frequently to Syria.

Op-ed on Arab stance on Iran. It seems to be a mix of fear, as Israel can defend itself from Iran but they cannot (sufficiently, in their eyes), and a desire to have Israel do the heavy lifting for them.
On the former, it is their responsibility and none should have a pass for bad planning when it comes to national interests, and on the former, Israel should find a way to deter the Arab states from leeching off Israel's defense capabilities. They need Israel just as much as Israel needs them.
Both aspects are augmented by their opinion of the US being a weak regional actor.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Iran keeps towing the same line in nuclear talks - exclude clandestine sites, materials, and work from banned activities, or no deal. Sounds like the exact opposite of the spirit of the deal but okay. And it appears that's how the US understands it as well.


This brings us to the main event - this Iranian demand may have torpedoed the nuclear deal for now. US officials indicated to Israel the nuclear deal is off the table for now.


In somewhat related news, an Iran-Russia deal reportedly dating back to 2021 and involving a buy of S-400 systems, Su-35 air superiority jets, and a military satellite, is now back in the spotlight, although it may be revised from the reported version in 2021.
Although some are sure it will go through, there are numerous caveats, one of them being potential sanctions on Iran when it enters the nuclear deal. This particular one has been somewhat alleviated seeing as the nuclear deal is reportedly postponed.

If it does go through, it could be a substantial obstacle for Israel.

 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Head of Mossad David Barnea says "Nuclear deal will not immunize Iran from Mossad operations".

Although indicated or explicitly said in the past, it's important for Israel and its various defense and intelligence organizations to lay the foundation and normalize Israeli actions vs Iran's nuclear program even when a deal is in place, to reduce backlash from the US and international community as much as possible.

The public memory is short, and that's why it's necessary, but it's not a new policy. Mossad, and the Israeli defense establishment in general, have acted vs Iran's nuclear program during the JCPOA, and it was a Mossad operation that revealed the information that ended the JCPOA and blocks the current deal from happening.


This opinion piece caught me a bit by surprise. It's somewhat religious in nature, which I tend to ignore, but this time there are real implications. King Charles wants to be buried in Jerusalem's Mount of Olives, which the Palestinians claim for themselves. What do you guys think? Would the UK change its Jerusalem policy in light of this?


Israel's ambassador to Germany says Germany is Israel's 2nd most important ally after the US.
  • Some could have guessed it even before the war in Ukraine, but I think the war vastly boosted this perception. With Germany now eyeing security as a serious matter, it may change its worldview not only regarding Russia, but antagonistic powers in general, which in Israel's case means Iran. This could have an effect on how efficiently and decisively diplomacy will be conducted in the middle east when it involves external powers, particularly on subjects like curbing terrorism, Iran nuclear deal, and potentially in a more distant future the prevention of Arab states from trying to develop their own WMDs.
  • Israel is also effectively delegitimized in the global stage by entities like China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and more, partly because traditional European allies are not serving as a counter-weight consistently enough, and we could soon see a change in that aspect.
European powers are also likely to reduce the scope of support for Palestinians due to the Palestinian factions being strongly aligned with Russia.



Israeli official predicts no return to Iran deal until US mid-terms in November. It has been widely reported recently that the Iran deal is being significantly delayed, at least in part due to Iran's refusal to disclose information on clandestine nuclear sites. Even if temporary, this is a very positive change for regional stability.



Iran unveils new Arash-2 suicide drone said to be especially designed to hit [Israeli cities] Haifa and Tel Aviv.

 
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STURM

Well-Known Member

To me the Brits don't necessarily have to change their policy on Bayt al-Muqaddas/Jerusalem in order for Prince Charles to be buried there. Highly doubt they would go as far as changing their policy for him to be buried there. Dicey situation but I don't see it as impossible despite whatever apparent obstacles and complications there are.

On another issue; I frankly can't remember if I've posted this before but this is an extremely interesting talk with a former IDF armour General. He was trained in Germany on the M-48 in 1964 and commanded an armoured battalion in the Ramadhan/Yom Kippur war.

On the eve of the invasion; which the Israelis initially thought would be a continuation of the War Of Attrition; he had a platoon along the canal with the remaining elements of his battalion some 20km away; his divisional HQ was 150km to the rear. He lost most of his tanks [including his own] and suffered high casualties [his battalion faced a division. Interestingly when he was later was the Military Atache in London he became chums with his Egyptian opposite who was an engineer officer in same sector as him. There is also no mention of the battle for Suez city in which the Israelis raced to capture before the cease fire and in the process lost 40 tanks. This interview is highly recommended.


I remember an Israeii telling me that the country is relatively small and at one point or another one eventually bumps into famous or well known individuals; either at an event or along a street. Did you ever have the chance to meet any well known officers who fought in 1967, 1973 and 1982?
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
This opinion piece caught me a bit by surprise. It's somewhat religious in nature, which I tend to ignore, but this time there are real implications. King Charles wants to be buried in Jerusalem's Mount of Olives, which the Palestinians claim for themselves. What do you guys think? Would the UK change its Jerusalem policy in light of this?

I actually doubt the veracity of that article. If anything I would suggest that HM King Charles III will be buried inside the Royal Vault at Windsor alongside hi parents because he was especially close to his mother, HM Queen Elizabeth II. He's also a traditionalist and he will most likely follow the tradition of his predecessors of being buried in the Royal Vault. There would be considerable uproar in the UK if a monarch was buried outside of the country. Even Edward VIII is buried in the UK and his wife Wallace alongside him at the Royal Burial Ground in Frogmore, at Windsor Castle.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
I agree. I'm sure Charles will stick to tradition & family, just as he's done with his regnal name. The tradition is to use the first given name (like his mother) & his parents chose it expecting him to become king, & he stuck with the tradition & their expectations. The speculation that he might use one of his other names (e.g. King George VII, King Philip) turned out to be baseless, just as I expected, & I'm sure this is the same. I'd bet on St George's chapel at Windsor. The last one at Westminster Abbey was in 1760, & since the late 15th century it's been there or Windsor.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I remember an Israeii telling me that the country is relatively small and at one point or another one eventually bumps into famous or well known individuals; either at an event or along a street. Did you ever have the chance to meet any well known officers who fought in 1967, 1973 and 1982?
They aren't exactly celebrities in Israel, and I think in American culture there are more "famous" military figures (alive today) than there are in Israel. Israel is very much US/Europe-like in perception of celebrities: Politicians, social media content creators, and artists.

Seeing celebrities in the streets is more common than in other western countries, but not nearly as common as one might think. Close to 10 million people already. Much has changed since the Kibbutz days.

The goals of said doctrine can be many, but the first layer of it is proper deterrence. When Bennet described the doctrine, he said Israel was going for the "head", i.e Iran, and not the "tentacles", i.e proxies.
  • But it seems Israel has not achieved the desired level of deterrence, and I believe this is partly, if not mainly, due to an inconsistent pattern of actions vs Iran, at least in those revealed publicly. The pressure comes in, perhaps, waves. Multiple high profile incidents occurring in quick succession, then quiet for a long time, and repeat. This gives Iran time to reconstitute losses, and is generally not quick enough to truly remove any capability from Iran.
  • We saw for example how catastrophic some strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure appeared, but Iran has quickly reconstituted and managed to keep enriching as if barely nudged.
We also know the timing of Israeli sabotage is political, meaning political processes are an obstacle to continued actions. For example Israeli politicians say they are not fazed by the talks, but the talks are also characterized by relative quiet on Israel's part.

Israel's activities in Syria, however, have not slowed down. In fact, they only ramped up. So it appears Israel is not really acting on this doctrine, and such deviation from a threat will cost Israel some of the deterrence it built so far.


Albania severs ties with Iran over cyberattacks that shut down infrastructure. Almost poetically, it creates opportunity for Israel to offer its expertise in cyber security. What Iran could gain from this is anyone's guess. Perhaps they thought Albania would concede to Iran in fear of repeated attacks. But we know one thing - Iran is not deterred.


Israeli defense chief, Benny Gantz warns UN Iran has vastly increased its number of advanced centrifuges (Jpost claims it tripled).
This connects to previous reports of what western governments believe to be Iran torpedoing the deal.

I remind that Iran demands IAEA stops all investigations into nuclear "black sites". It was likely thought to be an attempt to get the west to concede on some other issues, but Iran's decision to remain adamant on this demand, tells us it is likely not being serious about the talks and does not want a deal at the moment. Requesting a waiver on clandestine activities is not a reasonable request in any capacity, which leads me personally to believe Iran might be stalling here, and tries to sneak its way to a bomb with the material it has available right now. This coincides well with reports that Israel provided the US and Germany some new 'significant' intel. Since it remained mum about the content of the intel, and the reports coming in only mere days ago, I believe it is separate from the report on new centrifuges.


Israeli military chief says if not for Hezbollah, Lebanon would be party to Abraham Accords. I am not surprised at all by this statement. The Lebanese are inherently less antagonistic to Israel than other Arab countries, and blame Hezbollah for their country's woes, more than many Arabs elsewhere could afford to blame local terrorist groups or corrupt governments.


First evidence emerges of Iranian drones used in Ukraine. I won't elaborate beyond saying Iran's drones are not up to specs. Israel is not expected to slow down in efforts to target Iranian munitions production and distribution, including drones destined for Russia.


And I dare say not so coincidentally, someone leaked to the press that an Israeli company sells Ukraine anti-drone tech via Poland (sells to Poland, then Poland transfers to Ukraine), and the Israeli Ministry of Defense chooses to turn a blind eye.
  • It might be a bit of an exaggeration, but it could be the first sign of Israel integrating the Russia-Ukraine war into its fight vs Iran, especially as the increasing Russia-Iran closeness means that in many areas, hurting one means hurting the other.
  • Israel was properly deterred from overtly supporting Ukraine. Although Russia still has some leverage, it has expended most of it, allowing Israel to take a more aggressive approach.
The math is simple. Bleed Iran in Russia and Iran will be left with less equipment to fight Israel. Bleed Russian equipment, and Russia will have less potential to support Iran materially.
And considering there is a high intensity war Russia is involved in, and Ukraine's successes, every dollar invested in war material by Israel yields much higher gain than the same dollar invested in IDF's buildup.

 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
They aren't exactly celebrities in Israel, and I think in American culture there are more "famous" military figures (alive today) than there are in Israel.
Personally I would find it far more interesting to meet "famous" Israeli military figures than American ones.

The math is simple. Bleed Iran in Russia and Iran will be left with less equipment to fight Israel. Bleed Russian equipment, and Russia will have less potential to support Iran materially.
Just like in the 1980's; provide assistance/sell kit to Iran so the Iraqis [which Israel saw as the main threat] would bleed.

Israeli military chief says if not for Hezbollah, Lebanon would be party to Abraham Accords.
As you know Lebanon's population is not homogenous. When the "Israeli military chief" says "Lebanon" does he mean the Druze, Maronites, Shias or Sunnis? Shias at the bottom end of the social/economic ladder; middle to upper class Druze: Sunni politicians? Who?

I am not surprised at all by this statement. The Lebanese are inherently less antagonistic to Israel than other Arab countries, and blame Hezbollah for their country's woes, more than many Arabs elsewhere could afford to blame local terrorist groups or corrupt governments.
I'm not surprised that you aren't surprised; given our previous discussions. "The Lebanese are inherently less antagonistic to Israel than other Arab countries" - maybe, maybe not but didn't you caution or admonish me about seeing things in absolutes? Firstly which "Lebanese"? Secondly compared to other Arab countries the Lebanese have recent first hand experience of the effects of Israeli military action [irrespective of whether they blame Hezbollah or not]; bear that in mind when forming assessments about how they may view Israel. Who "blames Hezbollah" and which Lebanese are "inherently less antagonistic to Israel"? Please be specific rather than conflating things.

On Hezbollah its power base has traditionally been the Shia community [ironically they welcomed the Israelis in 1982 until an Israeli faux pas during a Shia festival] but Hezbollah use to have or maybe still does enjoy some - limited - support from the non Shia community.

In case you see the need to again explain to me about terrorists and the evils of Hezbollah; the so called benefits of the Abraham Accords to the Arabs; Iranian meddling in Lebanon; how Lebanon can benefit from Israeli benevolence; how dysfunctional Lebanon is and how incompetent Arabs are; I'm merely seeking clarifications to comments you made.

On another matter this article mentions certain actions Hezbollah did in 2006. Yes no doubt the Israelis have ensured it never happens again but I'm surprised Hezbollah even had the ability to begin with.


"While fighting raged in the towns and hills of southern Lebanon, Hizbullah launched an all-out assault on Israeli civilian and military communications networks. Hizbullah hackers shut down Israeli phone systems, electric grids, and IT systems periodically throughout the war. At the same time, they hacked into phone lines and eavesdropped on Israeli conversations, including those of Israeli soldiers, who, in many instances, gave away important tactical information on phone calls home. The hackers even cracked encrypted Israeli military communications, providing the militants with information on Israeli movements and intentions.[17] Through electronic warfare, Hizbullah made life even more difficult in northern Israel and, at the same time, gained valuable, tactical intelligence on its enemies."
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
As you know Lebanon's population is not homogenous. When the "Israeli military chief" says "Lebanon" does he mean the Druze, Maronites, Shias or Sunnis? Shias at the bottom end of the social/economic ladder; middle to upper class Druze: Sunni politicians? Who?
I think he just means that every minority group pulls in a different direction, and the sum of said pulls is enough to sign the Abraham Accords.
Given his position, I trust his judgment. Few understand Lebanon and its nuances better than him.

I'm not surprised that you aren't surprised; given our previous discussions. "The Lebanese are inherently less antagonistic to Israel than other Arab countries" - maybe, maybe not but didn't you caution or admonish me about seeing things in absolutes? Firstly which "Lebanese"? Secondly compared to other Arab countries the Lebanese have recent first hand experience of the effects of Israeli military action [irrespective of whether they blame Hezbollah or not]; bear that in mind when forming assessments about how they may view Israel. Who "blames Hezbollah" and which Lebanese are "inherently less antagonistic to Israel"? Please be specific rather than conflating things.
In today's reality it's not difficult, and sometimes even inevitable, to talk to people from all over the world like you and I do. I talked to a great deal of Arabs and Muslims over my life, by now in samples that should accurately represent certain populations. What I noticed is that consistently Lebanese people are less antagonistic, and those who are strongly anti-Israel, will usually find much greater opposition among Lebanese than they would among other populations.
Why would it be better to generalize and speak in absolutes in this case? Because on the government level, countries tend to either follow the will of the majority, or consolidate in that direction over time.

The average Lebanese is most concerned right now about a lack of government, and a sizable majority seem to blame Hezbollah for the situation, at least partially.
And when Hezbollah is so controversial, with people split between it being a guardian or an enemy of the people, without much in between, it's not difficult to see why so many would support normalized relations with Hezbollah's #1 enemy.

The fact Lebanon could be de facto partially ruled by an entity with a foreign allegiance and so antagonistic to Israel, could still function just enough to come to the negotiations table over a maritime dispute, is no small matter.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Given his position, I trust his judgment. Few understand Lebanon and its nuances better than him.
I wasn't questioning his credentials; impeccable they be; merely pointing out that Lebanon's population is not homogenous and that his claim is open to bebate.

What I noticed is that consistently Lebanese people are less antagonistic
What I noticed [admittedly I don't live in the Middle East or have extensively travelled there] from talks with Arabs of various nationalities; there is no typical Arab mindset or altitude towards Israel; it's not the 1960's anymore when many Arabs actually talked of pushing the Jews into the sea or having a parade in Haifa. Today there is a feeling of sympathy and support for the Palestinians [as there has been for decades] and feelings of sheer disgust and anger at various parties; including their own rulers: for not doing more but in general most Arabs are not personally antagonistic towards Israel.

That's the impression I have; having spoke to many Arabs; as well as some Israelis over the years.

it's not difficult to see why so many would support normalized relations with Hezbollah's #1 enemy
It's also not difficult to see and understand why Hezbollah still has support [not only from the Shia community] and why certain Lebanese; although they might not buy into Hezbollah's politics/ideology; see it not as a terrorist group but a bona fide resistance movement; amongst other things.

As a Lebanese [a Christian student from a middle class Beirut family] told me many years ago; "I'm indifferent towards Hezbollah but I understand why many support them and as I watched whole neighbourhoods being blasted in 2006 and heard of acquaintances being killed and injured in Israeli strikes; I cheered when news filtered out about the casualties inflicted on the Israelis by Hezbollah".
There are also Lebanese who are completely against Hezbollah and are critical of the country's Arab neighbours but at the same time might view Israel favorable. It's a highly complex rabbit hole.

Similarly it's also not too difficult to see why some Lebanese; although they might not be personally antagonistic towards Israel; may not be too eager with normalised relations given Israel's long history in Lebanon; along with other outside powers who meddled, intervened and did other things including having proxies; to the detriment of the Lebanese.

For the sake of the country; I hope it will eventually be in a position where it's totally in charge of its own destiny; having to worry about no outside powers including Iran, Israel and various Arab states and ruled by politicians who put the interests of the country first.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
There has been a recent uptick in Israeli strikes in Syria, as well as a slight change in their nature, and this article briefly disseminates it.
In short, Israel has recently targeted the Aleppo and Damascus airports, with what appears to be at least 1 strike on each per week. The supposed reason for that is that Iran's air bridge likely became the preferable option due to intensified targeting of its land bridge. Both options were always used, but it is assumed Iran intensified aerial transfers.
And the supposed reasons for the general intensification of strikes are:
  • Russia's partial withdrawal from Syria.
  • Iran's increasing activities (as result of the previous reason).
There has also been an exceptionally high profile strike recently on the SSRC facilities in Masyaf, which is not related to this trend. Such facilities/targets take time to be built, so there are also large intervals between strikes on them. That specific strike itself, however, could be timed to Russia's partial withdrawal from Syria.



Trump reportedly offered the West Bank to Jordan, according to excerpts released from Trump's upcoming book. I will not comment on the logic of such a proposal, as calculating all the potential benefits and drawbacks is a bit beyond the capabilities of my mortal self, but it does show a very positive approach Trump (or his administration) had toward the region - if the paradigm doesn't work, shift it.
If we look at past proposals for peace between Israel and Palestine, they all revolved around the land issue, which, although important, is hardly even a central one. And even then, all proposals were rather un-creative, with each consecutive proposal essentially offering the same.
Whatever the solution might be, it certainly has proven to be very far from past proposals, and should involve every aspect of the conflict, which includes neighboring Arab countries like Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, all of whom have substantial roles in the fate of Palestinians, and their current wellbeing.


In the meantime, however, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is escalating toward what many Israelis consider to be a repeat of the 2002 battle of Jenin, part of the larger 2000-2005 intifada.
To put it in the simplest way I can think of, Israel's strategy for the past decade (at least in the capacity it is today) vs the Palestinians is peace through welfare. That is, the more well-off they are, the more deterred they become from armed conflict. It's harder to imagine taking up arms when you have a nice house, a car, a job, and food in the fridge. Hence Israel's requests to keep the tap open whenever the threat of American and European aid cancellation looms, and Israel even allows Qatar to pay Hamas's salaries.
However, other factors which again are beyond me, brought the West Bank to a boil, and firefights between Palestinian factions and Israel's army and police are now very frequent. Sometimes a daily occurrence.
Strategies to cope with this situation were brought up in public debate, including going as far as enforcing curfews on towns with known substantial terror activities (typically PFLP, DFLP, PIJ, and Hamas). But the situation may have already unfortunately crossed the point of no return, as it was reported recently that the IDF is training various J&S regional units on operating armed drones, raising the bar of what's considered armed conflict inside.
Much like during the intifada, this is mostly centered around Jenin, which is in the northern West Bank.


And finally for today, an IDF commander talks Iran in an in-depth and quite interesting interview.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
If we look at past proposals for peace between Israel and Palestine, they all revolved around the land issue, which, although important, is hardly even a central one
That is the main issue : land. Land the Palestinians want and are entitled to for their future state. For them land is a central issue. There is some land Israel is more than happy to vacate when it suits its interests; land it will continue holding on to for strategic reasons but might be willing to vacate in the future and land it will never vacate or share.

Trump reportedly offered the West Bank to Jordan, according to excerpts released from Trump's upcoming book. I will not comment on the logic of such a proposal, as calculating all the potential benefits and drawbacks is a bit beyond the capabilities of my mortal self,
The issue is that Trump does not own the West Bank; not his to give and he can't play God. As it stands the region has had a long history of territory being traded and artificial borders created by outside powers with no regard for the locals; with damaging consequences which we still serving today decades later. The question of who really stands to benefit from these preposterous Trump schemes also arises.

but it does show a very positive approach Trump (or his administration) had toward the region - if the paradigm doesn't work, shift it.
Well it's easy to say that when it involves territories belonging to others when others pay the price when outsiders "shift" things. You might think that the Trump administration had a "positive approach"; I think it actually had a cloud cuckoo land approach in that his administration was totally out of touch with reality and that its schemes [led by his son in law] were intended to benefit Israel and the U.S. but of course not the Palestinians.

On the subject of the West Bank; do you recall an incident many years ago when Israeli troops entered a building which was rigged with explosives and suffered casualties? Which West Bank town was it?

That is, the more well-off they are, the more deterred they become from armed
The more secure they are with better future prospects: the less likely they will resist or be a threat to Israeli security. Take Gaza; if the blockade was lifted; if residents [most of whom are not originally from Gaza] had better opportunities; were free to travel with no restrictions as is their fundamental right [like ordinary people elsewhere]; chances are Hamas would lose power. It's not as if Palestinians have this ingrained mentality of wanting to perpetually take up arms and need a carrot approach to see the error of their ways.

firefights between Palestinian factions and Israel's army and police are now very frequent. Sometimes a daily

This article looks at the emergence of new Palestinian groups which although comprise men with ties from existing groups operate more loosely.

These weapons are being used to defend during confrontations when the Israeli army wants to raid Jenin camp or Nablus city, or for example against the [Israeli] occupation when settlers want to get to Joseph’s tomb,” Sari Orabi, a Palestinian political analyst, told Al Jazeera"

"Instead, Israel intends to “drain and pursue the resistance fighters, to keep them in a permanent defensive state, and to eliminate the largest number of them possible,” said Mansour. “It’s a surgical operation – it happens in a specific, targeted way, using a small number of undercover forces
.”

an IDF commander talks Iran in an in-depth and quite interesting interview.
The article was interesting but a lot of it tells us what we already knew. He mentions "Iran is not alone, it is trying to create a regional system. And members of this system will want to protect each other"

The thing is revolutionary Iran has not been alone for a long time but we must never overestimate the level of influence Iran has with its proxies. The Houthis are a good example; the general impression is that they don't do anything without Iranian approval. Now we know that's not the case; at times they did their own thing; like certain attacks on other countries which came at a time when Iran was in talks with those countries.

Predictably he spoke about the Iranian threat; it's ambitions, etc, but to me he also should have spoke about the political conditions which would lead to Iran seeing a lesser need to have proxies and to not confront Israel; things don't exist in a vacuum. Interestingly he describes Iran as "a growing superpower". Iran has always been a regional power but to me a "superpower" would have nukes, the ability to project soft and hard power globally and a very strong economy; Iran has none of these criteria. Is he suggesting that it's not a matter of if but when the Iranians get nukes?

When asked about what conditions would lead the Iranians on deciding to acquire nukes; he answers "to think that when they do decide to go nuclear, no one will be able to stop them". The question I'd ask is what would be the strategic conditions which would convince the Iranians they had to acquire nukes? What change in their threat calculus and in response to what actions by other countries? He also mentions the Iranians not understanding "us" which is fine as it's his personal opinion but do Israelis really understand what makes Iran tick or is there this assumption that it's only "terror" for the sake of it and the ambition to annihilate Israel?

Anyway those are just my thoughts on the article.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
That is the main issue : land. Land the Palestinians want and are entitled to for their future state. For them land is a central issue. There is some land Israel is more than happy to vacate when it suits its interests; land it will continue holding on to for strategic reasons but might be willing to vacate in the future and land it will never vacate or share.
After giving up the entire Sinai to Egypt, there isn't much land left for Israel to 'give up'. With the frequent wars in Gaza, available lands shrink even further. But while the question of how to settle the Palestinian conflict was approached from many directions, it was the only time a holistic solution was proposed that any progress was made. Although peace with the Palestinians wasn't achieved, Trump's plan included the trigger for the Abraham Accords, and if pushed further, could bring to public light the core issues of the Palestinian conflict, because in reality it's not a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It's not an Arab-Israeli conflict. It's a Palestinian-Arab conflict, an inter-Palestinian conflict, or even a Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict.

Having more lands will not improve the situation for the Palestinians. They'd still live under the rule of terrorist organizations. They'd still live in suffocating poverty which will likely only be aggravated, and millions of Palestinians will still live as sub-humans in the Arab states, if not outright endangered by wars (e.g. Syria).

What will help them is relief and settlement for their people abroad, infrastructure projects, education and general economical investment in their economy.

To help them improve, we need to separate their symbolic needs from their practical needs, and first satisfy the practical needs. Symbolism is a luxury they cannot afford. Having Jerusalem is a symbolic need.

The issue is that Trump does not own the West Bank; not his to give and he can't play God. As it stands the region has had a long history of territory being traded and artificial borders created by outside powers with no regard for the locals; with damaging consequences which we still serving today decades later. The question of who really stands to benefit from these preposterous Trump schemes also arises.
I certainly didn't see this form of criticism when former presidents offered to mediate talks between Israel and Arabs. Was Clinton a god when he mediated talks on a platform of land exchange? Perhaps, but as an atheist I have my reservations.

On the subject of the West Bank; do you recall an incident many years ago when Israeli troops entered a building which was rigged with explosives and suffered casualties? Which West Bank town was it?
I couldn't find anything on the West Bank, only Gaza. In 2014, 17 soldiers were injured and 3 were killed when a clinic in Khan Younis blew up.

The more secure they are with better future prospects: the less likely they will resist or be a threat to Israeli security. Take Gaza; if the blockade was lifted; if residents [most of whom are not originally from Gaza] had better opportunities; were free to travel with no restrictions as is their fundamental right [like ordinary people elsewhere]; chances are Hamas would lose power. It's not as if Palestinians have this ingrained mentality of wanting to perpetually take up arms and need a carrot approach to see the error of their ways.
Then how do you explain the rising popularity of Hamas in the West Bank? How do you explain the massive terror attacks that led to the blockade?
Hamas is not fighting to end the blockade, and the Palestinian people don't draw Hamas's legitimacy from the existence of the blockade. Hamas de-facto created the blockade, and over the years it worked meticulously to tighten it. Otherwise Hamas would lose its legitimacy and had died down when the blockade was created.

Proposing to end the blockade is lunacy on the same tier as proposing Russia would let Ukraine exist as a democratic, liberal, west-aligned nation if it only disarmed and surrendered - we have countless evidence that the opposite would happen.

If it's about the Palestinians' right to travel, it's not infringed. Israel doesn't owe anyone the right to travel through its territory, certainly not more than Poland owes Russians and Belarussians the right to enter its territory - which is none. Palestinians in Gaza can use the air and sea ports to travel abroad.
No sane leader, especially an Israeli one, would be willing to sacrifice thousands of civilians on both sides just to make travel a bit more comfortable for some people. That would be lunacy as well.

The thing is revolutionary Iran has not been alone for a long time but we must never overestimate the level of influence Iran has with its proxies. The Houthis are a good example; the general impression is that they don't do anything without Iranian approval. Now we know that's not the case; at times they did their own thing; like certain attacks on other countries which came at a time when Iran was in talks with those countries.
That's not a bug. That's a feature. Why do you think Houthis attacking Saudi Arabia and UAE before or during talks is contrary to Iran's own policy? In the power play of the middle east, such policy is actually very logical and common.
If you assume Iran is peaceful, then sure it wouldn't want to attack these countries during talks, but then, its proxies wouldn't exist either. So it doesn't sit well with current reality.
If you assume Iran is on a regional terror campaign, e.g. such run by terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, PMU, Houthis, IRGC, PIJ etc, then it makes sense it would use a policy of muscle, not flowers, to get its enemies to submit to its will. Striking inside the territory of said countries, and on their critical infrastructure at that, while they are powerless to retaliate, is the perfect message of power.
Option A clearly requires trust, while option B doesn't. And Iran and the Arab nations have 0 trust.

Predictably he spoke about the Iranian threat; it's ambitions, etc, but to me he also should have spoke about the political conditions which would lead to Iran seeing a lesser need to have proxies and to not confront Israel; things don't exist in a vacuum.
Should we also examine how Ukraine could have provoked Russia to invade it? Or the same for Georgia? Or how Czechoslovakia and Poland provoked Germany to invade?
Do you honestly think it would be productive to think what they could have done to avoid this fate?
And if your answer is "yes", then do you honestly think it would be productive for Israel to think what provoked Iran to attack it? And what good would it yield?
The officer explained it quite plainly - Israel is simply at the forefront. Had it been a modern day France copied to Israel's territory, it would be Iran invading France.
Giving hostile entities as Iran, Russia, North Korea etc the benefit of doubt only shows we are unable to learn and adapt quickly enough, and boosts their own ability to prepare and get an advantage.
I believe in a mantra of not doing the same work twice, for the sake of efficiency.

Interestingly he describes Iran as "a growing superpower". Iran has always been a regional power but to me a "superpower" would have nukes, the ability to project soft and hard power globally and a very strong economy; Iran has none of these criteria. Is he suggesting that it's not a matter of if but when the Iranians get nukes?
The Israeli and foreign understandings might differ. Also possibly a translation issue, as it's likely he just tried to find a word that described Iran as more than just another regional power.

When asked about what conditions would lead the Iranians on deciding to acquire nukes; he answers "to think that when they do decide to go nuclear, no one will be able to stop them". The question I'd ask is what would be the strategic conditions which would convince the Iranians they had to acquire nukes? What change in their threat calculus and in response to what actions by other countries?
IMO, nothing. But if played strategically, Iran can have it both ways - nukes and no sanctions. If they get nukes and sanctions, their vision of a worldwide Islamic revolution will be stuck in second gear in the middle east. If they get no nukes and no sanctions, they will not have the ultimate deterrent that would ensure the Ayatollah regime stays safe eternally. And if they can have nukes but no sanctions, they eat all the cake.
But to do that, Iran would need to bluff without being caught. Thankfully, the US and EU already recognize that Iran is not negotiating in good faith, and that if Iran could have clandestine activities during the JCPOA and insist on continuing to do so under the new deal, then there's no real assurance that Iran would really stop working on getting a nuke, at least not in any capacity that would reduce from this danger. In other words, Iran cannot really bluff anymore, so it has to work some other way. Concede to the fact that sanctions will likely remain, and in the meantime work with China and Russia to raise its economical might to fuel its regional campaign.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Having more lands will not improve the situation for the Palestinians. They'd still live under the rule of terrorist organizations.
And nobody said it would improve things per see but they would get what they're entitled to and one of the major roots causes in the region which also has had an adverse impact on the rest of the world would would be done away with. As for living "under the rule of terrorist organizations"; they live under Hamas rule and PLO rule. Unless I'm mistaken Israel does not see the PLO As a terrorist organisation. Also, as pointed earlier a change in fortunes - for the better - for the long suffering Palestinians could well see Hamas lose power or relevance.

They'd still live in suffocating poverty which will likely only be aggravated, and millions of Palestinians will still live as sub-humans in the Arab states, if not outright endangered by wars (e.g. Syria).
Whether that's true or not it's irrespective of the fact that they should have their state; that they've been denied their state for decades and that having a state will start them on the long road to recovery because for once they will truly in charge of their affairs and destiny. BTW the term "sub human" even in the context of how you applied it makes me uncomfortable because of its Nazi angle/connotations.

I certainly didn't see this form of criticism when former presidents offered to mediate talks between Israel and Arabs. Was Clinton a god when he mediated talks on a platform of land exchange? Perhaps, but as an atheist I have my reservations.
Apples to oranges comparison and you know it. Clinton's attempt at peace involved dialogue with both the Palestinians and the Israelis. Trump's and his son in law's schemes involved dialogue with the Israelis [of course it would] with the Palestinians only to be consulted at a later stage. Their opinion counted for little; they were expected to be grateful for what the U.S. offered and what Israel agreed to. On top of that the agenda was American and Israeli interests first [like most of the time]; the interests and well being of the Palestinians didn't even enter the calculus.

It's a Palestinian-Arab conflict, an inter-Palestinian conflict, or even a Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict
Naturally; Israel is merely an innocent bystander caught in the middle of an Arab mess the result of shortsighted incompetent Arabs who have yet to experience enlightenment. It has absolutely nothing to do with Israel. As much as I'd like to I don't believe in the tooth fairy and leprechauns.

I couldn't find anything on the West Bank, only Gaza. In 2014, 17 soldiers were injured and 3 were killed when a clinic in Khan Younis blew up.
There was certainly an incident in the early 2000's. Troops on ops in the West Bank entered a building which was rigged with explosives. Maybe in Jenin, maybe not.

Then how do you explain the rising popularity of Hamas in the West Bank?
As has been explained to you; Hamas came to power because of public disgust with the ineffective and corrupt Fatah. Just like how Hezbollah enjoys some level of support from Lebanese [not all of which are Shias] who might not necessarily buy into its politics; Hamas is seen not as a "terrorist organisation" by many Palestinians but as a resistance organisation even if they're not personally enamored of it. According to certain sources I read years ago even Israel initially saw Hamas as a possible alternative to Fatah.

Proposing to end the blockade is lunacy on the same tier as proposing Russia would let Ukraine exist as a democratic, liberal, west-aligned nation if it only disarmed and surrendered - we have countless evidence that the opposite would happen.
Again, I said two things; if Gazans were not living in an open air prison and were provided with opportunities which would be available if a blockade was lifted and could travel like people elsewhere [at the moment Gazan footballers can't even travel out of Gaza to train or compete; either footballers are seen as a threat or it's part and parcel of the collective punishment policy] then they would have less reason to be antagonistic towards Israel and there would be less support for Hamas which would lose a lot of relevance. Isn't so hard to fathom.

Ironically it's Israeli policies [far from the benevolent picture you present] which feeds the Hamas narrative and keeps it relevant.

If it's about the Palestinians' right to travel, it's not infringed. Israel doesn't owe anyone the right to travel through its territory.
Alright, so if Gazans decided to travel by sea from the Gazan coast [not Israeli territory] then the ever vigilant IN wouldn't stop them? If international NGOs decided to head to Gaza with humanitarian aid; Israel wouldn't object [in one incident scores foreign nationals were killed]; the same way it wouldn't object if Egypt opened the border crossing?

No sane leader, especially an Israeli one, would be willing to sacrifice thousands of civilians on both sides just to make travel a bit more comfortable for some people
The ability to travel is a fundamental right not a luxury or to "make travel a bit more comfortable for "some people"'. Also how on earth does letting "some people" travel leads to the "sacrifice thousands of civilians on both sides"?

Why do you think Houthis attacking Saudi Arabia and UAE before or during talks is contrary to Iran's own policy?
What I did say is that it's a false and simplistic assumption to assume that the Houthis are the ever willing and obedient proxies/puppets of the Iranians. The Iranians were embarassed because certain Houthi attacks were carried out without Iranian knowledge and permission at a time when talks were being held. By the same token not every Shia group which is has benefited from Iranian largesse always listens to Iran.


"But recent decades have seen a significant improvement in the political positions of Shiite populations, particularly with fall of Iraq’s Baath regime in 2003 and the liberation of South Lebanon by Hizballah in 2005. With Shiite empowerment across the region, the core notion of “resisting oppression” has lost some of its resonance. Thus, some of Iran’s powerful allies, such as the Badr organization and Asaib ahl al-Haq in Iraq, have emancipated themselves from Tehran’s guidance and increasingly charted their own course. Lebanon’s Hizballah has also become more independent in a number of ways including its approach to domestic politics and its conduct of military operations"

"Partners may take actions that run counter to Iranian interests, such as attacks that threaten the future of the nuclear deal or rapprochement with the United Arab Emirates. But Iran also gains a denser defensive network with more plausible deniability to respond to threats from opponents"

If you assume Iran is on a regional terror campaign, e.g. such run by terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, PMU, Houthis, IRGC, PIJ etc, then it makes sense it would use a policy of muscle, not flowers, to get its enemies to submit to its will.
There is a time for military action and a time when military action is not required or conducive to other actions being carried out. Iran - like Israel - relies on both soft and hard power. You figure Iran would have lasted this long against such powerful enemies like the U.S. and Israel if it didn't know when and how to strike a fine balance with regards to it's actions?
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
Should we also examine how Ukraine could have provoked Russia to invade it? Or the same for Georgia? Or how Czechoslovakia and Poland provoked Germany to invade?Do you honestly think it would be productive to think what they could have done to avoid this fate?
You've gone of tangent. Want to discuss the 30 Years War or the War Of The Roses whilst you're at it? Or maybe the Ogoden War?

You make it sound as if I suggested that Israel should supply Arrow and David's Sling to Iran as a confidence building measure or rename a Kibbutz after a matyred Iranian figure. All I pointed out is that the Iranians didn't suddenly wake up the wrong side of bed one morning and decided to wage "terror", "terror" and more "terror" or to adopt the policy is has without good reason. I asked what change in Iran's threat calculus or actions on the part of others would see Iran having a lesser need for nukes or proxies. Valid question. Also valid to assume that Israel; which has long realised that military action has its limits; would like to understand what motivates or makes it's enemies tick. I'm assuming of course that Israel isn't in need of a perpetual threat.

If they get nukes and sanctions, their vision of a worldwide Islamic revolution will be stuck in second gear in the middle east
Isn't 1979 or 1984 anymore. Fevered minded mullahs fresh from the success of the revolution and desperate because of the war Saddam launched aren't dreaming about spreading the revolution westwards [was never "wordwide" per see ] anymore. What Iran is trying to do is safeguard it's interests in the region [an area where it has long had influence] by various means including proxies as part of a sphere of influence stretching from Afghanistan to the Gulf and the Levant.

I can understand why Iran would want nukes. If I was an Iranian leader and looked at a map of Iran's neighbourhood; I'd want nukes or the ability to assemble them at short notice. I can also understand why Israel would want to prevent this; to maintain its nuclear monopoly; concerns that an Iranian nuke would see the Arabs waiting a similar capability and concerns fevered miended mullahs would want martyrdom for themselves and their country by launching a nuke at Israel.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
After giving up the entire Sinai to Egypt, there isn't much land left for Israel to 'give up'.
On the contrary there is but not necessarily Palestinian land per see. There is the Golan which is Syrian [and recognised as such by the international community] and which Israel continues to occupy in violation of UN Resolution 242 and there are strips of Lebanese territory; including the Sheeba Farms which the Lebanese have demanded back but Israel for some inexplicable reason insists belongs to Syria.

With regards to Pakestinian land there is the West Bank which shrinks year by year due to the illegal construction of sentiments; sprouting like mushrooms. You'll no doubt claim this isn't an issue because settlements can always be vacated; as some have been in the past but then the question arises as to why even bother constructing them in the first place if Israel is willing to vacate them at some distant point in the future.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Protests are again occurring all over Iran, this time over the murder of a woman of Kurdish descent by the morality police over a refusal to wear a Hijab (hat).
An Iranian activist/reporter is covering the events, including the violent confrontations between Iranians and regime security forces (not just police but others have also been involved).

You can see plenty of footage in her profile linked below.

My personal take? The regime has plenty of room to escalate and for now uses only riot police. It can still pull out the Basij and IRGC and mow down protesters like it did before. So I assume this will die down quickly and be overall inconsequential to the Iranian quest for freedom from the Ayatollahs.
Important to understand that unlike some Arab nations bordering Iran, the Iranians cannot carry weapons, thus any resistance will be unarmed at least for the first phases.


And nobody said it would improve things per see but they would get what they're entitled to and one of the major roots causes in the region which also has had an adverse impact on the rest of the world would would be done away with.
Are they really entitled to land? None is ever entitled to anything. The Jews after WW2 were not entitled to land, and when they got their land, several decades of wars ensued. None really seeks compensation for Israel for that. Are the Catalans entitled to land? Were the Irish? Tibetans?
Everyone can take the steps they deem necessary to get what they want, be it land or anything else. But certainly none is entitled to anything.
At least not on the level of sovereignty.

There's also no evidence whatsoever that this would make any improvement to the situation. But we do have plenty of evidence to the opposite. When the Palestinians were given sovereignty over Gaza, it turned into the world's densest war-zone. Thousands of people died, were displaced, or were somehow hurt in the process. Millions of people enslaved.
Who's to say when they get their sovereignty they won't again be taken by Hamas?
That's why past proposals included a cooldown clause that would allow steady drawdown of Israeli presence with the aim of establishing trust in the PA's stability - which the PA rejected as a deal-breaker.
And it's not like giving them that sovereignty and then have them be ruled by Hamas would somehow show the world it was tried, experiment failed, and we can return to the status quo. Nope. The world forgets quickly. Countries will again demand a redo, much like they choose to forget Gaza even exists.
We can't just play with the lives of millions like that, even if the world demands of us the immoral. It's not a game.

As for living "under the rule of terrorist organizations"; they live under Hamas rule and PLO rule. Unless I'm mistaken Israel does not see the PLO As a terrorist organisation. Also, as pointed earlier a change in fortunes - for the better - for the long suffering Palestinians could well see Hamas lose power or relevance.
Because of the Oslo Accords it is formally seen as legitimate. That doesn't mean the PLO isn't a terrorist organization in the traditional form. Their policy of terror by proxy makes them no less terrorist. Their National Terror Budget, aka Pay for Slay, is even higher than most terrorist organizations' budgets.
Look at the West Bank now. They are more well off than Gazans, yet they still opt for terror. The rise of Hamas and PFLP there, as well as massive increase in terror attacks and their intensity, shows higher quality of life is not enough to wean them off terror.
When nothing else can be done, it's something that can help, but more things can be done.

BTW the term "sub human" even in the context of how you applied it makes me uncomfortable because of its Nazi angle/connotations.
That's just completely disingenuous on your part. Never have I seen a more ridiculous attempt to make the Israelis=Nazis equation than that.

Apples to oranges comparison and you know it. Clinton's attempt at peace involved dialogue with both the Palestinians and the Israelis. Trump's and his son in law's schemes involved dialogue with the Israelis [of course it would] with the Palestinians only to be consulted at a later stage. Their opinion counted for little; they were expected to be grateful for what the U.S. offered and what Israel agreed to. On top of that the agenda was American and Israeli interests first [like most of the time]; the interests and well being of the Palestinians didn't even enter the calculus.
Explain to me again why the US should take more of Palestinians considerations into account? They willingly cultivate terrorist organizations, they support the most tyrannical regimes (North Korea, Iran, Russia, China, all enemies of the US and west in general), and are very much opposed to everything the west stands for.
Do you honestly expect the US to take a completely balanced approach when mediating between, say, Russia and Ukraine? Or North and South Koreas? Nevertheless, these negotiations always included more Israeli concessions than Palestinians.

Naturally; Israel is merely an innocent bystander caught in the middle of an Arab mess the result of shortsighted incompetent Arabs who have yet to experience enlightenment. It has absolutely nothing to do with Israel. As much as I'd like to I don't believe in the tooth fairy and leprechauns.
This, but unironically.

Again, I said two things; if Gazans were not living in an open air prison and were provided with opportunities which would be available if a blockade was lifted and could travel like people elsewhere [at the moment Gazan footballers can't even travel out of Gaza to train or compete; either footballers are seen as a threat or it's part and parcel of the collective punishment policy] then they would have less reason to be antagonistic towards Israel and there would be less support for Hamas which would lose a lot of relevance. Isn't so hard to fathom.

Ironically it's Israeli policies [far from the benevolent picture you present] which feeds the Hamas narrative and keeps it relevant.
Wrong. It just shows you are not following the situation as frequently as you should to make factual assessment of it.
Gaza is not under a blockade by Israel, it is under a blockade by Hamas.
Fact - no blockade under Fatah rule.
Fact - restrictions are loosening as a function of quiet. And are tightening as a function of violence. More than 100,000 Palestinians get work permits in Israel. Start a war? Entry denied. No violence for a while? Take even more permits and fewer security checks.
Fact - most of the current restrictions on goods are a result of Hamas using them for arms manufacturing.
Fact - if Hamas demilitarized, the blockade would be lifted.

Alright, so if Gazans decided to travel by sea from the Gazan coast [not Israeli territory] then the ever vigilant IN wouldn't stop them?
Of course it would. Those are Israeli territorial waters. Use the airport or sign an agreement with the state of Israel for changing the maritime borders.

If international NGOs decided to head to Gaza with humanitarian aid; Israel wouldn't object [in one incident scores foreign nationals were killed];
Israel would not object. There is even a clear protocol for that. Dock in Ashdod, transfer the goods to trucks, then transfer them to Gaza via the Kerem Shalom terminal.
No foreign nationals were ever killed when passing humanitarian aid to Gaza. What you're referring to is the Mavi Marmara incident, in which ships tried to breach Israeli territorial waters despite calls to dock in Ashdod for an organized transport, and when they were stopped, they drew arms and attacked a local navy force.
They were not transporting aid. They transported weapons, and attacked soldiers that legally boarded the ships. No civilians were killed in the incident, only combatants. All the weapons were later seized.

Full rundown of the events:
 
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