John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I assumed you meant substantial military arrangement alternatives which unlike general trade would be an issue.
Middle East Defence & Security
- Thread starter MaenZ
- Start date
The film clip I earlier attached of ballistic missiles hitting the airbase included a comment that the the ballistic missiles were designed to be manoeuvrable and avoid David's Sling ,as these have a five hundred kilo plus warhead and managed to hit the airbase may promote some discussion in the I.D.F
That outside forces were able to pare this attack before they hit targets and that Iran had virtually provided warning of such an attack gives some food for thought if these two circumstances did not happen ,a suspicion might also be that Iran did this as a gesture to its own people gambling that there would not be a war over this as no significant damage done or Israel will admit to ,certainly being able to hit a large airbase with multiple missiles will be seen by Iran as a victory
That outside forces were able to pare this attack before they hit targets and that Iran had virtually provided warning of such an attack gives some food for thought if these two circumstances did not happen ,a suspicion might also be that Iran did this as a gesture to its own people gambling that there would not be a war over this as no significant damage done or Israel will admit to ,certainly being able to hit a large airbase with multiple missiles will be seen by Iran as a victory
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Abuse ? Seems Israel with it's supporters lobby that abuse political situation in US for decades. Israel owes it's continue existence to US, then it's normal for US to ask Israel to play their game. You're clearly delusional to think Israel can continue survive for long term, by adding new 'alternatives' without US permission. However it is not your first delusion.
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
New drinking game.
Take a shot whenever @Ananda says/does:
1. "You Israel".
2. Whataboutism.
3. "delusional".
4. Ad hominem.
KipPotapych
Active Member
^ Ananda, while I disagree with some of your ideas and agree with others on the subject, it appears to me that it is going down to personal level and I wouldn’t want to see another thread locked for this reason.
Edit: in light of the new post while I was typing, the exact same goes for Big Zucchini. Common, guys…
Edit: in light of the new post while I was typing, the exact same goes for Big Zucchini. Common, guys…
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
Appeasing a Paper Tiger
Israel and Russia are de facto enemies. This is an undeniable fact. Both are, however, politically resilient to making deals with entities they each deem hostile. One such deal is deconfliction over Syria.
One might ask - Russia is preoccupied in Ukraine, its AD is fragile, and in Syria in particular it's numerically inferior, so why worry?
TLDR - Israel needs perfectly clear skies over Syria and Iraq, which together form a direct path between Israel and Iran.
Israel's ability to jam or destroy Syrian and Russian AD is unquestionable. But if either notices they're being jammed or social media report explosions, this will give Iran the early warning it needs to take quick measures to beef up defenses or take mitigating actions.
One might then ask - why not destroy them months or years ahead of a strike?
First, Iran could seize the opportunity to sprint toward some milestone in the nuclear program while its alert is heightened.
Second, this will open the region up to many geopolitical unknowns. For example if China decides to increase its support for Russia, or to supply Syria with replacements, this perpetual arms race could keep Syrian skies constantly contested.
This assertion simply relies on Russia folding and retreating from Syria if it's threatened by Israel which is not assured.
In the current state, Syria does not fire upon Israeli aircraft, and neither does Russia.
Israeli F-35 could easily evade all SAMs and strike in Iran but Israel will have to deploy more vulnerable assets such as unprotected refueling tankers, ELINT aircraft, SAR assets, and 4th gen fighter aircraft.
If such aircraft are forced into evasive maneuvers and DEAD in stand-in range, they could be pushed out of their energetic envelope in terms of fuel capacity.
However, Russia's and Syria's air defense assets are limited and their locations are known to Israel, allowing evasion of their detection envelope.
So to sum up, it is definitely possible and likely that Israel will pursue maintaining the status quo with Syria and Russia especially for the sake of a strike in Iran.
Israel and Russia are de facto enemies. This is an undeniable fact. Both are, however, politically resilient to making deals with entities they each deem hostile. One such deal is deconfliction over Syria.
One might ask - Russia is preoccupied in Ukraine, its AD is fragile, and in Syria in particular it's numerically inferior, so why worry?
TLDR - Israel needs perfectly clear skies over Syria and Iraq, which together form a direct path between Israel and Iran.
Israel's ability to jam or destroy Syrian and Russian AD is unquestionable. But if either notices they're being jammed or social media report explosions, this will give Iran the early warning it needs to take quick measures to beef up defenses or take mitigating actions.
One might then ask - why not destroy them months or years ahead of a strike?
First, Iran could seize the opportunity to sprint toward some milestone in the nuclear program while its alert is heightened.
Second, this will open the region up to many geopolitical unknowns. For example if China decides to increase its support for Russia, or to supply Syria with replacements, this perpetual arms race could keep Syrian skies constantly contested.
This assertion simply relies on Russia folding and retreating from Syria if it's threatened by Israel which is not assured.
In the current state, Syria does not fire upon Israeli aircraft, and neither does Russia.
Israeli F-35 could easily evade all SAMs and strike in Iran but Israel will have to deploy more vulnerable assets such as unprotected refueling tankers, ELINT aircraft, SAR assets, and 4th gen fighter aircraft.
If such aircraft are forced into evasive maneuvers and DEAD in stand-in range, they could be pushed out of their energetic envelope in terms of fuel capacity.
However, Russia's and Syria's air defense assets are limited and their locations are known to Israel, allowing evasion of their detection envelope.
So to sum up, it is definitely possible and likely that Israel will pursue maintaining the status quo with Syria and Russia especially for the sake of a strike in Iran.
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
Israel's Attack Options In Iran
It is pointless to try to assume what specific approach Israel will take when attacking Iran. It has not only a multitude of available known options, but it has the 'secret' factor - weapons and systems developed internally and not known to the public.
It does, however, have certain industrial capabilities we know about that may contribute to getting a better understanding of what some of the attack options Israel might have. Israel is believed to be operating to some extent many of the items it currently offers for export but which it has never acknowledged using itself.
MALE Drones
As a long time developer, manufacturer, and user of drones, Israel has developed and filled many niches. It has several squadrons of MALE drones of varying sizes. These are not typically considered expendable. However if a mission is deemed risky even for manned aircraft, it seems inevitable that drones will be used to boost capacity to some extent. These can include onboard armament, or acting as decoys.
IAF's strategic drone is the IAI Eitan, otherwise marketed as the Heron TP. Its long endurance of 30 hours and payload of 2,700kg allow it to carry certain armament including cruise missiles, decoys, and others.
Their persistence allows them to also utilize various pods to collect intelligence or continuously jam adversary communications and data collection systems throughout the operation.
They may also be used in their own attack waves to hit less hardened targets deeper in Iran.
Drones like Hermes 450 are comparatively more expendable and may be used as a form of exquisite decoys, and carry light payloads of their own.
Loitering Drones
Israel is also thought to be in possession of loitering munitions and drones of varying sizes - from tactical man-held, to strategic long range ones.
Perhaps the most valuable known ones are the Harpy and Harop drones.
Developed by IAI over decades (and with several generations), the Harop and Harpy are loitering munitions capable of a wide set of missions, designed for a long loitering time, and with robust communications.
Harpy is the original, and is equipped with an RF seeker capable of targeting a very wide range of radars and other high frequency emitters. It is intended primarily for SEAD/DEAD, and is believed to be one of Israel's deterrents against large conventional armed forces.
Harop is a derivative of Harpy that replaces the RF seeker with an EO payload and introduces a man-in-the-loop.
Both variants have evolved over the years, making them relevant to this day.
IAI claims a communication range of 200km, which naturally will be lower in a jammed environment. Regardless, it will need some form of communications relay. This can be done by jumping between manned aircraft flying toward Iran, or more realistically - using some form of MALE drone.
The Harpy/Harop have a flight ceiling of 15k ft, which allows them to avoid civilians picking up their presence at least as they fly out of Israel into the unpopulated deserts of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, where they can then descend to avoid radar detection.
Cruise Missiles
For manned aircraft, as well as some larger MALE drones, there is the option of cruise missiles. However for some reason, all publicly known figures for local cruise missiles indicate a very short range of 200-300km.
Ice Breaker is said to have a 300km range.
The Gabriel 5 missile is said to have a 290km range.
And Delilah is said to have a 250km range.
Overall these are not very useful munitions in terms of raw performance. Fuel conservation is key to this operation if manned aircraft are to be used.
What could the IAF do, then? One possibility is to simply attach another stage to each missile. One that can sustain flight for several hundred kilometers on top of what's afforded by the missile's own fuel.
However, even in this form, and especially as they lack meaningful penetration capability, they may be useful particularly for some softer targets on the western and southern parts of Iran. For example sensitive sites/installations, bases, and other high value targets.
Ballistic Missiles
Israel is known to have multiple types of ballistic missiles named Jericho. They possess commonality with the Shavit satellite launcher shown below.
Yet Israel is assumed to have only a small number of these. Ballistic missiles are expensive, they require infrastructure that is fairly easily noticeable, and Israel's status as a nuclear state means such launch could easily be interpreted as launching a nuclear weapon.
The reasons why ballistic missiles are often raised in such discussions are that they have a long range, and second that they have incredible penetration capability due to their sheer kinetic energy on impact.
Air Launched Ballistic Missiles
Rafael is known to have developed, produced, and marketed air launched ballistic missiles to be used to simulate enemy ballistic missiles. These could then be used to test Israel's ballistic missile defenses such as the Arrow system.
Being designed for test purposes does not in any way diminish from their ability to be employed as actual ballistic missiles. Launching them from aircraft allows them to be less detectable, have a smaller form factor, and be cheaper.
Rafael now markets the ROCKS. It is thought to be based in part on the Black Sparrow target ALBM as it is single-stage. Other products like Silver and Blue Sparrow have 2 stages and subsequently longer range and larger payloads.
Rafael does not publish any statistics on the ROCKS except for a CEP of 3 meters, and claims it has deep penetration capability.
There is no information on other ALBMs the IDF uses, but it is possible they employ the larger variants as well.
Glide Bombs
Israel has a wide range of glide and non-powered bombs. This category includes bunker busters which due to their characteristics and the nature of their mission - do not really enjoy the benefits of gliding.
On the lower end of the scale, Israel has several variants of SDB and SPICE 250, the latter having a powered version as well. These can be used to maximize the number of struck locations with modest penetration requirements. A single F-16 can carry 16, and a single F-15 can carry 28, although realistically less due to some constraints like fuel conservation.
On the upper scale, Israeli aircraft can carry bunker busters in the 5,000lbs class. A new variant hinted at being available to Israel is the GBU-72.
These however require the attacker to pretty much fly above the target, at dangerous altitude.
If Israel chooses to make a limited strike in Iran that doesn't involve complete DEAD, then it may skip the fortified targets for now, instead possibly damaging entrances and ventilation shafts which in turn do not necessarily require heavy munitions.
Cyber and Sabotage
Little can be said about concrete cyber and sabotage capabilities but it has been demonstrated in the past that Israel is capable of deploying far reaching cyber operations in Iran. Sabotage missions are scarcely talked about and for good reason.
Such operations, be it cyber or physical sabotage - take years to develop from concept phase to deployability.
A cyber operation could, for example, shut down gas pumps country-wide.
A physical sabotage operation could have components of a critical system corrode much faster than anticipated.
Such operations could also come in the form of triggered actions that can be activated as attacks on their own right, or as an advantage during another attack.
One glaring issue with such operations is that it isn't really known whether or not they're successful until the "money time", so it's best to limit dependency on them as much as possible.
It is pointless to try to assume what specific approach Israel will take when attacking Iran. It has not only a multitude of available known options, but it has the 'secret' factor - weapons and systems developed internally and not known to the public.
It does, however, have certain industrial capabilities we know about that may contribute to getting a better understanding of what some of the attack options Israel might have. Israel is believed to be operating to some extent many of the items it currently offers for export but which it has never acknowledged using itself.
MALE Drones
As a long time developer, manufacturer, and user of drones, Israel has developed and filled many niches. It has several squadrons of MALE drones of varying sizes. These are not typically considered expendable. However if a mission is deemed risky even for manned aircraft, it seems inevitable that drones will be used to boost capacity to some extent. These can include onboard armament, or acting as decoys.
IAF's strategic drone is the IAI Eitan, otherwise marketed as the Heron TP. Its long endurance of 30 hours and payload of 2,700kg allow it to carry certain armament including cruise missiles, decoys, and others.
Their persistence allows them to also utilize various pods to collect intelligence or continuously jam adversary communications and data collection systems throughout the operation.
They may also be used in their own attack waves to hit less hardened targets deeper in Iran.
Drones like Hermes 450 are comparatively more expendable and may be used as a form of exquisite decoys, and carry light payloads of their own.
Loitering Drones
Israel is also thought to be in possession of loitering munitions and drones of varying sizes - from tactical man-held, to strategic long range ones.
Perhaps the most valuable known ones are the Harpy and Harop drones.
Developed by IAI over decades (and with several generations), the Harop and Harpy are loitering munitions capable of a wide set of missions, designed for a long loitering time, and with robust communications.
Harpy is the original, and is equipped with an RF seeker capable of targeting a very wide range of radars and other high frequency emitters. It is intended primarily for SEAD/DEAD, and is believed to be one of Israel's deterrents against large conventional armed forces.
Harop is a derivative of Harpy that replaces the RF seeker with an EO payload and introduces a man-in-the-loop.
Both variants have evolved over the years, making them relevant to this day.
IAI claims a communication range of 200km, which naturally will be lower in a jammed environment. Regardless, it will need some form of communications relay. This can be done by jumping between manned aircraft flying toward Iran, or more realistically - using some form of MALE drone.
The Harpy/Harop have a flight ceiling of 15k ft, which allows them to avoid civilians picking up their presence at least as they fly out of Israel into the unpopulated deserts of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, where they can then descend to avoid radar detection.
Cruise Missiles
For manned aircraft, as well as some larger MALE drones, there is the option of cruise missiles. However for some reason, all publicly known figures for local cruise missiles indicate a very short range of 200-300km.
Ice Breaker is said to have a 300km range.
The Gabriel 5 missile is said to have a 290km range.
And Delilah is said to have a 250km range.
Overall these are not very useful munitions in terms of raw performance. Fuel conservation is key to this operation if manned aircraft are to be used.
What could the IAF do, then? One possibility is to simply attach another stage to each missile. One that can sustain flight for several hundred kilometers on top of what's afforded by the missile's own fuel.
However, even in this form, and especially as they lack meaningful penetration capability, they may be useful particularly for some softer targets on the western and southern parts of Iran. For example sensitive sites/installations, bases, and other high value targets.
Ballistic Missiles
Israel is known to have multiple types of ballistic missiles named Jericho. They possess commonality with the Shavit satellite launcher shown below.
Yet Israel is assumed to have only a small number of these. Ballistic missiles are expensive, they require infrastructure that is fairly easily noticeable, and Israel's status as a nuclear state means such launch could easily be interpreted as launching a nuclear weapon.
The reasons why ballistic missiles are often raised in such discussions are that they have a long range, and second that they have incredible penetration capability due to their sheer kinetic energy on impact.
Air Launched Ballistic Missiles
Rafael is known to have developed, produced, and marketed air launched ballistic missiles to be used to simulate enemy ballistic missiles. These could then be used to test Israel's ballistic missile defenses such as the Arrow system.
Being designed for test purposes does not in any way diminish from their ability to be employed as actual ballistic missiles. Launching them from aircraft allows them to be less detectable, have a smaller form factor, and be cheaper.
Rafael now markets the ROCKS. It is thought to be based in part on the Black Sparrow target ALBM as it is single-stage. Other products like Silver and Blue Sparrow have 2 stages and subsequently longer range and larger payloads.
Rafael does not publish any statistics on the ROCKS except for a CEP of 3 meters, and claims it has deep penetration capability.
There is no information on other ALBMs the IDF uses, but it is possible they employ the larger variants as well.
Glide Bombs
Israel has a wide range of glide and non-powered bombs. This category includes bunker busters which due to their characteristics and the nature of their mission - do not really enjoy the benefits of gliding.
On the lower end of the scale, Israel has several variants of SDB and SPICE 250, the latter having a powered version as well. These can be used to maximize the number of struck locations with modest penetration requirements. A single F-16 can carry 16, and a single F-15 can carry 28, although realistically less due to some constraints like fuel conservation.
On the upper scale, Israeli aircraft can carry bunker busters in the 5,000lbs class. A new variant hinted at being available to Israel is the GBU-72.
These however require the attacker to pretty much fly above the target, at dangerous altitude.
If Israel chooses to make a limited strike in Iran that doesn't involve complete DEAD, then it may skip the fortified targets for now, instead possibly damaging entrances and ventilation shafts which in turn do not necessarily require heavy munitions.
Cyber and Sabotage
Little can be said about concrete cyber and sabotage capabilities but it has been demonstrated in the past that Israel is capable of deploying far reaching cyber operations in Iran. Sabotage missions are scarcely talked about and for good reason.
Such operations, be it cyber or physical sabotage - take years to develop from concept phase to deployability.
A cyber operation could, for example, shut down gas pumps country-wide.
A physical sabotage operation could have components of a critical system corrode much faster than anticipated.
Such operations could also come in the form of triggered actions that can be activated as attacks on their own right, or as an advantage during another attack.
One glaring issue with such operations is that it isn't really known whether or not they're successful until the "money time", so it's best to limit dependency on them as much as possible.
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Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
Some OSINTeroos are estimating Israel would benefit from delaying an Iran strike until after April 22nd to avoid disrupting a holiday eve (should Iran retaliate), and to make use of the several days long holiday break that goes until April 30th.
I agree with this assessment.
I agree with this assessment.
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
Israel and US reportedly agree to an operation in Rafah in exchange for a more moderate response to Iran.
US approves Rafah op. in exchange for no Israeli counterstrikes on Iran - report
US approves Rafah op. in exchange for no Israeli counterstrikes on Iran - report
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
Reports of blasts in Isfahan, Iran as well as areas of Syria and Iraq.
Doesn't seem like there are videos of explosions, which could mean several things. It is likely to take days until we'll know the full extent of the damage.
According to Babak, the Iraqi army discovered a wreckage of a ROCKS missile (not Rampage as he claimed), which I have described earlier as the most likely weapon for strikes in Iran.
EDIT:
Upon closer examination, it seems this wreckage misses the entire front section. This raises the possibility of another member of the Sparrow ALBM family other than the Black Sparrow-based ROCKS.
The Blue and Silver Sparrow missiles have 2 stages.
Doesn't seem like there are videos of explosions, which could mean several things. It is likely to take days until we'll know the full extent of the damage.
According to Babak, the Iraqi army discovered a wreckage of a ROCKS missile (not Rampage as he claimed), which I have described earlier as the most likely weapon for strikes in Iran.
EDIT:
Upon closer examination, it seems this wreckage misses the entire front section. This raises the possibility of another member of the Sparrow ALBM family other than the Black Sparrow-based ROCKS.
The Blue and Silver Sparrow missiles have 2 stages.
Last edited:
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
In the last couple of days there have been numerous indications the IDF is practically preparing for entry to Rafah.
First, a wave of bombings inside Rafah. As Rafah becomes more concentrated with civilians, Hamassies, and Israeli hostages, strike opportunities are greatly diminished. Still, the IDF would be wise to exploit any opportunity to prepare the area for a ground incursion.
Second, tent cities and other activities related to evacuation efforts. It is assumed the evacuation will take several weeks. Preparations are seen around Khan Younis, a city adjacent to Rafah. There are estimates that many will be evacuated to the north, toward Gaza city, but I estimate this will be limited or won't happen at all. The shorter the evacuation route, the less opportunity Hamas to disperse its men and reestablish control. Also, Israel seems to want Gaza city cut off from the rest of the Gaza strip, and there are an estimated 300k people already there, so I don't think the IDF will let anyone in. Khan Younis itself and its adjacent open fields are enough to house approximately a million Gazans.
Third, Hamas are making a political push to avoid entry. One aspect is them showing a hostage on video yesterday. Another is their reported willingness to disarm in exchange for statehood (what a load of BS).
First, a wave of bombings inside Rafah. As Rafah becomes more concentrated with civilians, Hamassies, and Israeli hostages, strike opportunities are greatly diminished. Still, the IDF would be wise to exploit any opportunity to prepare the area for a ground incursion.
Second, tent cities and other activities related to evacuation efforts. It is assumed the evacuation will take several weeks. Preparations are seen around Khan Younis, a city adjacent to Rafah. There are estimates that many will be evacuated to the north, toward Gaza city, but I estimate this will be limited or won't happen at all. The shorter the evacuation route, the less opportunity Hamas to disperse its men and reestablish control. Also, Israel seems to want Gaza city cut off from the rest of the Gaza strip, and there are an estimated 300k people already there, so I don't think the IDF will let anyone in. Khan Younis itself and its adjacent open fields are enough to house approximately a million Gazans.
Third, Hamas are making a political push to avoid entry. One aspect is them showing a hostage on video yesterday. Another is their reported willingness to disarm in exchange for statehood (what a load of BS).